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
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WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG

JOHN DEWITT

J. OSCAR BOYD

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GEORHARDUS VOS

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CHRISTIANITY AND CULTURE.*

One of the greatest of the problems that have agitated the Church is the problem of the relation between knowledge and piety, between culture and Christianity. This problem has appeared first of all in the presence of two tendencies in the Church—the scientific or academic tendency, and what may be called the practical tendency. Some men have devoted themselves chiefly to the task of forming right conceptions as to Christianity and its foundations. To them no fact, however trivial, has appeared worthy of neglect; by them truth has been cherished for its own sake, without immediate reference to practical consequences. Some, on the other hand, have emphasized the essential simplicity of the gospel. The world is lying in misery, we ourselves are sinners, men are perishing in sin every day. The gospel is the sole means of escape; let us preach it to the world while yet we may. So desperate is the need that we have no time to engage in vain babblings or old wives' fables. While we are discussing the exact location of the churches of Galatia, men are perishing under the curse of the law; while we are settling the date of Jesus' birth, the world is doing without its Christmas message.

The representatives of both of these tendencies regard themselves as Christians, but too often there is little brotherly feeling between them. The Christian of academic tastes accuses his brother of undue emotionalism, of shallow argumentation, of cheap methods of work. On the other hand, your practical man is ever loud in his denuncia-

* An address on "The Scientific Preparation of the Minister", delivered September 20, 1912, at the opening of the one hundred and first session of Princeton Theological Seminary, and in substance (previously) at a meeting of the Presbyterian Ministers' Association of Philadelphia, May 20, 1912.

tion of academic indifference to the dire needs of humanity. The scholar is represented either as a dangerous disseminator of doubt, or else as a man whose faith is a faith without works. A man who investigates human sin and the grace of God by the aid solely of dusty volumes, carefully secluded in a warm and comfortable study, without a thought of the men who are perishing in misery every day!

But if the problem appears thus in the presence of different tendencies in the Church, it becomes yet far more insistent within the consciousness of the individual. If we are thoughtful, we must see that the desire to know and the desire to be saved are widely different. The scholar must apparently assume the attitude of an impartial observer—an attitude which seems absolutely impossible to the pious Christian laying hold upon Jesus as the only Saviour from the load of sin. If these two activities—on the one hand the acquisition of knowledge, and on the other the exercise and inculcation of simple faith—are both to be given a place in our lives, the question of their proper relationship cannot be ignored.

The problem is made for us the more difficult of solution because we are unprepared for it. Our whole system of school and college education is so constituted as to keep religion and culture as far apart as possible and ignore the question of the relationship between them. On five or six days in the week, we were engaged in the acquisition of knowledge. From this activity the study of religion was banished. We studied natural science without considering its bearing or lack of bearing upon natural theology or upon revelation. We studied Greek without opening the New Testament. We studied history with careful avoidance of that greatest of historical movements which was ushered in by the preaching of Jesus. In philosophy, the vital importance of the study for religion could not entirely be concealed, but it was kept as far as possible in the background. On Sundays, on the other hand, we had religious instruction that called for little exercise of the intellect.

Careful preparation for Sunday-school lessons as for lessons in mathematics or Latin was unknown. Religion seemed to be something that had to do only with the emotions and the will, leaving the intellect to secular studies. What wonder that after such training we came to regard religion and culture as belonging to two entirely separate compartments of the soul, and their union as involving the destruction of both?

Upon entering the Seminary, we are suddenly introduced to an entirely different procedure. Religion is suddenly removed from its seclusion; the same methods of study are applied to it as were formerly reserved for natural science and for history. We study the Bible no longer solely with the desire of moral and spiritual improvement, but also in order to know. Perhaps the first impression is one of infinite loss. The scientific spirit seems to be replacing simple faith, the mere apprehension of dead facts to be replacing the practice of principles. The difficulty is perhaps not so much that we are brought face to face with new doubts as to the truth of Christianity. Rather is it the conflict of method, of spirit that troubles us. The scientific spirit seems to be incompatible with the old spirit of simple faith. In short, almost entirely unprepared, we are brought face to face with the problem of the relationship between knowledge and piety, or, otherwise expressed, between culture and Christianity.

This problem may be settled in one of three ways. In the first place, Christianity may be subordinated to culture. That solution really, though to some extent unconsciously, is being favored by a very large and influential portion of the Church to-day. For the elimination of the supernatural in Christianity—so tremendously common to-day—really makes Christianity merely natural. Christianity becomes a human product, a mere part of human culture. But as such it is something entirely different from the old Christianity that was based upon a direct revelation from God. Deprived thus of its note of authority, the gospel is no gospel

any longer; it is a check for untold millions—but without the signature at the bottom. So in subordinating Christianity to culture we have really destroyed Christianity, and what continues to bear the old name is a counterfeit.

The second solution goes to the opposite extreme. In its effort to give religion a clear field, it seeks to destroy culture. This solution is better than the first. Instead of indulging in a shallow optimism or deification of humanity, it recognizes the profound evil of the world, and does not shrink from the most heroic remedy. The world is so evil that it cannot possibly produce the means for its own salvation. Salvation must be the gift of an entirely new life, coming directly from God. Therefore, it is argued, the culture of this world must be a matter at least of indifference to the Christian. Now in its extreme form this solution hardly requires refutation. If Christianity is really found to contradict that reason which is our only means of apprehending truth, then of course we must either modify or abandon Christianity. We cannot therefore be entirely independent of the achievements of the intellect. Furthermore, we cannot without inconsistency employ the printing-press, the railroad, the telegraph in the propagation of our gospel, and at the same time denounce as evil those activities of the human mind that produced these things. And in the production of these things not merely practical inventive genius had a part, but also, back of that, the investigations of pure science animated simply by the desire to know. In its extreme form, therefore, involving the abandonment of all intellectual activity, this second solution would be adopted by none of us. But very many pious men in the Church to-day are adopting this solution in essence and in spirit. They admit that the Christian must have a part in human culture. But they regard such activity as a necessary evil—a dangerous and unworthy task necessary to be gone through with under a stern sense of duty in order that thereby the higher ends of the gospel may be attained. Such men can never engage in the arts and

sciences with anything like enthusiasm—such enthusiasm they would regard as disloyalty to the gospel. Such a position is really both illogical and unbiblical. God has given us certain powers of mind, and has implanted within us the ineradicable conviction that these powers were intended to be exercised. The Bible, too, contains poetry that exhibits no lack of enthusiasm, no lack of a keen appreciation of beauty. With this second solution of the problem we cannot rest content. Despite all we can do, the desire to know and the love of beauty cannot be entirely stifled, and we cannot permanently regard these desires as evil.

Are then Christianity and culture in a conflict that is to be settled only by the destruction of one or the other of the contending forces? A third solution, fortunately, is possible—namely consecration. Instead of destroying the arts and sciences or being indifferent to them, let us cultivate them with all the enthusiasm of the veriest humanist, but at the same time consecrate them to the service of our God. Instead of stifling the pleasures afforded by the acquisition of knowledge or by the appreciation of what is beautiful, let us accept these pleasures as the gifts of a heavenly Father. Instead of obliterating the distinction between the Kingdom and the world, or on the other hand withdrawing from the world into a sort of modernized intellectual monasticism, let us go forth joyfully, enthusiastically to make the world subject to God.

Certain obvious advantages are connected with such a solution of the problem. In the first place, a logical advantage. A man can believe only what he holds to be true. We are Christians because we hold Christianity to be true. But other men hold Christianity to be false. Who is right? That question can be settled only by an examination and comparison of the reasons adduced on both sides. It is true, one of the grounds for our belief is an inward experience that we cannot share—the great experience begun by conviction of sin and conversion and continued by communion with God—an experience which other men do not

possess, and upon which, therefore, we cannot directly base an argument. But if our position is correct, we ought at least to be able to show the other man that *his* reasons *may* be inconclusive. And that involves careful study of both sides of the question. Furthermore, the field of Christianity is the world. The Christian cannot be satisfied so long as any human activity is either opposed to Christianity or out of all connection with Christianity. Christianity must pervade not merely all nations, but also all of human thought. The Christian, therefore, cannot be indifferent to any branch of earnest human endeavor. It must all be brought into *some* relation to the gospel. It must be studied either in order to be demonstrated as false, or else in order to be made useful in advancing the Kingdom of God. The Kingdom must be advanced not merely extensively, but also intensively. The Church must seek to conquer not merely every man for Christ, but also the whole of man. We are accustomed to encourage ourselves in our discouragements by the thought of the time when every knee shall bow and every tongue confess that Jesus is Lord. No less inspiring is the other aspect of that same great consummation. That will also be a time when doubts have disappeared, when every contradiction has been removed, when all of science converges to one great conviction, when all of art is devoted to one great end, when all of human thinking is permeated by the refining, ennobling influence of Jesus, when every thought has been brought into subjection to the obedience of Christ.

If to some of our practical men, these advantages of our solution of the problem seem to be intangible, we can point to the merely numerical advantage of intellectual and artistic activity within the Church. We are all agreed that at least one great function of the Church is the conversion of individual men. The missionary movement is the great religious movement of our day. Now it is perfectly true that men must be brought to Christ one by one. There are no labor-saving devices in evangelism. It is all hand-work.

And yet it would be a great mistake to suppose that all men are equally well prepared to receive the gospel. It is true that the decisive thing is the regenerative power of God. That can overcome all lack of preparation, and the absence of that makes even the best preparation useless. But as a matter of fact God usually exerts that power in connection with certain prior conditions of the human mind, and it should be ours to create, so far as we can, with the help of God, those favorable conditions for the reception of the gospel. False ideas are the greatest obstacles to the reception of the gospel. We may preach with all the fervor of a reformer and yet succeed only in winning a straggler here and there, if we permit the whole collective thought of the nation or of the world to be controlled by ideas which, by the resistless force of logic, prevent Christianity from being regarded as anything more than a harmless delusion. Under such circumstances, what God desires us to do is to destroy the obstacle at its root. Many would have the seminaries combat error by attacking it as it is taught by its popular exponents. Instead of that they confuse their students with a lot of German names unknown outside the walls of the universities. That method of procedure is based simply upon a profound belief in the pervasiveness of ideas. What is to-day matter of academic speculation begins to-morrow to move armies and pull down empires. In that second stage, it has gone too far to be combatted; the time to stop it was when it was still a matter of impassionate debate. So as Christians we should try to mould the thought of the world in such a way as to make the acceptance of Christianity something more than a logical absurdity. Thoughtful men are wondering why the students of our great Eastern universities no longer enter the ministry or display any very vital interest in Christianity. Various totally inadequate explanations are proposed, such as the increasing attractiveness of other professions—an absurd explanation, by the way, since other professions are becoming so over-crowded that a man can

barely make a living in them. The real difficulty amounts to this—that the thought of the day, as it makes itself most strongly felt in the universities, but from them spreads inevitably to the masses of the people, is profoundly opposed to Christianity, or at least—what is nearly as bad—it is out of all connection with Christianity. The Church is unable either to combat it or to assimilate it, because the Church simply does not understand it. Under such circumstances, what more pressing duty than for those who have received the mighty experience of regeneration, who, therefore, do not, like the world, neglect that whole series of vitally relevant facts which is embraced in Christian experience—what more pressing duty than for these men to make themselves masters of the thought of the world in order to make it an instrument of truth instead of error? The Church has no right to be so absorbed in helping the individual that she forgets the world.

There are two objections to our solution of the problem. If you bring culture and Christianity thus into close union—in the first place, will not Christianity destroy culture? Must not art and science be independent in order to flourish? We answer that it all depends upon the nature of their dependence. Subjection to any external authority or even to any human authority would be fatal to art and science. But subjection to God is entirely different. Dedication of human powers to God is found, as a matter of fact, not to destroy but to heighten them. God gave those powers. He understands them well enough not bunglingly to destroy His own gifts. In the second place, will not culture destroy Christianity? Is it not far easier to be an earnest Christian if you confine your attention to the Bible and do not risk being led astray by the thought of the world? We answer, of course it is *easier*. Shut yourself up in an intellectual monastery, do not disturb yourself with the thoughts of unregenerate men, and of course you will find it *easier* to be a Christian, just as it is easier to be a good soldier in comfortable winter quarters than it is on the field of battle. You

save your own soul—but the Lord's enemies remain in possession of the field.

But by whom is this task of transforming the unwieldy, resisting mass of human thought until it becomes subservient to the gospel—by whom is this task to be accomplished? To some extent, no doubt, by professors in theological seminaries and universities. But the ordinary minister of the gospel cannot shirk his responsibility. It is a great mistake to suppose that investigation can successfully be carried on by a few specialists whose work is of interest to nobody but themselves. Many men of many minds are needed. What we need first of all, especially in our American churches, is a more general interest in the problems of theological science. Without that, the specialist is without the stimulating atmosphere which nerves him to do his work.

But no matter what his station in life, the scholar must be a regenerated man—he must yield to no one in the intensity and depth of his religious experience. We are well supplied in the world with excellent scholars who are without that qualification. They are doing useful work in detail, in Biblical philology, in exegesis, in Biblical theology, and in other branches of study. But they are not accomplishing the great task, they are not assimilating modern thought to Christianity, because they are without that experience of God's power in the soul which is of the essence of Christianity. They have only one side for the comparison. Modern thought they know, but Christianity is really foreign to them. It is just that great inward experience which it is the function of the true Christian scholar to bring into some sort of connection with the thought of the world.

During the last thirty years there has been a tremendous defection from the Christian Church. It is evidenced even by things that lie on the surface. For example, by the decline in church attendance and in Sabbath observance and in the number of candidates for the ministry. Special ex-

planations, it is true, are sometimes given for these discouraging tendencies. But why should we deceive ourselves, why comfort ourselves by palliative explanations? Let us face the facts. The falling off in church attendance, the neglect of Sabbath observance—these things are simply surface indications of a decline in the power of Christianity. Christianity is exerting a far less powerful direct influence in the civilized world to-day than it was exerting thirty years ago.

What is the cause of this tremendous defection? For my part, I have little hesitation in saying that it lies chiefly in the intellectual sphere. Men do not accept Christianity because they can no longer be convinced that Christianity is true. It may be useful, but is it true? Other explanations, of course, are given. The modern defection from the Church is explained by the practical materialism of the age. Men are so much engrossed in making money that they have no time for spiritual things. That explanation has a certain range of validity. But its range is limited. It applies perhaps to the boom towns of the West, where men are intoxicated by sudden possibilities of boundless wealth. But the defection from Christianity is far broader than that. It is felt in the settled countries of Europe even more strongly than in America. It is felt among the poor just as strongly as among the rich. Finally it is felt most strongly of all in the universities, and that is only one indication more that the true cause of the defection is intellectual. To a very large extent, the students of our great Eastern universities—and still more the universities of Europe—are not Christians. And they are not Christians often just because they are students. The thought of the day, as it makes itself most strongly felt in the universities, is profoundly opposed to Christianity, or at least it is out of connection with Christianity. The chief obstacle to the Christian religion to-day lies in the sphere of the intellect.

That assertion must be guarded against two misconcep-

tions. In the first place, I do not mean that most men reject Christianity consciously on account of intellectual difficulties. On the contrary, rejection of Christianity is due in the vast majority of cases simply to indifference. Only a few men have given the subject real attention. The vast majority of those who reject the gospel do so simply because they know nothing about it. But whence comes this indifference? It is due to the intellectual atmosphere in which men are living. The modern world is dominated by ideas which ignore the gospel. Modern culture is not altogether opposed to the gospel. But it is out of all connection with it. It not only prevents the acceptance of Christianity. It prevents Christianity even from getting a hearing.

In the second place, I do not mean that the removal of intellectual objections will make a man a Christian. No conversion was ever wrought simply by argument. A change of heart is also necessary. And that can be wrought only by the immediate exercise of the power of God. But because intellectual labor is insufficient it does not follow, as is so often assumed, that it is unnecessary. God may, it is true, overcome all intellectual obstacles by an immediate exercise of His regenerative power. Sometimes He does. But He does so very seldom. Usually He exerts His power in connection with certain conditions of the human mind. Usually He does not bring into the Kingdom, entirely without preparation, those whose mind and fancy are completely dominated by ideas which make the acceptance of the gospel logically impossible.

Modern culture is a tremendous force. It affects all classes of society. It affects the ignorant as well as the learned. What is to be done about it? In the first place the Church may simply withdraw from the conflict. She may simply allow the mighty stream of modern thought to flow by unheeded and do her work merely in the back-eddies of the current. There are still some men in the world who have been unaffected by modern culture. They may still

be won for Christ without intellectual labor. And they must be won. It is useful, it is necessary work. If the Church is satisfied with that alone, let her give up the scientific education of her ministry. Let her assume the truth of her message and learn simply how it may be applied in detail to modern industrial and social conditions. Let her give up the laborious study of Greek and Hebrew. Let her abandon the scientific study of history to the men of the world. In a day of increased scientific interest, let the Church go on becoming less scientific. In a day of increased specialization, of renewed interest in philology and in history, of more rigorous scientific method, let the Church go on abandoning her Bible to her enemies. They will study it scientifically, rest assured, if the Church does not. Let her substitute sociology altogether for Hebrew, practical expertness for the proof of her gospel. Let her shorten the preparation of her ministry, let her permit it to be interrupted yet more and more by premature practical activity. By doing so she will win a straggler here and there. But her winnings will be but temporary. The great current of modern culture will sooner or later engulf her puny eddy. God will save her somehow—out of the depths. But the labor of centuries will have been swept away. God grant that the Church may not resign herself to that. God grant she may face her problem squarely and bravely. That problem is not easy. It involves the very basis of her faith. Christianity is the proclamation of an historical fact—that Jesus Christ rose from the dead. Modern thought has no place for that proclamation. It prevents men even from listening to the message. Yet the culture of to-day cannot simply be rejected as a whole. It is not like the pagan culture of the first century. It is not wholly non-Christian. Much of it has been derived directly from the Bible. There are significant movements in it, going to waste, which might well be used for the defence of the gospel. The situation is complex. Easy wholesale measures are not in place. Discrimination, investigation is necessary. Some

of modern thought must be refuted. The rest must be made subservient. But nothing in it can be ignored. He that is not with us is against us. Modern culture is a mighty force. It is either subservient to the gospel or else it is the deadliest enemy of the gospel. For making it subservient, religious emotion is not enough, intellectual labor is also necessary. And that labor is being neglected. The Church has turned to easier tasks. And now she is reaping the fruits of her indolence. Now she must battle for her life.

The situation is desperate. It might discourage us. But not if we are truly Christians. Not if we are living in vital communion with the risen Lord. If we are really convinced of the truth of our message, then we can proclaim it before a world of enemies, then the very difficulty of our task, the very scarcity of our allies becomes an inspiration, then we can even rejoice that God did not place us in an easy age, but in a time of doubt and perplexity and battle. Then, too, we shall not be afraid to call forth other soldiers into the conflict. Instead of making our theological seminaries merely centres of religious emotion, we shall make them battle-grounds of the faith, where, helped a little by the experience of Christian teachers, men are taught to fight their own battle, where they come to appreciate the real strength of the adversary and in the hard school of intellectual struggle learn to substitute for the unthinking faith of childhood the profound convictions of full-grown men. Let us not fear in this a loss of spiritual power. The Church is perishing to-day through the lack of thinking, not through an excess of it. She is winning victories in the sphere of material betterment. Such victories are glorious. God save us from the heartless crime of disparaging them. They are relieving the misery of men. But if they stand alone, I fear they are but temporary. The things which are seen are temporal; the things which are not seen are eternal. What will become of philanthropy if God be lost? Beneath the surface of life lies a

world of spirit. Philosophers have attempted to explore it. Christianity has revealed its wonders to the simple soul. There lie the springs of the Church's power. But that spiritual realm cannot be entered without controversy. And now the Church is shrinking from the conflict. Driven from the spiritual realm by the current of modern thought, she is consoling herself with things about which there is no dispute. If she favors better housing for the poor, she need fear no contradiction. She will need all her courage, she will have enemies enough, God knows. But they will not fight her with argument. The twentieth century, in theory, is agreed on social betterment. But sin, and death, and salvation, and life, and God—about these things there is debate. You can avoid the debate if you choose. You need only drift with the current. Preach every Sunday during your Seminary course, devote the fag ends of your time to study and to thought, study about as you studied in college—and these questions will probably never trouble you. The great questions may easily be avoided. Many preachers are avoiding them. And many preachers are preaching to the air. The Church is waiting for men of another type. Men to fight her battles and solve her problems. The hope of finding them is the one great inspiration of a Seminary's life. They need not all be men of conspicuous attainments. But they must all be men of thought. They must fight hard against spiritual and intellectual indolence. Their thinking may be confined to narrow limits. But it must be their own. To them theology must be something more than a task. It must be a matter of inquiry. It must lead not to successful memorizing, but to genuine convictions.

The Church is puzzled by the world's indifference. She is trying to overcome it by adapting her message to the fashions of the day. But if, instead, before the conflict, she would descend into the secret place of meditation, if by the clear light of the gospel she would seek an answer not merely to the questions of the hour but, first of all,

to the eternal problems of the spiritual world, then perhaps, by God's grace, through His good Spirit, in His good time, she might issue forth once more with power, and an age of doubt might be followed by the dawn of an era of faith.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

THE AUTHORSHIP OF THE FOURTH GOSPEL

*The Witness of the Gospel**

Matthew and Mark furnish no clue to their authors. In Luke and John the author speaks in his own person, though not in his own name. The use of *ye* in John xix, 35; xx, 31 indicates that the writer was, or professed to be, known to the original readers of the Gospel as clearly as the preface of Luke indicates that the evangelist was known to Theophilus. What does the Gospel tell us of this unnamed author?

1. He was an eyewitness of the life of Jesus. "*We beheld his glory*" (i, 14) is sometimes understood to signify the spiritual vision which all believers enjoy. But bodily vision is evidently meant. a) *θεδομαι* is used twenty times in the New Testament, nine times in the Gospel and First Epistle of John, and always denotes the sight of the eyes. Compare Matt. v. 8—"Blessed are the pure in heart, for they shall see (*δύονται*) God", with I John iv, 12—"No man hath beheld (*τεθέαται*) God at any time" and I John iv, 14—"We have beheld (*τεθεάμεθα*) and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world." b) The aorist points to a historical event. If spiritual vision were meant, the present would naturally be used, as in 2 Cor. iii, 18, or the future, as in Matt. v, 8. c) The *we* of verse 14 is followed by *we all* of v. 16. One represents the circle of eyewitnesses, the other the larger company of believers. d) The words are set in a historical framework—the incarnation, the dwelling among men, the witness of John the Baptist. The *beholding* is part of the history.

The claim to be an eyewitness is asserted yet more emphatically in the First Epistle, which is from the same hand

*"The Witness of Tradition" was discussed in this REVIEW, x (1912), pp. 437-464.

as the Gospel. "That which we have heard, that which we have seen with our eyes, that which we beheld, and our hands handled, concerning the Word of life" (i, 1).

Yet more particularly in xix. 35 it is affirmed that the author was an eyewitness of the crucifixion. "He that hath seen hath borne witness, and his witness is true: and he knoweth that he saith true, that ye also may believe." There is no reason whatever why the writer may not use *ἐκεῖνος* in referring to himself. Ulysses speaking in the first person calls himself *ἐκεῖνος*. (Odyssey o 346; ω 321). Jesus uses it in speaking of Himself in the third person, John ix, 37.⁹⁶ The construction causes no more difficulty in Greek than in English, and there is no reason to refer *ἐκεῖνος* either to some unknown person distinguished from the writer, or to Christ, as though the author were calling upon Him to attest the truth of his words.

The vividness and particularity of the narrative, the frequent and precise notes of time and place, the graphic touches, the lifelike portraiture, the sympathetic spirit, attest the truth of the claim that the Gospel is the work of an eyewitness.

2. The author was the disciple whom Jesus loved. a) The author was present at the crucifixion, but the only disciple who appears there is the disciple whom Jesus loved xix. 26. b) The earliest historical witness to the Gospel is contained in the closing chapter. Those to whom it was first addressed—ye, xix. 35, xx. 31—and who gave it to the world, appended to it the testimony that the author was the beloved disciple. "This is the disciple who beareth witness of these things, and wrote these things: and we know that his witness is true" (xxi. 24). This statement was attached to the Gospel from the beginning, so far as we know; and it is altogether probable that it was added during the lifetime of the Apostle. It appears to have been the purpose of the closing chapter, at least in part, to correct

⁹⁶ Instances of the same kind are cited from the Classic writers by Drummond, p. 392.

the impression that Jesus had declared that John should not die. But the obvious way to refute the error would have been to note the fact of his death if it had occurred. And the present, *beareth witness*, points in the same direction. If it refers to his abiding testimony through his Gospel, it would naturally follow *wrote these things*; he wrote these things, and thereby bears witness.

3. It also appears that this eyewitness and beloved disciple was John the son of Zebedee, for he alone answers to the description of the author. a) The author was one of the bosom friends of Jesus. The name "disciple whom Jesus loved" is sufficient proof. But the character of the narrative furnishes additional evidence. The writer is one of the inner circle of Jesus' friends, is acquainted with the thoughts and feelings of the disciples, portrays with graphic power scenes in which they alone were present, reports words spoken to them alone, such as no man could invent. The intimate friends of Jesus were three, Peter, James and John. They alone were with Him when He restored the daughter of Jairus to life, on the mount of transfiguration, and in Gethsemane. To them we turn to find the beloved disciple. But it was not Peter, who appears in company with him, nor James, who was put to death long before the Gospel could have been written; John alone remains. b) Chapter xxi shows us seven disciples gathered at the sea of Tiberias. One of them was the beloved disciple. But he was not Peter, Thomas, nor Nathaniel, who are named in company with him elsewhere—Peter in chap. i, and xiii, Nathaniel in chap. i, and Thomas in chap. xiv. He was either one of the two unnamed disciples or one of the sons of Zebedee. And in view of the intimate relation which the title involves we are constrained to see in him one of the sons of Zebedee, and as James was early cut off, again the process of elimination leads inevitably to John. c) The picture of the beloved disciple in the Fourth Gospel answers to the picture of John in the earlier Gospels. John was probably a cousin of Jesus, and holds a prominent place in

the Synoptic narrative. The request of the sons of Zebedee that they might sit on either hand of the Lord in His kingdom, is one of many indications that they held a position of peculiar intimacy with the Master. They were also partners and friends of Peter. These, as we have seen, were the three whom Jesus chose to be with Him in the most momentous experiences of His life. This John, so conspicuous in the Synoptic record, is nowhere named in the Fourth Gospel, nor is James his brother. The title "sons of Zebedee" occurs only in xxi. 2. And this omission is the more marked because it is at variance with the usual particularity of the Gospel. Others of the disciples are named—Peter often, Andrew, Nathaniel, Thomas, Philip, Judas the son of James, and Judas Iscariot. Indeed the Gospel never refers to a disciple without naming him except in this single instance. This Gospel alone gives the name of the servant of the high priest whose ear was cut off, and tells us that Peter struck the blow; this Gospel alone names Mary as the woman who anointed Jesus in Bethany, and tells us that it was Judas who first found fault with her. Yet in this Gospel the name of John, one of the bosom friends of Jesus, is nowhere found. But there is an unnamed disciple who holds in the Fourth Gospel the place that John holds in the earlier record. It is the disciple whom Jesus loved. His prominence in the apostolic company, his friendship with Peter, which appears again in the Acts and in Gal. ii. 9, his intimate relations with Jesus, correspond precisely to the Synoptic representation of John.

He is probably introduced in i. 35. The vivid description and exact notes of time point to an eyewitness. One of the two disciples who followed Jesus is named, why not the other, unless he was the beloved disciple, whose name is never given? The passage suggests that he also had a brother. Andrew and Peter, James and John are brought together here, as they are found together in the earlier Gospels (Matt. iv. 18, Mark xiii. 3, Luke v. 10).

It is said that the title "the disciple whom Jesus loved" savors of pride, and could not have been assumed by John. But let us examine his use of it. It occurs only five times; first in xiii. 23, where it is suggested by the fact that he was reclining on Jesus' bosom; and the fact is noted because it explains the subsequent course of events, was part of the historical situation. The title thus given was afterward employed because there was no other way of identifying him without mentioning his name. In xix. 26 the title suggests the reason why Jesus committed Mary to him and not to her own sons. In xx. 2 the name is used again, but after he has been introduced he is called simply "the other disciple". The remaining instances are in xxi. 7 and 20. Whether this chapter was added by another hand, or came from the pen of John, the fact remains that the Gospel does not parade the title. It was never used until the last night of Jesus' life, and afterward only when the course of the narrative required.

Nor does it convey an exclusive claim. Jesus is said to have loved Martha and Mary and Lazarus. Upon the very occasion when the title was first used, His love for the whole company of the disciples is most clearly and tenderly expressed. "Having loved his own who were in the world, he loved them unto the end" (xiii. 1). "Even as I have loved you, that ye also love one another" (xiii. 34). "As the Father hath loved me, I also have loved you" (xv. 9). "Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends" (xv. 13). He who recorded these words was moved by no narrow or selfish motive to call himself the disciple whom Jesus loved, but by gratitude and humility. So Paul laid claim to the love that belongs to all mankind: "The Son of God, who loved me, and gave himself for me" (Gal. ii. 20). That is the appropriating power of faith.

The question is asked by Prof. Peake,⁹⁷ why John is so much more prominent in the Fourth Gospel than in the

⁹⁷ *A Critical Introduction to the New Testament*, p. 146.

Synoptists. The fact is that in the Fourth Gospel John hides himself, and is prominent only because he is dragged into light by modern criticism. It is the critics and not the evangelist to whom this prominence is due. He appears only when the course of the narrative requires it, and then with veiled face. Only once is his voice heard, when at the Last Supper he asked, Lord, who is it?

There is scarcely room to doubt that the Fourth Gospel purports to be a work of an eyewitness, of the beloved disciple, of John the son of Zebedee. And this claim was attested and indorsed while the author was still living by those to whom the Gospel was first given.

If the Gospel was the work of a later writer, who wished to be taken for the Apostle, why should he resort to this curiously indirect method of identifying himself? If it was the work of John, addressed originally to those who knew him personally, there was no need to be more explicit.

Now the question arises, does the character of the Gospel bear out this claim? Is it such a Gospel as we have a right to expect from the hand of John?

John was a Jew, a native of Palestine. We should expect him to be reasonably familiar with the country, its geography, history, parties, institutions, customs. In the Fourth Gospel we find minute and exact knowledge of all parts of the land, Galilee, Samaria, Judea, Perea. The author is at home by the sea of Galilee and in the streets of Jerusalem alike. He is familiar with Jewish sects, and laws and customs, and cannot be shown to be in error in any matter of fact.⁹⁸ He has been charged, it is true, with many mistakes, some of which we may proceed to consider.

The argument drawn from the mention of Sychar in iv. 5 is now generally abandoned. It is reasonably certain that there was a city of that name, distinct from Shechem, answering to the modern 'Aska'.⁹⁹ Nor need we conclude that there was no such place as Bethany beyond the Jordan

⁹⁸ Zahn, *Introduction to the New Testament*, iii, pp. 349-355.

⁹⁹ See Smith's *Historical Geography of the Holy Land*, chap. xviii.

(i. 28) because Origen could not find it two hundred years later. It was a place of small importance, and there is no difficulty in supposing that it had changed its name or disappeared during those troubled times. If it had never existed, it is hard to account for its appearance in a Gospel elsewhere so precise and accurate.

The scene of John v is laid in Jerusalem; chap. vi begins with the words, "After these things Jesus went away over the sea of Galilee". It has been inferred that the author conceived of the sea as lying near the city. But *after these things* need not mean immediately after; and it is incredible that a writer who elsewhere shows such minute knowledge of the country should have been so grossly ignorant of its main features.

Caiaphas is said to have been high-priest that year (xi. 49, 51, xviii. 13); therefore the evangelist believed that the high-priest was chosen annually. But the words do not necessarily convey that sense. They may mean simply that memorable year. Or the explanation may lie in the relation between Annas and Caiaphas, a relation which we cannot precisely determine. In Luke iii. 2 we read of the high-priesthood of Annas and Caiaphas; and shortly after the crucifixion Annas is termed the high-priest (Acts iv. 6). It was the position of Caiaphas at that particular time that made him a prophet.

In his recent work on the Fourth Gospel Mr. E. F. Scott affirms that "It is even doubtful if the evangelist had any first-hand or complete acquaintance with the Old Testament. His allusions to it are comparatively few and of a somewhat perfunctory and superficial nature. . . . The Scriptures in any case are no longer the supreme authority which they were to the earlier Christian writers" (p. 197). This in face of the fact that the doctrine of the Logos is rooted in the Old Testament; that Christ appeals to the Scriptures and specifically to Moses as bearing witness of Him, and declares that the Scripture cannot be broken. Mr. Scott's book often reminds us of George Eliot's account of the

schemes of the Rev. Amos Barton, "admirably well calculated, supposing the state of the case were otherwise". We constantly ask as we read, Of what is he speaking? Certainly not of the Gospel with which we are familiar. The Gospel is saturated with the Old Testament. The law and the prophets are the back-ground of its history and doctrine. This will appear when we reach the second part of our inquiry, the Sources of the Gospel. Here I may be permitted to refer to my *Teaching of the Gospel of John*, chap. i.

Schmiedel¹⁰⁰ notes that "three points are enough to show that it (the Gospel) is dominated by complete indifference as to the faithfulness of a record." But they seem rather to show how captious criticism may become. They are (1) "Jesus gives the explanation of the Supper a year before its celebration." But Jesus is not foretelling the Supper in the discourse recorded in the sixth chapter. All that He says would be true if the Supper had never been instituted. He sets forth a general truth which finds visible expression indeed in the Lord's Supper. And if His words do directly refer to the Supper, it is surely conceivable that He who even according to the Synoptic Gospels foretells His death might also foretell this memorial of His death. (2) "500, if not 1000 soldiers, when he whom they are sent to take prisoner says 'I am he', recoil and fall to the ground". Here the exaggeration must be charged to the critic. The band or cohort was no doubt represented by a small detachment. And the effect produced is no more remarkable than other instances of supernatural power. (3) "One hundred pounds of spices are used to embalm his body." But Joseph of Arimathea was rich, Nicodemus was a ruler, the abundance of spices was provided as a mark of honor and affection, and it is probable that the body was covered with them. It is said of King Asa that "they buried him in his own sepulchres . . . and laid him in the bed which was filled with sweet odors and divers kinds of *spices* prepared by the perfumer's art" (2 Chron. xvi. 14). And to those

¹⁰⁰*Op. cit.* p. 139.

who cavil at this service of love rendered by Joseph and Nicodemus to the Master it may be said, as to those disciples who found fault with Mary, Let them alone, they have wrought a good work.

"One of the most remarkable facts about the writings of recent Jewish critics of the New Testament has been that they have tended upon the whole to confirm the gospel picture of external Jewish life, and where there is a discrepancy these critics tend to prove that the blame lies not with the New Testament originals, but with their interpreters. . . . Most remarkable of all has been the cumulative strength of the arguments adduced by Jewish writers favorable to the authenticity of the discourses in the Fourth Gospel, especially in relation to the circumstances under which they are reported to have been spoken."¹⁰¹

It is said that John could not have spoken of *the Jews* in the spirit of alienation and hostility manifest in the Fourth Gospel. We must observe that the term is often used in a purely historical sense, for those to whom the Gospel was addressed were chiefly Gentiles. It serves to distinguish Jews from Gentiles; Judeans from Galileans; the rulers from the multitude; unbelieving Jews from the disciples. These distinctions have their necessary place in the course of the narrative. Again, it is true, the phrase often conveys the thought of separation and antagonism. a) This is in line with the tendency apparent in the Synoptic record and in other New Testament writings (Matt. xxviii. 15, Mark vii. 3, Luke vii. 3, xxiii. 51, Acts xxviii. 17, 19, 1 Cor. i. 22, 23, ix. 20, 2 Cor. xi. 24). The spirit of detachment from the Jewish church was already at work. The attitude of Jesus toward the rulers, the leaders and representatives of Judaism is the same in all the Gospels. Did it make no impression on His disciples? b) It was natural that this tendency should find its clearest and fullest expression in the Fourth Gospel. The Synoptic Gospels were written, or at least the Synoptic tradition was fixed,

¹⁰¹ Abrahams, *Cambridge Biblical Essays* (1909) 181.

before the destruction of Jerusalem, which marked the end of the Jewish state and the final breach between Judaism and Christianity. Is it strange that this great event should be reflected in the language of the Fourth Gospel?

On the other hand it must be observed (1) that nowhere in the New Testament is higher honor accorded to the Jew than in this Gospel. "Israelite indeed" is a title of distinction. "Salvation is of the Jews." Jesus was recognized as a Jew, and called Himself a Jew. It is one of those strange assertions of Schmiedel regarding the Fourth Gospel, which lead us to wonder what book he has in mind, that "Jesus is represented as speaking of the Jews, the Law, the feasts of the Jews, as matters of utter indifference to him" (p. 235). What is it that indicates His indifference to the Law? Is it that He termed it the word of God, the Scripture that cannot be broken? That He appealed to it as bearing witness of Him? That He rendered it unflinching obedience? But it is said that He spoke to the Jews of *your* Law: "for Jesus himself, then, this law is not valid" (p. 16). But Moses, Joshua, Jeremiah spoke to Israel of *your* God; did they then deny that He was their God? Stephen speaks in the same breath of *our* fathers and *your* fathers (Acts vii. 44-51). To the Jews of Jerusalem Paul spoke of *your* fathers (Acts xxviii. 25). Surely the use of the argument *ad hominem* need excite no surprise. Jesus calls the Law *your* Law, as he calls Abraham *your* father, to emphasize their position and responsibility. And if we take those instances of the use of the term which are cited by Schmiedel (viii. 17, x. 34), we find that in both cases Jesus appeals to the Law in justification of His claims, and in one of them pronounces the Law the word of God, the Scripture that cannot be broken. He denied the charge of transgressing the Law when it was brought against Him by the Jews; and that is sufficient answer to the critic of to-day. Surely it is plain that Jesus and His disciples may be either identified with the Jews, or distinguished from them, since they were united with them by race but separated from them

by faith. And what is it that indicates His indifference to the feasts? Is it that so far as possible He observed them, so that they determine the chronology of the Gospel? That in their ceremonial He found illustrations of His character and mission?

(2) The truthfulness of the record appears in the fact that this phrase, so frequent in the Gospel, is ascribed only four times to Jesus, and in every instance is accounted for by the historical situation. In iv. 22 He distinguishes the Jews from the Samaritans, and identifies Himself with them. In xiii. 33 He distinguishes them from His disciples, and in xviii. 20, 36 He speaks of them to Pilate. Not until the destruction of Jerusalem had decisively severed the Christian from the Jewish church, could that phrase fully convey the sense of alienation and antagonism which we find in the Fourth Gospel. The evangelist may properly employ it in this sense, reading the past in the light of the present, but he is careful not to anticipate the course of history by putting it in the mouth of Jesus.

We turn to consider the relation of this Gospel to the Synoptic narrative. That they differ widely is evident at a glance. We may note first the main lines of variation, and then consider some specific differences.

This Gospel is broadly contrasted with the earlier Gospels in several respects: 1) In time. From the earlier record the inference has been drawn that the ministry of Jesus was confined to a single year; in John it extends over a period of two or three years and several months. But the *green grass* of Mark vi. 39 points to the spring of the year, and answers to the passover season of John vi. 4. Thus the Synoptic narrative too indicates a ministry of more than one year. The apparent discrepancy between the Fourth Gospel and the earlier Gospels in the date of the Last Supper and the Passion remains one of the most difficult problems in New Testament criticism. No solution of it has won general assent. Here it must suffice to remark that this difference, which lies upon the face of the Gospels, does not seem

to have troubled the early Christians at all; and it is reasonable to infer that they were familiar with customs, of which the knowledge has since been lost, that furnished the key to the difficulty.

2) In the scene of Jesus' ministry. According to John it was Judea, according to the Synoptists it was Galilee. But while it is true that Judea is the scene of about three-fourths of John's narrative, the work in Galilee is not forgotten. There His first miracle was wrought. The words of His brethren upon the eve of His final departure from Galilee (vii. 3, 4), six months before His death, indicate that for some time He had manifested Himself chiefly in the northern region. He was commonly regarded as a Galilean (i. 45, 46, vii. 41, 52, xviii. 5, 7, xix. 19). "His own country" (iv. 44) is not Judea, but Galilee. The Synoptic narrative is much more closely confined to Galilee than John to Judea. From the Baptism to the Passion there is no certain intimation of the presence of Jesus in the southern province. In Luke iv. 44 Judea may be read instead of Galilee; but Judea is sometimes used by Luke to include the whole of Palestine. The clearest indication of the Judean ministry is found in the lament over Jerusalem (Matt. xxiii. 37, Luke xiii. 34), which taken in its natural and obvious sense signifies that He had often visited Jerusalem and had often been rejected. Why the Judean ministry has left such meagre traces in the Synoptic record is one of the unsolved problems of the New Testament.

3) In the manner of Jesus' teaching. In the earlier Gospels it is plain, practical, popular; in John it is mystical and profound. The parable is not found here; though such figures as those of the shepherd and the sheep, the vine and the branches, might easily have been cast in the form of parables. But the terse and pointed sayings which are frequent in the Synoptic Gospels are by no means wanting in John. Drummond gives a partial list of them, numbering sixty (p. 18). And Matt. xi. 27-30 is in truth "an aerolite from the Johannean heaven". It is true that the Synoptic

Gospels dwell more upon the ethical and John upon the spiritual side of Jesus' doctrine, but in neither case exclusively; and surely if Jesus was what all the Gospels represent Him to have been both the ethical and the spiritual must have had a place in His teaching. It is highly unreasonable to insist that the greatest of teachers must speak always in the same tone. And the Gospels, which term Jesus at once the Son of God and the Son of man, are consistent in making Him speak both the language of earth and the language of heaven.

4) In the subject matter of His teaching. In the Synoptic Gospels His constant theme is the Kingdom of Heaven, in John it is Himself. "The Kingdom of heaven is like", "I am", are the characteristic phrases. But these aspects of Jesus' teaching are not contradictory but complementary. The crucial question is, Was He merely human, or was He also divine? And to that question all the Gospels return the same answer. Though He is nowhere termed God in the earlier Gospels as in John, yet He claims and exercises the attributes of Deity. He sets His word beside the word of God as of equal authority; proclaims Himself Lord of the Sabbath; forgives sin; promises to be present wherever two or three are gathered in His name; gives His life a ransom for many. In the very act of confessing His ignorance of the day and hour of His return, He exalts Himself above the angels (Mk. xiii. 32). Words which in the mouth of any other man would be insanity or blasphemy fall constantly from His lips. The Jesus of Mark is as truly if not as conspicuously divine as the Jesus of John.¹⁰² If He was divine, as all the Gospels declare, is it strange that He spoke much of Himself? He was a prophet and a Saviour. As a prophet He declared the will of God; as a Saviour He called men to believe in Him. In all the Gospels He is both prophet and Saviour, but the prophet is more conspicuous in the earlier Gospels and the Saviour in John. Is it strange that the teaching regarding Himself should be most

¹⁰² See Warfield, *The Lord of Glory*; Swete, *The Gospel according to St. Mark*, p. lxxxiv.

fully and sympathetically presented by the disciple who was in most intimate fellowship with Him, who wrote the Gospel for the avowed purpose of leading men to faith in Him as the Christ, the Son of God, and wrote when the significance of that teaching had been unfolding for more than half a century in the lives of men and in the history of the world? It has been dogmatically affirmed that "a Jesus who preached alternately in the manner of the Sermon on the Mount and of John xiv-xvi is a psychological impossibility". But in truth if Jesus was, as all the Gospels declare, the Son of God in the form of man, we must expect Him to sweep the whole range of truth from the moral precepts of the Sermon on the Mount to the profoundly spiritual teaching that He reserved for His disciples. If He was both God and man, He must have spoken in the tone of the Synoptists and in the tone of John.

We may proceed to examine other points of difference from the Synoptic narrative which are said to show that the Fourth Gospel could not have been written by John. a) In the Synoptic tradition, the Messiahship of Jesus was carefully hidden during His early ministry, while in John it is openly declared from the beginning. Here we must distinguish between the revelation and the recognition of His Messiahship. It is disclosed in the very beginning of the Synoptic story,—proclaimed by Gabriel, announced by John the Baptist, witnessed by evil spirits. In His first public discourse Jesus applied to Himself the words of Isa. lxi. 1, which were universally recognized as Messianic. From the beginning of His ministry He made use of Messianic titles, especially Son of Man.¹⁰³

The *recognition* of His Messiahship is apparently earlier in the Fourth Gospel than in the Synoptics, where the first explicit confession of it was made by Peter, Matt. xvi. 16, in the last year of Jesus' ministry. In John it was recognized and confessed from the beginning. But we must remember that the term Messiah represents very different

¹⁰³ See Warfield, *Op. cit.* p. 128.

conceptions, carnal and spiritual. The disciples, according to John, accepted Jesus at once as the Messiah in the sense in which as Jews they understood the term. But more intimate knowledge of Him led them in time to that higher conception which found expression in Peter's memorable words. For that spiritual conception a divine revelation was required. This is in keeping with John's use of the word believe, which sometimes signifies simple assent, and again denotes that trust in God which is the life of the soul.

b) It is said that there is a studied attempt to exalt John at the expense of Peter. If this is true, certainly it would raise grave doubts of the authorship of the Gospel in the minds of those who believe in the high character and inspiration of the Apostle. What are the facts? The Peter depicted in the Fourth Gospel is the same Peter with whom we have grown familiar in the Synoptic story,—ardent, impulsive, self-willed, needing restraint and rebuke, yet devoted to his Master, and holding the first place in the company of the Twelve. He is surnamed Cephas, the Rock, by Jesus. Andrew is known as Simon Peter's brother. He makes the great confession of Jesus' Messiahship in this Gospel as in Matthew, and at an earlier period of His ministry (vi. 68, 69). He defends Jesus in the garden, and John alone records his name. His denial is related by all the Gospels; John alone relates his confession and restoration. In the Synoptic narrative John is named 40 times, and Peter 64; in the Fourth Gospel the beloved disciple is named five times, and Peter 34. John does not obtrude himself, as we have seen, but appears only when the course of the narrative requires it. When they are named together, Peter is always first xviii. 15, xx. 2, xxi. 2. Upon what ground, then, is it asserted that the Fourth Gospel disparages Peter?

Upon three occasions, it is said, Peter is distinctly represented as inferior to John. 1) At the Last Supper John holds the place of honor, as he reclines in the bosom of Jesus. It may be true, as Westcott maintains, that the place

of honor was really held by Peter. In any case Peter appears throughout the scene as the leader of the Twelve. The beloved disciple appears only incidentally, while Peter is the central figure. And if John is represented as holding a place of peculiar intimacy with his Master, is it necessary to seek for some ulterior motive? May not facts count for something? And in a narrative so graphic and lifelike, may we not assume that the Gospel says so simply because it was true?

2) At the tomb of Jesus on the morning of the resurrection. But the case here is no stronger than before. If John was the first to reach the tomb, Peter was the first to enter. That John is said to have believed does not deny that Peter too believed, for the subsequent narrative bears abundant witness to his faith. John is speaking simply of his own experience.

3) At the sea of Tiberias (chap. xxi). But here again Peter takes the place of leader. He is named first. He says, I go a fishing, and the others follow. He leaps into the sea that he may be the first to greet the risen Lord. He draws the net to land. He is forgiven and restored, and made the chief shepherd of the flock. But it is said that while Peter is threatened with death, to John is given the promise of long life. Let us observe, however, that John expressly asserts that long life was not promised him. The words of the Master were simply conditional. "He said not". And moreover it is hard to see how long life, even if it were promised, should be a more signal mark of divine favor than the death by which Peter should glorify God.

The fact is that the character of Peter and his relation to Jesus, to the Twelve, and to John in particular, as portrayed in the Fourth Gospel, are in entire harmony with the Synoptic narrative.

c) It is said that in John Jesus is constantly represented as working miracles to manifest His glory, and they are termed signs; while in the earlier Gospels He expressly declared that no sign should be given. But if there is a

contradiction here, it attaches to the Synoptic story itself. Just before Jesus asserted, "no sign shall be given", He had cast out an evil spirit, and affirmed that the miracle was an indication that the kingdom of God was come (Matt. xii. 22-38). Evidently He did not mean that He would do no miracle, or that miracles should have no significance. His enemies refused to accept the miracles He had wrought, and demanded a sign of another sort, and that He refused to give.

d) It is affirmed that the Gospel is in several respects "a work of second-century controversy". It deals with questions which arose only "when the broad lines of Christian theology had been definitely laid down."¹⁰⁴ The discussions of Jesus with the Jews are altogether unlike those recorded by the Synoptists, deal with different questions and reflect the opinions of a later age. That there is a difference is true, though it is often magnified. When it is affirmed that "the controversy no longer turns on our Lord's attitude to the Law or the theocratic hopes",¹⁰⁵ we remember that the healing of an impotent man on the Sabbath was the occasion of the first attack of the Jews upon Jesus (v. 16), and that the anger kindled by this breach of the Law, as they conceived it, burned so fiercely that when He returned to Jerusalem after a long absence the attack was renewed (chap. vii). And it was this controversy regarding the Law which drew from Him the first explicit claim to equality with God which He made in presence of the Jews. And when we read that "the conflict between Jesus and the Jews in the Fourth Gospel comes to a head in the great Eucharistic discussion",¹⁰⁶ the simple answer is that the statement rests on a misapprehension of the sixth chapter of the Gospel. It is not directly concerned with the Eucharist, though it deals with the great spiritual truth which finds visible expression in the Eucharist. But the difference asserted between the Fourth Gospel and the

¹⁰⁴ Scott, *The Fourth Gospel*, pp. 70, 71.

¹⁰⁵ Scott, *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Scott, p. 71.

Synoptic Gospels does exist. It is due in part to the fact that the scene of the Fourth Gospel is laid in Jerusalem, and still more to the fact that the Fourth Gospel treats of those profounder aspects of our Lord's teaching which were the last to be comprehended and the most difficult to set forth. We have here simply a specific illustration of the generic difference between John and the earlier record.

e) It is hard to understand what is meant by the remark of Mr. Scott that "in the Johannine discourses the element of teaching is conspicuously absent. Little is said by way of ethical precept or even of spiritual illumination".¹⁰⁷ Again we ask, Of what is he speaking? Surely not of the Gospel with which we are familiar, of which the ethical and spiritual teaching is the very soul. And in the same paragraph from which this passage is taken we read, "They (the words of Christ) convey more clearly and emphatically than actions could do the inner secret of his personality, proclaiming him to be one with the Father, the Light and Life of the world, the Bread which came down from heaven. . . . The divine nature imparted itself by means of them. They passed into the hearts of those who would receive them like the very breath of God, and were found to be spirit and life". If such power is ascribed to His words, what do they lack of ethical precept and spiritual illumination? The nature of God, the Person of the Saviour, the way of salvation through Him, regeneration, the Person and work of the Holy Spirit, the relation of believers to the Master and to one another, the life to come—all these high themes are treated here with unequalled clearness and power.

f) It is said that the Fourth Gospel is at variance with the others in its representation of John the Baptist. To what extent this Gospel contains a polemic against the followers of the Baptist we may inquire hereafter. The inferiority of the Baptist to Jesus is as clearly and decisively attested by the earlier evangelists as by John. He declared at the opening of his ministry, One cometh after me for

¹⁰⁷ P. 171.

whom I am not worthy to perform the most menial office. Three specific points of variance are alleged.

1) It is asked, If John saw the Spirit descend upon Jesus, as the Fourth Gospel represents, how could he afterward have fallen into doubt? And how could Jesus have commended his steadfastness? But it is obvious that the difficulty is not created by the Fourth Gospel, but belongs to the earlier record. There too he sees the Spirit descending upon Jesus, and recognizes in Him the Christ; yet a little later asks, "Art thou he that cometh, or look we for another?" (Matt. xi. 3). He who questions the possibility of such transition from faith to doubt knows little of the weakness of human nature, conspicuously illustrated in the story of Elijah. As in the case of Peter Jesus recognized the love underlying the denial, so in John He saw the faith beneath the doubt. That he asked the question showed his doubt; that he asked it *of Jesus* showed his faith.

2) The place of his ministry in the record. In the Synoptic narrative it precedes the ministry of Jesus; in John it coincides with it in part. But surely it is plain that the Judean ministry of Jesus, which John records, overlaps the ministry of the Baptist; while the Galilean ministry, which the Synoptists relate, followed it.

3) The contents of the Baptist's message. In the earlier Gospels he appears as a religious reformer, and the burden of his preaching is repentance; in John he is simply a witness to the Christ. But the Synoptists themselves declare that while he summoned men to repentance he told them of the Coming One before whom he was sent to prepare the way. When the Christ appeared, what should he do but point to Him, as the Fourth Gospel represents? The Synoptists record his ministry before the baptism of Jesus; John records his ministry after the baptism. Should the manifestation of the Christ have no effect upon his teaching? Then he cried, The Christ is coming, repent; now he cries, The Christ is come, behold.

g) That the resurrection of Lazarus is not recorded by the Synoptics is a real difficulty, of which no satisfactory

explanation has been given. In John it occupies a conspicuous place, and is the immediate occasion of the arrest and execution of Jesus. Yet there is no reference to it in the earlier Gospels. One method of dealing with the difficulty is to reject the narrative of John as unhistorical. Schmiedel¹⁰⁸ even regards it as due to the misunderstanding of a sermon on the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. If we assume that the Fourth Gospel is trustworthy, how may we account for the omission of this important narrative by the Synoptists? They must have known of it; how could they fail to recognize its importance, and give it a place in their narrative? The reasons commonly assigned are not satisfactory. It is said that they omit the resurrection because it occurred in Judea. But it was intimately connected with the closing scenes of Jesus' life, which they record; and if it really led up to His death how could they omit it? Nor is it reasonable to suppose that they pass it by for fear that they might endanger the lives of the family of Bethany. It is true that in the account of the anointing given by Matthew and Mark the names of the sisters and Lazarus are not recorded. But the house of Simon the leper would be sufficient to identify them in a place like Bethany. Moreover the facts were widely known, familiar to the Jews. And if the event was so important as John intimates, it is hard to see why the Gospels a generation later should hesitate to record it even if the name of Lazarus should be withheld. We know of no sufficient reason to justify the omission. But that is not to say that there is no reason. It is not rational to reject history otherwise trustworthy because it contains difficulties that we cannot solve.

h) It is affirmed that the real humanity of Jesus, so conspicuous in the Synoptic Gospels, is entirely wanting in John. The compassion, the sympathy, the tenderness, which form the charm of His character in the earlier narrative, have disappeared. He is concerned for His own honor and glory alone, and His miracles are no longer the

¹⁰⁸ *Op. cit.*, p. 112.

expression of His love for men, but simply evidences of His divine mission. His human nature is simply a phantom, an illusion, like the body which the Docetae ascribed to Him; an appearance to which there is no corresponding reality. It is true of course that the divinity of Jesus is more conspicuous in the Fourth Gospel, and the sign-quality of His miracles is more pronounced. But these are merely differences of degree. The denial of the true humanity of the Jesus of the Fourth Gospel is a notable illustration of that curious aloofness from life, that singular detachment from the common thought and experience of men, which pervades much of the theological literature of our time, especially that which comes from Germany. Mayne Reid, friend of my boyhood, was accustomed to speak contemptuously of closet naturalists, who discoursed learnedly upon the nature and habits of wild animals without ever setting eyes upon them. There are many closet critics, who set up purely subjective standards of judgment, and measure all things by their own moods and feelings. I do not like this, therefore it could not have happened. This does not appeal to me, therefore it cannot be of interest to any one. They set up their own tastes and prejudices against the common judgment of mankind, the experience of two thousand years; and deal with books as if they had no history, and had filled no place in the world except on the desk of the critic.

For example, Schmiedel remarks,¹⁰⁹ "When we consider further how limited a number of ideas are continually repeated in these discourses in a way which is felt to be quite monotonous and tedious even by very many of those who regard the Fourth Gospel with a kind of awe, we wonder the more how Jesus could have gone on talking in this way for two years without being left with no one at all to listen to him". Yet the world has been listening to these discourses for two thousand years, and never more intently and eagerly than to-day.

¹⁰⁹ *Op. cit.*, p. 74.

Again Schmiedel remarks,¹¹⁰ in discussing Jesus' style of speaking in John, "It was really difficult for a soul in anguish to derive any comfort from it". And again,¹¹¹ "The Fourth Gospel knows nothing and can know nothing of the great consolation which the Epistle to the Hebrews (ii. 18) gives to all such earthly pilgrims: 'because that he himself hath suffered, being tempted, he is able to succor them that are tempted.' " Yet to this Gospel men have turned for comfort and strength throughout all the centuries of the Church's history. The great leaders of every age have borne this witness,—Augustine, Luther, Calvin. On his death-bed John Knox said to his wife, "Go, read where I cast my first anchor"; upon which she read the seventeenth chapter of John's Gospel. And myriads of men and women in humble station have drawn from this book supplies of grace and help in time of need. Yet all this testimony is brushed aside. I do not care for the book, therefore it could not be of use to anyone.

The story of the resurrection of Lazarus is treated at length by Schmiedel. The Jews thought that the tears of Jesus showed His love for Lazarus, the love attested by the sisters and the evangelist. But the critic thinks otherwise. "The author of the Gospel has taken care to show that we may not, as a matter of fact, expect to find any genuinely human feeling in the Jesus of his story".¹¹² Yet in fact no passage in all the Scripture has brought Jesus nearer to the hearts of men in time of sorrow; and those words, "I am the resurrection and the life," have kindled the hope of immortality in human breasts beyond any other words that were ever spoken. He who does not feel what has stirred the hearts of men without number may well inquire whether the fault be not in himself. Let any man who questions the worth of this Gospel visit the homes of mourning, and he will soon discover whether the Jesus represented here is capable of speaking comfort to troubled hearts. Surely to

¹¹⁰ *Op. cit.*, p. 73.

¹¹¹ *Op. cit.*, p. 157.

¹¹² *Op. cit.*, p. 32.

disregard the witness of mankind in judging of the character, quality, effect of a book comes perilously near the modern unpardonable sin, of being unscientific.

It is pleasant to turn from the critical, even cynical, tone in which the fondest hopes and highest interests of mankind are often treated, to such a book as Prof. Drummond's *Johannine Thoughts*, of which he was kind enough to send me a copy. The chapter entitled "Lazarus" bears also the heading, *The Sympathy of Christ*, and we read, "His tears must have been tears of sympathy" (p. 122). And again, "To thousands of troubled hearts the chapters which record the intimate conversation between Jesus and his loved disciples have been a source of comfort and peace" (p. 155).

It must be granted, however, that the charge would be amply justified if certain modes of interpretation which have been recently put forward could be sustained. There would be little comfort in the Gospel if we should follow those who make of it a series of forced and frigid allegories. Some of those who are foremost in assailing the historical and critical trustworthiness of the early fathers are reviving some of the worst features of their systems, without the spiritual insight and fervor which redeem their writings from barrenness. They shun their virtues and imitate their defects. The most puerile conceits of Augustine and others are reproduced as the latest word of scholarship.¹¹³

Dr. Moffatt in his valuable *Introduction to the Literature of the New Testament* informs us that "the five husbands of iv. 19 are the five earlier deities of the Samaritan cultus . . . and *he whom thou now hast is not thy husband* is either Yahweh, who really belongs to Israel, or else Simon Magus, the contemporary idol of the Samaritans".¹¹⁴ Schmiedel tells us that the sick man at the pool of Bethesda represents the Jewish people, and the five porches the five books of Moses.¹¹⁵ The mother of Jesus represents

¹¹³ I have given many instances of Augustine's use of allegory in my article "Augustine as an Exegete", *Bibliotheca Sacra*, April, 1904.

¹¹⁴ P. 524.

¹¹⁵ *Op. cit.*, p. 99.

the ancient faith.¹¹⁶ The plain, simple narrative is resolved into a series of types and allegories, not drawn from the Gospel but imposed upon it. Allegory of course is not wanting in John, but it is used as everywhere in the New Testament with rare discretion, and we have no right to assume it where it is not plainly indicated. Even where the substantial truth of the narrative is admitted, to overlay it with allegory is to obscure the facts, to veil the true character of Jesus, to take Him out of relation to the common life of men. The history is thrust into the background. Facts give place to fancies, and in the interpretation of the Gospel every man is a law unto himself. In the course of our study, indeed, we are often reminded of the opening chapter of *Martin Chuzzlewit*, where the critical methods sometimes employed in modern exegesis are admirably represented. The words of Wendt are worth noting:¹¹⁷ "When we reflect how readily every sect of that age which had to do with the Old Testament—scribes of Palestine and philosophers of Alexandrine Judaism, a Paul and a writer to the Hebrews, and subapostolic Christianity likewise—resorted to allegory as a means for introducing new ideas into the old Scriptures, and making them appear to be registered there already, we must recognize the high significance of the fact that such allegorical interpretation of Scripture is as strange to the Johannine as to the Synoptic utterances of Jesus".

There are those who discover in the Fourth Gospel a church manifesto, of which one of the the most striking features is the large place given to the sacraments. This is properly reserved for consideration when we come to treat of the Purpose of the Gospel.

We are told that John appears in Gal. ii as a bigoted Jew, who believed that the gospel was sent to the chosen people alone. If that were true, surely John might learn something in the years that elapsed before the Gospel was writ-

¹¹⁶ Scott, *op. cit.*, p. 75.

¹¹⁷ *Gospel according to St. John*, p. 190.

ten. Peter and Paul were bigoted enough, yet they were converted: was John alone incapable of learning? But it is not true that John is represented in Galatians as a narrow-minded bigot. James and Peter and John recognized the divine commission of Paul, and gave him the right hand of fellowship, that he should go to the Gentiles and they to the circumcision. Each of them chose the sphere of labor for which he was best fitted, and all recognized that the work among Jews and Gentiles alike was ordained by God.

The relation of the Gospel to Gnosticism is an interesting and complicated theme. Here it must suffice to observe that though the incipient forms of Gnosticism are assailed in the Epistles of Paul; though John was a contemporary, and according to tradition an opponent, of Cerinthus; and though the Epistles which bear his name, proceeding certainly from the same school if not from the same hand as the Gospel, and of approximately the same date, evince the keenest abhorrence of that Docetism which was one of the main tenets of the system: yet there is no attack upon Gnosticism in the Fourth Gospel. Never do the opponents of Jesus assume the Gnostic position. Gnosticism does not appear in the Fourth Gospel, because the Gospel is true to the period of which it treats. There is no point of contact between the Gospel and Gnostic systems which is not amply accounted for upon the theory of the apostolic origin of the Gospel by the simple supposition that the Gnostics drew upon the Gospel for their material. Certainly if there is a polemic here it is singularly indirect and ineffective, for the later Gnostics contrived to find in the Gospel the basis of their teaching. There is nothing in the relation of the Gospel to Gnosticism which forbids us to believe that it was written by John the Apostle in the closing years of the first century.

Such is the evidence which constrains us to believe that the Fourth Gospel was written by John, the son of Zebedee, and the bosom friend of Jesus.

Harrisburg, Pa.

J. RITCHIE SMITH.

THE WITNESS OF THE HOLY SPIRIT TO THE BIBLE.

The doctrine of the Witness of the Holy Spirit to the divine origin of the Bible, as taught by Calvin and by the Reformed and Lutheran theologians of the succeeding century, has fallen into an almost complete neglect. This is partly due to the error of identifying the Witness of the Spirit with the argument from Christian experience which is much used in modern Apologetics, but is also partly due to a mistaken mystical conception of its nature, and to the influence of the prevalent antisupernaturalism upon modern theological thought. It is worth while, therefore, to consider the nature, object, and apologetic value of the doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit to Scripture.

It should be noted at the outset that this is not an isolated truth, but a part of the saving work of the Holy Spirit in the application of Redemption, and that therefore it is closely related to the whole organism of Scripture truth. It is one aspect of the question as to the efficient cause and the ground of saving faith. It has, therefore, certain presuppositions which were clearly recognized and stated, especially by Calvin and by most of the great theologians, both Lutheran and Reformed, of the succeeding century. The chief of these presuppositions is that God can be known only by revelation. This is true of our natural knowledge of God. The origin and development of our knowledge of God is not a realization of God's self-consciousness in man, as pantheism conceives it; but is due to the self-revealing act on God's part in Creation by which He has made Himself manifest, creating man with a religious nature capable of seeing God in the works of His hands.

Furthermore, faith is conviction of truth grounded on evidence. In this broad sense it is not distinguished from knowledge. Its distinctive feature is that in faith the evi-

dence is not that of self-consciousness or reason, but consists in a testimony external or objective to our consciousness. Religious faith, therefore, must be grounded in the testimony of God. This is true in reference to the knowledge of God obtained from general revelation in Nature and man. We must rely on God's witness to Himself in the heart and in His Creation. This is just as true of a true or saving faith in God's Word.

In addition to this, it must be remembered that sin, obscuring and distorting our natural knowledge of God, and darkening man's heart or mind, has rendered him incapable of seeing God in His works, and no less incapable of truly seeing Him in the special revelation in Scripture by which He has restored and completed His revelation of Himself. There is need, therefore, of a complete renewal and illumination of the sinner in order to the exercise of saving faith in God and in His Word. Saving faith, like all truly religious faith, must rest on God's testimony and presupposes man's capacity to recognize the testimony as from God.

It is in accordance with these fundamental truths that the old Protestant theologians asserted that the Bible is its own witness because God speaks in it. This is not reasoning in a circle. It does not mean that we believe the Bible to be of God because God says so in it, and we believe that it is He who says so because the Bible is His word. It means simply that the Bible is self-witnessing; that it bears in itself the marks of its divine origin if we have the eye of faith to see them. This can be seen from the fact that the Bible demands faith from every one to whom it comes with its message. Its demand for faith is not limited to those capable of weighing the external evidence for its divine origin. The ground of such faith, therefore, must be ultimately the self-evidencing character of the Bible. It follows also from what has been said, and it was fully recognized by the old Protestant theologians, that doubt or unbelief as to the divine origin and authority of Scripture, is not due to any deficiency in or want of objective evidence, but

to the condition of heart of sinful man. This is not only the teaching of Scripture, it is proved by the fact that the same evidence for the Bible which convinces one man, fails to convince another, and by the further fact that the same amount of evidence may fail to convince a man at one time and yet later produce a complete conviction.

All these truths are taught in Scripture as well as by experience. Sin with its obscuration of our religious knowledge is conceived of as a power of darkness which rules over this sinful world, and the Gospel revelation by contrast is called light. This contrast is always represented as fundamental and ineradicable by natural means so that the transition from darkness to light is only by means of supernatural revelation and supernatural illumination. Darkness, then, in the Old Testament is not only used in a quasi-objective sense to depict the misery, estrangement from God, and want of all true knowledge of God which characterized the world before the advent of Christ and the revelation of God which He made, so that Christ's coming was a light to the world (Isa. ix. 1 [2]; lx. 2), but also expresses the ignorance or spiritual blindness of sinful man apart from inward illumination (Job v. 14; xxxvii. 19). This is not a mere absence of light, nor a merely negative use of the term darkness, as where it represents the essential unknowableness of God (Deut. v. 22; Psal. xcvi. 2), but is a positive condition of the wicked (1 Sam. ii. 9), and a penal infliction (Deut. xxviii. 29; Job. v. 14).

In the New Testament we find the same quasi-objective use of the term to express the dense ignorance of God which spreads over the earth apart from the revelation of God in Christ and the light of the Gospel, so that Christ is the light of the world, and the Gospel a light which shines in a dark place (Jn. i. 5; 2 Pet. i. 19 etc.), and also the same subjective sense of the term which denotes the spiritual blindness of the sinner. In the teaching of Jesus as recorded in the Synoptists, the term is most frequently used in an eschatological sense to denote the mental and spiritual

condition of those in the state of future punishment. In the Gospel of John, however, it is a term denoting the dense ignorance which is totally unable to see the divine revelation of light which has always shone and still shines into it from the Logos and from the Incarnate Word (Jn. i. 5). In this sense Christ is come as a light into the darkness of the world (Jn. xii. 46). But the condition of spiritual blindness of the individual apart from the inward spiritual illumination which Jesus gives, is set forth when a walk in darkness is contrasted with possession of the light of life. Here the light is that by which true life is obtained. It is the life-giving inward light which Jesus gives the darkened soul. And by contrast the darkness is spiritual blindness (Jn. viii. 12). Paul also uses the term darkness to denote the spiritual blindness of the natural man. Before God creatively illuminates the mind, this darkness is as dense as that of the outer world at Creation before God said "let there be light" (2 Cor. iv. 6). It is therefore represented as a power which has authority to rule over men and from which God must deliver them (Col. i. 13). It affects man's whole understanding or mind so that the Gentiles are described as darkened in their understanding. In this state they are alienated from God, and this is due to the ignorance and hardness of heart which always accompany this darkness or spiritual blindness (Eph. iv. 17, 18). It is, therefore, a spiritual blindness due to sin, and is so characteristic of the condition of the natural man that Paul describes the former condition of his readers absolutely as darkness (Eph. v. 8). This is a condition of hardness or stubborn resistance of the truth of the Gospel, a condition of blindness wrought by sin (Eph. iv. 18; 2 Cor. iv. 4). According to Peter this is a condition out of which man can come to the light of the Gospel only by an effectual call from God (1 Pet. ii. 9).

In consequence of this spiritual blindness the natural man i.e. the unregenerate man, is unable to receive the revelation made by the Spirit through the Apostles (1 Cor.

ii. 14ff). In this context Paul says that he relied for success in his preaching of the Gospel, not on man's wisdom, but on the demonstration of the Spirit, in order that the faith of the Corinthians might not rest on the wisdom of man, but on the power of God. The reason for this is because the unregenerate man does not receive the things of the Spirit, and cannot receive them because they are spiritually discerned. The regenerate man, on the other hand, does receive these things, and the reason for this is that the former has not and the latter has spiritual insight or discernment. Moreover Paul here teaches that this spiritual discernment consists in the apprehension of the religious value, truth, and divine origin of the doctrines discerned, and that it is due to the operation of the Spirit of God upon the heart. And in the preceding chapter the Apostle asserts that the very same Gospel with the same amount of external attestation, was an offense to the Jew and foolishness to the Greeks, but to those who were inwardly and effectually called it was the wisdom and the power of God (1 Cor. i. 23, 24). Hence, as we have seen, if this Gospel be hid i.e. its truth and saving efficacy unrecognized, it is not for lack of evidence, but because men are lost and blinded by sin (2 Cor. iv. 4).

Consequently one important aspect of the work of Regeneration is an illuminating action of God's Spirit on man's heart or mind, removing the spiritual blindness. In the earlier parts of the Old Testament it is the work of God's Spirit as the source of life in the cosmos and of supernatural power in the theocratic leaders, that is most prominent. In the Psalms and Isaiah, however, the Spirit of God is represented as dwelling in the individual believer as the source of an ethical change. This is clearly the case in Psa. li. where David prays for the creation of a new heart and the renewal of a right spirit within him, and prays God not to take the Spirit of Holiness from him. The Holy Spirit was present in Israel through Moses so that in their rebelliousness they grieved Him (Isa. lxiii.

10f). This inward work and presence of God's Spirit, however, is chiefly characteristic of the Messianic times. The new Church is to be a spiritual Church (Isa. xlv. 3; lix. 21; Ezek. xxxix. 29), His continued presence being the great blessing of the coming Messianic age (Isa. lix. 21). He is the source of spiritual life to God's people (Ezek. xxxvii. 14), and His universal outpouring and influence will mark the Messianic age (Joel ii. 28-32).¹ In all this, however, the illuminating activity of the Spirit in removing the blindness due to sin is not specifically mentioned. But that this is part of the saving work of God in man's heart is made perfectly clear where the Psalmist prays that God will illumine his eyes lest he sleep the sleep of death (Psa. xiii. 4 [3]), and especially where he prays that God would open his eyes that he might behold wondrous things out of His law (Psa. cxix. 18); so that, though he believed that the entrance of God's word gives light to the soul (verse 130), this can only be through the opening of the blind eyes. Hence to be "taught of the Lord" (Isa. liv. 13) and to "know the Lord" (Jer. xxxi. 34) refer to this saving knowledge which results from the illuminating work of God in the soul. It is this same inward work of spiritual enlightenment which Isaiah predicted that the Messiah would accomplish for His people (Isa. xlii. 7), and which was fulfilled when Jesus came as the Light of the World.

When we turn to the New Testament we find that this enlightening work of the Spirit is most fully developed, the saving work of the Spirit in the individual being characteristic of the New Testament doctrine of the Holy Spirit in contrast to that of the Old Testament. This is not made explicit in the Synoptic Gospels, though they evidently contain clear intimations of this truth. Jesus' miracles of healing were more than signs of His Messiahship and Deity; they were symbolical of His power to heal the terrible disease of sin. The healing of the blind man as recorded in

¹ Oehler, *O. T. Theology*, pp. 507, 508; B. B. Warfield, "The Spirit of God in the Old Testament," *PRES. AND REF. REVIEW*, VI, pp. 665-687.

Mark and Luke teaches the supernatural power of Jesus to open the blind eyes of the soul (Mk. viii. 22-26; Lk. xviii. 35-43). In the latter instance (ver. 42) the answer of Jesus to the blind man that his faith had saved him, indicated the deeper than physical healing that the Saviour wrought. Another indication of the truth that mere external evidence will not convince a spiritually blind heart is seen in the fact that Jesus would do no mighty works to convince men of His claims when there was a sinful opposition of the heart to Himself. Moreover He taught in the Parable of the Rich man and Lazarus that unbelief in reference to the Old Testament was not due to any want of evidence, nor could it be removed by any additional external proof (Lk. xvi. 31). The knowledge of the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven is not a natural possession of man, but a gift of God (Mt. xiii. 11); and the same thing is true in regard to the recognition of Jesus' Messiahship and Deity, as our Lord's words to Peter at Caesarea Philippi clearly show (Mt. xvi. 17). The great revealing work of Christ, as set forth in Mt. xi. 25ff, clearly cannot be limited to the revelation of God in Jesus' Person and life and teaching, but must include His lifegiving touch on the sinner's heart by which alone His objective revelation of God is made effective.

It is, however, in our Lord's teaching as recorded in the Gospel of John that this truth is most fully and richly developed. In the earlier chapters the Holy Spirit is represented as the source of regeneration and spiritual life. But in the third chapter there is a hint that this involves an enlightening of the mind. Nicodemus says that he knows that Jesus is a teacher come from God, and it was in reply to this statement that Jesus set forth the necessity of the new birth from God's Spirit, implying that a true recognition of Himself as a teacher is possible only to one who is born anew by the Spirit (Jn. iii. 3ff). But it is in the fourteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth chapters that the revealing and enlightening work of the Spirit is most fully

expounded. The departure of Jesus to the Father is as momentous in the history of Redemption as was His Advent. His revealing and saving work, He teaches, is to be carried on by the Spirit who is "another Paraclete", to take Christ's place and carry on His work; or more accurately Christ is to be present in His Church by the Spirit, especially as the Spirit of truth (Jn. xiv. 26; xv. 26; xvi. 12ff). The Spirit is to glorify Christ by completing His revelation, and by guiding the Church into all truth. These promises include not only the completion of the organism of special revelation through the Apostolic revelation, but also the spiritual illumination of the Christian Church through the ages. It is, moreover, "the things of Christ" and not new truths which are the object of the Spirit's witness. He does not speak from Himself but is a witness to the truth which is Christ Himself. The work of the Spirit in this respect, therefore, is a supernatural one, removing the blindness of sin, and its object or objective content is the "things of Christ" or the Gospel.

Paul develops fully this teaching of Jesus. Jesus by His Resurrection becomes the exalted Lord, the "quicken-
ing Spirit" (*πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν* 1 Cor. xv. 45), and the source of spiritual light as well as life (2 Cor. iii. 16f). According to Paul neither the law of Moses nor even the Gospel of Christ can remove the darkness of mind due to sin (2 Cor. iii. 12 ff). When the Spirit is given as the power of a new supernatural life, then it is light within as well as without. The Spirit removes the veil of blindness on the sinner's heart. In the fourth chapter this same supernatural power is referred to God. This is to emphasize its essentially creative nature. God, who at the Creation when the world was in physical darkness, said "Light shall shine out of darkness", has shined in the same creative or supernatural way in the hearts of Christians, so that they can recognize God's glory in Christ (2 Cor. iv. 6); which glory shines in the face of Christ far more brightly than on Moses' face (iii. 7). He who cannot see this light has been

blinded by sin (iv. 3f) so that the failure to see the glorious light is not due to defect of light but defect of vision. Here the reference is probably to Paul's conversion, but not exclusively nor to what was peculiar to it; but rather to what is common to all believers (*ἐν ταῖς καρδίαις ἡμῶν*). In Gal. i. 15f Paul indeed speaks of an inner revelation of Christ to him, but here he refers rather to his authoritative knowledge of the Gospel which he had as an Apostle, as is also the case in 1 Cor. ii. 10.

The Spirit of the Lord is therefore for Paul the source not only of spiritual life but of saving knowledge of the truth. The need of this spiritual illumination according to Paul, as we saw, lies in the blindness of the natural man to divine things (1 Cor. ii. 6-16), so that Christ crucified is foolishness to him and yet the power of God to those effectually called (1 Cor. i. 23f). Moreover, the Spirit which discloses the mystery of the Gospel to the Apostles (Eph. iii. 5), is also the Spirit who illumines all Christians. Where the Spirit comes, therefore, Christians are enlightened in the "eyes of their heart", i.e. spiritually illumined, to know God and comprehend their glorious hope and the greatness of God's power in them (Eph. i. 18-23). The prayer, moreover, in Eph. iii. 16-19 for strengthening by the Spirit is for the purpose of this spiritual knowledge. The Gospel is a mystery i.e. something which needs to be disclosed, and even when disclosed, man, who is blinded by sin, cannot comprehend it until he has been spiritually enlightened. This great truth which Paul thus fully set forth in the Epistles to the Corinthians and Ephesians, was in the Apostle's mind from the first, for he refers to the same truth in his earliest Epistle when he writes that his Gospel came to the Thessalonian Christians not only in word but in power and in the Holy Spirit (1 Thess. i. 5).

The same truth is taught by Peter. It is true that he speaks of our being born again by God's Word, but this is only a familiar figure in which the instrumental cause is spoken of as if it were the efficient cause of this great change. The change from spiritual darkness to spiritual

light is clearly affirmed to be due to an efficient call from God (1 Pet. ii. 9). And what is true of Peter is true also of John. The anointing with the Holy Spirit gives knowledge (1 Jn. ii. 20) and the Spirit continues with the Christian as a guide to truth (ii. 21). It is by the Spirit that we know that Christ abideth in us (iii. 24; iv. 13). The Spirit, moreover, bears witness to Christ (v. 6ff.), while faith in Jesus' Messiahship is the consequence of the new birth from God (v. 1).

It is in accordance with this that true or saving faith, or what the old theologians called *fides divina*, is a gift of God or divinely wrought. It is not an arbitrary act of the soul which can be performed at will; and such is the state of man's heart that, though normally it could not be withheld upon sufficient evidence, the presence of adequate evidence does not produce it. This is because unbelief, according to Christ's teaching, springs from finding in Himself a cause of offence (*σκάνδαλον* Mt. xiii. 57; xxvi. 31), which in turn springs from a hostility of the heart to Himself. Saving faith, therefore, is impossible without a total change of heart or regeneration. Jesus, therefore, prayed for Peter that his faith should not fail, thereby acknowledging that it is a gift of God; the Apostles prayed that the Lord would increase their faith (Lk. xvii. 5); and Jesus told Peter that his faith in His Messiahship and Deity rested on an inward revealing act of the Father. In the Gospel of John this is brought out more fully. Unbelief is a sin because it shows an attitude of hostility to God and Christ, and faith likewise discloses a state of the heart, a "being of the truth" (Jn. xviii. 37), a "hearing and learning of the Father" (Jn. vi. 45). Consequently only he that is drawn by the Father can come to Christ (Jn. vi. 44), and this "coming" or faith is the Father's gift (Jn. vi. 65). Faith is the gift of God's grace and only follows a complete change of heart.

Paul also, although he does not in so many words ascribe the producing of faith to the Holy Spirit except perhaps in 2 Cor. iv. 13 and Eph. ii. 8, nevertheless speaks of

a power of God which works in man before he reaches true faith (Col. ii. 12). The preaching of the Gospel, moreover, is the power of God to those effectually called, and foolishness to those without this call (1 Cor. i. 23f); and the preaching of the Apostle was in the demonstration and power of the Spirit, so that the faith of his hearers depended not on human wisdom or arguments but on the power of God (1 Cor. ii. 5). It is by God's Spirit alone that we can confess Jesus as Lord, and no man can truly call him Lord without the Spirit's power (1 Cor. xii. 3). Similarly, according to the Apostle John, faith in the Messiahship of Jesus is the result of being "born of God" (1 Jn. v. 1).

The Bible, then, teaches that because of the darkness of the world due to sin which has marred God's image in man and Nature, God has made a special revelation of Himself in an objective and supernatural manner, which revelation culminates in Jesus Christ and the Apostolic interpretation of His Person and work. This is a light to the world. It is self-evidencing and bears the marks of its divine origin. But sin-blinded man, just because his religious sense is injured and his heart and mind darkened by sin, cannot see God in His Word or come to any experimental knowledge of Him through the revelation it makes. The Holy Spirit in regeneration, therefore, must enlighten the mind, renew man's whole nature, and give him spiritual light, thus enabling and moving him to recognize the marks of God in His Word. This action of the Spirit is therefore internal, supernatural and hence objective to man's consciousness. But it communicates no new truth; it simply enables us to exercise saving faith in God, in Christ, and in God's Word. It therefore gives us not only an ability to believe, but also a certitude of faith, not only in our own sonship, as Paul teaches (Rom. viii. 16), but in the deity of Jesus and the divine origin of His Gospel and of God's Word.²

²On the whole subject of the Scripture doctrine of the enlightening work of the Holy Spirit, besides the general works on Biblical Theology, see the following which discuss the subject briefly: Buchanan,

The Witness of the Holy Spirit to the Bible, then, is not something standing apart and isolated from the life of faith; it is a part of the inward enlightening work of the Spirit which we have briefly set forth, and of precisely the same nature. It is of importance to understand the nature and value of this truth, because it has fallen into neglect, or else has been misunderstood, and so laid open to criticism.

This particular application of the doctrine of the Spirit's work was first adequately developed by Calvin, and by him handed on to the theologians of the succeeding century of both the Reformed and Lutheran branches of Protestantism, though in the Lutheran theology it found full treatment only in the seventeenth century. When rightly conceived it will be seen to be a truth of fundamental importance in relation to such great questions as the origin and certitude of faith.

It is necessary, however, to guard it from misconceptions. It was no less acute a thinker than Strauss³ who affirmed that in this doctrine the Protestant system found a standpoint for faith independent of the fallible judgment of the Church and of the unstable judgment of the individual subject of faith. But because Strauss conceived of the Spirit's witness in a mystical way as being the communication to man of a new truth separate from the Bible, i. e. the proposition that the Bible is God's word, he thought the doctrine open to criticism and held that in adhering to it the Protestant theology unavoidably abandons its position in regard to the authority of Scripture, and turns aside into Mysticism or Rationalism. If, he says, this Witness of the Spirit to the divine origin of the Bible is the communication

The Holy Spirit, pp. 88-111; Kuyper, *The Work of the Holy Spirit*, p. 152; Beversluis, *De heilige Geest en zijne Werkingen*, pp. 407-411, 470; Gloël, *Der heilige Geist in der Heilsverkündigung des Paulus*: pp. 287-300; Nösgen, *Wesen und Wirken des heiligen Geistes*, II, pp. 40-46; Swete, *The Holy Spirit in the New Testament*, pp. 152f, 179, 233. Also works on the theology of the Gospel of John, such as B. Weiss, *Johann. Lehrbegriff*, pp. 285ff; E. F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel, Its Purpose and Theology*, pp. 254f, 338, 349.

³ Strauss, *Die Christliche Glaubenslehre*, I. 130ff.

of a truth to man, i.e. that the Bible is God's word, then this new truth revealed becomes the fundamental thing, and it itself must require support. Who shall certify to us that this truth really is from God? Either another witness of the same kind is necessary, in which case we have the *regressus ad infinitum* of Mysticism; or else the human mind is supposed simply to recognize the truth revealed as appealing to it, in which case faith depends solely on ourselves and we fall ultimately into Rationalism. This criticism is acute, and is valid against the doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit to the Bible as Strauss conceived it i.e. as giving a "content" of truth apart from the Bible itself. It is necessary, therefore, to understand the nature of this Witness, especially since pretty generally in modern times either Strauss' misconception has been repeated, or else the Witness of the Spirit has been confounded with the argument from Christian experience.

Turning then to the nature of this Witness of the Holy Spirit to the Bible, it should be noted first that it is not the direct communication to the Christian by the Holy Spirit of a truth or proposition, as for example that the Bible is the Word of God. This is really a form of Mysticism. Such a view is not implied in the Scripture teaching as it has been set forth, nor is there any such promise in the Scripture concerning the work of the Spirit. This conception of the Witness of the Spirit would make it analogous to the idea of Revelation in the case of the Prophets and Apostles who received communications of truth directly from God. It would, then, itself require to be authenticated, and consequently we would have a never-ending chain of revelations, as Strauss pointed out. In addition to this difficulty, this view by making faith depend upon the new truth revealed, would subordinate the Scriptures to this new revelation, and fail to recognize the self-evidencing character of the Bible. It therefore cuts the knot, and fails to untie it. None of the old Protestant theologians conceived of the Witness of the Spirit in this way. All em-

phasized the self-evidencing character of the Scripture which they assert is *αὐτόπιστος*. Calvin especially devotes a whole chapter⁴ to criticising the Anabaptists, and points out that the Word is the instrument of the Spirit who uses the Word and confirms it, but reveals no new truth,⁵ so that the Witness of the Spirit confirms the Scriptures and does not supercede them.

Neither is this Witness of the Spirit an influence which causes to emerge in our consciousness a blind or ungrounded conviction that the Bible is the Word of God. Faith is a conviction which is grounded on evidence. If the evidence be lacking—i.e. evidence which at least is valid for the subject of the faith—the conviction will not emerge. The opening of the blind eyes of the soul is in order to an act of vision which terminates on an object viz. the Bible with its marks of divine origin. It is not a blind or vague feeling that the Bible is from God; it is rather an intuitive or immediate perception of the marks of God's authorship which are upon the face of the Scripture. The view of the Witness of the Spirit which we are criticising, moreover, fails entirely to take account of the fact that the Bible is its own witness, that it bears upon itself the marks of its divine origin, and that the ultimate reason or ground of faith is this fact that God speaks to us through the Scripture. All that is required is that the veil shall be removed from our eyes in order that we may see God in the Scripture, and it is this removal of the blinding effects of sin which takes place in regeneration, which constitutes the Witness of the

⁴ Calvin, *Institutes*, I, 9.

⁵ *Ibid.* I, 9:3. Cf. also I, 9:1 "The Office of the Spirit which is promised to us is not to feign new and unheard of revelations, or to coin a new system of doctrine, which would draw us away from the received doctrine of the Gospel, but to seal to our minds the same doctrine which the Gospel delivers". In I, 7:5 Calvin, it is true, speaks of a "sense" which can be produced by "nothing short of a revelation from heaven". But this, as Dr. Warfield says, is only to describe its "heavenly source"; not its mode or nature. Cf. B. B. Warfield, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God", *PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, VII, pp. 219-324. It confirms the Scriptures according to Calvin, it does not supercede them. Cf. also, I, 9:3.

Holy Spirit. This agrees with what we have seen to be the teaching of Scripture which uniformly represents the enlightening work of the Spirit as an opening of the eyes of the soul for an act of objective vision, and not a mere subjective impression.

This, moreover, is the uniform teaching of the old Protestant theologians. All alike emphasized the fact that the Bible is self-evidencing or *αὐτόπιστος* as they called it. Calvin laid the greatest emphasis upon this point. He taught that the Scripture bears on its face the marks of its divine origin so that when our eyes are opened we recognize this clear evidence as we would immediately distinguish between white and black or a sweet and bitter taste.⁶ In precisely the same sense all the Reformed and Lutheran theologians taught that the Scripture bears the marks of its own credibility and is *αὐτόπιστος*.⁷

⁶ Calvin, *Institutes* I, 7:2—"But if any one should inquire 'How shall we be persuaded of its divine origin, unless we have recourse to the decree of the Church?' this is just as if anyone should inquire, 'How shall we learn to distinguish light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter?'. For the Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth, as white and black things do of their colour; or sweet and bitter things of their taste."

⁷ Cf. Polanus, *Syntagma Theol.* I, 14. Piscator, *Aph. Doct. Christ.* p. 16 asserts that it is the result of the Witness of the Spirit that the Scripture shows itself as self-evidencing or *αὐτόπιστος*. Ursinus, *Loci*, pp. 436ff regards the Witness as enabling us to recognize the marks of God in the Scripture. Zanchius, *Op.* VIII, 332-334 says that the deity of the Scripture shines from its pages like the sun even though we are so spiritually blind that we cannot see it. Maresius, *Systema*, pp. 11, 12, lays emphasis on the fact that the testimony of the Spirit is not a blind one apart from the marks of God in the Scripture. Maccovius, *Loci Com.* pp. 27, 28 asserts the same thing; and Heidegger, *Corp. Theol.* II, 14, expressly says that the Witness is not a "bare persuasion" without any grounds—"Testimonium illud Spiritus S. non est nuda persuasio animi, quae fallaciae obnoxia esse queat, vel motus cordis irrationabilis, qualem enthusiastae pro divino venditant: sed est fulgor et splendor eius in tenebrosis cordibus nostris, ministrans nobis illuminationem cognitionis gloriae Dei in facie Jesu Christi (2 Cor. IV 6), ut ita remotis naturalibus obstaculis omnem excellentiam et divitias verbi divini introspicere valeamus." Likewise the Lutheran theologians, although they conceived of the nature of the Witness of the Spirit somewhat differently from the Reformed theologians, agreed

The Witness of the Spirit, therefore, is not mystical either in the sense that it consists in the immediate revelation of a truth or proposition to the mind concerning the Scripture, or in the sense that it causes the emergence of a blind, irrational, or ungrounded conviction. The marks of God are in the Bible, and the want of faith is due to the effects of sin on the mind, blinding it to these marks; it is not due to any want of evidence. Consequently when spiritual blindness is removed, the marks or criteria constitute valid grounds of faith.

But if the Witness of the Spirit is not mystical in either of the above senses, it is nevertheless objective to the subject of faith, and is not to be confused or identified with the argument from Christian experience, or the witness of experience to the divine origin of Christianity and the Bible. The Spirit of God by means of the Word of God does produce in the Christian an experience of salvation through Christ, which experience is inexplicable apart from the Word, is congruous with the Word, and so testifies to the Bible that it is of divine origin, the very word of God. By many theologians, especially in modern times, the Witness of the Spirit to the Bible has been identified with this argument from Christian experience. This argument has assumed several forms, but in every case the argument is of the nature of an inference from Christian experience to its cause. In its lowest form it eliminates the supernatural work of the Holy Spirit altogether, and simply argues for the divine origin of Christianity from its effects in bettering man ethically. This was the view taken by the old Rationalists. Semler argued for the divine origin of Scripture simply because it improves man, and the view of Less was practically the same.⁸ Not unlike this position of the old

that it does not produce a blind conviction, and that the Scripture is self-evidencing; Gerhard, *Loci Theol.* II speaks of the Scripture as *αὐτόματες* and "winning faith by virtue of their own excellence". Cf. also Baier, *Compend. Theol.* Pos. 80. Quenstedt, *Theol. Didact. Polem.* I, 140, also teaches the same thing.

⁸ Less, *Ueber die Religion, ihre Geschichte und Bestätigung*³ Bd. ii. pp. 117 f. Less says that everyone who tests or tries Christianity will

Rationalists is that of those members of the Ritschlian school who deny all immediate and supernatural influence of the exalted Christ or of the Spirit upon the heart, and having thus eliminated every transcendent element in the genesis of faith, seek to explain it simply from the influence of the historical Jesus. Thus Herrmann asserts that the personal power of goodness works upon us through Jesus as He lived on earth, and through Him we believe in God. The certitude of our faith in God is thus due to the moral influence upon us of the historical Jesus. Herrmann's view was also advocated by Gottschick and Rade.⁹

This argument for Christianity and this account of the genesis of faith is a denial of the truth of the Witness of the Holy Spirit. It substitutes for the supernatural power of the Spirit, the ethical and religious effect of the truths of Christianity, as in the old Rationalism, or of the so-called historical Jesus, as in the left wing of the Ritschlian school. It rests upon a Pelagian view of sin and man's condition, and leaves wholly unexplained the fact that Jesus and the Gospel is foolishness to one man and the power of God unto salvation to another. Since it totally neglects the blinding power of sin, it is wholly inadequate as an explanation of the genesis of faith.

There is, however, a higher form of the argument from Christian experience, which has often been identified with the Witness of the Spirit. It admits the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit upon the heart in producing

find an improvement and peace and happiness. Less calls this a witness of the Spirit, but prefers to call it an argument from experience. Consequently many Rationalists like Wegscheider rejected the doctrine altogether. On the Rationalists cf. Klaiber, "Die Lehre der altprotestantischen Dogmatiker von dem Testimonium Spiritus Sancti, und ihre dogmatische Bedeutung, *Jahrbuecher für deutsche Theol.* ii. 1857, p. 22.

⁹ Herrmann, *Der Verkehr des Christen mit Gott*; also *Gewissheit des Glaubens*, 59; Gottschick, *Die Kirchlichkeit der sog. Kirchlichen Theologie*; Rade, "Der rechte Christliche Glaube," *Christl. Welt*. 1892, Nr. 1. For an account and criticism of the Ritschlian Theologians vid. Köstlin, *Die Begründung unserer sittlich-religiösen Ueberzeugung*, pp. 97ff.

Christian experience, and finds in this experience what it terms a Witness of the Spirit to the divine origin of God's Word. The Spirit by means of the Word produces in the Christian an experience of salvation, which experience is due to the hearing of the Word, is congruous with the Word, and which therefore witnesses to the truth, and so to the divine origin of the Bible. This is a valid argument, but quite distinct from the Witness of the Holy Spirit. Some of the modern theologians who have developed this argument have not fallen into the mistake of identifying it with the Witness of the Spirit, as for example Köstlin.¹⁰ By many, however, the doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit has been reduced to this argument from Christian experience. This was done in the eighteenth century by the Supra-naturalists and the Rationalists. Thus Baumgarten¹¹ says that there is a twofold experience from which we infer the divine origin of Scripture; first an experience of the truth of the main content of Scripture by means of the agreement of the Scripture descriptions of states of the soul with our own, and by means of our attaining to an end not otherwise attainable when we accept the Bible way of salvation; and secondly an immediate experience of the power of the Bible on our souls. We argue from this by inference that the Bible is true and so must be divine in origin since no human book has any such witness to it. This argument from experience which has been developed in modern times by such theologians as Frank, Köstlin, and Ihmels, has by a number of theologians been identified with the Witness of the Holy Spirit.¹²

¹⁰ Köstlin, *op. cit.*, pp. 100 ff.

¹¹ Baumgarten, *Dogmatik*, pp. 120 ff.

¹² H. Cremer, *Realency. f. prot. Theol. u. Kirche*, vi. p. 760: "Dies ist das testimonium Spiritus S., die kirchliche und individuelle Erfahrung von der Bedeutung der heil. Schrift. Sie bezieht sich auf die Schrift als ganzes". Precisely the same reduction of the testimony of the Holy Spirit to the argument from experience is found in the Article on this subject by Wiesinger, "Ich Glaube an den heiligen Geist", *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, ix. 1898, pp. 763-787; *vid.* especially pp. 778, 779: "Ist es der vom Geiste gewirkte Glaube an Jesum Christum, in dem wir

This argument from Christian experience is a valid argument for the divine origin of Christianity and the Bible, but is quite distinct from the Witness of the Spirit to the Bible. The identification of the two confuses the question of the grounds of faith with that of the origin of faith. Christian experience depends upon or grows out of a saving faith the doctrinal content of which is given by the Christian revelation in the Bible. Christian experience, therefore, presupposes a faith in this revelation and cannot give rise to such faith. The Witness of the Spirit is not one among several grounds of faith. It lies back of all such grounds as the efficient cause of the genesis of faith, enabling us to be convinced by the grounds of faith as we otherwise would not be. Christian experience on the other hand, may be a reason for faith after such faith has arisen; it cannot give rise to it since it presupposes saving faith. The distinctly Christian experiences of the transformation of life, pardon, peace, divine sonship, and sanctification—all these are produced in an instrumental sense by God's Word, and are nourished by the Word, and so witness to the saving power and hence the divine origin of the Word; but these experiences are all consequences of the faith to which the Witness of the Spirit gives rise.

Moreover this testimony of Christian experience to the Bible is not an objective witness of God to us; it is the witness of our own hearts to God's Word. It is not the Spirit bearing witness with our spirit, but the testimony of our renewed heart and experience to the Word which nourishes it. It rests moreover on an inference from our experience to the Bible as its source, and has not, therefore,

die Gnade Gottes und des ewigen Lebens gewiss geworden sind, so sind wir ebendamit auch der Schrift, sofern sie uns diese Heilsbotschaft vermittelt, gewiss". This also seems to have been the form in which the doctrine was revived in Holland, after its rejection by the Rationalists, by Scholten; *vid.* Van Oostersee, *Christian Dogmatics*, i, p. 152. In America a view similar to that of Cremer and Wiesinger has been given in the Article by Dr. John De Witt, "The Testimony of the Holy Spirit to the Bible", *PRESB. AND REFORMED REV.* 1895, pp. 69-85.

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the immediate character of the recognition of the divine origin of God's Word which results from the Witness of the Spirit. Although the soul may seem to possess an immediate certitude of the divine origin of the Bible, if we look only to the argument from Christian experience a syllogism will be seen to underly it, viz. the Christian is certain that his new life is from God, and he is certain that it is from the Scripture, so that he is therefore certain that the Scripture is from God. And since this witness of experience is thus subjective in character, faith is made to rest upon the experiences of the soul rather than upon the marks of divine origin in God's Word and this objective testimony of God Himself which is the ultimate ground of true faith and Christian certitude.

There is still another view of the Witness of the Spirit to the Bible which, though it endeavors to hold to the objective character of this witness as from the Holy Ghost, and not from man's experience, nevertheless resembles the argument from Christian experience in many respects. This is the view of the old Lutheran theologians. In the Lutheran theology of the seventeenth century a conception of the relation of the Holy Spirit to God's Word as a means of grace emerged which influenced the idea of the Witness of the Spirit to the Word. The power of the Spirit was conceived as being wholly in and through the Word, and not directly upon the heart as the action of a Personal Being. The Word itself, therefore, was conceived as having a supernatural power which always operates and is effective when not resisted. The Witness of the Spirit, therefore, as conceived by Quenstedt, Baier, and Hollaz,¹³

¹³ The peculiar form of the doctrine in the Lutheran Church is due to the fact that it was not fully developed until the seventeenth century when the doctrine of the purely immanent relation of the Holy Spirit to the Word arose. Luther believed that the subjective appropriation of the Gospel is due to the work of the Holy Spirit. The Spirit "seals" the Word in our experience as a saving word, but Luther did not develop the inference that thus the divine origin of the Word is witnessed to, *vid. Klaiber, op. cit. pp. 2, 3; also Martius, Locus Dogmaticus De Testimonio Spiritus Sancti Historice et Systematice Expli-*

is really the saving efficacy of God's Word, which efficacy, however, is a supernatural one from God's Spirit in the Word. Hence these theologians said that the Spirit bears witness to the divine origin of the Word by means of the efficacy of the Word. This conception of the Testimony of

catur, p. 9. Melancthon touches briefly upon the doctrine in the Preface to his *Loci* where he sets the "method of philosophy" over against the "doctrine of the Church", the former being by "demonstration", the latter resting on divine revelation. This latter, though witnessed to by miracles, has also the Witness of the Spirit which aids the mind to faith. Speaking of Christian truths he says—"quia res sunt extra iudicium humanae mentis poritae, languidior est assensio, quae fit, quia mens movetur illis testimoniis et miraculis et juvatur a Spiritu S. ad assentiendum". The doctrine is found stated in Hutter, Q. I Prop. III; Hunnius, *Op.* Ed. 1607, i. 10; and fully developed by Quenstedt, Baier, and Hollaz. The idea is that the Spirit's influence and witness is solely through the saving power of the Word. Quenstedt, *Theol. Didact. Polem.* I, Cap. 4, Q. 9, p. 140, says that the "criteria" of the divinity of Scripture produce only *fides humana*; that *fides divina* is due to the Witness of the Spirit; and that this is found in the supernatural efficacy of the Word of God—"Quanquam multa sint κριτήρια et motiva fidei seu credibilitatis, ut vocant, quae potenter suadent S. Scripturae auctoritatem, et originem coelestem, sive inducunt hominem infidelem docilem, et non malitiose repugnantem, ut credat, hoc verbum, quod Scriptura proponit, esse θεόπνευστον et vere Dei verbum: Illa tamen κριτήρια sive γνωρίσματα, quantacumque sint, fidem tantum humanam et persuasionem efficient; ultima vero ratio, sub qua et propter quam fide divina et infallibili credimus, verbum Dei esse verbum Dei, est ipsa intrinseca vis et efficacia verbi divini et Spiritus S. in Scriptura et per Scripturam loquentis testificatio et ob-signatio". Baier's doctrine is the same—*Compend. Theol. Pos.* Proleg. C. II, parag. 22, p. 86—"Divinam fidem, qua Scripturae sacrae ex parte formalis (seu sensus aut doctrinae) divina origo agnoscatur, doctrina ipsa Scripturae omni tempore gignit, quatenus cum attentione lecta, aut voce docentis proposita, explicata et auditu percepta, per se immediate quidem, sed virtute divina, quam sibi semper et indissolubiliter conjunctam habet: adeoque concurrente, et virtutem hanc exerente Deo, intellectum quidem hominis illuminat, seu excitata cogitatione sancta et objecto congrua in assensum inclinat: voluntatem vero ejus allicit ac movet, ut intellectui assensum, sibi ipsi (Doctrinae in Scripturis comprehensae) tanquam a Deo profectae, praebendum imperat; et sic intellectum ipsum ad assentiendum, sub ratione revelationis divinae, determinet." Also p. 92 "ita etiam in ordine ad nos seu ut *fide divina* credamus, Scripturae libros, sub eo, quo nobis, idiomate, i.e. verborum in certa lingua, serie et contextu, esse divinitus inspiratos, et sic habere vim illam normativam, seu dignitatem Canonicam, non sufficit solum Ecclesiae testimonium; verum et hic internum Spiritus

the Holy Spirit, Klaiber claims, is quite different from the argument from experience since it is a testimony of the Spirit of God and not of our religious states of mind,¹⁴ and Klaiber and Martius¹⁵ adopt this view themselves.

This idea of the Testimony of the Holy Spirit is inadequate. We pass over the objection that it rests upon a wrong view of the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Word, and over the fact that neither Scripture nor experience

S. testimonium, seu operationem efficacem *per* ipsam Scripturam, concurrere oportet." Thus the power of the Holy Spirit is *through* the Word solely. Precisely similar is the doctrine in Hollaz, *Exam. Theol. Acroamat.* p. 125—"Per internum spiritus sancti testimonium heic intellegitur actus supernaturalis spiritus sancti *per* verbum Dei attente lectum vel auditu perceptum, *virtute sua divina* scripturae sacrae communicata cor hominis pulsantis, aperientis, illuminantis, et ad obsequium fidei flectentis, ut homo illuminatus ex internis motibus spiritualibus vere sentiat, verbum sibi propositum a Deo ipso esse profectum, atque immotum ipsi assensum praebeat." Here the object testified to is the divine origin of Scripture; the nature of the witnessing is an internal action of the Spirit through the Word, the power being identified with the efficacy of the Word. This latter point is made clearer in the following passage where the power of the Spirit and of the Word are identified—p. 125—"Internum spiritus sancti testimonium de authentia sacrae scripturae *coincidet quoad rem cum efficacia sacrae scripturae in actu secundo spectata . . . Etenim vis effectiva*, quam verbo Dei in producendo effectum illuminationis, conversionis, renovationis, et confirmationis, tribuimus, vere divina est, Rom. 1:16, nec *differt quoad rem* a virtute, quae spiritus sancti operantis in cordibus hominum est, quanquam *disparitas sit in modo habendi hanc vim*, ut pote quae spiritui sancto ex se et a se *cum causae principali verbo autem participative* causae organicae competit." Gerhard, *Loci* I. Cap. II Parag. 22, pp. 9, 10, touches on the doctrine only briefly and not in such a way as to bring out the peculiar features of the Lutheran view as seen in Baier, Quenstedt and Hollaz. After speaking of the "criteria" of the divine origin of Scripture, both internal and external, he says—"Tum demum sequitur, ut Spiritus S. in cords ipsius ferat testimonium, et suorum verborum veritatem obsignet etc." The same view is held by those of the modern Lutheran theologians who have treated of this doctrine, for example Philippi, who discusses the doctrine at some length, *Kirchliche Glaubenslehre*, i. pp. 129ff.

¹⁴ Klaiber, *op. cit.* pp. 20ff.

¹⁵ Martius, *Locus Dogmaticus De Testimonio Spiritus Sancti Historice et Systematice Explicatur*, pp. 38ff; Klaiber, *op. cit.* pp. 17ff, 30ff.

warrant the attribution of any such power to the Bible, but show the truth to be quite the contrary. Looking at this view of the Witness of the Spirit in itself, we see that while it aims at the recognition of the divine source of the Witness, it really conceives of its result as a feeling of the saving power of the Bible, and not as an objective or intuitive beholding of the marks of God in the Bible. It not only, therefore, tends to reduce the Witness to an inference from Christian experience, it also limits the criteria of the divine origin of Scripture to its saving efficacy, whereas the Bible has many other marks of divine origin which the renewed mind can behold or recognize. Like the argument from Christian experience, it gives after all an inferential rather than an immediate certitude, and can be put in the form of the same syllogism, as Klaiber himself recognizes. The Christian feels the saving power of the Bible, he knows his new life is from God, and therefore that the Bible is from God. He does not, therefore, so much see and acquiesce in the self-evidencing divine character of the Scripture, as experience its power and hence infer its origin from God. The difference between this mode of conceiving of the Witness of the Spirit and that of Calvin and all the Reformed theologians may be illustrated from the case of a painting of a great master. How are we to recognize the painter? According to one view the masterpiece arouses feelings of artistic pleasure or wonder and from them we know it must be from the hand of a master. According to the other view the painting bears a number of marks of its being from the hand of such and such a master; these marks we immediately recognize if we have the artistic sense. Just so when the eyes of our heart are opened, or our religious sense restored by God's Spirit, we immediately see the marks of His hand in the Scripture.

The Witness of the Holy Spirit to the Bible, then, is not objective in the sense of being the mystical communication to the mind of a truth or proposition, nor is it a subjective inference from Christian experience. It is simply the

saving work of the Holy Spirit on the heart removing the spiritual blindness produced by sin, so that the marks of God's hand in the Bible can be clearly seen and appreciated. God testifies to the Bible by prophecy and miracle, by the greatness of the truths which it contains, by their suitability to our needs. But unrenewed man, while he may attain to a merely intellectual or "speculative" faith on the basis of rational arguments or the testimony of the Church, cannot savingly apprehend God nor see God as He is revealed as the author of the Scripture. Those who are born of the Spirit have their minds and hearts enlightened so that they are enabled and persuaded to accept the objective testimony which God gives to the Bible, and to recognize immediately or behold intuitively the marks of God's hand in the Scripture. Nothing intervenes between the human soul and the Word of God, but the soul is given the ability to see God as the Author of the Bible and to rest on its truths with a saving faith, or what the old theologians called *fides divina* because it rests on God's testimony, as distinguished from *fides humana* which rests simply on human testimony or rational arguments. The evidence for the divine origin of the Bible is not lacking, but the unrenewed man cannot be convinced by it. Hence while saving faith does not arise apart from evidence, and while normally, i.e. apart from the binding effects of sin, it could not be withheld when the evidence is present, it does not follow that it will arise when adequate evidence is present, because the heart and mind are blinded by sin so that they are not open to conviction. It was for this reason, as we saw, that Jesus traced unbelief to a condition of the heart, and that Paul represented the illumination of the Spirit as absolutely necessary to the apprehension of the truths of the Gospel. The Witness of the Spirit to the Bible, therefore, is not isolated, but a part of His saving work in the soul. He witnesses with our spirits that we are the sons of God; He enables us to recognize the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ; but He also takes away our spiritual blindness so that we see the glory of

God in His written Word as well as in His Incarnate Word. Just as an aesthetic sense is necessary for the appreciation of a work of art, so the restored religious sense is necessary for a saving apprehension of God and divine things, and so it is that, though the external attestation and the internal marks of divine authorship are not wanting to the Bible, until men are born again they will not be convinced, but when their spiritual sight is restored they see, not with a blind irrational feeling, but see and behold the divinity of the Bible. The Christian, therefore, believes the Bible ultimately on the testimony of God in His Word recognized by means of the testimony of God in his heart.

This doctrine was first adequately developed by Calvin. Following him it was taken up in Holland, France, England and Scotland. It received full recognition in the form in which Calvin developed it by Ursinus, Piscator, Zanchius, Wollebius, Wendelin, Maresius, Maccovius, and Heidegger.¹⁶

¹⁶ Calvin, *Institutes*. I. Cap. 7. Calvin devotes an entire chapter to the Witness of the Spirit to the Bible. He was the first to give the doctrine its full significance as the one absolutely indispensable condition of any adequate knowledge of God and divine things for *sinful* man. He taught that the ground of belief in the truth of Scripture is that God is its author (i. 7:4). But our sure persuasion of this is due to the inward Witness of the Spirit in the heart. The necessity for this Witness does not lie in any inadequacy or want of valid reasons for belief in the divine origin of the Bible. "It is true," he says, "that if we were inclined to argue this point, many things might be adduced which certainly evince, if there be any God in heaven, that He is the Author of the Law and the Prophecies and the Gospel. Even though men of learning and deep judgment rise up in opposition, and assert and display all the power of their minds in the dispute, yet unless they are wholly lost to all sense of shame, this confession will be extorted from them, that the Scripture exhibits the plainest evidences that it is God who speaks in it, which manifests its doctrine to be divine" (i. 7:4). The necessity for the Witness of the Spirit is subjective, and lies in the fact that our minds are blinded by sin and that it is true or saving faith, not mere intellectual assent, that is in question. Calvin says that in spite of the validity of the reasons for belief in Scripture "yet it is acting a preposterous part, to endeavor to produce sound faith in the Scripture by disputations"; and he adds that though he could refute all cavils, this would not "fix in their hearts that assurance which is essential to true piety" (i. 7:4).

It is taught in the same form and spirit by such modern Reformed theologians as Van Oostersee, Kuyper, and

As to the nature of this Witness, Calvin taught that it was an "internal witness" "fixing assurance in the heart", so that those "inwardly taught by the Spirit feel an entire acquiescence in Scripture, and that it is self-authenticated, carrying with it its own evidence, and ought not to be made the subject of demonstration and argument from reason, but obtains the credit which it deserves with us by the testimony of the Spirit" (i. 7:5). He also calls it a divine illumination of the mind which results in an immediate intuitive perception of God in the Scripture, and is therefore not through any process of inference (i. 7:5). He speaks of it once as a "revelation from heaven" (i. 7:5), but does not mean the revelation of a proposition or truth, as is clear from his attacks on the mystics. He is here referring simply to the supernatural or heavenly origin of this witness which the Christian has. Neither did Calvin conceive it as dispensing with the necessity for grounds or reasons of faith; he unfolds these in an entire Chapter,—i. 8. The Witness of the Spirit lies back of all grounds and is necessary in order that the objective evidence may have any effect on the sin-darkened mind. On Calvin's doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit, *vid.* B. B. Warfield, "Calvin's Doctrine of the Knowledge of God." *PRINCETON THEOL. REVIEW*, viii, pp. 219ff, especially pp. 262ff; also Pannier, *Le Témoignage Du Saint-Esprit*, pp. 63-116. For the history of the doctrine in France after the time of Calvin *vid.* Pannier, *op. cit.* pp. 136f.

The Reformed theologians of the age following Calvin expounded this doctrine in the same profound way that Calvin conceived it. They taught that the Bible is self-evidencing, bearing its own marks of divine origin; that man is blinded by sin and cannot attain true or saving faith by means of arguments or the "criteria" of divine authorship in the Bible; that true faith and full certitude are due to the regenerating and illuminating work of the Holy Spirit on the sinful heart. The Testimony of the Spirit for these theologians, then, is this work of the Spirit, and its effect is not a blind conviction without grounds, nor a mystical revelation of truth, but a well-grounded assurance of faith. Thus, for example, Ursinus, *Loci*. pp. 437ff, "Unicum testimonium est, solis Christi spiritu renatis proprium et his solis cognitum, cuius ea vis est, ut non modo veritatem doctrinae propheticae et apostolicae abunde in animis nostris testetur et obsignet, sed corda etiam ad amplectendam eam et sequendam efficaciter flectat et permoveat". Arguments are to be used to confirm faith but this Testimony of the Spirit alone makes us "acquiesce" in God's Word—"Quamvis enim hoc solum efficit, ut in verbo Dei acquiescamus, et solum etiam nobis abunde satisfacere debet: videbimus tamen ipsam quoque Scripturam postquam in isto summa certitudinis et consolationis nostrae constituit, etiam relique in medium affere, idque non sine ratione." Also Zanchius, *Op.* viii, 332-334, says that the testimony of no man can

Bavinck in Holland, and Charles Hodge in America.¹⁷ In Britain it was fully stated by such writers as Owen, Whit-

render us certain of the divine origin of Scripture. Neither can the Church give the Spirit who is the author of true faith. Not even the Scripture can do this, for though its divinity shines like the sun, the spiritually blind cannot discern it. This is done only by the work of the Spirit illuminating the mind. "Si Scriptura S. hoc ex se sola posset praestare, omnes qui illam aut audiunt, aut legunt, etiam agnoscerent, esse verbum Dei, cum revera sit verbum Dei. Non omnes hoc novunt, etsi legunt et audiunt . . . Etsi igitur Scriptura in se lumen est lucernaeque; accensa imo Sol splendidissimus: tamen sicut Sol non potest sese caeco homini quis et qualis sit patefacere, nisi caecus aliunde illuminetur: Ita Scriptura non potest sese agnoscendam re ipsa praebere cuiquam homini, nisi Spiritu S. mens hominis ad videndam Scripturae dignitatem illustretur; ac aures ad audiendum Deum in illis loquentem, aperiantur. Quare neque Scriptura sua sola dignitate et auctoritate quam habet sine Spiritu sancto sufficit ad hoc, ut quis eam agnoscat certum esse Dei verbum". Zanchius does not undervalue arguments such as the testimony of the Church; he simply asserts the necessity of the work of the Spirit on the heart before it can be convinced by evidence. One important point to notice is that Zanchius does not, like the Lutherans, identify the Testimony of the Spirit with the saving efficacy of the Scripture, but expressly distinguishes this latter as one of the marks of the divine origin of the Scripture, from the Testimony of the Spirit which gives effect to all the evidence—"Multas variasque Scripturae ipsius demonstrationes, tum ab ipsius in nobis vi et efficacia, tum a multis aliis rebus et effectis extra nos desumptas: quibus tanquam sigillis veritas in nobis per Spiritum S. obsignatur, ac nos in illa magis ac magis quotidie confirmamur, hanc sacram Scripturam verum ac vivum esse sermonem Dei." This testimony is an internal illuminating power of the Spirit of God in the heart—"Testimonium Spiritus S. intus in corde nobis testificantis et persuadentis, hoc esse verbum Dei: et simul mentem illuminantis, et coelestem veritatem atque excellentiam verbi ostendentis; atque ita efficientis, ut nos non solum certo credamus, sed etiam vere agnoscamus, Deum esse eum, qui in Scripturis loquitur". Similarly *vid.* Wollebius, *Compend. Theol. Christ.* pp. 3 and 4—In answer to the question how the "divinity of Scripture" is recognized by us, he says that the witness to this is twofold—"principal" and "instrumental" or "ministerial". The latter is the testimony of the Church, the former is the testimony of the Spirit *externally* in the Scripture which He inspired. But this external Witness is efficacious only by the internal Witness of the Spirit in the heart—"Testimonium autem hoc duplex principiale et ministrale. Principiale est testimonium Spiritus sancti; foris in ipsa Scriptura; intus vero in corde ac mente hominis fidelis ab ipso illuminati, loquentis, eique Scripturae divinitatem persuadentis. Ministrale vero testimonium est testimonium Ecclesiae." The same truths are

aker, Gillespie and others.¹⁸ The doctrine was not only not made use of by the Arminian theologians, but its validity was

taught by Piscator, *Explicatio Aphor. Doct. Christ.* Aph. vi. p. 94—True faith in the "authority" of Scripture is due to the Witness of the Spirit, because, though the Scripture is *αὐτόπistos*, man is blinded by sin—"Et si autem haec scriptura fidem apud omnes meretur, tanquam *θεόπνευστος* et *αὐτόπistos*: tamen testimonio Spiritus sancti sanciri eam in cordibus nostris oportet, ut nobis certa eius constet autoritas, ac proinde ut plenam ei fidem habeamus." Piscator illustrates this from the inability of the blind to see the sun—"Etsi sol clarissime lucet, tamen lumen ejus videre non potest caecus; ut autem videat, necesse est illuminari oculos ejus luce interiore. Ita nos natura sumus caeci in videndis rebus divinis clarissime in Scriptura propositis; ut autem eas videamus, necesse est illuminari oculos mentis nostrae per Spiritum sanctum." Maresius, *Systema Breve Universae Theol.* p. 11, brings out the following points—1. the Witness is both objective and internal; 2. it does not produce a "blind" faith, but is through the marks of God's hand in Scripture; 3. it is an illumination of the mind to see the divinity of Scripture; 4. it produces full certitude and true faith; 5. it witnesses to the divine origin of Scripture—"Sed quamvis haec et similia argumenta sive motiva, impiis redarguendis et convincendis apprime inserviant, tamen ut quis certitudine fidei persuadeatur Scripturam esse a Deo, . . . opus habet testimonio interno Sp. Sancti per illam ipsam Scripturam efficacis, in quod fides sua ultimo resolvatur, tanquam in sui causam efficientem principialem . . . Hac autem persuasionem nihil certius; cum lumen fidei ita se menti insinuet, ut per illud fidelis non solum credat, sed etiam se bene et vere credere certo sentiat." Maccovius, *Loci Communes.* Cap. 4, pp. 27, 28, teaches that the arguments for the divine authority of Scripture are not efficient without the Witness of the Spirit which is of the nature of an illuminating of the mind—"Verum enim vero haec argumenta omnia parum momenti adferunt ad credendum, nisi accesserit illuminatio mentis nostrae facta per Spiritum Sanctum, quam vocamus testimonium Sp. Sancti. Testimonium autem Sp. S. est lux quaedam ita mentem perfundens, ut eam leniter afficiat, ostendatque rationes ipsi rei, quae credenda proponitur, insitas, sed antea occultas". Wendelin teaches precisely the same doctrine,—*Christianae Theol. Libri*, i. p. 23—"Quaeritur inter nos et Pontificos; Unde pendeant Scripturae autoritas quoad nos? Seu, unde constet Scripturam esse divinam, vel a Deo inspiratam? Nos statuimus principaliter id constare: (1) Ex persuasionem Spiritus sancti, qui de divinitate sacrae Scripturae nos certos facit." Precisely the same is the view of Heidegger, *Corp. Theol.* Loc. ii. Secs. 12, 13, 14, 15, p. 28. The Spirit of truth opens the eyes of our hearts which are spiritually blind, so that we see the divinity manifest in God's Word—"Ille oculos nostros illuminat, ut videant in verbo ab ipsomet inspirato Divinitatis et *θεοπνεύμας* omnis radios. Ille, ceu sigillum Dei, quo obsignati sumus, 2 Cor. 1:22, nos tum per argumenta Divini:

denied.¹⁹ This was only the natural consequence of their naturalistic minimizing of the saving work of the Holy Spirit on the heart. And the same thing was true of the Socinians.²⁰ In the eighteenth century it was reduced to

tatis in verbo Dei splendentia tum supra ea, tum contra argumenta, quae caro et sanguis eidem opponit, certos reddit, quod verbum Scripturae a Deo et Deo dignum sit". No full historical sketch of the doctrine of these theologians has been given. Some material will be found in Heppe, *Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche*, pp. 20-22. The doctrine also found expression in the Reformed Symbols such as the Gallican Confession, the Belgic Confession, the Anglican Confession, and the first and second Helvetic Confessions; also in the Netherlands Confession, *vid.* Müller, *Die Bekenntnisschriften der Reformirten Kirche*; and also Pannier, *op. cit.*, pp. 124-136. Probably its best and most adequate confessional statement is that in the Westminster Confession i. 5—"We may be moved and induced by the testimony of the Church to a high and reverent esteem for the Holy Scriptures; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many and incomparable excellencies, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth, and divine authority thereof, is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word, in our hearts".

¹⁹ Van Oostersee, *Christian Dogmatics*, i. pp. 149-154. Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie Der Heilige Godgeleerdheid*, ii, pp. 501-511. H. Bavinck, *Gereformeerde Dogmatiek*, i, pp. 621-647. Charles Hodge, *Systematic Theology*, iii, p. 69; also *Way of Life*, pp. 13-28.

²⁰ John Owen, *The Reason of Faith, Works*, vol. iv. pp. 1-100, especially pp. 82ff. William Whitaker, *A Disputation on Holy Scripture*, pp. 332-358. George Gillespie, *Works*, vol. ii. pp. 105ff. John Ball, *A Treatise of Faith*, pp. 13, 14. John Arrowsmith, *Chain of Principles*, pp. 103, 104. W. Lyford, *Principles of Faith and Good Conscience*, p. 2; *The Plain Man's Senses Exercised*, p. 38. John White, *A Way to the Tree of Life*, pp. 44, 45. Edward Reynolds, *Works*, vol. v. pp. 154, 155. Cf. B. B. Warfield, "The Westminster Doctrine of Holy Scripture," in *THE PRESBYTERIAN AND REFORMED REVIEW*, iv. pp. 626ff.

²¹ Episcopius, *Instit. Theol.* iv. 1 cap. 5; Parag. 2. Limborch, *Theol. Christiana*, i. 4: parags. 15-17. In the case of these Remonstrant theologians *fides humana* and *rational arguments* are substituted for the *fides divina* and the Witness of the Spirit. This was the natural result of their semi-Pelagian ideas.

²² The Socinians also rejected the doctrine of the Witness of the Holy Spirit, holding that everything must be proved by reason, *vid.* Fock, *Der Socinianismus*, p. 336.

the argument from experience by some of the Supra-naturalists and Rationalists, as for example Baumgarten; and denied by others, such as Wegscheider.²¹ The attempted revival of the doctrine by Schleiermacher²² in reaction from Rationalism was only a spurious one, being wholly vitiated by the identification of the Holy Spirit with the spirit of man, and the reduction of the Witness to an argument from experience; while its attempted revival in Holland by Scholten did not rise in its conception above the argument from experience.²³

In the second place it is necessary to determine as briefly as possible the "content" or "object" of this Witness of the Holy Spirit to the Bible. To what in regard to the Bible is this testimony given? This witnessing, of course, is a part of the entire saving work of the Holy Spirit in the heart of the sinner. It is not something separate from the

²¹ Baumgarten, *Dogmatik*, pp. 120ff. reduced the Witness of the Spirit to the argument from experience. This is true also of Less, *Beweis der Wahrheit der christl. Relig.* pp. 141, 143; and also of Reinhard, *Dogmatik*, p. 65. Having been reduced thus by the Supra-naturalists to the argument from experience, it was rejected altogether by the Rationalists, *vid.* Brettschneider, *Handbuch der Dogmatik*, i. p. 206; Wegscheider, *Inst. Theol.* For an account of the treatment of the doctrine in the eighteenth century Rationalism *cf.* Martius, *op. cit.*, pp. 26ff.

²² Schleiermacher, *Der christl. Glaube*, parag. 142:2. The Testimony of the Spirit is, according to Schleiermacher, given through the mediation of Christians in the Church. The Witness is, therefore, the testimony of the collective experience of Christians to the Scripture, and though it gains thus a certain amount of objectivity in reference to the individual Christian, it does not go beyond the argument from experience. Moreover the identification of the Holy Spirit with the collective consciousness of Christians, does away with the very foundation of the doctrine of the Reformers. It is characteristic of the doctrine of the Reformers, and in this they followed the Scriptures closely, always to insist on the essential distinction between the Spirit of God and the finite spirit, and to maintain the personality and transcendence of the Holy Spirit. Schleiermacher's attempted revival of the doctrine was a spurious one.

²³ Scholten reduces the Witness of the Holy Spirit to the argument from experience and describes it as the "testimony of the heart and conscience" which are "purified by communion with Christ". *Cf.* Van Oostersee, *op. cit.*, i. p. 152.

whole of the Christian life. The Spirit does guide into all truth; brings us to confess Christ as Lord; testifies to the glory of Christ; makes believers know all things which have been given them by God; assures them of Divine Sonship. But the testimony of the Holy Spirit to the Bible, though closely connected with all this, is additional to this, and is not to be identified with the gift to the believer of assurance of faith. The conception which has been stated of the nature of this Witness determines its object. If it were a blind and groundless testimony, or the mystical communication of a proposition, then it might be supposed to include questions the determination of which must rest solely upon historical and critical and exegetical grounds. If we are to conceive of the Spirit as giving to the soul a truth such as—"The Bible is God's Word", why might He not say to us such and such a book is canonical or is not canonical, or that the Bible is plenary inspired? But the Witness is not the mystical communication of a truth, nor the causing to emerge in consciousness of a blind and unfounded faith. Hence it does not witness to questions which are to be determined by exegetical and historical considerations. The Spirit, then, does not testify to the nature or extent of the Bible's inspiration. These are questions to be exegetically determined, and which can be determined in no other way. Of course after we have determined what is the Bible's doctrine of inspiration, we must ask whether it is true. And here the evidences for the truth of the Bible must be brought in. And the efficacy of these on the heart will depend on the work of the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless the Witness of the Spirit is not to the nature of the inspiration of the Bible. An examination of the passages already cited from the old Reformed theologians will show that they did not conceive of the testimony of the Spirit as being to the doctrine of the Inspiration of Scripture. Piscator,²⁴ it is true, used the term *θεόπνευ-*

²⁴ Cf. passages cited from the Reformed Theologians in note No. 16. By using the term "inspiration," in this connection, to denote the divine origin of Scripture, the Reformed Theologians did not make the mistake

στος in speaking of that to which the Spirit bears witness, but the passage shows that he did not intend any particular doctrine of Inspiration, but rather the divine origin of the Scripture. In this he agreed with the other theologians cited who constantly spoke of the "divinity of Scripture" and said that this shone forth from it like the rays of the sun.

of supposing that the question of the nature of the Bible's inspiration could be determined otherwise than by the exegesis of the statements of the Scripture writers concerning the subject.

Quite different from this, however, is the view of W. Robertson Smith, followed by T. Lindsay, James Denney, J. P. Lilley, M. Dods, C. A. Briggs and others. These writers suppose that the term "inspiration" as applied to Scripture denotes simply the fact that the Bible is a means of grace through the influence of the Holy Spirit on the heart. This, according to them, constitutes its "inspiration." On this view we recognize the divine origin and truth of the Scripture by the Spirit's Witness through its saving power, and it is this saving power which gives the Scripture its authority, and which constitutes its "inspiration." In this way the idea of inspiration is lowered by the attempt to determine its nature, not by exegesis, but by asking what we find the Bible to be. Hence our idea of Scripture is substituted for that of the Bible concerning its own nature, and Scripture is regarded as a rule of faith only in so far as it is a means of grace. The Witness of the Spirit, therefore, instead of confirming the authority of Scripture, as it did in the Reformed Theology, becomes a means of erecting a subjective norm above the Bible, thus doing away with its authority as a rule of faith. Moreover the Witness of the Spirit, being thus reduced to the experience of the saving power of the Scripture, is supposed to be given directly or immediately to so much of the historical element in the Bible as our Christian consciousness finds essential. This essential part, it is supposed, will be left untouched by historical criticism which may do as it pleases with the supposedly non-essential parts of Scripture. In this way Christianity is supposed to be rendered independent of the results of historical criticism, in very much the same manner as the Ritschlian theologians believe it to be. A false subjectivism is thus introduced through the mistake of seeking to determine in a subjective way questions which can be settled only by an objective investigation of historical evidence. This entire view rests upon the mistake of supposing that, because saving faith is personal trust and not a mere intellectual assent, therefore its content cannot be given by an objective communication of truth by God. Hence Ritschl and his followers maintained that the Reformation idea of faith rendered necessary a new idea of revelation and inspiration, and they also claimed that they were the true successors of Calvin and Luther. In this they

Neither is the Witness of the Spirit to the Canonicity of any or all of the Biblical books. The Witness, not being the communication of any new knowledge or matter of fact, does not inform the Christian what books the Apostles imposed on the infant Church to be its rule of faith and practice. This is a question which requires historical investigation and which must be determined upon historical grounds. The appeal, from objective scientific considerations to the internal life of the Christian for the settlement of such questions, is not only vain; it has been used in the interests of an attempt to elevate the human mind and the Christian consciousness above the Scripture in a rationalistic spirit which accepts only what appeals to us. It is true that the old Protestant theologians did sometimes speak as if the Holy Spirit bore witness to the Canonicity of the books of Scripture, but in regard to this two remarks should be made. First, this is not their prevalent way of putting the matter. They almost invariably conceive of the Witness

were followed by W. Robertson Smith and the writers above mentioned, all of whom suppose that the seventeenth century theologians departed from the religious view of the first Reformers. They are mistaken in this. Calvin, as we have seen, believed that the Witness of the Spirit is to the divine origin of the Bible. The nature of inspiration is to be determined objectively by exegesis, and the Canon also objectively by historical investigation. We believe the Bible ultimately because the Spirit enables us to see that it is from God, but that does not in the least affect the truth that we are to seek to determine by exegesis what it says as to its inspiration. It is true that a mechanical view of inspiration was held by some of the Protestant theologians of the 17th and 18th centuries, but the majority of them taught the same high view held by Calvin and all of the early Reformers.

On the view which we have been criticising, see W. Robertson Smith, *What History Teaches Us to Seek in the Bible, Lectures and Essays*, Ed. by J. S. Black and G. W. Chrystal, pp. 207ff.; and especially *Answer to the Form of Libel*, pp. 18ff; T. M. Lindsay, "Professor W. Robertson Smith's Doctrine of Scripture," *Expositor*, Series iv. vol. 10, pp. 241ff; also the Doctrine of Scripture, *ibid.* Series v. vol. 1, pp. 278ff. J. Denney, *Studies in Theology*, pp. 204ff; M. Dods, *The Bible. Its Origin and Nature*, pp. 123ff, 135ff; J. P. Lilley, *Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles*, Appendix, p. 104; C. A. Briggs, *Introduction to the Study of Holy Scripture*, pp. 165ff.

of the Spirit as being to the "divinity" i.e. to the divine origin of the Scripture; and secondly, when they use the term Canon and Canonicity, they use it in a twofold sense to denote at once the idea of the extent of the canon of Scripture and the idea of the divine origin and authority of Scripture. And when they speak of Canonicity as being the object of the Witness of the Holy Spirit, it is the latter idea to which they usually refer. This is true for example in the case of Quenstedt,²⁵ and it is true also of the Reformed theologians. Calvin has been supposed to have held that the Spirit testified concerning what books are canonical, but this rests upon misapprehension.²⁶ Calvin's

²⁵ B. B. Warfield, *Princeton Theol. Rev.*, vol. viii, p. 291.

²⁶ Cf. B. B. Warfield, *ibid.*, pp. 283ff. Reuss, *History of the Canon*, etc. Chap. 16, and Pannier, *op. cit.*, p. 252, both seem to suppose that Calvin sought to determine the Canon of Scripture by means of the Witness of the Spirit. This rests, as Dr. Warfield has shown, on the misapprehension of two passages from Calvin. In *Inst.* i. 7:1, repelling the Romish idea that the Scripture has only such weight as the Church gives it, Calvin says, "For thus dealing with the Holy Spirit as a mere laughing stock, they ask, Who shall give us confidence that these (Scriptures) have come from God,—who assure us that they have reached our time safe and intact,—who persuade us that one book should be received reverently, another expunged from the number,—if the Church should not prescribe a certain rule for all these things. It depends, therefore, they say, on the Church, both what reverence is due Scripture, and what books should be inscribed in her catalogue." This quotation shows that the Romanists argued that the Church assures us of the contents and even the integrity of Scripture. But Calvin does not say that we are assured of the Canon by the Spirit. He says that the Romish view is wrong, but does not imply that the Witness of the Spirit assures us of all these things which the Church pretends to settle.

The other passage is in the *Confession of La Rochelle*, and does apparently attribute the determination of what books are Canonical to the Witness of the Spirit. But this Article was not by Calvin, but was added to a draft submitted by Calvin by the Synod of Paris. Calvin's own article did not contain this idea. Pannier, *op. cit.*, p. 141 cites Lespine, a Protestant disputant with two Doctors of the Sorbonne, as teaching that the Witness of the Spirit determines the Canon, but only indirectly by inference from the divine authorship of the books. All of the Reformed Theologians which we have cited in note 16, taught that it is to the divine origin of Scripture that the Witness of the Spirit is given, and though sometimes the word "canonical" is used, it seems to denote the idea of being authoritative and from God.

whole discussion shows clearly that he takes the Scriptures as a whole, conceives this as given on historical and critical grounds, and conceives of the Testimony of the Spirit as being to the divine origin of the Scripture.

If, however, an erroneous mystical view of the nature of the Witness of the Spirit to the Bible is mistaken in conceiving of this Witness as extending to exegetical and historico-critical questions, the view of the nature of the Spirit's Witness which confounds it with the argument from experience errs in limiting the object, to which the Witness is given, to the saving truths of the Bible or to the truth and divine origin of the revelation or the Gospel which the Bible records. If the Witness of the Spirit is identified with the testimony of Christian experience, it must of course be conceived of in this way. For Christian experience testifies not so much to the Bible, as to the saving truths of the Gospel, and from these truths it may extend or spread till it covers the Bible which contains these truths. But if the Witness of the Spirit is simply the experience of the saving power of the Gospel, it obviously can extend only indirectly to the Bible as a whole, and only indirectly also to any fundamental Christian truths which transcend experience. There is no immediate Witness to the nature of the future life of the Christian, any more than there is to the Virgin Birth of Christ. This is the view of the modern Lutherans and of all who identify the Witness of the Spirit with the argument from Christian experience, as well as of some who do not fall into this mistake.²⁷ But

²⁷ In the case of Quenstedt *op. cit.* p. 140, it is not so clearly stated that it is the "saving truths of Scripture" as distinct from the Scripture, to which the testimony is given. Baier *op. cit.*, p. 86, in the passage already cited regards the testimony of the Spirit as being given to the "doctrines comprehended in the Scriptures". Hollaz says that it is the "written word" which we "read from" these Scripture books, cf. *op. cit.*, 125. It cannot be said, however, that the old Lutheran theologians carried out the logic of their view of the nature of the Witness of the Spirit, so as to make a sharp distinction between the saving truths which the Scripture contains and the Scripture itself. This has been done by Klaiber, *op. cit.*, pp. 17f, 30f, Martius *op. cit.* p. 43, Philippi, *op. cit.* i. pp. 135f. This also is the view of

this idea of the object of the Spirit's Witness results from a wrong view of its nature. There is a witness of our experience to the saving truths of the Gospel, such as Justification, Divine Sonship, the power of Christ to save. The divine origin of these great truths may be inferred from the experience of their saving power, as may also the divine origin of the Bible which contains them. But since this is after all the witness, not of God to us, but of our experience to the Word of God, it can bear direct witness only to that which it feels to be divine.

The Witness of the Spirit is the Witness of God to us. It therefore proceeds in the opposite way from the argument from experience. It is a witness to the Bible itself as such and as a whole, and hence by inference we may proceed to infer the divine and revelatory character of the contents of the Scripture. When our eyes have been opened and our spiritual blindness has been removed, we can see in the Bible itself all the marks of its divine authorship. The saving power of some of these truths is only one of these marks. It is the Book itself which we are enabled by the Spirit to perceive could have its origin only from God. When with unclouded spiritual eyes we look upon the Bible as a whole, we immediately see the evident marks of its divine authorship, just as one with aesthetic sense sees the marks of the master in the masterpiece. The Witness of the Spirit, therefore, is not to the revelation contained in Scripture which "finds us" and thence to the Scripture as a whole, but directly to the divine origin of the Scripture as a whole, spreading from this to its contents. It does not, therefore, assure us immediately of the Virgin Birth or of the Resurrection of Christ, any more than it does of the truth of the Old Testament history or the doctrine of such Reformed theologians as Van Oostersee, *op. cit.* i. p. 151, and H. Bavinck, *op. cit.*, pp. 639ff. Bavinck conceives the Testimony of the Spirit as given directly to the doctrines of Scripture, and as spreading from them to the historical parts of Scripture with which they are inseparably connected. John De Witt, *op. cit.* p. 81, also conceives the Testimony of the Spirit as being given to the saving truths of the Gospel contained in the Scripture.

eternal punishment. But it does assure us that this Book is of divine origin and authority so that it supports these great facts and truths mediately and by way of inference. It is, in a word, simply this—God has left the marks of His authorship on the Bible, and the Spirit of God opens our eyes to behold in Scripture the marks of its divine authorship or origin.

The third question which arises concerns the bearing of this doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit upon the value and necessity of Christian Apologetics which aims at an objectively valid and rational defence of the Christian view of the world and the divine and supernatural origin of Christianity and of the Bible. Does the fact that, because of the blindness of the sinful heart, faith is the gift of God's Spirit, do away with the value or necessity of evidence for the divine origin of the Bible? In seeking briefly to answer this question, three things must be kept in mind. First, the Witness of the Spirit is not a ground of faith among other grounds. It cannot, therefore, be substituted for the grounds of faith. The Holy Spirit in Regeneration is the efficient cause of faith. We believe, therefore, by means of this Witness, not on account of it. The Witness, therefore, does not dispense with the value or necessity of the grounds of faith, or in this instance, the marks on account of which we recognize that God is speaking to us in the Scripture. It is true that we must be gifted with an aesthetic sense in order to recognize the masterpiece or painting and to discriminate it from that which has no aesthetic value. But given this aesthetic sense, the marks of the master's hand must be present in the work of art or there will be no marks for us to see and recognize. Just so God's Spirit opens the eye of faith, but that eye beholds an object and recognizes the hand of God in the Bible. Second, it must be remembered that the reason why saving faith in Christ, Christianity, and the Bible cannot be produced by evidence or arguments, is not due to any insufficiency of evidence or any want of reasons of universal validity and

objective character, but is due to the subjective inability of the sinful heart to be affected by such evidence. If the evidence were insufficient or invalid, what would be needed would be more or better evidence. But such additional evidence the Spirit does not supply. He opens the sin-blinded eyes and prepares the heart, so that the evidence may have its proper effect. Third, it must be borne in mind that saving faith, like all faith, is a grounded conviction. It does not differ from knowledge or from a merely "historic" or "speculative" faith in that the latter rests on grounds or evidence while saving faith does not. Nor is the distinction that the grounds of knowledge and of "speculative" faith are objective, valid and sufficient, while those of saving faith are not. The distinction lies in the nature of the evidence and in the source of the mental act in each case. In knowledge the conviction of mind is based on the internal testimony of sense perception, self-consciousness, and reason. In the case of faith, the conviction is based on testimony external to the subject. In religious faith, it is the testimony of God Himself. In reference to the Scripture, God has borne witness in it to His own authorship, and faith in this is grounded in these criteria of its divine origin. The distinction between a merely speculative faith in God's Word produced by evidence, and saving faith and trust in it, lies further in the fact that the source of the latter consists in the regenerating and illuminating work of the Holy Spirit on the sinner's heart. Because you cannot make a man a Christian by merely presenting him with arguments addressed to his intellect, it does not by any means follow that he can be made a Christian apart from all evidence of the truth of Christianity. Nor does it follow, because you cannot argue a man into a saving belief in the divine origin of the Bible without the work of God's Spirit in his heart, that therefore all such evidence is valueless. True faith is God's gift, but He gives no blind faith and no ready-made faith. He prepares our hearts and minds so that the evidence of the divine origin of the Bible being

presented, the prepared heart responds to the evidence because its sinful blindness has been removed. It is true, therefore, that saving faith will not arise without the Witness of the Spirit, but neither will it arise without some evidence valid for the subject of the faith. Let us emphasize the fact that saving faith cannot be produced by arguments, not even by the revelation of God in Christ, because the soul is dead in sin; but let us remember that there is always evidence of some kind present when saving faith arises, and that objectively there is adequate and sufficient evidence for the divine origin of Christianity and the Bible, and that this is logically the prius of our personal act of faith. The Witness of the Spirit, therefore, is absolutely necessary to Christian faith and Christian certitude. Without it all evidence and all arguments are useless to produce any true faith and full certitude of faith. Nevertheless it does not do away with the place and value of the evidence both internal and external for the divine origin of Christianity and the Bible.

This statement will enable us to see the mistake underlying two chief misconceptions upon this point. The Ritschlian theologians with their distinction between religious and theoretic knowledge, their depreciation of Christian Apologetics, and their doctrine of value-judgments, have invariably claimed to be the true successors of Luther and Calvin, and to have rescued Protestantism from a rationalistic intellectualism. They thus practically identify their idea that religious knowledge consists in "judgments of value" with the doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit as taught by the Reformers. The two doctrines are totally different. The one is the fruit of a fundamental religious agnosticism; the other of a deep evangelicalism. They differ first in regard to the evidences or grounds of faith. According to the Ritschlian, these are not objectively valid or rationally sufficient. There is, therefore, a deficiency of universally valid evidence. On the other hand, according to the old Protestant theologians, this deficiency is not in the

objective evidence but in the spiritual condition of the subject of faith. The evidence fails of effect because the heart is spiritually dead. In the second place, there is a fundamental difference in the conception of the subjective hindrance to a rational faith. According to the Ritschlian position there is a fundamental dualism between the heart and the head apart from the effect of sin, a dualism which is fatal to Christian faith. What the Ritschlian means to say is that theoretic knowledge is limited to phenomena, and therefore faith has free scope in the sphere of the transcendent objects of religious faith. But this separation of spheres is impossible, and where a rationally grounded faith in God and His supernatural modes of action is given up, one of two positions only remains, each fatal to Christian faith. Either we must say that with the heart we believe in supernatural Christianity although our head tells us it is impossible, in which case faith cannot survive because it cannot be compelled; or else we must reduce our Christianity to the limits of our philosophy and eliminate from it all that Naturalism forbids us to retain. Then we shall have given up supernatural Christianity. We shall not even be able to say that we believe in the Deity of Christ because of His value to the Christian heart, but only that His Deity consists in His value to the Christian heart. Christianity is thus reduced to the basis of the bare natural religious sentiment. In all this there is a fatal dualism between the head and the heart, between faith and knowledge, which is incurable because rooted in human nature as such, and which does away with the rational basis of all religious faith and tends to reduce the religious consciousness to a merely subjective feeling without any sure objective reference or validity.²⁸

²⁸ In erecting a sharp distinction between religious and theoretic knowledge, such as is found in Ritschl's *Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung* and in Herrmann's *Verkehr des Christen mit Gott* and his early work *Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen u. zur Sittlichkeit*, it was not intended to assert that we can believe a thing to be true on one set of grounds and know it to be false or impossible on

Totally different from this is the doctrine of the Witness of the Holy Spirit. The subjective hindrance here is superinduced by sin. The dualism in man is between the carnal mind which is at enmity with God and the things of God's Spirit which can only be spiritually discerned. When, therefore, the sinful soul is born again by the almighty and supernatural power of the Spirit, its original capacity for the knowledge of God is restored, and experiencing in the heart the power of God, it is prepared to recognize the divine power as it wrought for man's salvation from sin objectively in the Person and work of Jesus Christ.

There is a second view which depresses the value of Christian Apologetics because of the doctrine of the Witness of the Holy Spirit. This view is totally removed from the naturalistic and rationalistic presuppositions which underlie another set of grounds. Such a position has been unfairly attributed to the Ritschlian theologians, but it misrepresents them. What was intended was the assertion that so called "theoretic knowledge" is limited to the sphere of science so that it cannot encroach upon the sphere of the objects of religious faith. But quite apart from the question as to whether knowledge can thus be limited, the Ritschlians were unable to keep faith and knowledge, or religion and philosophy, in these separate spheres. Their phenomenalist theory of knowledge and their rejection of metaphysics from theology necessarily resulted in a reduction of the content of faith at the demand of their philosophical position. Hence, since the metaphysical theology reached back into the New Testament, their doctrine of religious knowledge depressed the authority of Scripture after the fashion of Rationalism, and did not exalt the authority of Scripture as did the doctrine of the Witness of the Holy Spirit. The value-judgment is not a witness to Scripture but an instrument for sifting out the truth from the Scripture. Kaftan attempted to vindicate the objective character of religious knowledge and the unity of truth in his *Wahrheit der Christl. Religion*, but in his distinction between Opinion, Faith, and Knowledge, he brings back the old dualism. Wobbermin, *Der Christliche Gottesglaube in seinem Verhältniss zur gegenwärtigen Philosophie*, has perhaps done more justice to the task of Christian Apologetics than any other of the Ritschlian theologians. It has an "indirect use" i.e., the Christian faith objectively may be rationally defended; but directly in the genesis of saving faith reasons are of no value. But Wobbermin's position is unsatisfactory. The faith which the Holy Spirit gives is not a blind or groundless faith, and while no amount of evidence will make a man a Christian, it does not follow that faith will arise apart from all evidence.

derlie the Ritschlian position. It is rooted in the deeply evangelical spirit and thorough supernaturalism characteristic of Calvin and all the Reformed theologians. It is due to a deep sense of the effects of sin and of the power of God's grace. We refer to the view of Drs. Kuyper and Bavinck. They argue that, because saving faith is due to the Witness of the Spirit, and because arguments do not produce the conviction of the Christian, therefore rational grounds of faith may be dispensed with. Apologetics has a secondary place, and is the "fruit" of faith. Bavinck²⁹ seeks to show that Christian certitude is not the result of Christian experience which really grows out of it, nor of arguments which cannot give absolute certitude or true faith, but that it simply flows from faith itself which springs up in a renewed heart in contact with Christ. Kuyper³⁰ has fully worked out these principles in his profound discussion of the effects of sin and of regeneration upon our knowledge and upon science. The unregenerate and the regenerate form two classes, distinct in kind and hence totally removed the one from the other in their intellectual processes and products. The one class is working out a science under the obscuring effects of sin, the other under the illumination of the Spirit in regeneration. No arguments can lead from one sphere to the other, hence no arguments for the science of the regenerate can be regarded as universally valid. Apologetics is of secondary importance. It is for the benefit of the Christian and for the purpose of defending Christian faith, and not for the purpose of grounding it or serving under the Spirit's power to produce faith.

We have seen, however, that the doctrine of the Witness of the Spirit does not imply this attitude to the arguments for the divine origin of Christianity. Saving faith, as was said, cannot be produced by arguments, nor indeed by the revelation of God in Christ, because faith and unbelief depend on the condition of the heart, and the soul is dead in

²⁹ Bavinck, *Zekerheid des Geloofs*³, pp 63ff.

³⁰ Kuyper, *Encyclopaedie der heilige Godgeleerdheid*, ii., Afd. 1, Hoofdst. 2 and 3, pp. 52-129.

sin. The ultimate source of faith is the power of the Spirit. But faith is not blind, and rational grounds may enter into the grounds of even saving faith, and without some grounds valid for the subject, it cannot arise. In the case of faith in the divine origin of the Bible, no doubt the marks of God's hand and His self-revelation in the Scripture are the ultimate grounds of faith. But they are nevertheless evidences or reasons for belief, and in fully recognizing these, Drs. Kuyper and Bavinck admit a reason for faith which is after all universally valid, and apart from the effects of sin on the mind would be recognized as such. Consider for a moment Dr. Kuyper's two classes of men, the regenerate and the unregenerate. Since the difficulty with the latter and that which discriminates them from the former is subjective, lying in the state of the heart, it follows that the reasons for the faith of the former are universally valid, and under the influence of the Spirit may be instrumental even in the increase of saving faith in the world. If the trouble with the unregenerate is in their own heart, it follows that there is nothing the matter with the grounds of faith. In addition to this, so far as their subjective condition is concerned, the difference is not absolute. In the one class, sin has destroyed no faculty of the soul and some religious sense is kept alive by Common Grace. In the other class, regeneration has not removed all at once the effects of sin on the heart and mind. This is not at all to be understood as implying that the transition from the unregenerate class to the regenerate class can be effected by arguments. This, we repeat, can be brought about only by the Spirit of God and His almighty power. It is only intended to indicate that in themselves the evidences of Christianity are universally valid, and that even in regard to the production of saving faith they play an important part, while as grounds of Christian certitude of the divine origin of Christianity and the Bible they are indispensable, since the Witness of the Spirit is the efficient cause, and not one of the grounds of faith.

All this, however, does not in the least minimize the absolute necessity of the Witness of the Holy Spirit, without whose light in our hearts we would grope in darkness, unable to be convinced by any evidence, and too blind to see the glory of God as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ and in the pages of the Word of God.

Princeton.

C. WISTAR HODGE.

DR. WATTS' "RENOVATION OF PSALMODY" *

IV.

HIS INFLUENCE UPON THE ENGLISH HYMN

In attempting now to estimate the place of Dr. Watts in the history of the English Hymn, it is convenient to distinguish the bearings of his work and influence upon the development of the Hymn itself, upon the production of hymns, and upon Hymn Singing.

As to *the Hymn*. Watts undertook to construct Congregational Song *de novo*. He offered his System of Praise to the churches as a substitute for all that they had been accustomed to sing; and as such it came to be received in its full scope and entirety by vast numbers of people to whom the old Psalmody, or the earlier Hymnody, became as though they had never been. Even to historians of English Hymnody the work of Watts has bulked so large as to throw a deep shadow of obscurity over all his predecessors. Thus Montgomery makes the oft-quoted remark that "Watts may almost be called the inventor of hymns in our language"; regarding him as so far departing from all precedent, "that few of his compositions resemble those of his forerunners", and as establishing a precedent to all his successors.²²³ Again, Mr. Horder in his *Hymn Lover*,²²⁴ calls Watts "the real founder of English Hymnody," and claims that "what Ambrose was to the Latins; what Clement Marot was to the French; what Luther was to the Germans; that, and perhaps more, was Watts to the English."

It is difficult to regard Watts, as Montgomery does, as

* Being the third of the lectures upon "The Hymnody of the English-speaking Churches," delivered on the L. P. Stone Foundation at Princeton Theological Seminary in February 1910.

²²³ *The Christian Psalmist*, Glasgow, 1825, Introductory Essay, p. xx.

²²⁴ W. G. Horder, *The Hymn Lover*, London, n. d., p. 96.

altogether or almost the inventor of English hymns; and surely Mr. Horder has put Watts' work somewhat out of perspective. Ambrose stands at the fountain head of all metrical Congregational Song; and Sternhold, not Watts, is the English sponsor of the movement to provide the people with vernacular songs, which Luther and Marot represent. When Watts wrote, great stores of metrical Psalm versions had been accumulating for a century and a half. Some passages from these Watts incorporated into his own work: many more, equally available, lay ready to his hand. Even the "Christianized" Psalms of Watts were a development rather than a creation, as has already appeared. Of hymns, in the narrower sense, there were many, and of good hymns not a few. If Watts had lacked his gift of hymn writing but retained his practical sagacity, he could have compiled an English hymn book out of existing materials, whose excellence would not be questioned today. With Marckant, Austin, Wither, Cosin, Herbert, Tate, Mason, Ken, Baxter, Herrick, Crossman and Stennett, still holding a place in our hymn books, it is idle to regard Watts as inventing the English Hymn.

It may even be that Watts could not write a better hymn than Ken's Morning and Evening hymns, a more useful Christmas hymn than Tate's "While shepherds watched," or a Sunday hymn with more of tender charm than Mason's "My Lord, my Love, was crucified." But he could bring to bear upon his hymn writing a discernment, and a combination of resources, spiritual, intellectual, poetic, utilitarian, possessed by none of his predecessors or all of them if put together. He was not alone in perceiving that an acceptable evangelical Church Song was a spiritual need of his time, but he had the ability to foresee, as other men could not, the possibilities and limitations of the Congregational Hymn in filling that need. With great assiduity he dedicated his ample gifts to the embodiment of what he saw. He produced a whole cycle of religious song which his own ardent faith made devotional, which his manly and lucid mind made

simple and strong, which his poetic feeling and craftsmanship made rhythmical and often lyrical, and which his sympathy with the people made hymnic. Probably the whole body of his work appealed alike to the people of his time, whose spiritual needs he so clearly apprehended. The larger part of his work proved to be an abiding enrichment of Church Song, and to many its only adequate expression. His best hymns remain permanently, after the winnowing of two centuries, among the classics of devotion.

But Watts' work was more than an extensive reinforcement of the stores of available hymns. By the force of its very fitness it established a definite and permanent type of English Hymn. And this type, rather than any particular hymns, is the real expression of Watts' mind and purpose, and constitutes his special discovery. Purposing to construct Church Song anew, he sought for the true basis of a sympathetic devotion. He found it not in a poet's mind, but in the thoughts and feelings and aspirations held in common by the largest number of Christians. That common ground he selected as the available area of Congregational Song, within which he sank his foundations, and proceeded to erect his System of Praise on lines kept within the same limits by careful measurement. By this criterion Watts' work may be tried, both as to form and substance.

(a) *As to Form.* Watts invented no hymn measures, but fell back upon the rudimentary forms of verse used in Psalm singing. In the original edition of his *Hymns*, he confined himself to the three simplest and most often used metres of the current *Sternhold and Hopkins*,—common, long and short. In the second edition, he added the metre of their 148th Psalm,—6. 6. 6. 6. 4. 4. 4. 4. In the *Psalms imitated* he rendered "some few Psalms in Stanza's of six, eight or twelve lines, to the best of the old Tunes." He sought no musical development of Congregational Song, beyond a better rendering of the Psalm tunes. He rather accommodated himself to the conditions of musical decadence surrounding him, with a view to immediate usefulness; say-

ing,²²⁵ "I have seldom permitted a Stop in the middle of a Line, and seldom left the end of a Line without one, to comport a little with the unhappy Mixture of Reading and Singing, which cannot presently be reformed."

The Hymn Form thus indicated is even simpler and more restricted than that of the earlier metrical Psalm. But in Watts' own hands the succession of rhythmic periods acquires a dignity of cadence peculiarly satisfying, and, with his pure and nervous English, constitutes a hymn style in pleasing contrast with the halting measures of Sternhold and Hopkins and the rather rippling effects of Tate and Brady. With his eye on the practical requirements of common song, Watts gave to the Hymn Form other features that distinguish it from the formlessness of the metrical Psalm:—the adaptation of the opening line to make a quick appeal, the singleness of theme that holds the attention undivided, the brevity and compactness of structure and the progression of thought toward a climax, that give the Hymn a unity.

(b) *As to Substance.* The content of the Hymn, as Watts conceived it, was Scriptural, as being a response to Scripture. It was an evangelical interpretation of revealed truths as appropriated by the believer. The adoration of God in nature and providence being expressed in the Psalms, the great theme of the Hymn proper became the Gospel in the full width of its range, including its deliverance from the terrors of the law. The Hymn thus became primarily an expression of Christian experience.

This raises the question whether Watts stands sponsor for the homiletical ideal of the Hymn, as against the liturgical. He was trained in that conception of worship which the sermon and not the season dominates; and plainly he designed his hymns to meet the demand from the pulpit for hymns that would illustrate and enforce the sermon themes. This demand was undoubtedly one of the moving causes in the change of Nonconformist Praise from Psalmody to Hymnody. Granting that the sermon was Scriptural,

²²⁵ Preface of 1719, p. xxvii.

Watts' conception of the Hymn as a response to Scripture made such an use of hymns natural; and, granting that the minds and hearts of the people were centred in the sermon, the homiletical use of hymns would not necessarily interfere with the best interests of Congregational Song.

Whether for good or ill, there is no doubt that Watts, both by his example in appending hymns to his own printed sermons, and by supplying so many hymns adapted to being appended to other people's sermons, greatly encouraged the homiletical use of hymns. But his hymns are seldom homilies, and they are made liturgical, in the broad sense of that word, by confinement within the common ground of Christian experience and avoidance of individualism, whether elevated or eccentric. They are filled also with reverence and a deep sense of God's majesty and goodness, that evoke a recurring note of adoration and praise. And, before committing Watts to the homiletical ideal of the Hymn, we must remember that his own hymns were designed to be used in connection with Psalms as a single System of Praise.

In doctrine the hymns of Watts were Calvinistic in tone and often in detail. This was not from any polemical intent, but because Calvinism was the form of belief held in common by the writer and the singers. He aimed to avoid "the more obscure and controverted Points of Christianity" and "the Contentious and Distinguishing Words of Sects and Parties . . . that whole Assemblies might assist at the Harmony, and different Churches join in the same Worship without Offence". He held that in "Treatises of Divinity which are to be read in private", precision of statement should be aimed at, but that in hymns expressions should be sought "such as are capable of an extensive Sense, and may be used with a charitable Latitude. . . . that what is provided for publick Worship shou'd give to sincere Consciences as little Vexation and Disturbance as possible".²²⁶ This was no more than to carry into the sphere of

²²⁶ Preface of 1707, pp. vii, viii.

belief the same search for the common ground he had already made in the sphere of experience. Watts lived long enough to see the common ground of belief much narrowed by the Arian movement, and to read the polemical Hymnody of the Calvinistic controversy. And in the course of time it has no doubt become impracticable for the Churches to confine their Hymnody to the things held in common. Nevertheless there are but few today who would question the soundness of the principle announced by Watts, or seek to use the Hymn as a weapon of polemics rather than as a bond of union.

Of Watts' determination to keep the Hymn within the common ground in the sphere of the understanding, nothing needs to be said, beyond noting his success in carrying out that aim. His remarks upon the subject were in fact addressed to literary critics, who he feared would misunderstand the purpose of his work. But in the aim itself there was nothing really novel. It involved nothing more than loyalty to the Protestant principle that every part of public worship should be conducted in a language understood by the people.

V.

HIS INFLUENCE UPON HYMN WRITING: THE SCHOOL OF WATTS

Upon the *production of hymns* also Dr. Watts' work exercised a great influence, not wholly for good. The art that hides art beneath apparent simplicity seems to the observer to be the most imitable of all literary forms: and a success so striking as that of Watts inevitably breeds imitators. Moreover the reiterated assurances of Watts' prefaces that his hymns were not poetry, but only measured verse written down to the level of the meanest capacity, were a distinct encouragement to many who could not write poetry to believe they could write hymns. In this way Watts' hymns became a direct model for the construction of

other hymns, and he became unconsciously the founder of a school of hymn writers.

The five familiar hymns of Joseph Addison appeared in *The Spectator* between July and October, 1712, five years after the publication of Watts' *Hymns*. When two had thus appeared, there followed in the number for August 19, an unsigned letter from Watts himself, alleging that the reading of them had encouraged him to try his own hand, and accompanied by a version of Psalm 114, afterwards included in his *Psalms imitated*. Looking behind this pleasantry, we may infer the actual connection between the two writers to be that Watts' example and influence had encouraged the older poet to write hymns. But Addison had his own thoughts and style, and if an actual follower of Watts in hymn writing, was no imitator of him, and was not especially of his school.

The exact measure of Watts' influence upon the Wesleys is not easily appraised. We know that when John Wesley went on his mission to Georgia, he took with him the *Psalms and Hymns*, and that in his first hymn book, printed at Charleston in 1737, a large part of the contents is by Watts. Some of his hymns found permanent place in the Wesleyan books, and both brothers felt high admiration for them. But other influences affected the Wesleys more deeply, and are more evident in their original and translated work. Watts served them by way of suggestion and encouragement rather than as furnishing a model for their own hymns.

With Watts' contemporary and friend, Dr. Doddridge, it is different. His hymn writing was one of several lamps "kindled at Watts' torch".²²⁷ The hymns were homiletical in motive, mostly intended to be sung in his own chapel at the Castle Hill, Northampton, after the particular sermon in the glow of whose composition they were composed. After Doddridge's death 370 of the hymns were published by his friend Job Orton, with quite superfluous notes, as *Hymns founded on various texts in the Holy Scriptures. By the*

²²⁷ His *Rise and Progress* and Catechism in verse were others.

late Reverend Philip Doddridge, D.D. (Salop, 1755). They reached a second edition in 1759, and a third in 1766, with small additions. Many reprints followed, and the *Hymns* gained the place of a standard publication. The book does not range technically with the "Supplements to Watts", but already in 1755 a letter of Mrs. Doddridge speaks of numerous ministers intending to introduce it in that capacity,²²⁸ and such it actually became in fact. The effect of it was to augment by so much the available body of hymns of the Watts type, covering some new themes and special occasions with hymns of decided merit and usefulness. Doddridge must be accounted first scholar in the School of Watts. Chronologically he had been preceded by Simon Browne. But Browne's hymns as a whole hardly justified their existence, whereas Doddridge's constituted a worthy extension of Watts', and the best of them attained a position to be described as classical.

Dr. Thomas Gibbons, the next in the succession of Independent hymn writers, took his impulse from Watts, without sharing Watts' gift. Nor could he succeed in getting either of his collections already referred to into the churches. The earlier one has, however, the special interest of containing the hymns of his friend President Davies of Princeton, whose Mss. had come into Gibbons' hands. And President Davies' hymns remain as an interesting testimony of how far Watts' influence had spread. They attained wider liturgical use than those of Gibbons, and at least two of them²²⁹ have proved permanently useful. But in the work of both writers we can detect the beginnings of that process which perpetuates the form and manner of a literary type apart from its original inspiration. Neither Watts nor Doddridge had been free from a tendency to prosaic dullness, and at

²²⁸ John Stoughton, *Philip Doddridge*, ed. Boston, 1853, p. 120, note.

²²⁹ These are "Lord, I am thine, entirely thine", and "Great God of Wonders! all thy Ways". For a reprint of Davies' hymns and a study of them by the present writer, see *Journal of The Presbyterian Historical Society* for Sept. and Dec., 1904.

the weaker hands of their imitators this tendency found a marked development.

The most popular, after Watts, of XVIIIth century Independent hymn-writers, was Joseph Hart, who is usually reckoned a disciple of the School of Watts. He published in 1759 (119) *Hymns composed on various subjects, with the Author's experience*, to which later supplements added some hundred more. They were introduced in his own chapel in Jewin Street, London, with immediate acceptance, and gained a wide use among Calvinistic Nonconformists of different connections. Repeated editions were called for, and their reprinting has continued till the present time. An inspection of these hymns makes it evident that Hart was not of Watts' school. His work addresses a lower plane of education and taste than Watts, with his eminently respectable surroundings, had in mind. Moreover a congregation bred to sing only Psalms and hymns of the Watts type could not have carried these strange measures, which were fitted to the melodies of the Methodist Revival. These warm and even passionate strains are explained by Hart's associations with the Moravians, in one of whose chapels he was converted, and these new measures he learned in his attendance at the Tabernacle at Moorfields. Hart belongs rather with that evangelistic movement, with which, whether Calvinistic or Arminian, Watts had little sympathy.

On the Baptist side of Independency also, Watts became a controlling influence. We have already traced the beginnings of a Particular Baptist Hymnody down to Stennett's *Hymns for the Holy Ordinance of Baptism* of 1712. Then followed a breach in Baptist hymn making. In the thirty-seven years following, the silence was broken only by two faint voices. In 1734 Mrs. Anne Dutton appended a group of hymns to her poem on *The Wonders of Grace*, and in 1747 Daniel Turner of Reading published *Divine Songs, Hymns and other Poems*.²⁸⁰

²⁸⁰ Turner is best known through his enlargement (pub. 1794) of Jas. Fanch's "Beyond the glittering starry skies".

The year 1750 begins a new period in Baptist hymn writing, but it is a Hymnody of the School of Watts. Benjamin Wallin's *Evangelical Hymns and Songs* of that year counted for something, but two volumes of *Poems on subjects chiefly devotional*, by Theodosia (Bristol, 1760) counted for much. The hymns of Anne Steele appearing thus, and in a posthumous third volume (Bristol, 1780), were framed on the familiar model, but added a new note to the contents of the English Hymn. Exchanging the common ground for the feminine standpoint, she gave us the Hymn of Introspection and of intense devotion to Christ's person, expressed in fervid terms of heightened emotion. Composing under the shadow of affliction and ill-health, she added to English Hymnody the plaintive, sentimental note.

A number of these hymns remain in common use, and Miss Steele is still regarded as the foremost Baptist hymn writer. But the measure of our regard for her hymns reflects but faintly the enthusiasm of their welcome. Those concerned for a Baptist Hymnody soon perceived that a great light had arisen among themselves: it had become practicable to consider the compilation of denominational hymn books to supplement Watts. Through these, already noted, her hymns became known in all English Churches; and through reprints of these and also a Boston reprint of her poems,²⁸¹ they became eventually familiar in America. So far reaching and so deep was the impression made by Miss Steele that when Jeremy Belknap published his *Sacred Poetry* at Boston, 1795, he was moved to include her hymns to an extent justifying him in devoting nearly half of his preface to a biographical sketch of her. And when the people of Trinity Church, Boston, grew weary of the authorized Psalmody, and the vestry ventured in 1808 to print a parochial hymn book, 59 of its 152 hymns are Miss Steele's; a tribute, as the preface explains "to her poetical superiority, and to the ardent spirit of devotion which breathes in her

²⁸¹ *The Works of Mrs. Anne Steele*, Boston, 1808, 2 vols., 16mo. (a reprint of the English ed. of 1780).

compositions." It is easy to understand that the depth and sincerity of feeling in Miss Steele's hymns made Tate and Brady and even Watts seem cold. But in the course of time it has become plain to many that those of her hymns that were most closely patterned on Watts were also those best adapted to congregational use.

There were now practical inducements for hymn writing, and the years from 1760 till towards the close of the XVIIIth century constitute what is still the only very significant era of Baptist Hymnody. Miss Steele was followed in 1768 by John Needham of Bristol, whose *Hymns devotional and moral on various subjects* added 263 to the available store, but added nothing in the way of advance on his great model, Dr. Watts, whom he closely imitated. At the West, Benjamin Beddome was producing a weekly hymn for use after his sermon at Bourton. Some of these appeared in Baptist hymn books during his life, and in 1817 no less than 830 were gathered up by Robert Hall as *Hymns adapted to public worship or family devotion, now first published from the manuscripts of the late Rev. B. Beddome, M.A.* In merit and in actual use Beddome stands beside Miss Steele. During the same period John Ryland of Northampton was contributing hymns to *The Gospel Magazine* and to current hymn books. John Fellows printed his *Hymns on Believers' Baptism* in 1773 and *Hymns in a great variety of metres* in 1776. John Fawcett published in 1782 his *Hymns adapted to the circumstances of public worship and private devotion* (Leeds). Richard Burnham began to publish his *New Hymns* in 1783, and Samuel Medley gathered into several volumes, beginning with 1785, his hymns that had appeared in leaflets and periodicals. The hymns of Samuel Stennett were contributed to Rippon's *Selection* of 1787. And we may close the list with the *Walworth Hymns* of Joseph Swain (London, 1792), who could follow the traditional model as well as any, but had also a distinct gift for a somewhat freer spiritual song. All of these men are still of some interest to the student of English hymns: they con-

tributed to the permanent body of Evangelical Hymnody, and retain a minor place in current hymnals. Such as they were, they represent the golden age of Baptist Hymnody, and serve to show how it shone with a light reflected from the person and work of Dr. Watts.

Beyond the bounds of Independency his influence is just as apparent in the hymn writers of the later Presbyterian and Unitarian group, of whom Joseph Grigg and Mrs. Barbauld are most familiar; and in Scotland in the work of Ralph Erskine and the writers of the *Translations and Paraphrases*. Indeed the whole history of English hymn writing points back to the fact that Watts established once for all a definite type of Hymn. Partly because of its essential fitness, and partly from the accident of its furnishing a mould which is the easiest to fill out, it has happened that from his time till ours the work of hymn writers without special force or inspiration of their own has tended to revert to the original model.

VI.

HIS INFLUENCE UPON HYMN SINGING

After all, the Hymn is intended to be sung. The Hymn Form and the writing of hymns have little significance apart from Hymn Singing. And it is so with the work of Dr. Watts. Whatever importance be attached to his influence upon the ideal of the English Hymn and upon hymn composition, any final estimate of his place in Hymnody must be based upon the record of his success in getting his hymns sung. For that was the sum of his achievement. His greatest influence, that is to say, lay in his undoubted leadership in the establishment and extension of Hymn Singing as a part of congregational worship in the stead of the ordinance of Psalm Singing maintained since the Reformation.

We have already said that he may not be regarded as the "Inventor of the English Hymn". It is equally true that he cannot with strict accuracy be called the founder of the ordinance of Hymn Singing in our English-speaking Churches. The Restoration movement toward hymn singing cannot

justly be ignored, any more than the early hymn writers can be overlooked. Hymn singing had begun before Watts, and hymn books were in use before the publication of his. Nevertheless it is his figure that stands out against the deplorable conditions of Psalmody at the beginning of the XVIIIth century. He does not stand alone, but his personality commands the situation, his mind plans the remedy purely from personal resources, and his strong will overcomes the force of tradition, of conviction, of sacred associations, of habit, of prejudice, and, not least, of indifference. The aggressiveness and even bitterness of tone assumed by Watts in his prefaces and treatise on Psalmody, standing in contrast to his habitual moderation, mark his method of a deliberate attack upon the position of the Psalm singers; to whom indeed some things therein said seemed little short of blasphemous. He raised the issue squarely of Hymn against Psalm. While the *Psalms imitated* did actually serve as a bridge over which numerous Psalm singers crossed almost unconsciously into Hymnody, Watts himself did not offer them as a compromise or half way measure, but only as a supplement to his *Hymns*, first published, and followed by the *Psalms* after an interval of twelve years.

This assault upon the metrical Psalm might have counted for little, might indeed have proved a destructive influence, if Watts had not been able to replace the overthrown Psalmody with a Hymnody that satisfied the religious sentiment more completely, and yet retained a sufficiency of the familiar form and tone of the accustomed Psalm. The number of those who read Watts' arguments against metrical Psalmody was limited, though his views were widely spread for at least a century by means of debates and "Psalmody sermons". But to a multitude of devout hearts the evangelical *Psalms and Hymns* in themselves furnished an incontrovertible argument against a longer continuance in the old Psalmody. It is this wonderful adaptation of Watts' System of Praise to meet the situation and to change it that gives it some consideration to be regarded as a work of genius.

The full scope of Dr. Watts' personal agency in the movement which has transformed all but a comparatively insignificant minority of English-speaking Churches from Psalm singing into Hymn singing Churches, it is impossible to estimate. His more immediate influence was confined to the Nonconformist Churches of England and to Churches of corresponding type in America; and even in these operated more slowly than is sometimes imagined. Watts had many friends and admirers in the Church of England, and among them not a few who would gladly have witnessed the introduction of his System of Praise. But as against Anglican tradition his influence was immediately ineffective. Upon the unchurched masses whom the Wesleys reached with their preaching and hymns, Watts had no influence, and for them a quite moderate degree of concern. When we set the Watts movement against the two other XVIIIth century movements, that were to introduce Hymn Singing among the unchurched and into the Church of England respectively, the two features that stand out are:—*first*, that the priority lay with Watts, and that his influence to an undetermined extent permeated the others: and *second*, that while the two other movements were connected with revivals and dependent upon stimulated emotions, the movement inaugurated by Watts was not in intent revivalistic, but purely liturgical, a sober and deliberate undertaking for the "Renovation of Psalmody" in the ordinary worship of the Church.

Philadelphia.

LOUIS F. BENSON.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE.

The Principles of Moral Science. An Essay. By the Rev. WALTER McDONALD, D.D., Prefect of the Dunboyne Establishment St. Patrick's College, Maynooth. Second Edition: Revised and Enlarged. Dublin: W. H. Gill & Son, Ltd. 1910. Pp. xvi, 277, vii.

It is to Dr. McDonald's credit that he curtails the discussion of casuistical questions—that most dreary and unedifying, not to say demoralizing, part of moral theology—and refers to special cases of conscience only in order to illustrate and test general principles. If the application of these principles leads to paradoxical conclusions, there is at any rate no evidence that the author has taxed his ingenuity to invent any of those grotesque and pernicious cases of conscience which would not occur to one man in a million, but which have done so much to bring the Jesuitical casuistry into deserved disrepute, and would have done incalculable harm had not most of them been buried in Latin books not intended for the laity. Nor can one reasonably object if a work which is intended “to explain and defend the definite system of moral theology which has been taught for centuries in the Catholic Schools,” wears a certain air of mediaevalism. Even upon this Procrustean bed there is room for a certain amount of free movement; and I sympathize with Dr. McDonald's evident pride in having “arrived at some important conclusions which differ from those of the ordinary Catholic hand-books”.

Though tempted to imitate the “author's confession” and say of him as he (quite truly) says of Kant, that I do not profess to understand his system of ethics; and as he says of Hegel and T. H. Green, that I have not found his work at all illuminating: I hope the reader will follow Dr. McDonald's excellent example of reading on to the end, instead of, like Spencer, laying down a book because of his peremptory rejection of some of its initial statements (35). If an honest effort still results in failure to think oneself into a point of view that is as alien to all current modes of ethical thought as Kant and Green are to the Schoolmen, one need have the less hesitation in confessing it, since Roman Catholics are always quick to assert that their doctrines are and must be to the Jews a stumbling-block and to the Greeks foolishness. So Protestants are often found to affirm that those who differ from them on moral questions must have their vision obscured by sin, or that prayer for divine guidance will be followed by an infallible answer as to what is objectively right. In either case the attempt of the philosophical moralist to answer the

question, What is right? in the light of reason, is foredoomed to failure, because appeal is made to some supernatural or super-rational authority. Hence ethics becomes moral theology, and I think Dr. McDonald would have done well to keep the old name.

Let the author illustrate. "The Catholic who eats meat on Friday (unless he is ill or has some other reasonable excuse) commits not only a sin of disobedience, but also one of intemperance, and this even though he may not take as much meat as he might take on any other day of the week without committing any sin". To any one who is *not* familiar with the details of moral theology, it appears strange to say that what is temperance on Thursday becomes intemperance on Friday; and one is not surprised to learn that Lacroix does not seem to be either very clear or very happy when he tries to explain it (129-130). But the author's explanation is quite simple. "The very essence of temperance is ordinate use of food; but the Catholic who eats meat on Friday uses food inordinately." Why? Because "on Friday the ecclesiastical law intervenes". But how does that explain "the power of ecclesiastical legislators to bind their subjects in virtues other than obedience"? That is the crux; and the answer apparently is that "there is a change of order produced objectively as a result of the intervention of the will of the legislators".

This paradox, however, is only the beginning of Scholastic wisdom. In the case just cited the sin is one of disobedience as well as of intemperance. But take another case. Suppose it to be a rule of some religious house that no student while in residence, shall drink wine. It would, of course, be sinful for a student to drink a glass of wine more than moderation allows; but if all other circumstances except the rule are exactly the same, why should it be sin for a student but not for a professor, to take a glass of wine after dinner? And of what kind of sin would the student be guilty? *Prima facie*, he would be guilty of disobedience. But that is only the crude opinion of common sense. The author's view is that he would be guilty of the material sin of intemperance, but not of disobedience. He would be a very dull student who, "though living under rule, would not be able to do what he might reasonably do if he were not under rule", without being guilty of formal disobedience. He would avoid this by taking care that his motive is good. Moreover, in the religious houses the rules are made so as not to bind in obedience, apparently because it is not considered desirable to expose the student to so many occasions of violating the serious obligation of obedience (127-132). In short, one may violate a rule of abstinence without disobedience, but not without the sin of intemperance; because any act that is out of the order established by a superior in regard to food and drink is intemperate, but it is not disobedient unless the established order is backed by an act of ruling will. I hope all this is clear to the reader. I take it to mean that ecclesiastical legislators have power to establish rules or an "order", but that they either have no power, or that they sometimes refrain from exercising the power, to bind in con-

science. There can therefore be no formal sin of disobedience when the rule does not bind in obedience. But what about the authority to establish an "order", deviation from which is wrong? The author strongly insists upon the objectivity of moral truths and the existence of a moral order which is the natural order backed up by the will of God, and is not dependent upon our knowledge of it; yet it would appear that ecclesiastical legislators can establish an order of their own and so create sins for those who would otherwise not only know no sin, but be guilty of no material wrong. I will not say that one who believes this "can believe as many as six impossible things before breakfast", but I do say it illustrates the difference between Ethics and Roman Catholic Moral Theology.

The two fundamental concepts of the book are those of Material Sin and Philosophical Sin. In regard to the latter, nothing need be said except that the author is quite in accord with the common moral consciousness when he differs from those Schoolmen "who require for moral goodness reference of an act to God as last end". To take the other view would make the concept of philosophical morality absurd. No act of the child or the savage or the convinced atheist, who knows no God, could be regarded as good, since these acts can not be referred to God as last end.

The concepts of philosophical and material sin do not seem to be so helpful in sustaining Dr. McDonald in his second point of difference from some of the Schoolmen. He challenges those disciples of the Schoolmen who admit no ethical quality in any act which is not free, to "tell us whether the lunatic who attacks one with sword or gun is or is not an unjust aggressor; if not, why one may kill him in self-defence; and, if his assault is unjust, how it is not thereby stamped as ethical" (p. xi). I don't know which horn of this dilemma the "Schoolman" would take; but suppose he chooses the first. If a tiger kills a man, is he an "unjust" aggressor? That is too paradoxical even for Dr. McDonald. "A lunatic kills a friend, and a mad dog kills his master; there is disorder in both cases, but only in one is there violation of the moral order. The act of the dog is harmful, but not morally wrong; the act of the lunatic is morally wrong, although he himself is not held responsible for the wrong-doing." But why? "To the ordinary man who does not allow philosophical speculation to run away with his common sense, no creature lower than man is capable of acting morally." Still, this should not be taken for granted; and the reason apparently underlying this assumption is that "morality and intelligent self-direction are correlative". But if that is so, is not the act of the lunatic as much "outside the moral order" as that of the tiger? In a wider sense it might be maintained that no act or event in the universe is outside the moral order. But in the narrower sense of the author, good and evil of the moral order are limited to the acts of agents who are capable of intelligent self-guidance (p. 6). I gather that he would reject the logical inference because of two difficulties, neither of which is serious. In the first place, there

are necessary acts which are moral although they never can be free. The acts of God, e.g. are holy as well as necessary; "are they not therefore moral"? (p. 9). To which I should reply: read Kant again. Just because God is "holy", He is, strictly speaking, a supra-moral being, just as animals are infra-moral.

The author's second difficulty grows out of the assumption that it is never lawful to take a human life except as the penalty for an "unjust" act. This assumption, however, creates other difficulties which are sometimes rather disingenuously evaded. Thus, e.g. an unborn child can scarcely be called an unjust aggressor; yet non-Catholic moralists and physicians commonly regard it as lawful to sacrifice the life of an unborn child when necessary in order to save the life of the mother. Dr. McDonald says (197) this is doing evil that good may follow. But that is to assume the point at issue. Catholic writers hold that it is wrong to cause the death of the child directly but not to cause it indirectly—i.e. it would be wrong to perform an operation or to administer a drug with intent to cause abortion in order to save the life of the mother, but it would be right to seek to relieve the mother even though it were foreseen that this act would indirectly result in the death of the child. I am glad to say that the author does not find this quibble entirely satisfactory.

What then is his own solution? He lays down the following rule: "An external action is to be considered morally good, even though it should produce a bad as well as a good effect, provided (1) it does not subordinate a being which by nature is not to be subordinated; and (2) the good effect produced is sufficient to compensate for the bad." Now the second criterion, though it is not free from difficulties of application, is a valid and helpful principle. But what about the first? The author says that when certain actions by which one is served at the expense of another—as when an infant's life is taken by an act which relieves the mother's distress—are acknowledged to be morally right, they do not effect any real subordination of one being to another, and this is the ground on which they are defended (203). "It is not the death of the child that relieves the mother, and if it were . . . it would be wrong to cause death, for it would be subordinating a being who is by nature independent and *sui juris*." Now that, I think, is double nonsense. The patent fact that it sometimes is the death of the child that relieves the mother, no one would be disposed to deny except in the interest of a preconceived theory. Suppose, then, this act is wrong. One alternative would be to leave the case to nature and let both mother and child die. I should think that would be more wrong; but if our author's principle is correct, the physician would seem to be morally obliged to this inhumane conduct; because if he chose the only other alternative and subordinated the life of the mother to that of the child, his act would again be inordinate, i.e. materially wrong, since "essences which are by nature independent cannot lawfully be subordinated." I resist the temptation to comment upon the author's doctrine that men are by nature independent of

one another—if this were so, would it not be wrong to segregate lepers and to confine the insane?—and pass to another illustration of “material” wrong.

“Let us suppose that a number of people travelling across a desert have lost their way or been robbed of their provisions. They have but one vessel of water, which, however, has been almost certainly poisoned. There are but two alternatives: certain death of thirst, if they do not drink the water; and an exceedingly probable but not quite certain death from poison, if they do drink it,—or at least one of them, for a trial. It seems to me, that in such a case it is only a very foolish person who would not drink the water rather than die of thirst; and yet, in case it should be poisoned, which is almost certain, to drink would be direct suicide and therefore inordinate.” (267). If a building is on fire and a person in the second story window is bound to be burned to a cinder in two minutes unless he jumps, he would certainly be a foolish person who did not jump. If he jumped and were killed, his act would be formally right, but it would none the less be suicide and materially wrong. If duty obliges me to undertake a dangerous journey and I choose the least perilous route and go by sea, and the ship sinks and I am drowned, that is suicide and inordinate. Suicide is wrong, but it is only a very foolish person who would not commit suicide. That sounds like nonsense, and I think it is nonsense.

The familiar distinction between formal and material sin, or, as I should prefer to say, between subjective and objective rightness and wrongness, is not proved valueless by the fact that many of the perplexities connected with our moral judgments grow out of the necessity of recognizing both the internal and the external aspects of conduct. The unfortunate Hindoo woman who is conscientiously convinced that she ought to throw her child into the Ganges, is bound to act wrongly, either subjectively or objectively, no matter whether she drowns her child or saves it. That is a bad enough predicament to be in; but I do not think it is as bad as that of the thirsty traveller, who, in order to avoid material wrong, must do what he and every other sane person regards as irrational. Passing over the absurdity of calling the effort to save one’s life suicide, I do not see how the act of the traveller in question, who follows the moral rule of choosing the least of inevitable dangers, and thus avoids responsibility for any objective evil that may ensue (240), can be even materially wrong. “A material sin is a violation of order backed up by law.” But the law surely is that one should *will* to save one’s life, not that one should actually save it.

If the author’s application of the principle of material sin to special cases lands him in a nest of irritating paradoxes, the reader may comfort himself with the thought that material sin is after all no very serious matter and one is not morally responsible for it; and the author may perhaps like to recall the statement of so eminently modern an authority as the late Henry Sidgwick to the effect that it

is the business of the moral philosopher to seek unity of principle and consistency of method at the risk of paradox. Still, glaring paradox always demands some justification, and may even suggest the suspicion that there is something wrong with one's "principles".

Princeton.

GEORGE S. PATTON.

A Brief History of Modern Philosophy. By Dr. HAROLD HÖFFDING, Professor of Philosophy at the University of Copenhagen. Authorized Translation by Charles Finley Sanders, Professor of Philosophy at Pennsylvania College, Gettysburg, Pa., Author of the English Translation of Jerusalem's Introduction to Philosophy. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912. 8vo; pp. x, 324. Price \$1.50 net.

"This book is clear, compact and comprehensive. The various schools are analyzed and criticized, and the thread of continuous development is constantly kept in view."

"As a psychologist Doctor Höffding is an empirical introspectionist. He is thoroughly modern in his antipathy towards metaphysical introspection. He discovers a native tendency in man, manifesting itself in the impulse towards well-being, the source or further meaning of which is beyond our knowledge, which furnishes the basis of ethics. Religion is the reaction of the human mind to the sense of value and represents the highest function of the human mind." The work under review discovers nine stages in the development of modern philosophy. These, each of which is discussed in a separate book or chapter, are: "The Philosophy of the Renaissance," "The Great Systems," "English Empirical Philosophy," "Philosophy of the Enlightenment in France and Germany," "Immanuel Kant and the Critical Philosophy," "The Philosophy of Romanticism," "Positivism," "New Theories of the Problem of Being Upon a Realistic Basis," and "New Theories of the Problems of Knowledge and of Value."

To Thomas Reid and the "Scottish School" but half of a page is devoted. This, in view of the prevalence and influence of this school, especially in the United States, impresses us as a very serious defect.

The volume closes with a "Chronology of the Chief Works in Modern Philosophy." This chronology embraces one hundred and eighty-nine treatises and will be very helpful. It is significant that the only American referred to in this list is Professor William James.

On the whole, Dr. Höffding has given us an exceedingly valuable handbook of modern philosophy. As a textbook for those who would learn the history of modern philosophy it does not equal Weber's History of Philosophy. For one who would review that history, or who would refresh himself as to the significance of certain periods of it, it may be superior.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY.

The Moslem Christ. By SAMUEL M. ZWEMER, D.D., F.R.G.S., Edinburgh and London: Oliphant, Anderson & Ferrier. Crown 8vo; cloth. Price 3s. 6d net.

This volume is an essay on the life, character and teachings of Jesus Christ according to the Koran, and orthodox tradition. Its author is quite properly known as "the modern apostle" to the Mohammedan world. He is therefore able to speak with peculiar authority and definiteness. The present discussion is not designed merely to satisfy intellectual curiosity, but it has a definite and practical purpose. Islam is the only truly anti-Christian religion of the world, as the author shows, and it is also the present supreme antagonist of Christianity. It is therefore of interest to every true Christian to know how Jesus Christ is regarded by the two hundred million followers of the false prophet, and it is of special importance that the missionary leaders of the Church should know how to approach the great Mohammedan masses. This needed information and this suggested line of approach are admirably set forth in this interesting volume. Turning to the Koran, to the commentators, and to various orthodox traditions, Dr. Zwemer shows that to the Moslem mind the founder of the Christian religion, although miraculously born and possessed of power to work miracles, and the last and greatest of all prophets until Mohammed, although he had the special honor of being taken up into Heaven, is nevertheless a mere man, sent of God, and one of the objects of his mission was to announce the coming of Mohammed. Such erroneous views of the person of Christ are shown to be as universally accepted as the false accounts of the teachings of our Lord. The cardinal truths of the Gospel, namely the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, are not only obscured, but contradicted by the Koran, and the teachings of our Lord as understood by the Mohammedans omit all reference to the Incarnation, to the Atonement, and to Salvation from sin by faith in his name. Nowhere in the Koran or in tradition is there any trace of the great Christian doctrine of justification by faith. Whatever is recorded of the teachings of Christ is attributed to Mohammed, who, in his life and death, is made to resemble Jesus Christ. According to the Moslem tradition, the death of Mohammed was foretold. It was not unavoidable, but freely accepted by him. He died a martyr's death. His sufferings were meritorious. He helps those who believe in him to enter Paradise. In brief, *for all practical purposes Mohammed himself is the Moslem Christ.*

To meet such false conceptions, the author shows that the Christian missionary must first of all know thoroughly the traditions, the life of Mohammed, the Koran, the Moslem conception of Christ. He must then preach with all boldness the Incarnation, the Deity of Christ, and his atoning death. Such testimony will have its reflex influence upon the Christian Church in securing for her a stronger grip on the great fundamentals of the Christian faith, and in showing how plainly

Unitarianism fails to be Christianity. The only message for the Moslem world is found in the Gospel of a divine, living Savior, the Son of God, and the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Religion of Science the Faith of Coming Man. By JAMES W. LEE, Author of "The Making of a Man", etc. Fleming H. Revell Company. \$1.50 net.

Every wide-awake minister in active service will joyfully welcome any work that will aid him in making clear to his congregation the reasonableness of Christianity. He must address each week numbers of people, better educated than in any other age. He finds them doubting the cogency of threadbare arguments derived from the fathers and expressed in the vocabulary of a past age. The "ipse dixit" method of preaching fails. He must present evidence that is of the same character as that presented in other fields of knowledge. His message is lacking sadly in force unless he understands the spirit of the age which he must address and unless he is able to interpret the truth he would bring so that it will take its place with the other truth which his congregation receives. Philosophy, the old refuge of the theologian, will avail him little. Its methods are rightly distrusted by modern men. He must understand the scientific spirit and organize his evidence according to the methods of science; for these are the methods of thought that govern the thinking of his hearers.

Dr. Lee's book claims to present Christianity from the point of view of the scientific method and is hailed by some as a splendid source of argument and illustration. The value of such a work will depend on its reliability both from the point of view of theology and of science. It is worse than useless for any preacher to argue from an incorrect statement of scientific truth or to use so-called scientific analogies which are immediately recognized by the well-informed to be unsound.

We will therefore first consider this book from the scientific point of view and in so doing I will make use of the criticisms of a Christian man of science who carefully read this book at my request.

The first chapters are the best. The argument however that because man is religious God exists, since every sense and longing of man corresponds with reality in other cases, is of very dubious validity. Dr. Lee is very seriously in error in his chapter on the "Test of Science". He says, in effect, that when a discovery is made and is put to practical use so that *all men* can realize that it is a true discovery then it is scientifically tested and known to be true. He cites the case of wireless telegraphy saying that the scientific test was made by Marconi when the principle discovered by Hertz became of *practical* use. In thus writing Dr. Lee has fallen into a popular but very unscientific error. The test of science is not whether a discovery can

be made useful to humanity. It is whether a certain hypothesis can be proved true by experiment and if those who are authorities are convinced by these experiments, the truth obtained is scientific truth. Its practicability is of no importance whatever. It is unfortunate that the author has made this mistake for by so doing he shows a very limited knowledge of what science really is.

An attempt is made to disprove or ridicule the Kantian philosophy. This would have been far better omitted since Dr. Lee should know that really scientific men are seeking to find out the relations existing between certain things and that they will immediately acknowledge that they do not know the "Ding an sich". To a large extent they are thus in agreement with Kant. These and other lesser defects greatly weaken the book from the scientific standpoint and it is to be regretted that with so much that is really admirable and so many apt illustrations drawn from biology, botany, geology and astronomy the author did not know enough to make his work more convincing.

Theologically considered the book is equally unsatisfactory. It is hard to follow the line of the author's argument. Would that there were summaries of what has been and is to be proved! After attacking vigorously the doctrine of election as derived from the unscientific theologians of the Middle Ages, we are led out upon a shining sea of speculation where we see reflected Gnosticism (with its doctrine of a creator for the world intermediate between God and man), and the Indian Philosophy. The treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity is speculation and the attempt to give it scientific basis here made is interesting but wholly unconvincing.

The concluding chapters explain why Christianity alone of all known religions is the religion of science and why in it alone lies the hope for the complete and perfect development of the race. Here also there is much poetry, some science, considerable valuable argument and some surprising flights of philosophic imagination.

The writer of this criticism was greatly disappointed in Dr. Lee's book. It was so well written and began so strongly that he hoped for much. It gave promise of being a real help but this was not fulfilled. The task set for himself by the author was a tremendous and exceedingly difficult one. Only a man of wonderful learning combined with wonderful spiritual insight can succeed in it. The need is real and pressing. May the man soon arise to satisfy it.

Cranford, N. J.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

The Winds of God. Five Lectures on the Intercourse of Thought with Faith during the Nineteenth Century. By the Rev. JOHN A. HUTTON, M.A. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. Price 75 cents net.

The object of this delightful little book is stated in its title—its substance is made up of lectures delivered by the author to a gathering of ministers at Mundesley in Norfolk, England. Mr. Hutton shows

how the spiritual life of the last century is reflected in its literature and by a sympathetic understanding of its great poets skillfully traces the course of thought in England both before Darwin and after the publication of his "Origin of Species". The conclusions he reaches are reassuring and this book can be heartily recommended to the lover of poetry as an interpreter of the soul of man.

Cranford, N. J.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Book of Isaiah (The International Critical Commentary) I-XXXIX. By GEORGE BUCHANAN GRAY, D.D., D.Litt., Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in Mansfield College, Oxford; XL-LXVI by ARTHUR S. PEAKE, D.D., Rylands Professor of Biblical Exegesis in the University of Manchester. In two volumes. *Vol. I., Introduction and Commentary on I-XXVII.* New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. Crown 8vo; pp. ci, 472. \$3.00 net.

This volume is not intended to be original in the sense of offering new theories. It is particularly useful in laying before English readers the recent work in this field, and primarily the work of German scholars, and in presenting this material analyzed and in compact form and lucid statement and with frank and helpful discussion. It has its postulates in criticism, it is true, those of the school to which it belongs. Like the authors of a companion volume, noticed in this REVIEW, April 1912, p. 316, Professor Gray has discussed questions of genuineness without dealing with the work of Dr. Geerhardus Vos, which includes the same ground in its survey (*Presbyterian and Reformed Review*, 1898-1899, pp. 411-437, 610-636, 70-97). The present volume would be stronger had it first satisfactorily answered Dr. Vos's arguments. A criticism by Professor Eduard König (*Theologisches Literaturblatt*, 1912, Nr. 8) is in place here. Referring to the attitude which Professor Gray has taken to the assertion of Hackmann, Marti, and others, that Isaiah is exclusively a prophet of evil, he says in substance: This most recent commentator on Isaiah does not repeat the assertion, but says: "Though unquestionably Isaiah was in the first instance a prophet of judgment, and his narrative of the vision [chap. vi] contains no word of promise, or any suggestion of a happier future and the establishment of a righteous society beyond judgment, it would be quite unreasonable, even if there were no evidence at all to the contrary, such as i. 26, to infer that his mind never dwelt on the ideal which should be the very opposite of the present state" (p. xciv). But this attitude of the author's is not a very definite one, since he comes either to a negative judgment or to one not decidedly positive regarding the Isaianic origin of the prophecies of salvation found in the book of Isaiah. Like several of the most recent expositors he omits the

sentence in vi. 13, "A holy seed will be the stock thereof", because the words are lacking in the Septuagint. But in view of the character of the Greek version (see farther on), this lack does not justify a judgment of textual criticism against the integrity of the Hebrew text. Again, in the case of ix. 1-6, the author by no means speaks so sharply against the Isaianic origin of the passage as do Marti and Kautzsch, but yet he does not defend this origin with decision. "I believe, however", continues Professor König, "to have shown in my *Geschichte der alttestamentlichen Religion*, S. 329-347, that the modern dogma concerning Isaiah, as solely a prophet of evil, can and must be definitely opposed."

The exegesis of a book necessarily depends upon the theory of its composition. When prophetic discourses, which appear in the book of Isaiah as continuous sermons, are broken into fragments and the parts are assigned to different writers living at widely separated periods in history, the several paragraphs require an exegesis independent of their context and no longer as integral parts of a connected address. Of course, fewer facts are available on which to base conclusions, and the way is open for widely divergent theories. The exegetical loss must, however, be borne without complaint, if the partition rests upon substantial grounds. This is one reason why the exegete cannot neglect introduction. In connection with Professor Gray's exposition it is profitable to use Dr. Alexander's unabridged commentary on Isaiah, another important contribution by a scholar of America to the study of the prophecies which seems nowhere to be cited by Professor Gray. The new is sometimes better than the old, but in many cases the old will command the assent of the reason.

In regard to the textual criticism, we would merely refer to a remark by Professor König to the effect that while Professor Gray's investigation of the state of the text is searching, yet in his comparison of the Hebrew text with the versions the contingency that the translator sought to remove obscurities, and accordingly at times departed from the Hebrew text in his renderings, is not taken into consideration.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on Haggai, Zechariah, Malachi, and Jonah (International Critical Commentary). By HINCKLEY G. MITCHELL, D.D., JOHN MERLIN POWIS SMITH, Ph.D., JULIUS A. BEWER, Ph.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. 8vo; pp. xxvi, 362, 88, and 65. \$3.00 net.

This is the third and concluding volume on the Minor Prophets in the International Critical Commentary. Professor Smith has written the commentary on the Book of Malachi (88 pages), and Professor Bewer the commentary on Jonah (65 pages). These two authors have already made contributions to the series. Professor Mitchell appears for the first time, furnishing the commentary on Haggai and Zechariah. The criticism of the text of Haggai sometimes goes back of the

versions and becomes subjective; but it is impartial and quite free from the dogmatic tendency of a school. The same commendation cannot be given to the textual criticism conducted by Professor Mitchell in the book of Zechariah. For example, in passages like iii. 8, vi. 9-14, xi. 8, Professor Mitchell alters, inserts, and translates after the manner of Wellhausen, where the radical reconstruction is arbitrary and the translation of the untouched portion of the text departs at crucial points from the natural indications of the grammar. In exegesis it is a true principle that prophecy in general sprang out of the contemporary needs of the people to whom it was addressed. But the theory that the prophet has his eye fixed upon current events, and his hopes awakened by them, is decidedly overworked by Professor Mitchell, notably in the second chapter of Haggai. In his comments on this same chapter there is also revealed at times a failure to mention important interpretations which differ from his own. It is proper to add in this connection that in treating of the records found in the books of Ezra and Nehemiah (see pp. 5-13 and 21-23) the discussion is conducted without reference to Dr. Boyd's articles in the *Presbyterian and Reformed Review* for the year 1900.

Professor Bewer regards the prophecy of Jonah as a parable. The theory has long had standing in the Christian church. And the lesson is the same, and justifies the place of the book among the Prophets, whether the narrative is looked upon as history or parable. The theory that it is a parable or allegory is not altogether free from difficulty; a satisfactory explanation must be found for the declaration of Christ, recorded in Matt. xii. 41, to the effect that the men of Nineveh repented at the preaching of Jonah, and shall stand up in the judgment with the Israelites who failed to repent at the preaching of Christ, and shall condemn them. The objections raised by Professor Bewer against the historical character of the narrative are, with one exception, not difficulties to any one who is reasonably acquainted with archaeology and Semitic modes of expression. All except one fall away in the light of ancient customs and forms of speech. To the reader who understands, the narrative is not historically inaccurate or miraculous unless it be in the one matter that Jonah remained alive in the "belly" of a great fish for a part of three days. It is not good debate jauntily to cite irrelevant matters. The discussion would have been more scholarly had it been concentrated on the essential matter. Professor Bewer has an elaborate note on the size of Nineveh, with the intent of showing that the description of Nineveh as "an exceeding great city of three days' journey" is a gross exaggeration, and indicates that the author wrote long after the city had been destroyed, and when it was a memory only. Professor Bewer refers, indeed, to Gen. x. 11 and 12, but sets aside its evidence by ascribing the passage to a glossator. Ordinarily the two verses are not treated thus, even by those who assign them to one of the later writers of the school of J; nor has it been customary to date them after the fall of Nineveh. Why not,

then, frankly admit that the passage in Genesis fully explains the reference in the book of Jonah to "Nineveh, that great city"? As there is a greater London, so there was a greater Nineveh, embracing the towns, hamlets, and villas occupying the thickly populated district at the confluence of the Zab and the Tigris.

Darius, the son of Hystaspes, is called Darius Hystaspes by Professor Mitchell (text and running headlines of pages 17-23; pp. 41, 109), the father's personal name being annexed to the son's name without any connecting word. This method of distinguishing Darius the Great from others of the name is not unknown. It has had a strange vogue in England and America, being employed for instance by Hales in his *New Analysis of Chronology*; by Horne in his *Introduction*; by McCurdy in the American edition of Lange's *Commentary* (Haggai), although the German basis upon which he built has Darius Hystaspis, and later in his *History, Prophecy, and the Monuments*; in the publications of Funk and Wagnalls; and in the *Century Cyclopedia of Names* (under Xerxes). By this method the name does not carry its meaning on its face; in fact it is in itself meaningless, and the force of the appended name is contrary to analogy (such as that of the noun Nothus and the adjective Codomannus in the designations of the later kings Darius Nothus and Darius Codomannus). A curious parallel among the Hebrews, however, has come to light in recent years; for ancient Jewish signets and stamped earthenware have been found containing two proper names, usually separated from each other by a single or double line, and in each case it is believed that the second name represents the father. But the standard methods of condensing the name of Darius son of Hystaspes to two words, where a brief denotation is desired, are two: either to use the patronymic Hystaspides after Darius (Ussher, *Annales veteris et novi Testamenti*, p. 86), or to employ the genitive case Hystaspis, after the analogy of the Greek idiom (Herodotus, iii. 70). This latter method, yielding the form Darius Hystaspis, is the common one, it has been established in literature for centuries, it is familiar and intelligible to scholars the world over. It is found in Eusebius (*Chronicorum liber I, cap. xv. 7; xviii. 1; etc.*), and is used in later works written in the Latin language (Guthberletus, *Chronologia*; Gesenius, *Lexicon manuale*; Rosenmüller, *Scholia in Haggaium*; Bähr, *Herodoti musae* on *Thalia* 70; Knabenbauer, *Commentarius in Prophetes Minores*). In England it is the usage of such scholars as Sir Isaac Newton, Prideaux, Kitto, Rawlinson, Driver; and in such works as the *Encyclopedia Biblica* and the *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. In America it is employed for example in *Webster's Dictionary*, the *Temple Bible*, the *New International Encyclopaedia*. Robinson's translation of Gesenius' *Lexicon* into English has Darius Hystaspes; but in the revision of this work, prepared by Professor Brown, the form Darius Hystaspis has been restored. The form Darius Hystaspis is used quite universally in Germany, and is very common; it is employed in Holland also. In France, if it is used at all, it is the rare

exception; the French preferring the full statement in their own language Darius fils d'Hystaspe.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

The Student's Illustrated Historical Geography of the Holy Land.

By The Rev. WILLIAM WALTER SMITH, A.B., A.M., M.D., Corresponding Secretary of the Sunday School Federation, Secretary of the New York Sunday School Commission, Inc., Secretary of the New York Sunday School Association, Member of the General Board of Religious Education, Member of the Executive Committee and of the Teacher Training Committee of the New York County Sunday School Association, etc. Author of "The History and Use of the Prayer Book", "Christian Doctrine", "The Making of the Bible", "From Exile to Advent", "Sunday School Teaching", "Religious Education", "The Ageless Hymns of the Church", etc. Illustrated with One Hundred Half-tone Pictures of Bible Places and Thirty-five Maps, many of them in colors. With Foreword by the Rev. Milton S. Littlefield. A Popular Reading Manual and Text Book for Teachers and Clergy. An Illuminating Course of Lessons for the Sunday School, to be used in the History and Geography Ages. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. 1912. Pp. xxiii, 65. Price 75 cents net.

This little book has been carelessly prepared. Little or no attention seems to have been paid to securing clearness of statement, and the material has often been thrown together with no effort at orderly arrangement. The work is inaccurate, containing many exaggerations, crass errors in history and geography, uncertainties stated as facts, and biblical proper names misspelled.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

A History of the Literature of Ancient Israel from the Earliest Times to 135 B. C. By HENRY THATCHER FOWLER, Ph.D., Professor of Biblical Literature and History in Brown University. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912. 8vo; pp. xiv, 392.

In this book but little space is devoted to the argumentation of critical problems. The author has a different end in view. His work is based upon the conclusions accepted by the school of Wellhausen; the literature of the Old Testament is partitioned, dated, and arranged in chronological order as determined by this school; and upon this foundation the author proceeds to build his own structure. And that proves to be a fine appreciation of the literary character of the Hebrew narratives and poems and prophecies, written with great literary charm. In these two respects the book has scarcely a superior. We note, first, that many good things which the author says about the literature, and all the messages which he finds in it, are equally true with a different dating of the writings; and, secondly, that his outlook upon the literatures of the world is not wide. His gaze is mostly fixed upon English and

Hebrew; and so it comes to pass that his analogies taken from the history of English literature and used to support the theories he has espoused are quite nullified as evidence by the history of extra-biblical literature in the Mosaic age (cp. for example, E. C. Richardson in this REVIEW, 1912, pp. 581-605).

Good canons of literary criticism are easily obtained from these pages. For instance, Professor Fowler recognizes that sudden and effective changes of rhythm take place in odes of which the unity is unquestioned (pp. 21, 23, 38, 42); and that the changes from one literary form to another in a prophecy may be "bewilderingly swift", and narrative, direct address, soliloquy, and dialogue be "puzzlingly intermingled" (pp. 118, 119). Because of the neglect to heed these facts, many of the laborious reconstructions of the biblical text which are offered to the public in these latter days are worthless. Or an argument may be framed for the probability of religious odes from the pen of David. David, a musician and a writer of poetry (pp. 36, 37), was "ethically immature and superstitious in religion, but intensely loyal to the God of Israel as he understood such loyalty" (p. 65). "His strong religious sense" (p. 65) is revealed in his deep repentance of sin (p. 61). Then in the almost contemporary narrative of David's court and domestic life "the moral and religious aspect of the events is felt throughout" (p. 65). Thus all the essentials for the production of religious poetry united in David, in his native endowment, his loyalty to God, and his experiences.

A minor matter of some interest is a detail in the translation which Professor Fowler gives of the inscription on the Moabite stone. As was pointed out by the writer of this brief notice of Professor Fowler's book, since the *matres lectionis* are but sparingly used in this inscription, the word *bnh* in line 8 may be either singular or plural, either his son or his sons (*PAOS*, 1890, and *Hebraica*, 1891). The passage reads: "Now Omri had taken possession of all the land of Medeba, and dwelt in it during his days and half the days of his sons [or his son], forty years." The plural is natural in view of the date of the stela, which was evidently erected after the fall of Omri's dynasty (line 7). In 1896 the plural was recognized by the Swede Amandus Nordlander (*Die Inschrift des Königs Mesa von Moab*). Four years later Hugo Winckler argued for the plural (*Altorientalische Forschungen*, Reihe II. pp. 401-407), and was followed, too closely in some respects, by J. Lagrange (*Revue biblique*, 1901, pp. 524 and 532). Kent adopted the plural in the translation which he published in 1905 (*Israel's Historical and Biographical Narratives*, p. 495), and he is followed by Professor Fowler (p. 89). When the plural is read, the statements of the Moabite stone and the Hebrew records are at once seen to indicate the same date for the revolt of Moab. The interval also from the activity of Omri as general or his proclamation as king to the revolt is conveniently measured by the conventional span of forty years. This solution, however, pleases neither Lidzbarski nor Halévy, who argue as though

Mesha were using the word "half" with mathematical exactness (*Ephe-meris*, I. 143; *Revue sémitique*, 1901, pp. 301-303).

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

The Deciding Voice of the Monuments in Biblical Criticism. By MELVIN GROVE KYLE, D.D., LL.D., Lecturer on Biblical Archaeology, Xenia Theological Seminary. Oberlin, Ohio: Bibliotheca Sacra Company. 1912. 8vo; pp. xvii, 320.

This book treats of archaeological research in its bearing upon the Bible. It is not intended as a textbook, but is a book for popular reading; it lacks the sharp definition, absence of repetition, and rigid rejection of the superfluous that belongs to a scientific manual, and allows room for chastened rhetorical illustration. While the author's joy in every discovery that confirms the Scriptures is not hidden, the book is dispassionate in its treatment of the questions at issue. It reveals the scholar's hospitality to facts, insight into the place and relative value of the different kinds of evidence, and judicial mind. Further archaeological research may prove that some reports of discoveries, upon which the author necessarily relies, are premature, and it will certainly bring additional facts to light. But the author shows restraint. He knows what he has proved, and does not claim too much. It seems indisputable that his main contentions will stand.

In connection with the discussion of the function of archaeology, a most important matter is touched upon, namely, the difference in literary methods and standards between the ancient Semites of the east and the modern Aryans of the west. The Reformers of the sixteenth century rightly insisted upon the interpretation of Scripture according to its plain meaning. They emphasized thereby a correct hermeneutical principle. But they neglected to give due weight to the fact that Old Testament literature is oriental literature, not occidental. Too often the biblical writings have been interpreted as though they had been written in western Europe according to the standards of form and modes of expression which are prevalent there to-day. The result has been not a little mischievous misinterpretation. Dr. Kyle will have performed a true service for the church, if his book succeeds in impressing upon its readers that it is "absurd . . . to judge Oriental writings by Western standards".

Only the greater theories that concern the history and literature of Israel are taken up and scanned in the light of archaeology. Not a few questions, upon which depends the possibility of the early history having been committed to writing contemporaneously or almost contemporaneously with the events narrated, have been raised by archaeology, and some of these are not mentioned in the book. On the other hand the author has evidently not felt called upon to cite all cases where archaeology has proven the historicity of persons whose existence has been denied by criticism. He is treating his subject in a large way; not attempting to discuss every minor point, but

exhibiting the substantial contribution which archaeology has made towards clearing the ground of false theories and furnishing a more secure basis for biblical criticism.

"Archaeology controls criticism." Criticism must bow to the authority of archaeology.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

De Prophetie van Habakuk . . . Door DIRK JAN KATWIJK. Rotterdam: T. de Vries Dz. 1912. 8vo; pp. xvi, 204.

This dissertation, which was offered for the degree of Doctor of Theology at the Free University of Amsterdam, is admirable in every respect. We know of no better book on the prophecy of Habakkuk. Its scholarship is in evidence on every page; revealed at the outset in the lengthy and judicial review of the criticism to which the book of Habakkuk has been subjected; and seen in the exegesis which occupies the latter half of the work, in the author's acquaintance with the modern exposition and his discussion of the exegetical questions. The scholarly spirit also is manifest in the calm and courteous tone, and in the absence of sarcasm. With all its wealth of learning, the book is readable, for the style is lucid and the presentation of the matter is orderly.

The unity of the prophecy is maintained, and the integrity of the text is defended. The author suitably dates the first complaint shortly before the battle of Carchemish, assigns the second complaint to the time of distress caused by the Chaldean invasion nearly a decade after the battle of Carchemish, and places the utterance of the prayer, recorded in the third chapter, perhaps as late as the exile. This dating of the several parts is appropriate, and may be correct; but it is not at all certain, and is quite unnecessary, and there is no advantage that we can see in assuming it; for the second complaint need not have tarried until the Chaldeans were actually harassing the land of Judah. The moral problem, and with it the thought which is voiced in the second complaint, presented itself as soon as the first complaint was answered by the announcement that the fierce Chaldeans should come and punish Judah terribly for its wickedness. The oracle (ii. 4) is the answer to this second complaint, and relieved the moral difficulty which the prophet felt; and the woes are faith's prompt conclusion regarding sinners, and the hymn is faith's courageous attitude in view of the evils foretold.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

The Higher Criticism. Four Papers by S. R. DRIVER, D.D., and A. F. KIRKPATRICK, D.D. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1912. Pp. xi, 92. Price 50 cents net.

We question the value of this reprint of old papers on the general subject of the rights and worth of Old Testament criticism. When these things were first said, ten, eight, twelve and seven years ago, respectively, they were not new, and by this time it would seem as

if all who were capable of being convinced had been convinced long since, that higher criticism of the Bible has its rightful place in the scheme of things. And equally, the old attempt to adopt that naturalistic reconstruction of Israel's history worked out by continental rationalists and harmonize it with the historic faith of the Church, reappears here in all its feebleness. "The wish is father to the thought" with these earnest scholars.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

What is Judaism? A Survey of Jewish Life, Thought and Achievement. By ABRAM S. ISAACS, Ph.D., Professor of Semitics, New York University. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. x, 206. Price \$1.25.

In a charming style Professor Isaacs endeavors to picture to his readers in these papers—a dozen or so of them—the Jew of to-day as he would have him thought of, appreciated, yes, admired, by his Gentile fellow-American. The author wields a facile pen, and his type of mind is optimistic, broad rather than deep, aesthetic rather than critical. The product of such a mind and such a pen is an exceedingly readable little book, well adapted to clear away prejudices and lay the foundation of a kindly, neighborly intercourse between Jew and Gentile in our city life, where action is more often in evidence than reflection, and where consequently men are oftener moved by old passions and habits than by thought. The answer which the author gives to the question that he has chosen as the title of his book is by no means a complete answer—of course—and it is not altogether a frank answer: the advocate is expected to elicit, not all the facts, but the evidence for what he advocates. Yet the answer is enlightening, interesting, timely, and remarkably good-natured.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

The Makers and Teachers of Judaism. From the Fall of Jerusalem to the Death of Herod the Great. By CHARLES FOSTER KENT, Ph.D. (Being volume IV of *The Historical Bible*). New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1911. Pp. xiii, 323. With maps, charts and appendices.

Former volumes of this Historical Bible have already been noticed in these columns. This one, the last of the series to deal with the Old Testament, shares the merits and the defects of the others. Clear in style and simple in plan, it is admirably adapted to interest and enlighten the young learner; while the assurance—absolutely colossal at times—with which it settles in ten words historical and literary problems that divide the critical world leaves no unduly vague and doubtful impressions on the reader's memory. That this would be the ideal method of text-book making, provided the author were infallible, is indisputable. As matters stand, we prefer, even when dealing with beginners, to both practise and inculcate caution as the most precious spiritual equipment of the historian.

The same inaccuracy in details which has been criticized in the earlier volumes appears in this book also. The first Seleucus, whose surname was Nicator, is termed Nicanor (pp. 154, 259), through confusion with the Syrian general of Maccabean days. It is doubtless a mere slip that Ptolemy Physcon is called Psycon (p. 263) and is brought to the throne six years too late. The "Medean" Empire (p. 203) must have had some subtle connection with Queen Medea. And Phasaëlus, brother of Herod, is deprived of one syllable of his name by being regularly spelled Phasælus (pp. 282 ff). Jonah is made to predict the extension of "southern", instead of northern, Israel (p. 175); and by way of compensation, Antioch is transported from the southern bank of the Orontes, where it belongs, to the "northern bank" (p. 154)—an error, by the way, already present in Dr. G. A. Smith's article on Antioch in Hastings' Dictionary. In fact the book suggests in many ways that it was prepared with haste. The large output of volumes bearing this author's name explains the haste.

In the difficult problems connected with the founding of the Jewish state Prof. Kent prefers almost always the most extreme solution that has been proposed. For example, he is one of very few to follow Koster in his denial of a general return of exiles under Zerubbabel; and we have not noted any divergence of views from those of Professor Torrey, the author's colleague at Yale, except in the estimate of Nehemiah, chapter 13, where even Prof. Kent cannot quite follow the radical eccentricities of Torrey's historical skepticism.

To have such combinations as these put forth to our students as history—to learn and recite in all solemnity, as though things really occurred thus—would be a melancholy chapter in the history as well of education as of Bible-study, if there were any promise of large and lasting influence in them. But it must seem, even to optimistic spirits of Dr. Kent's way of thinking, a hopeless task to rewrite the Bible. For every copy of "The Historical Bible" there pass into circulation hundreds of copies of the simple old Bible, that will continue to tell its familiar story to its readers when this series and others like it are by-gones and curiosities. If the old Bible is error and "The Historical Bible" is truth, it is greatly to be feared that truth will never overtake error.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

The Ethics of the Old Testament. By HINCKLEY G. MITCHELL, Professor of Hebrew and Old Testament Exegesis in Tufts College. 8vo; pp. x, 417. The University of Chicago Press: Chicago, Illinois. \$2.00 net.

This is a carefully wrought, an interesting and an instructive volume. Taking up in chronological order each book of the Old Testament, the author discusses and unfolds the passages, whether narrative or didactic, which throw light on the ethical development of Israel.

It is, however, a disappointing discussion for the following reasons:

1. It "leaves it to the reader to define for himself the ethical significance of the Old Testament as a whole in the light of its findings, suggesting only that while it can evidently no longer be regarded as 'peculiar' for 'the completeness and consistency of its morality', and therefore infallible, its surpassing importance as a record of the moral development of the Hebrews and a means of stimulation to, and instruction in, right conduct must always be recognized." That is, we have an admirable exhibit of the ethical development of Israel, but we do not have an estimate or even a presentation of the ethical ideal of the Old Testament. We are told what the Israelites did and in some cases how they thought, but we are not told what the Old Testament teaches that they ought to have done or how they ought to have thought. Yet this latter is what is of most importance and is what from the title of the book we had the right to expect.

2. The chronological order is that of the destructive criticism and is adopted with all the cocksureness of that school. Thus "most, if not all, of the psalms are of post-exilic origin". "The Book of Ruth is without doubt a fictitious narrative written in protest against the exclusiveness represented by Ezra, about 450 B. C." "The Pentateuch is not the work of Moses, but the product of a later process of development lasting until the middle or end of the fifth century B. C." "It is impossible to regard the Ten Commandments as, in any strict sense of the term, Mosaic." "They date from about 650 B. C." It is not, therefore, even only a record of the ethical development of Israel that Professor Mitchell gives us. The whole process is inverted; first things are put last; beginnings that must have been supernatural are made endings that can, perhaps, be explained away as natural. This is what we have, unless we are prepared to adopt our author's critical positions and take the Old Testament as being the opposite of what on its face it claims to be and what our Lord believed it to be. The wonder is how such a book can still be as stimulating and instructive ethically as we have seen that Professor Mitchell admits.

3. His ethical interpretations are not always satisfactory. For example, it is not true that Gen. iii "teaches that man was not originally endowed with the faculty for making ethical distinctions". It is not the fact "that it is based on the idea that childhood is the ideal state, and that, therefore, Yahweh, although he was obliged to give the first human beings fully developed bodies, withheld the gift that would have made them independent in a sense, and morally responsible." In a word, it is not the teaching of Gen. III, as our author holds, that man had to fall in order to become a moral being. As Keil and Delitzsch say when commenting on this passage: "The knowledge of good and evil, which man obtains by going into evil, is as far removed from the true likeness of God, which he would have attained by avoiding it, as the imaginary liberty of a sinner, which leads into bondage to sin and ends in death, is from the true liberty of a life of fellowship with God."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Sociological Study of the Bible. By LOUIS WALLIS. Author of "An Examination of Society." Formerly Instructor in Economics and Sociology in the Ohio State University. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1912. 8vo; pp. xxxv, 308.

"This book is a recasting of a number of papers which have appeared in the *American Journal of Sociology* at various times during the last ten years. The material has also been worked over in lecture courses at the Ohio State University; the Plymouth Congregational Church, Columbus, Ohio; the First Congregational Church, Columbus, Ohio; the Abraham Lincoln Centre, Chicago, Illinois; and in a private correspondence course given to students in the United States and other countries." It is not, as from its name might be supposed and from the lack of a good treatise of such a kind is much to be desired, an exposition and interpretation and application of the teachings of the Bible with regard to the institutes of human society, the family, the nation, the church, the race, and the kingdom of God. On the contrary, it is "an evolutionary study of Christendom." It does not aim to show how the supernatural revelation of Jehovah to Israel determined the development of society as well as of religion among the Jews and subsequently in Christendom, rendering both the religion and the civilization of both unique; but it does aim to show that "the vital religious ideas of Christian society took shape in response to a social pressure as tremendous and compelling as that in which we live to-day." That is, it would establish and illustrate the proposition that God is the creature rather than the creator of society.

In order to do this it assumes off-hand four positions which, it would seem, only the amplest proof could justify. First, it denies the distinction between nature and the Supernatural. "Nobody," it says, "has ever yet drawn the line between these terms; and there appears to be no prospect that anybody ever will." Second, it makes the Old Testament just the reverse of what it seems to be and claims to be. The first books it regards among the last written. Thus, we read, it "is now definitely established that the first six books of the Bible were produced after the Babylonian exile." Further elaboration, however, is unnecessary. We are all familiar with the "results" of the "destructive" criticism. What, however, it may be well to call attention to is the certainty assumed to attach to these results. 'That the Old Testament was compiled from earlier books' and that the writers who did the compiling lived at a late period, long after the downfall of the Hebrew nation—this "is a conclusion of modern science just as definite and certain as the established laws and principles of chemistry and physics." Third, "there is no evidence that the religion of Yahveh stood at first upon any different footing than did the other cults of the ancient world." It was not supernaturally communicated from without and from above, though it makes this claim. On the contrary, "it came into existence by the sifting of ancient religious ideas through the peculiar national experience of the Hebrews." Even "the Mosaic

Law, instead of being the force that set the peculiar development of Israel in motion, was itself the product of that evolution." Thus the Hebrew nation did not consist of twelve tribes that were suddenly welded into a mighty social organism at Mount Sinai in the desert of Arabia; but "the social group known as the Hebrew nation came slowly into existence, in the land of Canaan, at the point of junction between two previously hostile races, the Israelites and the Amorites." So, too, "the purpose of the Bible is not history in the scientific sense, but *religious edification*." "The editorial point of departure in the making of the Old Testament is condemnation of the Hebrews for walking after the iniquity of the Amorites." Again, "the religion of Israel took on its world-renowned character of religious exclusiveness through the fight against the Amorite gods." Once more, "the Captivity gave the religion of the Hebrews a world-perspective," and so "the national god of Israel became the Redeemer of Mankind." Fourth, the mistake of Judaism and of Christianity in both its Catholic and its Protestant forms has been that it has rejected the "social problem", and "the decline of orthodox Protestantism is due to its emphasis upon individual rescue as the only method of redemption."

It is farthest from the intention of the reviewer to try to controvert all or any of these positions. As most of them are stated without proof, he is under no obligation to do so; and if it be true, as urged, that all scholars accept at least most of them, he would, at any rate in the judgment of the author, disqualify himself by so doing. He wishes simply, and for the sake of those who do not pretend to such scholarship, to raise a question or two.

1. Do not Mr. Wallis and his whole school confuse the occasion of social and of religious development with their cause? Historical events are the former, but are they the latter? Would the aggressiveness of Amorite law and morals have produced any reaction on the part of Israel, if Israel had not been under the influence of a moral standard other and higher than that of the Amorites? Thus so far from the history of Israel explaining the Sinaitic legislation, does it not for its own explanation demand that legislation?

2. How are we to account for that legislation or for the unique moral earnestness of which, according even to Mr. Wallis, it was the expression? There was nothing in the environment of Israel to suggest it. Indeed, it is admitted to have been the result of a reaction against environment. There was nothing in the genius of Israel to originate it. Their whole history shows that naturally they were no more earnest than their neighbors. It would seem, then, as if the Bible's own explanation, viz., that "God spake all these words", were both the rational and the only one, that we must accept it or allow the religion of the Bible to go unexplained.

3. What is to be done with the prophets on our author's theory? Many explain the religion of Israel as the product of their own genius, but what of their genius? In view of their character with its passion both

for righteousness and hope, in view of their Messianic promise and of its having been made then and there, in view of their universalistic ideal and of its arising as it did when and where such universalism was naturally impossible,—the Hebrew Prophets are rightly regarded as constituting the most remarkable body of men that ever lived. With the Hexateuch and many of the Psalms, not to speak of other Scriptures, open to them for their instruction; with a long course of history punctuated at its great epochs with supernatural intervention; even with all these advantages we find ourselves unable to explain the prophets and their message otherwise than that they spoke, and knew that they spoke, as they were "moved by the Holy Ghost himself." When, however, we take them, as our author is obliged to take them, as coming at the beginning rather than toward the close of the development of Israel, the wonder deepens, their testimony to the Supernatural becomes even stronger, the endeavor to dispense with it demonstrates the necessity of positing it.

This, however, is not the only respect in which Mr. Wallis has done good service in the cause of truth. He has served her intentionally as well as in this instance unintentionally. We are much indebted to him for showing most clearly that "the prophetic opposition to the wealthy had no affinity with modern radicalism or socialism." "The hobby-rider" has gone to them in search of material to support his cause; but if fairly interpreted, they do not furnish it. "What the prophets really fought against in their fierce denunciation of the wealthy, was the contraction of the master-class upon itself, and the crowding of the less fortunate baals, their widows and orphans, into the lower enslaved class. The prophets never protested against human slavery, or any other institution whose logic ultimately denies "human rights. As a consequence, they have no affinity with modern democracy." "Their writings are virtually a series of *ex parte* pamphlets in which only one phase of the issue is voiced." They are always against wrong and oppression, but they do not denounce the then and now existing order of society as inherently wrong and oppressive. So also we cannot commend too highly our author's position as to the relation of the church to political and social questions. Hear what he says: "The present awakening of religious people to the social side of religion brings with it a real peril. The reaction from the former one-sided emphasis upon 'individualism', and 'personal wrong-doing', seems to be taking us over toward the opposite extreme. More and more we hear it said that the church machinery should put itself behind projects of social reform—such as liquor legislation, child-labor laws, unionism, socialism, etc. If the church should lend itself to social reform, it would have to take up some definite position with regard to politics and economics. But men have always differed about politics; and if this view of church life prevails, those who do not favor the particular program adopted by their church cannot support the organization; and this would convert the church into a political party. Our chief

guide here must be the testimony of experience. The witness of history is in favor of the complete separation of Church and State. The Church may be compared to a great electric dynamo. The function of a dynamo is to 'generate energy', and convert 'power' into a useful form. Any proposition that seeks to turn the Church away from its function as a generator of moral and spiritual energy looks back to the troublesome times when religion was a political issue." This review must close with a single question. Could the Church continue to be a great spiritual dynamo, should our author succeed in explaining Christianity as simply the result of social evolution?

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

A Harmony of the Gospels. In the words of the American Standard Edition of the Revised Bible, and Outline of the Life of Christ. By JOHN H. KERR, D.D., Author of "Introduction to New Testament Study". Third edition, Revised. New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. xxiii, 236.

Dr. Kerr's *Harmony of the Gospels* was published by the American Tract Society in 1903, and was duly noticed by Professor William Park Armstrong in this REVIEW, Vol. II, (1904), pp. 679-680. It is now issued also, in this very cheap edition (fifty cents) by the Revell Company; an imprint edition having also been published by the International Young Men's Christian Association. We must refer to Professor Armstrong's notice for a particular account of the characteristics of the book. Here we need only observe that the fact that it meets a need seems to be shown by its republication in so accessible a form.

Something, however, may be properly said, by way of general description. It is the English version of the Gospels which is printed, and the text is derived from the American Standard Edition of the Revised Version. When any given section is found in only one Gospel, it is permitted to extend across the whole page. Elsewhere four separate columns have been maintained, even though some of them are left blank because of the failure of the section in question in one or two of the Gospels. This feature is thought particularly important, as enabling the reader to estimate at a glance the contents of each Gospel. It is not quite so clearly marked in the present edition as in the previous edition (which is still on sale), because in an effort to narrow the page and so save space the width of the columnar spaces is not kept uniform: the reader who can afford the price (one dollar) would therefore still do well to provide himself rather with the primary edition. In the distribution of the material of the Gospels into greater sections, Dr. Kerr prefers to make use of the natural divisions of the life of our Lord, rather than of the purely chronological framework provided by the annual passovers. This constitutes his *Harmony* also an "outline of the life of Christ", and as he attaches to the heading of each of these greater sections a chronological notice, the suggestion of a tentative chronological schematization is preserved. In his view the material of the Gospel narratives falls between October, B. C. 6,

and May 18, A. D. 30; he assigns the birth of our Lord to *circa* Dec. 25, B. C. 5, and His crucifixion to April 7, A. D. 30. He thus includes four passovers in our Lord's ministry, one of which is assumed to fall at Jno. V, though a certain amount of doubt is expressed as to the identification of that feast. The topical distribution of the material separates it into short periods of Preparation at the beginning and of Triumph at the end, with the great period of Labor between, divided into the Judaean, the Galilean (in two parts: "to the multitudes" and "to the disciples") and the Perean ministers and the Passion Week.

A phrase in the Preface seems to imply that the term "Harmony" has fallen somewhat into disrepute. Dr. Kerr disclaims any attempt to "harmonize" anything: he has simply arranged the material of the Gospels chronologically and put the parallel passages into immediate juxtaposition. This is, of course, a process of harmonizing, and is the necessary first step in any attempt to obtain from the Gospels a view of the course of our Lord's life on earth, in the consecution of its events and (if that can be traced) its stages of development. When "Harmonies" are spoken of depreciatively, as it seems they sometimes are, it is either because the possibility of tracing our Lord's life through its stages from the baptism to the crucifixion is denied, or else because the value of such a view of the course of our Lord's life is unduly disparaged. The actual preparation of a "Harmony" is the sufficient answer to the former of these points of view. The admirable results obtained by the mere preparation of a "Harmony" is itself indeed a testimony, not to be despised, to the trustworthiness of the Gospel narratives and of itself goes far to refute the critical disintegration which has been applied to them. For the rest, it is to be admitted that the purposes which "Harmonies" serve are not the very highest. It is not by their means that we obtain our best understanding of the great figure of Jesus or arrive at our fullest appreciation of His Person and work. We know Dante's genius from the *Divina Commedia*; we learn the best things of Raphael by looking at his paintings. But a life of Dante or of Raphael is not therefore of no interest or importance. Because we can come to know Jesus better by studying His portrait as given to us severally in Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, it does not follow that we have no need of investigating with care the course of His life on earth. "Harmonies" are not to be depreciated because their service is rendered for the latter rather than the former task. We can know Jesus, fortunately, without a "Harmony". But we cannot make the first step towards obtaining a just conception of the course of His life on earth, without consciously or unconsciously forming a "Harmony"; and to leave this essential work to the unconscious, that is to say fragmentary and unpremeditated, instinctive action of our historical sense is merely to invite error, disproportion and general ineptitude in the prosecution of our historical work.

We have thought it well to say these primary things explicitly, as we

commend afresh Dr. Kerr's excellent "Harmony" to the attention of our readers. No one can get along without a "Harmony" who wishes to know the course of our Lord's life on earth: and here is a good "Harmony" to guide our historical studies in the life of Christ.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

St. Paul. A Study in Social and Religious History. By ADOLF DEISSMANN, D. Theol. (Marburg), D.D. of Aberdeen, St. Andrews, and Manchester, Professor of New Testament Exegesis in the University of Berlin, Author of 'Light from the Ancient East'. Translated by LIONEL R. M. STRACHAN, M.A., English Lecturer in the University of Heidelberg, formerly Scholar of St. John's College, Oxford. London: Hodder and Stoughton. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1912. Pp. xix, 316. Price \$3.50 net.

Deissmann's *Paulus* was noticed in this REVIEW, 1912 (x), pp. 139f. The translator of the English edition, who has given us also Deissmann's *New Light on the New Testament* and his *Light from the Ancient East*, is well and favorably known for the accuracy and faithfulness which he combines with an idiomatic and graceful style. The content of the book has not been changed; but the form has been improved by the elimination of typographical errors. Mr. Strachan has added a few notes and prepared useful indices. In view of the interest which attaches to the Gallio inscription a brief note might have been added indicating the literature which has appeared since the publication of the German edition, which, in part at least, consists of: Lietzmann, *Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie*, 1911 (liii), 345ff, 1912 (liv), 95, cf. this REVIEW 1912 (x), 139f; P. B [attifol], *Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétiennes*, 1911 (i), 214f; E. B. Allo, *ibid.* 1912 (ii), 145f; Goguel, *Revue de l'Histoire des Religions*, 1912 (lxv), 315ff [the reference (p. 315, n. 2) to Simcox, *A Point in Pauline Chronology, Journal of Theological Studies*, 1911, is an error both in subject, for it does not treat of the Gallio inscription, and in date,—it appeared in 1901]; Wohlenberg, *Neue kirchliche Zeitschrift*, 1912 (xxiii), 380ff; F. Prat, *Recherches de Science Religieuse*, 1912 (iii), 374ff; Dubowy, *Biblische Zeitschrift*, 1912 (x), 142ff; E. Schwartz, *Göttingische gelehrte Anzeigen*, 1911 (173), 670; Harnack, *Sitzungsberichte d. Königlich preuss. Akademie d. Wissenschaften*, phil.-hist. Classe, 1912 (xxxvii), 673ff, cf. Wohlenberg, *Theologisches Literaturblatt*, 1912 (xxxi), 505ff; Knopf, *Theologischer Jahresbericht*, 1911 [published 1912] (xxxi), 371ff; I have not seen Bares, *Pastor Bonus*, 1911 (xxiv), 219ff cited by Dubowy, p. 149 and Knopf, pp. 371f. The status quaestionis remains however much the same. There is general agreement that the Claudian letter to Delphi preserved in the fragments of the inscription was written in the first half of the year 52, prior to July 31st and that Gallio was proconsul at that time. It cannot be said that either of the possible alternatives for the beginning of the proconsulship has been eliminated or that the exact time of Paul's appearance before Gallio has been determined. The earlier

date for the proconsulship—spring or early summer 51-52—is advocated by Lietzmann (1 July), Goguel (May), and Harnack (summer); the later—52-53—by Wohlenberg (1 July), Dubowy (May), and Prat (May).—Paul's arrival in Corinth and appearance before Gallio being according to Lietzmann, January 50 and July or August 51 respectively; Goguel, spring 50 and autumn 51; Harnack, beginning of 50 (end 49?) and [not discussed]; Wohlenberg, autumn 51 and May, June or autumn 52 and departure in spring 53; Dubowy, spring 52 and autumn 53; Prat, winter 51 and summer 52. If Orosius' date for the Claudian edict rests on good authority, as Harnack seeks to show; and if *προδλάσις* in Acts xviii. 2 fixes the arrival of Aquila and Priscilla in that year, Paul may have reached Corinth in the end of 49 or the beginning of 50, and his appearance before Gallio may be dated in the early summer of 51. This is the earliest date that the inscription permits. The later date, however, remains equally possible and is, in view of the implications of the relative chronology, still the more probable.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

Introduction to the Life of Christ. By WILLIAM BANCROFT HILL, D.D., Professor of Biblical Literature in Vassar College. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. Pp. viii, 226. Price \$1.25 net.

This is a good book and will serve its purpose admirably. It may be commended to those who are preparing for a theological course and to others who may desire to know about the results and something of the methods of historico-critical study of the Gospels. The subjects treated are,—Heathen and Jewish writings; Christian writings other than Gospels; the Apocryphal Gospels; the canon, text, and date of the Gospels; the Synoptic problem; the Johannine problem; characteristics of each Gospel; the trustworthiness of the Gospels; and the use of the Gospels for a life of Christ. There is an Appendix on Lives of Christ, and an Index. The discussion is concise and clear, informed by careful scholarship, comprehensive knowledge, and good judgment. There are certain matters of interpretation and historical construction in regard to which the author's view is unsatisfactory; but these are few and do not seriously mar the pleasure of agreement touching matters of fundamental importance to historical Christianity. The point of view of the book and its style may be illustrated by the following brief statement about miracles (pp. 174f): "The question of miracles is a comprehensive one, starting with the philosophical problem of the existence of a personal God and his relations to the universe, passing next to the religious problem of the attitude of God toward man and the function of miracles in his self-revelation, and ending with the historical problem of the sufficiency of evidence that certain miracles were actually performed. If the student of the Gospels is fully convinced that there is no personal God, or that the universe is independent of his will, or that sufficient knowledge of God is given in natural ways, then the miraculous is ruled out, and any

report of it is absurd. In other words, the atheist or the deist is justified in affirming that miracles do not happen. But the agnostic, and still less the theist, has little right to make that affirmation until he has carefully examined the historical evidence that miracles have taken place. And no evidence is so important and worthy of serious consideration as that presented in the Gospels; for no miracles are in such evident harmony with the noblest conceptions of God and man as the miracles of Christ".

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

La Théologie de Saint Paul. Par F. PRAT, S. J. Deuxième Partie. Paris: Gabriel Beauchesne + Cie, Editeurs. 1912. (Bibliothèque de Théologie Historique publiée sous la direction des professeurs de théologie à l'institut catholique de Paris.) 8vo; pp. 579.

This volume is the second part of a comprehensive work on Paulinism, and deals with the Apostle's teaching from a systematic point of view. The first part we have not been able to examine, but to judge from the references to it scattered through the present volume it contains the historical and isagogical prolegomena. Professor Prat is evidently well-prepared for discussing his large subject intelligently and throwing upon it the light of even the most recent investigation. Very little in the modern literature on Paulinism of either German and Dutch or English provenience seems to have escaped his attention. He is also well-posted exegetically, and makes free use of the resources of Protestant scholarship. Besides this his ecclesiastical position as a Catholic leads him to approach Paul's teaching from a peculiar but at the present juncture especially interesting point of view, now that the question, to what extent the respective systems of Catholicism and Protestantism have their basis and preformation in the New Testament teaching, seems about to acquire a new interest and actuality. Of late Professor Pyper of the University of Leiden has broadly reviewed this problem after a purely historic fashion. It is, of course, exegetically considered, a problem that has been exhaustively threshed out in the old controversies between the Romanist and Protestant theologians, but none the less, in view of the more organic and historically-conditioned understanding of the teaching of the New Testament writers supplied by the study of Biblical Theology, it would seem capable of a new formulation and a more convincing solution. As for Paul in particular, Protestantism has always claimed to be a revival of the great principles of soteriology upheld by the Apostle as over against the Romanist system which had fundamentally abandoned the Pauline position. But not many years ago Wernle in his treatise "*Der Christ und die Sünde bei Paulus*" gave a construction of the Pauline doctrine of justification, which, while not in any sense vindicating the Romanist doctrine as a whole, yet if well-founded, would tend to show that there was a solid basis in Paul for some of the characteristic Catholic tenets in regard to sin and salvation. We are surprised to see that in the long and fairly complete bibliography

of the literature on Paulinism at the close of the present volume Wernle's treatise is not mentioned, nor is any reference made to it in the course of the discussion. On the whole the polemic element in Professor Prat's book, although quite pervasive, appears singularly detached from what might be called its "modern" quality, meaning by the latter the way in which it keeps in touch with and utilizes the modern biblico-theological investigation of Paulinism. The new type of polemic which aims higher than at an argumentation from isolated proof-texts is not overmuch in evidence here. As an example of the author's procedure we may mention how in his treatment of the divine purpose of salvation, he takes his point of departure not in the numerous Pauline deliverances concerned with the heart of the matter, but with such a peripheral, incidental text as I Tim. 2, 1-3, obviously in order to lay the desired universalistic basis for the plan of redemption, by subsequent adjustment to which the absolute predestinarian strain of teaching found in numerous other contexts can be made innocuous. This is, altogether apart from the question of the correct exegesis of I Tim. 2, 1-3, the direct opposite of biblico-theological procedure, insofar as the latter seeks faithfully to reproduce the structure and proportion of thought as it presented itself to the mind of the biblical writer himself. All through one is made to feel that the author's allegiance to the Catholic system has shaped too much his mode of approach and method of treatment. Too often the orthodox Romanist doctrine is used as the heuristic principle with which in mind the author asks what may in its support be gathered from Paul. The result is that in all cardinal points the Apostle's teaching is found identical with the Catholic theology in its anti-Protestant Tridentine crystallization. So in regard to the original state of man where the "*dons surnaturels*" are introduced as being the counterweight to the natural perishableness and carnal inclination of man. It is true Paul's teaching has in it an element that might seem to fall in with this doctrine, inasmuch as the original psychical state of man is contrasted in I Cor. 15, 45, 46 with a higher pneumatic state, which latter is thoroughly supernatural. But the difference is that to Paul the supernatural state stands at the end of the development, and therefore can, discounting the intervening reign of sin, be brought into connection with the first man only as a prospect or goal placed before him, not as a remedy to offset any inherent deficiencies of created human nature. In regard to the doctrine of concupiscence as the source of sin the author's plea is somewhat better supported, inasmuch as the Pauline conception of the *Sarx* in one of its branches actually covers the sphere of bodily sin, but here also it has to be acknowledged that the main stem of the conception has nothing to do with this, being determined not by the anthropological contrast between spirit and body, but by the religious contrast between the presence and absence of the Spirit of God, and the author, while quite correctly tracing both phases of the idea, does not attempt to deduce the one from the other. Most strikingly the detachment from the large trend of

modern investigation in favor of the *parti pris* of Catholic teaching appears in the chapter on "La Foi Principe de Justification". Here the reasoning becomes almost entirely dogmatic in character, and all the weight of evidence which goes to prove the declarative sense of *δικαίωσις* is simply passed by in silence, the author's main reliance being the old contention that for God to declare righteous him who as a matter of fact is not righteous is impossible. Equally much is made of the objection that the Protestant idea of faith voids the act of all religious and moral significance by making it a purely receptive organ, whilst the Catholic doctrine views in it the active principle of a subjective righteousness. But in neither of these two cases is any serious effort made to demonstrate the un-Pauline character of the Protestant and the Pauline character of the Romanist position. It must be added in fairness that in connection with the sacraments the author does not appeal in support of the Romanist doctrine of the Eucharist to the recent tendency as represented by Eichhorn, Heitmüller and others, to ascribe to Paul a pronounced sacramentarian teaching. To be sure here also he relies too easily upon the old plea that in the words "this is my body" the "is" must be taken literally, an insistence upon the letter which ill agrees with the admission made on the next page that in the words accompanying the cup not merely one but two metonymies may be recognized. Less influenced by dogmatic prepossessions is the discussion of the objective soteriology, especially as regards the atoning work of Christ. Still here also the principal point insisted upon is the un-Pauline character of the idea of substitution of Christ for the sinner in the punishment of sin. The writer thinks that not "substitution" but "solidarity" truly expresses the mind of the Apostle on the subject, and furnishes the key to a correct understanding of the atonement. This seems to us making a false alternative of two ideas which admirably go together and mutually require each other. The Protestant advocates of the vicarious penal theory of the atonement certainly cannot be accused of failure to appreciate the importance of the solidarity between Christ and man as the indispensable prerequisite of imputation or substitution, just as little as the advocates of the federal theory of Adam's relation to the race overlooked this important fact. But, while insisting upon solidarity as a prerequisite to imputation, they did not on that account fall into the error of making it supersede the latter as the governing principle of the atonement, so as to rule out every idea of imputation from the sinner to Christ or vice versa. Of this error it seems to us Professor Prat does not steer clear. He appears to think that the mere solidarity of Christ with mankind as such suffices to make men participants in the effects of his death. But solidarity is either a legal conception and as such includes imputation, or it is a physical conception implying realism, and only in the latter sense can it serve as a substitute for imputation. All the advantage, therefore, that the author thinks to secure by emphasizing the principle of solidarity is dependent on his avowal of the theory of realism, an avowal which

at least explicitly he refrains from making. It is quite true that the formulas of the imputation of our sin to Christ and of the imputation of Christ's righteousness to us are lacking in Paul, but the reason for this is not to be sought in the Apostle's ignorance of or aversion to the conception itself. The reason simply is that Paul prefers to put the matter on the broader basis of the identification of the Person of Christ with us. The Pauline formula is: Christ was made unto us or for us sin or righteousness. But this broader personal formula of itself includes the other more narrow and impersonal one which theologians have adopted in entire harmony with the intent of Paul. When Professor Prat further thinks that the theory of solidarity solves the problem of the effect of Christ's death in the subjective sphere, of what Paul calls our "dying with Christ", he seems to us to miss the real point in which the difficulty of this undoubtedly Pauline conception lies. The problem is not how we can share with Christ in something that he first experiences. This is fully accounted for by the principle of solidarity and real union of life. But the problem is how this death with Christ, which is in his case a death *for* sin and in our case a death *to* sin, can yet be one and the same process, with causal connection between its two stages. To this problem the insistence upon the principle of solidarity between Christ and us offers nothing in the way of solution, unless one were prepared to say that Christ's death was in every respect a death *to* sin and not *for* sin, which the author is not.

While compelled to make the above strictures on the author's method, we gladly acknowledge that in many respects his book is one of unusual merit, from which every student of Paulinism will be able to learn. Especially the notes subjoined to the various chapters are of great value excelling as they do in compactness and lucidity of statement. Such notes as A, II on the usage of the term "Gospel" in Paul and F I on "L'évolution sémantique du mot στοιχείον" are models of their kind. In general the style of the book furnishes a most happy example of the adaptation of the Gallic type of mind to the lucid treatment of abstruse theological problems.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

Kurzgefasste Grammatik des Neutestamentlichen Griechisch mit Berücksichtigung der Ergebnisse der vergleichenden Sprachwissenschaft und der KOINH-Forschung. Von A. T. ROBERTSON, D.D., Professor der Neutestamentlichen Exegese am Baptischen Seminar in Louisville, Ky. Deutsche Ausgabe von HERMANN STOCKS, Seminar-oberlehrer in Cottbus. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1911. Pp. xvi, 312. M.5-, geb. M.6-.

Dr. Robertson's *Short Grammar of the Greek New Testament* was reviewed in the PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, vol. vii., 1909, pp. 491-493. A second edition had appeared only a year after the time of original publication. The appearance of a German translation gives further evidence of the rapidly widening usefulness of the book. It

is true, the service which Stocks has rendered amounts to very much more than mere translation; for the material has been subjected to a thorough re-examination, and some sections have been re-written. But the improvement thus introduced into the German edition should cause no derogatory reflection upon the original work. It indicates rather that Dr. Robertson's book was of such value that it could serve as a useful basis for the work even of an independent and painstaking investigator.

On p. 134, *εἰς* with the accusative in the sense of a predicate nominative is still (compare the review mentioned above, p. 492) represented as occurring in Attic. Examples may fairly be desired. The usefulness of the valuable bibliography has in the German edition been increased by revision and classification. Despite the full table of contents, however, an *index rerum* is still to be desired.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY.

The Oriental Religions in Roman Paganism. By FRANZ CUMONT. With an Introductory Essay by Grant Showerman. Authorized Translation. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company; London Agents, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1911 Pp. xxiv, 298.

The Religious Life of Ancient Rome. A Study in the Development of Religious Consciousness from the Foundation of the City until the Death of Gregory the Great. By JESSE BENEDICT CARTER, Author of "The Religion of Numa". Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin Company. The Riverside Press, Cambridge. 1911. Pp. x, 270.

For the historical student everything connected with the Eternal City has a peculiar interest, but comparatively little attention has been paid to the religious life of the Romans. The general reader has a vague notion that the influence of the oriental religions was felt during the Empire—was there not a priest of Serapis in *Last Days of Pompeii*?—but he is usually content to dismiss the religion of the Romans as a subspecies of the better known religion of the Greeks, a pale copy in less vivid colors. As Professor Carter says: "The religion of ancient Rome is very little known outside the narrow circle of specialists in Latin. Her religion has been hedged about in a very extraordinary way, as though this jealous secrecy, which was always a part of it in the days of its life, was still guarded after its death by the wraiths of the gods who have gone the way of all the earth."

Both of the books before us grew out of courses of lectures, one given at Paris and Oxford, and the other before the Lowell Institute at Boston. *The Oriental Religions* is a translation of *Les religions*

orientales dans le paganisme romain, which was published in 1906 and revised in 1909. M. Cumont, who is a professor in the University of Ghent established his reputation as a collector and interpreter of evidence in the religious field in his two volumes (1896 and 1899) on *Textes et monuments figurés relatifs aux mystères de Mithra*, and the translator and publishers of the present volume have done a service in making accessible to English readers his work in a broader field. M. Cumont believes that "the propagation of the Oriental religions, with the development of neo-Platonism, is the leading fact in the moral history of the pagan empire". He traces the influence of these religions in chapters on Rome and the Orient, Why the Oriental Religions Spread, Asia Minor, Egypt, Syria, Persia, Astrology and Magic, and the Transformation of Roman Paganism. The mass of valuable notes and references is conveniently placed at the close of the book.

At a time when the Orontes was pouring its waters into the Tiber, and the Hellenized Orient was imposing its culture upon Rome, the influence in the sphere of religion was part of a larger movement. As M. Cumont says: "The transformation of beliefs was intimately connected with the establishment of the monarchy by divine right, the development of art, the prevailing philosophic tendencies, in fact with all the manifestations of thought, sentiment and taste." For our knowledge of these religions and of their influence in the Roman empire we are dependent upon literary and archaeological sources: allusions in Latin writers, and descriptions by Stoic and Platonist philosophers and Christian apologists; and the growing body of monuments and inscriptions. The evidence after all is meagre. "Shut out from the sanctuary like profane outsiders, we hear only the indistinct echo of the sacred songs and not even in imagination can we attend the celebration of the mysteries."

Both our authors warn us against the inference often hastily made that resemblance between the doctrines or ceremonies of two religions imply imitation. M. Cumont protests alike against regarding the pagan mysteries, with the Church Fathers, as a sacrilegious parody of the sacraments inspired by the spirit of lies, and against seeing in the Christian ceremonies, with the Oriental priests, a plagiarism of their ancient rituals. "It would appear that both were very much mistaken."

As we read the evidence of the wide-spread popularity among the Romans of the cults of Isis and Serapis, of Attis and Cybele, the Great Mother, and of Mithra, the invincible sun-god, two questions come before us: how explain the spread of these religions among the adherents of the official Graeco-Roman religion? and how explain the victory of Christianity over all its rivals? M. Cumont excludes from his subject the spread of Christianity in the Roman world, although he says that the diffusion of the Oriental religions promoted the victory of the Christian church. These religions did much to disintegrate the official cult, they separated religion from the state,

and taught before and alongside of Christianity ideas such as personal purification and eternal life. But it should be noted that the eastern cults hindered as well as helped the progress of Christianity. This point is made by Professor Carter, who says: "There were absolutely no exceptional conditions created for the benefit of Christianity. It entered into the struggle of human thought with no superiority except what it contained within itself. In fact, one of the most tangible proofs of the beauty of its original doctrines, of the sublimity of the moral teachings of Him who spake as never man spake, is to be found in the workings of those pre-conditions, which not only helped but also hindered her, while they seem to have been only of help to her rivals. The organization of the Empire rendered possible organized persecutions; philosophy created heresies, and the other Oriental religions, which in the main supported rather than opposed one another, ranged themselves unitedly against her."

The pervasive influence of the Oriental religions, with their cruel and sensual rites which scandalized the Latin writers as well as the Christian apologists, is often regarded as an evidence of the degradation of the Roman character under the Empire. M. Cumont would have us view the matter in another light. He thinks that a moral ground must be sought for the diffusion of these cults among all classes of Roman society, in spite of the fact that by the adoption of their mysteries "barbarous, cruel and obscene practices were undoubtedly spread". The new faiths, in contrast to the cold, prosaic and austere Roman religion, appealed to the emotions through their mysterious rites, to the intellect through the erudition of their priesthood, and to the conscience through the claim to wash away the impurities of the soul. "The Oriental religions acted upon the senses, the intellect and the conscience at the same time, and therefore gained a hold on the entire man. Compared with the ancient creeds, they appear to have offered greater beauty of ritual, greater truth of doctrine and a far superior morality." There is matter for discussion here, but it is evident that these religions became more spiritualized in course of time, and that the various deities at least of Egypt and of Syria came to be conceived, in accordance with the dominant philosophy, in a henotheistic or pantheistic way.

Professor Carter includes an account of the progress of Christianity in his comprehensive and very interesting survey of the religious life of the Romans. The apostle Paul, he believes, by teaching Christianity in a juridical form, translated it into terms of the Occident; and to this work of Paul was due not only the existence of Christianity as the religion of Europe but in a sense the preservation of western civilization itself. In the third and fourth centuries, he tells us, the great contending forces were "Neoplatonism, Mithraism and Christianity". All three were interested in the soul and its purification from guilt, and promised eternal life. Neoplatonism was at a disadvantage because it had no body of doctrines or ritual or organization for worship. But why did Christianity triumph over Mithraism at a

time when, as Renan suggests, there was doubt as to which one of the two would become the religion of Europe? Professor Carter finds two reasons: first, because of Christianity's connection with a personal Founder, and, second, because of its ideal of conduct, regarded as its essential message by men as different as Augustine and Nietzsche. "To lift up those who have fallen beneath the feet of the progress of the world, to care for those who are of no apparent profit or good to society at large, to give to those who cannot give again, these are the deeds which even in our modern parlance we call 'real Christianity'. This is the 'Selavenmoral'; it does indeed hinder human progress, if by human progress is meant the Superman who gains added height by treading on those who are weaker than he. We may take Nietzsche's part against Christianity, we may have steeled ourselves by dint of scientific and pseudo-humanitarian thought so that we advocate euthanasia and lethal chambers, but somewhere inside of us is the chord which responds to the Christian note. It is this note which has unchained a response in millions of human beings during these nineteen centuries. It is the essentially new thing which has come into the world during this new régime. Neoplatonism and Mithraism knew nothing of it, and to its presence, so far as phenomenal explanations go, was owing the conquest of Christianity over the combined forces of the ancient world."

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

La Hongrie Calviniste. Par E. DOUMERGUE. Toulouse: Société d'édition de Toulouse. [1912.] 8vo; pp. 209.

In the year 1909 M. Doumergue, Dean of the Protestant Faculty of Theology at Montauban, was led to make a flying journey among the Calvinistic Churches of Hungary. He visited the five faculties of theology—at Pápa, Debreczen, Kolozsvár, Budapest and Sárospatak,—and some village churches. He was everywhere received with cordiality; and no pains were spared to enable him, within the three weeks which were at his disposal, to see as much and to learn as much of the Hungarian churches as was possible. Professor Pokoly of Kolozsvár even wrote out a memoir for his instruction. Exceptional opportunities, in a word, were afforded him to observe the life and work of the Hungarian churches; and he brought to the observation exceptional native and trained powers of appreciation. The volume which he has published is naturally, therefore, exceptionally interesting and instructive.

The volume falls into three distinct parts. In the first (pp. 17-68), Mr. Doumergue gives a delightful account of his visits to the five theological faculties. Written with a fine lightness of touch this account takes the reader along with the author from town to town, and makes him sharer in all his feelings and impressions. The towns, the people, the institutions, the individuals, all stand before us in their living reality. Here is a single specimen of the cameo-like pictures which abound. "I finished my visit [at Budapest] by going to

a beautiful and large village nearby, Kunszentmiklós, where the superintendent of the province resides, the true type of the Magyar Calvinist Bishop, Baksay Sándor. He has never been outside the boundaries of Hungary. But he possesses a whole French library, which would do credit to more than one French pastor; he is one of the greatest of Hungarian Hellenists. The Hungarian Academy of Sciences has entrusted to him the translation of Homer into verse. In a word, he is one of the best Magyar men of letters. He knows his Bible by heart and all his Psalter; it is scarcely necessary to add that he is a strict Calvinist" (p. 51). We hold out our hand, across land and sea, to Bishop Alexander Baksay!

The second and longest section of the volume (pp. 71-166), is a sketch of the history of the Reformed Churches of Hungary; but, as the history is not continuously traced, M. Doumergue appropriately entitles it: "The great names and great epochs of Hungarian Calvinism." Here with a masterly touch, M. Doumergue makes the heroes of the long struggle of the Reformed Churches of Hungary and their achievements live again before us. The general course of the history outlined, he sums up for us on a later page in a quotation from one of his Hungarian hosts. "A learned professor," he writes (p. 188-9), "sketched for me one day the phases of Hungarian life. First of all, the great period: Hungary seems altogether Protestant. Then the Counter-Reformation is at work: the two first uprisings are purely Protestant; in the third the Catholics take part; in the fourth the Catholics are the chiefs, so much has Protestantism been little by little wrecked. In the nineteenth century there arises the literary and tolerant movement: the Protestants no longer are the most numerous party, but they hold the hegemony of intellect, with their Petőfis and Jókais. Calvinism is at the apogee of its popularity; the party of liberty is led by Kossuth, who is of Lutheran origin." "But the Catholics," adds M. Doumergue, "are struggling to regain the lost time. In every sphere of scientific attainment they are showing an untiring activity. Their numbers in the Academy of Sciences are continually increasing. Their propaganda in journals, in schools, rises more and more; and Protestantism, which persecutions have deprived of the numerical majority, no longer possesses the great intellectual majority. What is needed is a spiritual revival, which will restore its glorious life to the church, to the nation."

The most delicate part of M. Doumergue's task is reached, when, in the third section of his book, he undertakes to give some account of the present condition of the Hungarian Reformed Churches, under the title of "The Interior Life" (pp. 169-198), closing with a few words on their "Relations and Isolation" (pp. 201-206). The Hungarian Churches are, in his view, perhaps over-organized, and yet perhaps not organized in the most efficient manner. Certainly, we cannot look upon the present indifference in doctrinal matters which seems to be prevalent, as a good sign. The struggle against the liberalism, imported from Germany in the early seventies, which was

carried on particularly by Révész and Balogh, has apparently given way to a general acquiescence in grave differences of opinion, so long as they are quietly held. We learn that of the five theological faculties, two are considered "orthodox", two "liberal", and one "mystical" (p. 182). Meanwhile, the heart of the church remains sound, and it is supposed that the publication of "liberal" views here and there does no great harm. We cannot look upon this as a healthful condition. For the rest, M. Doumergue evidently thinks, that while there are many signs of life in the churches, a great revival is much to be wished; though it would be well, he thinks, if that revival could be home-bred, or at least, could take on forms which are "Magyarized". The greatest dangers of the Hungarian churches, he seems to think, arise now from their isolation. Set upon the Eastern limits of Europe, speaking a language known to few outside their own borders, there is peril that the blood of the whole body of Christ may circulate feebly in these extremities. No doubt there is such a danger: but,—may it not be exaggerated?

At all events the other branches of the Reformed Church must always hold their Hungarian brethren in the warmest regard. M. Doumergue rightly emphasizes the debt we all owe to the Hungarian Church which has borne the brunt of both Turkish invasion and of Romish persecution for us all. "She has given her blood," he writes strikingly, "to arrest the Musselman invasion, and with Hunyadi, before Belgrade, she saved Europe. Then, always at the cost of her purest blood, Protestant Hungary has striven against the Hapsburgs, against the invasion not so much of Catholicism as of Jesuitism. The Philips the Second of Spain and the Hapsburgs of Vienna were for the Europe of the sixteenth to the eighteenth century what the Turks had been at the end of the Middle Ages. And in that defence of Modern Europe, in which Holland and Richelieu and Sweden were glorious, Hungary took the most noble part with her Bocskays, her Bethlens, and her Rakoczys."

The prime object of M. Doumergue's book is to fix our affectionate attention on the Hungarian Reformed Church as one of the most isolated, one of the most needy, but also one of the most deserving, one of the most noble of the whole family of Reformed Churches. M. Doumergue is a Frenchman and writes for his French Protestant audience. He thinks there are special affinities between the Magyar and the (especially Southern) French character; and that there should be above all a closer relation instituted between the Hungarian and the French Reformed. We wish it with all our hearts. But we Americans must not fail, either, in our duty of love. Like the Hungarian Churches, we too have our place set on the edge of the world: the extreme East and the extreme West may find they have many things in common which both would miss nearer the center. Above all, in the movements of the peoples that characterize our times, Hungary has come into our very midst. The immigrant Magyar Reformed in America are in immediate contact with us, and call to us as they do

to no other nation. It matters not how they are organized into churches on our American soil: whether they retain their organic connection with the churches of their fatherland or become constituent parts of sister churches already living and laboring on these, to them, foreign shores. What matters it that to these Hungarian Reformed in our midst, the American churches shall show themselves brothers, and through them manifest their spiritual unity with their brethren at the other end of the world.

Professor Doumergue, himself a member of the Reformed Church of France, writing of the Hungarian Reformed, has dedicated his book "to the Theological Seminary at Princeton",—and added the sentiment: "I believe in the Holy Catholic Church, the Communion of Saints." No doubt he meant it as a symbol. We accept it as such. France, Hungary, America: the suns are different, the faith is one. We in the extreme west read his book, written in France, to commend to our love the Churches in the extreme east and we lay it down with the words with which he closes it on our lips: "God bless Hungary!" And we add, God bless the churches of France: God bless His people everywhere and make them one in heart and thought and life!

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine. Lectures delivered before Lake Forest College on the Foundation of the late William Bross. By FREDERICK JONES BLISS, Ph.D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. (The Bross Library, Volume V). Pp. xiv, 354. \$1.50 net.

This volume is evidence that its author has not confined his interest to the exploration of Palestine and the excavation of its ancient sites, but has had eyes and ears open to the religious situation of the land to-day. In fact much of what the author records as of his own observation he has learned through the opportunities which his scientific work has afforded him to mingle with all classes of the Syrian population. In addition to this point of contact Dr. Bliss has had the advantage not merely of birth and long residence in Syria, but of bearing a name honored throughout the region because of the character and services of Dr. Daniel Bliss, his father, long president of the Protestant College at Beyrout. The author is at pains to acknowledge, in his preface, the value of his own wide acquaintance among the students of that college, with its variegated religious clientele; and he adds a further source of information, of a more fortuitous nature, in his use of the unpublished journals of the late Professor S. I. Curtis.

The field covered in this book includes both the Christian and the Mohammedan sects. Indeed it embraces sects that strictly belong to neither the one nor the other of the two great religions, and has something to say of the Jews. But the author announces a future study of the Palestinian Jews, and of the Druses and other semi-Mohammedan sects.

There is much valuable material packed into these pages. Though professedly a popular, rather than a scientific or technical work, its writer, by his personal familiarity with the by-ways of his subject, has been able to correct even specialists in this field or that: so Adeney in his *The Greek and Eastern Churches*, on the mutual relations of the four Greek Orthodox patriarchs, p. 43, and Parry in his *Six Months in a Syrian Monastery*, on the existence of certain minor orders in the Jacobite clergy, p. 77.

There is in more than one place in this book a frank outcropping of its author's subjective attitude towards theological and ecclesiastical questions involved in his discussion. He himself recognizes that there are other "schools of criticism"—he is apparently referring to the sphere of comparative religion—than that to which he belongs; for on pp. 188f he remarks, "I find myself in disagreement with the sweeping generalizations of Dr. Zwemer and the school of criticism that he represents," touching the Mohammedan doctrine of God. It is at least implied, p. 184, that the Bible's superiority to the Koran in its doctrine of God consists, in part at least, in the comparative rarity of passages like Romans ix. 18, and the comparative frequency of such passages as James i. 13, 14 which furnish a wholesome "antidote" thereto. James' words are pronounced "sane"; what then are Paul's words? We fear that the Protestantism for which Dr. Bliss stands, as it appears from this book, is an ethical program, with a Bible subjectively selected, and a God framed after the desires of the human heart rather than the word of revelation. And with this we cannot but suspect an attitude towards those of other religions that is better described as concessive than as tolerant, an attitude that in the end will never accomplish that redemption of Christianity in Syria which the fathers began and for which the Church has striven.

We note a few of the more important errors that have escaped the eye of the proof-readers. P. 37, footnote², "their" for "there". P. 47, near bottom, "has" for "have". P. 89, near bottom, "Cyril IV" for "Cyril VI". P. 143, near top, "has" for "hast". P. 185, near top, "lear" for "liar". P. 194, footnote¹, the pointing of the fifth Arabic word. P. 257, near top, "zibr" for "zikr". P. 270, "hums" without a capital. P. 271, "stilletos". P. 299, middle, "Ali's" for "Hossein's". P. 309, near bottom, "become" for "became". Also the following: p. 260, "real good"; p. 328, "some over"; p. 329, "a strike even"; p. 333, "in inverse ratio" should be "in direct ratio", or else "decrease" should be "increase".

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

L'Orientation religieuse de la France actuelle. Par PAUL SABATIER.

Paris: Librairie Armand Colin. 1911. Pp. 320. 3 fr. 50.

One of the most difficult notions to define is that of religion. The reason is that theories influence definitions and theories of religion are exceedingly numerous. In the first chapter Sabatier explains to us carefully what he means by religion. He desires a definition that

will suit our time and our civilization. M. Salomon Reinach defines religion as "*un ensemble de tabous*" but this suits Polynesia, not France. Other recent definitions proposed by Guyau, *une explication sociologique universelle a forme mythique*"; by Darmesteter, "*La religion embrasse tout le savoir et tout le pouvoir non scientifique*"; by Boutroux, "*La religion est l'élan de l'âme qui, se retrempant aux sources de l'être, conçoit un idéal transcendant, et acquiert, pour y tendre, des forces dépassant la nature*"; and by the Abbe Bricout, "*on a entendu par religion l'ensemble de sentiments de représentations et d'actes volontaires provoqués, chez un individu ou dans un groupe d'hommes, par la conscience de ses relations personnelles avec les puissances supérieures souveraines*"; are rejected. The question is asked why not form our definition empirically and say that for our contemporaries religion is that instinctive need by which man is led to the consciousness of his better self, to unite himself with those who can be of service to him as guides or companions in this difficult labor, and to make an effort to realize with them that which the inner witness suggests. In other words so long as a man observes, reflects and descants, there is philosophy; religion arises when, ceasing to be a simple witness of his own life and of the life of others, he throws his will into the balance and affirms that he is a collaborator in the eternal work which he perceives going on around him and to which he gives himself. It is this impulse which has created all religious institutions and which also destroys them when they no longer answer its need. *C'est l'amour qui crée le nid, c'est aussi l'amour qui le fait abandonner.*

The usual method of "religious orientation" in such countries as France is to take the church as centre of reference: to call religious those who are in connection more or less close with the church and irreligious those who stand without. Thus in France (p. 270 note) Mgr. Dadolle, *évêque de Dijon*, reported to the Pope that the number of active Catholics does not exceed four or five millions. This leaves about thirty millions who are living untouched by any churchly influence. Shall we call the latter *incrédules*? Sabatier does not. Along with indifference to the church there exists in France to-day a revival of real religious aspirations and this movement from the heart of the people is affecting all spheres of life.

The indifference of the people to the churches is to be traced back to the war of 1870. The Roman Catholic church lost the respect of the country because, notwithstanding that the priests as individuals proved themselves good citizens, when France decimated on the battle field, with two noble provinces lost, impoverished, wounded in pride and trembling with anger took refuge in the church, instead of sympathy and active help and advice in the task of social and political reconstruction, all that was heard were recommendations to use miraculous medals, to organize pilgrimages to Paray-le-Monial to entreat the Sacre-Coeur to reestablish the temporal power and so to save France for Rome and Rome for France. On the other hand the Protestant Churches fared no better. Up to 1870 the Protestant nations had been

regarded as workshops where were elaborated the scientific and moral principles to conduct the world to new destinies. The Franco-Prussian war was a huge disenchantment. Protestant Germany proved unjust, rapacious and cruel. The religion of the Reformation suffered irreparable damage. So to-day when even the United States is held up by certain *professeurs de vie intense* as an example of the industrial and commercial prosperity which can be attained by way of Protestantism, France is not attracted, and asks with anxiety whether the materialistic ideal of the new world is any better than that of the old.

The new religion of the people however is spreading upward and influencing all spheres of life. Contemporary philosophy is feeling it. After more than forty years the Latin lands are again producing notable philosophers. It is true that they are not creators of any religious doctrines; rather are they witnesses or spectators of religion. Nevertheless, the new philosophy has a sympathetic *élan* with the movement of affirmation, love and unity among the people. In Art, Sabatier finds evidences of a sincerity and a broad realism which is akin to idealization and so is religious. In Literature while there is enough of desire to flatter evil tastes, to make money, to gain notoriety, still a change is taking place. There is in the newer authors an involuntary return to religion. They, like Maeterlinck, approach life by the way of experience and reality and those sentiments which religion excites in us are roused in us by their work.

Even Catholicism has not remained untouched. It has split into conservatism and modernism, the watchword of the latter being "*Toute vérité est orthodoxe*." The Protestant churches in their turn are affected in that they are abandoning their individualism for a wider feeling for humanity as a whole and a deeper sympathy for social efforts. The new religion finally has resulted in the creation of the lay schools and the earnest efforts of many serious minds to form a course of adequate moral instruction in them.

A review cannot do justice to the brilliancy with which this book is written, its earnestness, its wide sweep of observation and the clearness of its exposition. Nor is it possible for one not living in France to pass judgment on the statements of fact herein made. The interest of the work consists however in its treatment of a condition not peculiar to France alone but to other countries, our own included. It is estimated apparently by respectable authorities that 80,000,000 in the United States are not in any connection with the churches of all denominations. Are they irreligious? Not if we accept Sabatier's psychological definition. The trouble however is that all human impulses if they do not meet their legitimate object tend to die or degenerate and in the long run or the short pervert the organism. So if the religious impulse puts what is not God himself in the place of God it soon degenerates and brings ruin upon its organism. Patriotism, philanthropy, aesthetics, are not adequate substitutes for God himself. But "how shall they call on him in whom they have not believed, and how shall they believe in him whom they have not heard and how shall

they hear without a preacher?" Or, fundamentally, does God strive upwards to full life and personality in the constitution of human society or has he come down in Jesus Christ to raise a fallen and lost humanity to himself?

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

The Life of Dr. J. R. Miller. "Jesus and I are Friends." By JOHN T. FARIS, Associate Editor of the Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Board of Publication. 1912. 8vo; pp. vi, 246.

This is the record of a man who, in his own estimation, was "less than the least of all saints"; but who, if judged by his works, must be counted among the really great men of the church of all ages. When scarcely more than a boy, as Delegate, Assistant Field Agent and General Field Agent of the Christian Commission he served his God and his country during the darkest days of the Civil war with courage, with fidelity, and with success which, had he done nothing else, should have entitled him to everlasting remembrance. As Editor of the Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work, he saw the periodicals of the Board increase from 6 to 23, and the issue of the periodicals from 9,256,386 to over 66,248,215 copies. As a pastor, he was equally laborious and equally effective. In the thirty-nine years of his three Philadelphia pastorates 5,341 persons were received, an average of 137 for every year. As an author, he published sixty-eight volumes, which attained during his life a circulation of more than two million copies, and some of which were translated into German, French, Italian and Norwegian. Yet all this did not sum up his ministry. The world was his parish. By personal interviews, but specially by letter, he brought help and comfort and salvation to an unnumbered and practically innumerable multitude of all classes and of all religions and of no religion.

Nor was his work less remarkable for its quality than for its quantity and variety. He made the periodicals that he edited models for the Sabbath School literature of all the churches. He not only led men into the church, but he helped them to find in Jesus the friend that he had found. His books were remarkable equally for spirituality and chasteness of style. He is often spoken of as the greatest religious writer of his day, and such was the simplicity of his diction that it is said that publishers were accustomed to allow one fifth less space for a given number of words from him than from other authors.

But Dr. Miller was himself greater and better than even his works. He regarded sincerity as the great need of the age, and he was preeminently and fundamentally sincere. Though in no sense a controversialist, he had principles; and nothing could move him from them. Unlike many men of large achievement, he would talk of anything rather than of what he had himself done. Though incessantly interrupted, he was always surrounded by the atmosphere of holy

calm. Mercilessly exacting of himself, he was tenderness itself toward others. The thirteenth chapter of the First Epistle to the Corinthians best describes him, and one had only to go into his presence to think at once of him who so loved the world that he died on the cross for it.

Dr. Miller chose his own biographer, and he has been most fortunate in the choice. Mr. Faris has not given us a eulogy; that would have been inadequate; but he has given us a record; and that reveals to us the secret of the man's life and work. It brings us into communion with Dr. Miller himself. It inspires us to try to follow him as he followed his Friend and ours.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Famous Places of the Reformed Churches. By the Rev. JAMES I. GOOD, D.D. Professor of Reformed Church History in the Central Theological Seminary of the Reformed Church in the U. S. Philadelphia: Heidelberg Press. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 455.

This "religious guide-book to Europe" does not contain a mere description of routes and sights, but gives a series of historical sketches briefly reviewing the lives of the great Reformation heroes, and the subsequent religious movements in their respective lands. We are led through Switzerland, Holland, Germany, France, Bohemia, England and Scotland, and are reminded of the tremendous sacrifices, of the suffering, and blood-shed, by which our liberties were purchased. The volume opens with a "Foreword" by Dr. Wm. Henry Roberts, and contains a delightful chapter on Edinburgh written by the Rev. Marcus A. Brownson, D.D. The text is illustrated by a number of pictures of "famous places of the Reformed Churches".

Princeton.

CHAS. R. ERDMAN.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY.

The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ. International Theological Library. By H. R. MACKINTOSH, D.Phil., D.D., Professor of Theology, New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark; New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. 8vo: pp. xiv, 540. \$2.50 net.

Professor Mackintosh tells us in his Preface that he has designed his book "chiefly as a student's manual", and (that it may serve that end) that he has wished to make it "cover with a fair measure of completeness, the whole field of Christology". This seems to promise us a plain, objective, comprehensive treatise. But we are afraid these qualities are scarcely those which most strikingly characterize it. The language in which it is written is overloaded, burdened with superfluous qualificatives, and, though often brilliant, often also not very exact. The presentation is individualistic to its finger-tips. And comprehensiveness of treatment is sought chiefly by pre-fixing to the

constructive discussion—the author calls it, significantly, “the reconstructive statement”—an equally long survey of the “history of Christological doctrine”. Under this heading we class together the first two Books, which are entitled respectively “Christology in the New Testament” and “History of Christological Doctrine”, because, though formally distinguished, their subject-matters are dealt with much after the same fashion. They together occupy 284 pages, leaving for the “reconstructive statement” the remaining 250 pages.

Perhaps we ought to give some illustration of the looseness of the language of which we have complained. We begin with the simplest forms. On p. 43 our attention is directed to the “suggestion that in the earliest faith two forms of faith in Christ went side by side, in peaceful rivalry: that to which He was but a prophet and forerunner; and that to which He already appeared as authentically Divine in majesty and redeeming power”. It is then very correctly remarked that no such division of opinion is traceable in the New Testament, but it is surprisingly added (*italics his*): “Both estimates were held by *all* Christians”. What is intended is clear enough and very true: but what is actually said is, strictly taken, nonsense—for no one could possibly have combined the beliefs that Jesus was both “*but* a prophet” and that He was God. The fatally pleonastic “but” wrecks the precision of the statement. Similarly we read on p. 108 of “St. John’s usage of the title ‘Son of Man’ ” whereas the fact of course is that John never uses that title, but only quotes Christ as using it; on p. 118, in an exposition of the Prologue to John, that it declares of the Logos that “He was from the beginning” when what it really declares of course is that *in* the beginning He already was, which is something very different; on p. 125, that the Apostolic habit of praying to Christ may be regarded “as the practical ‘deifying’ of Jesus”, whereas the truth is that Jesus was not held to be God because He was prayed to but was prayed to because He was held to be God; on p. 129, that it was possible for the first Christians “to accentuate either Christ’s Divine unity with, or His personal distinction from the Father”, where the adjective “Divine” is quite without meaning; on p. 228, that according to Thomas Aquinas the two natures of our Lord, “are not so much united, as brought into a common relation to the Logos”, which after some reflection may no doubt be made to yield its meaning, but is a very awkward way of expressing it; on p. 266, that according to Thomas the Logos by His exinanition “became capable of forming the center of a single personal life”, as if He had not formed the center of a single personal life from all eternity; on p. 318, that the “influence” of Jesus has in every age “continued to reconcile men with God”, an expression which we would be loath to believe fairly embodied Professor Mackintosh’s conception of the work of Christ; on p. 323, that the Greek idea of salvation naturally led to defining our Lord’s Person “in terms of substance, not spirit”, an instance of an inveterate habit of false antithesis; on p. 386, with respect to the attribution of “an impersonal humanity” to our Lord, that “we are rightly told that the

truth against which the phrase is designed to safeguard is this, that the humanity of our Lord had no *independent personality*", where, however, the disturbing "against" is probably a printer's error¹; on p. 397, with reference to Mk 13: 32, that if Jesus "could thus be ignorant of a detail connected in some measure with His redemptive work, the conclusion is unavoidable that in secular affairs His knowledge was but the knowledge of His time"—certainly as fine a specimen of *non sequitur* as could easily be turned up anywhere. We have purposely chosen these instances from statements of no great intrinsic importance: they illustrate better on that account a fault of style.

But the fault illustrated invades the most important statements also, in which over-statement, incomplete antithesis, disturbing adverbial and adjectival qualificatives abound. Take such a sentence as this, for example: "God and man are one, but the unity results not from the formal juxtaposition of abstract natures, but from spiritually costly experiences of reciprocal possession and coalescence" (p. 371). What is a "*formal* juxtaposition of *abstract* natures"? Had Dr. Mackintosh said simply "juxtaposition of natures", his meaning would have been clear, though question might still be raised of the justice of the use of this expression to describe the orthodox doctrine of the Person of Christ. But what a "*formal*" juxtaposition of natures is, and how "*abstract*" natures can be juxtaposed, whether formally or any other way, we must profess our inability to imagine. We are equally puzzled to divine what it means to say that the unity of God and man in the Person of the exalted Jesus "results from experiences of reciprocal possession and coalescence". Where "reciprocal possession and coalescence" are experienced, one would think unity already given—not requiring yet to be constituted. And when we remember that in Professor Mackintosh's view, as we shall see, there never existed in Jesus Christ—certainly not prior to His exaltation—any two factors (God and man) to experience "reciprocal possession and coalescence", we shall begin to realize how loose and unmeaning the expression is. Take another example. We read (p. 270): "If we hold with conviction that Jesus is one in whom God Himself enters humanity" (this is itself a fatally ambiguous expression) "then He does so either with all His attributes unmodified or in such wise as to manifest only those qualities which are compatible with a real human life". The false disjunction is flagrant. God may enter the human race by assuming into personal union with Himself a human nature without any modification taking place in any of his Divine attributes (this in point of fact is precisely what did take place); and yet manifest ordinarily in His life "in the flesh" only those of His divine qualities which are compatible with the real human life which by virtue of His assumed human nature He willed to live.

Perhaps, however, a longer passage will give us a better insight into

¹ We have not observed many printers' errors: p. 150, line 2, "second" for "third"; p. 216, "Julius of Holicarnassus" for "Julian".

Professor Mackintosh's methods of sentence building. We will take one from pp. 455-6. "It is, of course, true," we read, "that Christ, both in His own mind and in that of the apostles, stands in positive relations to the Divine foreknowledge. But we do not exhaust the special connection of Christ with God by relating Him merely to the Divine *thought*. So far He is on the same plane with the creatures." Here there is a quite clear declaration that Christ in common with the creatures was the object of the Divine foreknowledge (and therefore has not existed eternally), and with it an intimation that He differs from the creatures in being something more than the object of the Divine foreknowledge. The statement, therefore, at once follows that this something more is that He—and by immediate inference, not they—is the object also of the Divine *will*. But in accordance with Professor Mackintosh's usual manner, he cannot make this statement simply. Qualifying clauses are introduced, and qualifying clauses of such a character as confuse the antithesis and indeed go far towards abolishing it. What we actually read is: "The filial connection is so close that we must also think of Christ as eternally related, and related as an eternal fact, to the *will* of God—as the timeless object of His producing and sustaining love." What the disturbing intercalated phrase, "and related as an eternal fact" means and what its function in the antithesis is, are not immediately clear. Any fact, eternally contemplated as such in the thought of God and eternally decreed as such in the will of God, might be appropriately designated, perhaps, on that account "an eternal fact", that is, a fact which has from all eternity been certain to occur. But this does not seem to exhaust the meaning of the phrase as here used. It seems to be intended to designate Christ, as distinguished from the creatures, a fact which has existed eternally not merely in the thought of God, nor merely in the will of God, but also in actuality. But thus the antithesis is confused. The main declaration of the sentence is that Christ differs from the creatures in being the object not merely of the eternal Divine thought but also of the eternal Divine *will*. The assertion that He differs from them further in, unlike them, existing eternally in actuality is inserted in the midst of this declaration without preparation for it and in such a manner as to confuse the consecution of thought. Things are not bettered by the addition of the explanatory clause—"as the timeless object of His producing and sustaining love",—although the qualification "timeless" here attached to "object" confirms the explanation of the phrase "an eternal fact" as a declaration of the eternal actual existence of Christ. For the eternal Christ which was formerly said to be the eternal object of the Divine thought, and has just been said to be the eternal object also of the Divine will, and that so as to exist co-eternally with this will, is now said, not merely to be also the "timeless object" of the Divine love, but also to owe His existence and His persistence in being alike to that love. What would appear to be meant is that the love of God eternally produces and sustains in being as its timeless object Him whom we know as

Christ in accordance with the eternal will and, behind that, the eternal thought of God. So far have we travelled from the simple antithesis which differentiates the temporal Christ from the creature as the object not merely of the thought but also of the will of God; and we begin to suspect that that fundamental antithesis was never intended to be drawn at all, and that Professor Mackintosh did not have it in his mind to deny that creatures are eternally the object of the Divine will as well as of the Divine thought (which nevertheless his words do emphatically deny), but only wished to deny to them the eternal actual existence which he affirms for Christ. Be that as it may, having now ascribed Christ to the love of God as His producing and sustaining cause, Professor Mackintosh passes at once away from this idea again and reverts to the mere 'thought and will of God'. He proceeds: "The thought and will of God cannot be conceived save as imparting reality to Christ". This can scarcely mean that God cannot be conceived as a thinking and willing being save as bringing into being the man Christ, as a phenomenon in time and space. It appears to be Professor Mackintosh's mode of stating the old argument that a duality in the Godhead is given in the very idea of a self-conscious and loving God, an argument to which, we may remark in passing, he does not seem elsewhere to accord quite conclusive force. If so, we perceive how completely he has passed in the course of a few sentences from the phenomenal Christ with which the paragraph began to the noumenal Christ. The concluding sentence carries on this new line of thought. "Or to put it otherwise," we read, "the Father revealed in the Son cannot be thought as fully real in abstraction from the Son in whom alone we apprehend Him." The change of terms here from "Christ" to "Son" is no doubt the sign that now the phenomenal Christ has been definitely left in the background, although to Dr. Mackintosh, "Son" is not always elsewhere,—at least primarily,—the designation of the pre-incarnate person. We appear to have arrived nevertheless at the thesis that God, if He is to "be thought as fully real", must be thought of as dual,—Father and Son. We apprehend Him only in the Son in whom He is revealed; and in abstraction from the Son we cannot think of Him as real. Even here, however, we are haunted with a doubt whether a new idea is not intended to be subtly suggested—the Ritschlian principle that we know God only through Christ. On the whole, nevertheless, we seem by searching to have found out the author's thought. But we have had to search for it.

The intelligent reading of a book written after this fashion is not an easy task. We are not always sure it is a rewarding one. Logical consecution not having always presided over its composition, it does not easily yield its meaning to logical analysis. We are tempted again and again to take it "in the vague" and to depend for the ascertainment of its meaning on the general impression it leaves on the mind,—much, for example, as we take the illusive writings of, say, Maeterlinck. The thought seems to be so congested in Professor Mackintosh's pregnant sentences that it refuses to flow out liquidly to the reader.

And even when we reach the thought our difficulties are not all over. Professor Mackintosh says many good things well and strongly. We have noted numerous passages where truths of importance, often truths disputed in circles with which Professor Mackintosh manifests a certain sympathy, are stated with clearness and force. And the drift of the whole discussion is on the side of the angels. But the points of view from which Professor Mackintosh approaches his task and the presuppositions with which he endeavors to accomplish it, gravely compromise his results, or rather, if we are to speak quite frankly, render it from the first impossible that he should succeed in reaching a satisfying solution of the problems which it offers. Even when he is endeavoring to state facts which are generally allowed, it is impossible for him, with his presuppositions, to state them so as to be generally acceptable. This is perhaps sufficiently illustrated by the very first affirmation he makes. The authors of the New Testament, he tells us (p. 2) "are eventually" (not a very well chosen adverb here, one would think) "one in their view of Christ". "Two certainties are shared in common by all New Testament writers: First, that the life and consciousness of Jesus was in form completely human; second, that this historic life, apprehended as instinct with the powers of redemption, is one with the life of God Himself. In Christ they find God personally present for our salvation from sin and death." This is Professor Mackintosh's substitute for saying that throughout the New Testament our Lord is looked upon and presented as both God and man. It is a very poor substitute: it fails indeed to make it clear that the New Testament recognizes Him as either God or man, and in its positive statements it stands in no relation whatever to New Testament teaching. Nothing could be more untrue than to say that "the life and consciousness of Jesus" are represented in the New Testament as "in form completely human". It would be nearer the truth to say that the whole New Testament is written to show that neither the life nor the consciousness of Jesus was even in form completely human. John expressly tells us this of himself: and, as Professor Mackintosh recognizes (p. 5 note), even Mark draws Jesus "as he appeared to contemporaries, *living out the truth of Divine Sonship*" (italics ours). Not forgetting, Professor Mackintosh adds, it is true, "the human limitations of this Divine personality", but as he supports this only by a passage (vi: 5) which, as he subsequently himself explains (p. 14), does not in the least support it, we may be justified in leaving the qualification out of account. How can it be said of one who is reported as declaring, "Verily, verily, I say unto you, Before Abraham was I am" (Jno. viii: 58), that His consciousness is represented as "completely human"? Nay, how can Professor Mackintosh tell us in one breath that the consciousness of Jesus is represented throughout the whole New Testament as "in form completely human", and almost in the next breath (p. 29) remark on "the unconditioned character of His self-consciousness" as depicted even in the Synoptic Gospels as a rock on which low views of His Person even in the

days of His flesh inevitably make shipwreck? Is an "unconditioned self-consciousness" "in form completely human"? We cannot withhold the expression of our sympathy for Professor Mackintosh in the difficulties he experiences in attempting to impose his *a priori* schematization of the Person of our Lord on a New Testament text obviously so impatient of it. Neither is it the New Testament view that the "historic life" of Jesus Christ, that is to say, we suppose, the life He lived in what the Epistle to the Hebrews calls the days of His flesh, "is one with the life of God Himself". They represent it rather as a life in a true sense alien to the life of God, a life altogether unnatural to Christ as God, a life of humiliation, characterized by obedience, whereas it belongs to God to reign (Phil. ii: 8 *sq.*). Nor is the matter helped by the insertion *more suo* of the qualifying clause, "apprehended as instinct with the powers of redemption". This is not a New Testament phrase and it represents a point of view which is not a New Testament point of view. Jesus Christ according to His own testimony came into the world on a ministry of mercy and redeems men by giving His life as a ransom for their sins. It is redolent of a totally different conception to say that His life on earth "was instinct with the powers of redemption"; and if His life on earth were apprehended as thus "instinct with the powers of redemption", this would not justify us in pronouncing it on that account "one with the life of God", and in point of fact the majority of those who so apprehend it do not therefore consider it "one with the life of God". To find "God personally present for our salvation from sin and death" in Christ is not to find Christ God, and those who have made this and like phrases their shibboleths do not in point of fact find Christ God. If this were all that could be said for the New Testament conception of Jesus on His divine side, then nothing is said which might not be said of any good man in and through whom God works for the salvation of sinful men. That it is not all that must be said Professor Mackintosh knows very well, and tells us in detail in his subsequent treatment of the conception of Christ presented in the several portions of the New Testament. It is all the more to be regretted that he permits his *a priori* schematization of the Person of the Lord to confine his statement here of the common New Testament doctrine to such a doubtful minification. Obviously we shall not find our way a step in Professor Mackintosh's book unless we keep clearly in mind the presuppositions of his speculative doctrine of the Person of Christ. Those presuppositions color all his thought and all his expressions, and make the book merely a historico-speculative presentation and defence of his particular "reconstruction".

We shall confine ourselves in what follows to some remarks on three of the fundamental presuppositions which Professor Mackintosh brings with him to his attempt to expound the doctrine of the Person of Christ, and which condition or rather determine his entire conception of that doctrine. These concern his ontology of spiritual being,—if "ontology" is the right word to use in connection with his conception

of the nature of spirit; his point of view with reference to the Christian doctrine of the Two Natures of our Lord; and his opinions with reference to Kenosis.

Professor Mackintosh gives his adherence to a very explicit, and we may add somewhat extreme, voluntarism in his conception of the nature of spirit (cf. pp. 113-114, 166, 188, 221, 304, 334, 416, 421, 422, 424, 500). "There is in the universe", he declares (pp. 114), "nothing more real than will, the living energy of spirit; nothing more concrete and actual, whether it be in God or man". Again, "To the modern mind, will is the very core and essence of personality" (p. 188). And more explicitly still, "The ultimate and central reality of things is will" (p. 41). Professor Mackintosh does not mean by these declarations merely to assert the primacy of the will among the constitutive attributes of personality. He means to replace the conception of "substance" by the conception of "will" in representing to himself the being of spirit. When he comes to form a conception of the Person of Christ, therefore, he has no Divine "nature" and no human (spiritual) "nature" by the union of which in one person he can think of it as constituted. He has nothing on which to fix his thought but the Divine Will and a human will. He has no other formula for a Divine-human Christ, then, except the affirmation of the identity of Christ in will with God. "What the believer wishes to assert is not that Christ is manifestly superhuman and so far partially Divine, but that His will, the personal energy which moved in Him, is identically the will of God" (p. 422). "Let men perceive that in Christ there stands before them One who in spiritual being—that is, in will and character—is *identical*" (italics his) "with God Himself, that in Him we have to do with nothing less than the Eternal, and at once it becomes plain that revelation can go no further" (p. 424). Does the deity of Christ consist then merely in the identity of His will with God's? Professor Mackintosh would deprecate the qualification "merely": identity of will with God is identity with God, for God is just Will. "If behind all will and thought there exists in God a mysterious incognizable substance, not to be described in terms familiar to human experience, but representing the point through which the thread of cosmic relations pass, and constituting the inmost essence of the Divine life, then indeed the oneness of Christ with God"—on the hypothesis that it is a oneness of will—"is after all only relative" (p. 113). But if will is not "something less and lower than ultimate reality" (p. 113)—then, "if we are inspired by Christian faith to affirm that Jesus Christ is identical with God in will—a Will manifested in His achievements—we have reached a point beyond which no advance is possible; for in ethical terms, the highest terms available, we have affirmed His ontological unity with God in a sense generically different from what is predicable of man as man" (p. 304). We may "speak, indeed, loosely of making *our* wills one with God's", and we certainly do not mean that thereby we become really one with God. But this is not all we mean when we speak of Christ's will being one with God's: we do not mean *this* "partially, or inter-

mittently; or by way of metaphor; it is one identically" (p. 417); we mean that "the self-conscious active principle of the Son's life" (we interrupt the quotation to ask if this change in terminology is not significant) "subsisted in perfect and identical union with the Father", (p. 417). There can be no doubt, then, that Professor Mackintosh wishes, under his new point of view, to teach the real deity of Christ, as identity in Will with God. "In every conceivable sense in which this is a *true* estimate of His person, it is also a metaphysical estimate", he remarks (p. 304), in defence of himself against the reproach that he is teaching a merely (he would object again to the term "merely") ethical view of Christ's deity. It is another question, however, whether the construction he offers us really gives us a Divine Christ. He himself is constrained to add, immediately after the last quotation we have made from p. 417: "This of course does not carry us once more beyond the moral relations of love and trust; that were to de-ethicise Sonship all over again. What is meant is that these relations must be interpreted at their full value—as significant of truth proper, not mere metaphors—and when we take them so, it appears that essentially (which means not in virtue of some ineffable substance, but in that central Will by which personality is constituted) Christ is one with God". This is a blind saying. If we do not get beyond the moral relations of love and trust in asserting Christ to be one with God, it seems an abuse of language to speak of this union as "essential". And in any case to speak of Christ's unity with God as a unity not in "substance" (we pass the gratuitous characterization of this "substance" as "some ineffable substance" as only another instance of Professor Mackintosh's mannerism) but only in "Will", has its dangers. We do not affirm that a doctrine of real incarnation is impossible if spiritual being be defined as just will; but undoubtedly this ontology presents grave difficulties to thought in construing the idea of incarnation, and Professor Mackintosh does not appear to us to have overcome these difficulties. With all his manifestly good intentions he may prove to have given us a Christ who is rather ethically like God than a Christ who is God.

That Professor Mackintosh has not succeeded in speaking always in the terms of his ontology is not surprising. To conceive will without a subject of which it is the will is not easy: to speak of it otherwise than as someone's will is impossible. This difficulty is not to be covered up by contrasting the rival ontologies as "metaphysical" and "ethical" or even as "quantitative" and "qualitative" conceptions of God. When we are asked to think of God rather as "Purpose" than as "Infinite Thing or Quantity" (p. 500), or "to put aside the category 'substance' and construe the facts freshly in terms of personality" (p. 334), or to "place the reality of God" rather in His "will and character" than in an "inscrutable and unethical substance" (p. 421), or not to assume "that substance as a category is higher and more adequate than Subject" (p. 416), it is a poor reader who does not fully understand that there is only an attempt being made to "rush"

his judgment by calling names. The question is not whether God is to be conceived as a Thing or a Person, substance or Subject, but whether He is to be conceived as Person or mere attribute, as Subject or mere Activity. When Professor Mackintosh equates "Subject" with "intelligent conscious Will", and this in turn with "personality, or self-consciousness", he is only hastily gathering fig-leaves to conceal the nakedness of the idea of bare Will, which He affirms that God is. How can there be Will save as the will of some Subject, self-consciousness without a self to be conscious of itself; and what is an "intelligent conscious Will" except a short way of saying an intelligent, conscious, voluntary Agent? No doubt Person is the highest of all categories, and Purpose is the constitutive quality of Person; but we confound all thought if we wish to make this Purpose the Person rather than the Person's. To evaporate God into His activities or functions is simply to abolish God and can end in nothing but Ritschlian phenomenalism. Some of Professor Mackintosh's historical judgments may illustrate further the difficulties into which his voluntarist ontology may bring him. Expounding Origen's Christology he mentions (p. 106) that father's ascription to the Son of homoousia with the Father and then adds: "It is quite in harmony with this homoousia that Origen should elsewhere describe the Son as 'begotten of the Father's will', for in the spiritual realm no contrast exists between will and substance".¹ Again, speaking of Athanasius (p. 188), he remarks: "We should put differently the point that God is Father 'by nature and not of will'; for the modern mind will is the very core and essence of personality". A point of view which obliterates the distinction between Arian and Athanasian is certainly a powerful solvent. It is perilous to attempt to construct the doctrine of the Trinity held by any thinker from fragmentary remarks. But it is difficult to understand what sort of a doctrine of the Trinity can be built up on Professor Mackintosh's postulates, and we have read his final chapter, which is entitled "Christ and the Divine Triunity", without receiving full enlightenment. The one thing he seems to be sure of (compare also pp. 452-4) is that the eternal distinctions in the Godhead are not, in any very intelligible sense at least, distinct persons.

If the distinct Persons of the doctrine of the Trinity present a difficulty to Professor Mackintosh's thought which he seems scarcely to know what to do with, the Two Natures of the doctrine of the Person of Christ present to it an impossibility which he knows very well what to do with, and against which he therefore turns his direct polemic (cf. pp. 14, 29, 46, 73, 85, 127, 155-7, 164, 214, 228, 236-7, 293-9, 371). To one who, as Professor Mackintosh does, acknowledges

¹ The remark is borrowed from Loofs, as a footnote advises us. Loofs (*Leitfaden zum Studium der Dogmengeschichte*, 1893, p. 124) writes: "This is not contradicted by the description of the Logos as υἱὸς ἐκ τοῦ θελήματος τοῦ πατρὸς γεννηθὲς (citat. Justinianus L. xxi, p. 482 note 3), for in the purely spiritual realm ἐκ τοῦ θελήματος and ἐκ τῆς οὐσίας are no contrasts."

Christ to be truly God, there would seem no escape from recognizing two natures in the constitution of His person,—that is, of course, unless the extremest docetism is embraced and His bodily nature is treated as an illusion. Professor Mackintosh enunciates, it is true, with apparent approval the proposition, "All that is Divine in Christ is human, and all that is human is Divine" (p. 214); but he will scarcely extend this to our Lord's body. We must suppose his vigorous denial of two natures to Christ to refer therefore only to the spiritual side of His person. Even here no doubt he admits that at least an appearance of duality has always been recognized and must be recognized. "He was always viewed as both things—heavenly Divine Spirit, and true man who had suffered and died", he tells us (p. 127). He even writes (p. 85): "As a matter of fact the duality is simply indissociable from the Christian view of Jesus. Faith is conscious of the personal presence of God in Him; it is therefore inevitable that He should be regarded alike in a Divine or eternal aspect—implying somehow a real pre-existence—and in an aspect for which He fulfils His mission under the conditions of time". But he insists that this duality concerns merely "two aspects" (italics his) "of a single concrete life", (p. 295); and he fulminates loudly against and cheerfully caricatures what he calls the false "hypostatisation" (it is not precisely the term we should have expected) of these aspects into "distinctly functioning substantialities, which may be logically estimated or adjusted to each other, or combined in unspiritual modes" (p. 295). Thus, he insists, "an incredible dualism" is introduced into our conception of Person of Christ, which substitutes for "that perfect unity which is felt in every impression of Him" (p. 294) a "formal juxtaposition of abstract natures" (p. 371) that "leaves a profoundly disappointing impression of unethical mystery, and even, in a sense, of duplicity" (p. 294): "no longer one", our Lord is thus "divided against Himself". Moreover, he insists, an impossible impersonal "human nature" is thus assumed to lie back of the personality "enjoying some kind of real being apart from the unifying or focal Ego" (p. 295). This is of course mere caricature. The doctrine of the Two Natures does not suppose that there ever existed or ever could exist an impersonal human nature, and never dreamed of attributing any kind of reality to any human nature apart from "the unifying Ego". To say that the denial that the human nature assumed into personal union with Himself by the Logos possessed an *independent* personality, reduces it "in itself" "to unconscious and impersonal elements" (p. 207 cf. p. 386-7) is only to play with words. No one ever imagined a "human nature" which was or could be "unconscious and impersonal". The conjunction of a human nature with a divine nature in one conscious and personal subject no doubt presents an insoluble problem to thought. But this is just the mystery of incarnation, without which there is no incarnation; for when we say incarnation we say Two Natures—or can there really be an incarnation without a somewhat which becomes incarnate and a somewhat in which it becomes incarnate? And it is really indisputable

(despite Professor Mackintosh's caveats) that the Two Natures are everywhere presupposed in the New Testament, which simply cannot be interpreted in its allusions to our Lord without their aid, and in which there are passages like Phil. ii. 6, where they are frankly mentioned. The successful explanation of how Christ could be both "of the Israelites as concerning the flesh", and "God over all" (Rom. ix. 5), and yet not of two natures, is a task we do not envy any man who undertakes it. It does not help to this explanation of course, to declare Christ's humanity only modified deity—the preëxistent Son of God transformed into a man—so that the "Two Natures", are after all but one nature, for that finds the source of His humanity in the bosom of God, whereas Paul finds it in the Israelitish race, or more specifically in the seed of David (Rom. i. 3). We might no doubt take a round-about way and explain that the Son of God became incarnate only through the mediation of the whole line of our Lord's Israelitish ancestors. It would be hard in that case to be sure to vindicate for Jesus Christ a more express deity than belonged in common with Him to each of the long line through which Luke, let us say, traces Him back to end at last in the words, "which was the Son of God". But if that difficulty were only got over we might explain the rest by serving ourselves with a rather odd formula of which Professor Mackintosh seems fond (e.g. p. 365, cf. p. 469) and say that thus the incarnation was with Him "immediate, but by no means unmediated". On the whole, however, we think it easier, and in every way more satisfactory, just to follow the New Testament teaching and accept the doctrine of the Two Natures.

Professor Mackintosh prefers, however, to explain our Lord's humanity as modified deity, and thus comes forward as a belated champion of the Kenotic theories (for references, see Index, s. v. "Kenosis"). He finds what he calls "the profoundest motive operating in the Kenotic theories"—it certainly is the nerve of their appeal to the devout mind—in what he speaks of as "the wondrous nature and subduing magnitude of the Divine sacrifice" (p. 265): "They wished to throw into strong relief the exceeding greatness of the step downward taken by the Son of God when for our sakes, though rich, He became poor". In this, however, they possess no advantage over the common doctrine. And in the very act of emphasizing this motive Professor Mackintosh himself seems to allow that the fundamental motive of the Kenotic theories was rather "to signalize the reality and integrity of our Lord's manhood", and elsewhere he more justly explains that "it was precisely a wish to read the divinity of Christ through His true humanity which inspired the Kenotic theories of His person" (p. 421). In point of fact the Kenotic theories owe their origin to a determination to see in Jesus Christ "in the days of His flesh", phenomenally at least, nothing more than a human being; and it is therefore that Albrecht Ritschl described them as merely *verschämter Socinianismus*. It is from this point of view that Professor Mackintosh takes his start, insisting that Jesus was not merely

purely man but a man of his time whose life on earth (we emphasize the telling words) was "a distinctively human phenomenon, moving *always* within the lines of an authentically human mind and will" (p. 400) and indeed, as Dr. Sanday expresses it, "presenting *all* the outward appearance of the life of any other contemporary Galilean" (p. 398). So obvious does Professor Mackintosh consider this that he even affirms that "were it conceivable that we were forced to choose between the conviction that Jesus preserved true manhood in all its parts, and the assurance that He was the Son of God come in flesh for our salvation, our plain duty would be to affirm His humanity and renounce His deity" (p. 395). Certainly on this ground the Kenotic argument is conclusive, if Jesus is nevertheless held to be God and the doctrine of the Two Natures is discarded. If Jesus is God and nothing but God, and yet on earth was man and nothing but man, why then, of course, it must be that God has been metamorphosed into man; it is a truism that "no human life of God is possible without a prior self-adjustment of deity" (p. 470). This is the whole of the argument which is presented with much elaboration (cf. especially pp. 469-470). The difficulties with it are naturally, that Jesus is not represented in the New Testament—the sole source of our knowledge of His person—as in His essential being God and nothing but God; nor is His life on earth there presented as, in Professor Mackintosh's sense, "unequivocally human" (p. 469); and the conception of a metamorphosis of God into a man which is assumed is as Albrecht Ritschl declared it to be (*Justification and Reconciliation*, E. T. pp. 409-411) "pure mythology". The particular manner in which this metamorphosis was accomplished in Professor Mackintosh's opinion was not as supposed by Thomasius, by the abandonment by the Son of some of His attributes, explained for the purpose to be merely "relative"—such as His omnipotence, His omniscience, His omnipresence,—while others, designated "immanent" or "essential", such as His holiness and His love—were retained; but by the "transposition" or "modification" (both terms are used) of *all* His attributes (p. 477). The Son, it is explained, continues, as incarnate, to possess "*all* the qualities of God-head" (the italics are Professor Mackintosh's), "only now in the form of concentrated potency rather than of full actuality, *δυνάμει* rather than *ἐνέργειᾳ*". No explanation is suggested of how, when God thus ceases to be God, He yet remains God,—for does not the very idea of God involve not only the conception of immutability, against the emphasis of which Professor Mackintosh vainly inveighs as if it were rather immobility, but also the conception embodied in the Scholastic phrase of "actus purus"? One who is only potentially God is certainly not actually God, as indeed Professor Mackintosh naively confesses when he writes the sentence, "What Christ is by potency, with a potentiality based on His personal uniqueness, God is actually for ever" (p. 479). God to be God must be all He can be actually, and He must be all this "actually for ever". When He ceases to be actually what God is, He ceases of course to be God. How far Pro-

fessor Mackintosh is prepared to press his idea of the reduction of God in Christ is revealed to us startlingly by a phrase let fall on p. 470: "We are faced by a Divine self-reduction which entailed obedience, temptation and death",—and that this is not a chance inadvertence we may learn from its virtual repetition ten pages later: "Prayer and death are the seals of His oneness with us" (p. 480). It must be carefully observed that what is said here is not that the Divine Subject, by assuming into personal union with Himself a human nature, became a sharer in the obedience, temptation, and death, which belong to humanity; but that God Himself, not by a "fictitious" *communicatio idiomatum* but in His own Being, obeyed, was tempted, died. God Himself not merely acquired knowledge slowly and by effort, felt temptation and learned obedience by that which He suffered, but endured the last indignity of death! One would question whether Professor Mackintosh really means what he says, did he not with such persistence insist that the Infinite became just finite in Christ, or as he himself expresses it "descended into the sphere of finitude" (p. 481). "Only one limit to God's presence in Him remained", he tells us (p. 415)—"the limit of finitude"; so clear is he that Jesus Christ is just a finite being. And yet He is just God! We must confess that Professor Mackintosh permits to himself language in all such matters which dazes us. He tells us that "it belongs to deity, not indeed to be immutable, but to be eternal" (p. 423), and we mark the statement as giving us at least one stable feature of deity by which we can recognize it when we see it. But we soon read of the "Eternal passing into time", and thereby losing knowledge in the eternal form and requiring to retain it, if He retains it at all, as "discursive and progressive" (p. 477, cf. 470); and soon afterwards we meet with the declaration that time and eternity are not essentially disparate. If "God and man are not definable as opposites" so also "time is susceptible of eternity" (p. 503)—a declaration the meaning of which we confess is dark to us.

The oddest thing about Professor Mackintosh's Kenoticism, however, is that he seems to think he has a Biblical basis for it. He does not depend, indeed, "on two or three isolated passages in St. Paul" (p. 469), as it is well he does not, as not even two or three passages suggesting or even allowing it can be discovered. He seems to think that Jesus is dramatized in the Gospel narratives as living an exclusively human life, "moving always" [note the "always" again] "within the lines of an experience humanly normal in constitution, even if abnormal in its sinless quality" (p. 409). Were this so, it would be very remarkable; for certainly the evangelists did not intend so to depict Him. John assuredly not; and just as assuredly not the Synoptists, as Professor Mackintosh indeed appears to recognize (p. 5, note 1). And surely it were remarkable that that long line of acute and diligent scholars who for a century and more have been engaged in "the quest of the historical Jesus" have not up to to-day found it out. Then were their long quest over. What a poor showing Professor Schmiedel, for example, makes, with his meagre list of nine "pillar-

passages", presenting, as he tells us, an unmistakably human Jesus, and presenting this human Jesus, as he tells us again, in definite *contradiction* to the whole drift of the narrative,—if the whole narrative really presents us with nothing but a normally human Jesus! Will Professor Mackintosh, by a stroke, stultify the whole long, laborious struggle of the Liberal critics—"from Reimarus to Wrede"—to discover a merely human Jesus beneath the narrative of the Gospels? If there is one thing that is certain, it is that the Gospels know nothing, in any of their parts, of a normally human Jesus: their whole effort is to place before us in vivid dramatization a distinctively super-human Jesus.

We are neither insensible nor unappreciative of the elements of value in Professor Mackintosh's work. We heartily recognize that its fundamental note is adoration of the Divine Savior. But it must be frankly recognized that its theoretical construction of the doctrine of the person of Christ is quite impossible. It ought by now to be clearly understood that no resting place can be found in a half-way house between Socinianism and orthodoxy. We cannot have a Christ purely Divine in essence and purely human in manifestation. And what on this ground can be made of the exalted Christ? Does He remain after His ascension to heaven the purely human being He was on earth? Or does He on ascending where He was before, recover the pure deity from which He was reduced that He might enter humanity? In the one case we have no Divine Christ, in the other no human Jesus, to-day: and the Christian heart can consent to give up neither. Professor Mackintosh takes the latter of the alternatives, and greatly magnifies the place of the Resurrection "as a 'crisis' in the constitution of Christ's person" (pp. 370-371). The exalted Lord in heaven has become as our Savior indistinguishable from the Father. Is he still man? Professor Mackintosh wishes us to believe that He is,—how, since His humanity belonged to, nay *was*, His humiliation, he does not, he cannot explain. "There is now", he says, "a Person in whom the focus of a human life is become indissolubly one with the last reality of being, so that the heart of man and the heart of God beat in the risen Lord with one pulsing movement, one indistinguishable passion to save and bless" (p. 371). This is rhetoric. In cold fact, the exalted Lord, having laid aside the modifications of deity by virtue of which he entered into the sphere of finite life, has necessarily laid aside His humanity (which was only this modified deity), and that He was once man can be to Him only a memory. Ritschl pointed out that on the Kenotic postulates "Christ, at least in His earthly existence, has no Godhead at all". It requires to be pointed out now that in the form which Professor Mackintosh gives these postulates, He has in His exalted state no manhood at all—except always His body! Of course Professor Mackintosh does not wish this result. He strives manfully to escape or at least to gloss it. It is unavoidable. And it is because such results as these are unavoidable on his postulates that we think that these postulates are as unacceptable to truly Christian

feeling as they are repugnant to right reason and in contradiction to the whole drift of revelation.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

Was Christ Divine? By WILLIAM W. KINSLEY. Boston: Sherman, French & Co. 1912. Pp. 144.

Mr. Kinsley claims that modern science and metaphysics will ultimately prove that Christ is divine. By this he means only, as the course of his discussion shows, that Christ was a man in a peculiarly intimate relation with the "Divine Spirit." Mr. Kinsley makes use of the idea of the "sub-conscious self", after the manner of Sanday, though he seems never to have read Sanday's recent work on Christology. Mr. Kinsley supposes that Christ's "sub-conscious self" was in especially close touch with God whom Mr. Kinsley conceives of as a Spirit diffused in some way through the worlds of Nature and of humanity. Christ, then, can only differ in degree from other men. It is, accordingly, only a humanitarian view of Christ which Mr. Kinsley gives us.

The book is written apparently without any knowledge of much of the recent literature on the subject. The author says that no one now supposes that Jesus was mentally unbalanced, being apparently in entire ignorance of the numerous recent discussions of this very point by De Loosten (Lomer), Rasmussen, Schaefer, and numerous others. He says that no one now questions the historicity of Jesus, in apparent ignorance of the recent controversy on this subject; and he betrays an equal ignorance of the recent and now notorious Drews controversy in his statement that no one nowadays holds a mythical view of the origin of Christianity.

This book, in our judgment, is not calculated to aid in any respect to a better understanding of the Person of Christ, and the Deity of Christ is not established, but is explained away by appeals to certain ideas which are not the results of scientific investigation and study, but matters of pure speculation.

Several errors occur—Liddon's Bampton Lecture instead of Bampton Lecture; Weisacker instead of Weizsäcker; Nalloth instead of Nolloth; Tübingen instead of Tübingen.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

Das Wunder. Eine dogmatische-apologetische Studie. Von Dr. A. W. HUNZINGER, ord. Universitätsprofessor in Erlangen. Leipzig: Verlag von Quelle & Meyer. 1912. Ss. 165.

Hunzinger divides his discussion into five parts:—1. The history of the doctrine of miracles; 2. The nature and significance of miracles; 3. The miracles of the history of redemption; 4. Natural science and belief in miracles; 5. Historical science and belief in miracles.

Hunzinger rejects what he calls the scholastic definition of a miracle as an event "contrary to" the laws of Nature, and he also rejects the whole attempt to define a miracle in relation to Nature

or natural law. The Word of God, he says, produces a change in the Christian man which he experiences as miraculous, and this miraculous character, therefore, attaches to the historic events which constitute the redemptive revelation recorded in the Scripture. Hence, any event which makes us feel God's saving power is a miracle. Whether or not such an event is produced entirely apart from second causes, or whether or not it takes place in accordance with natural law, we can never know because our scientific knowledge of the total complex of natural laws in any specific case is so limited. Natural science, therefore, can never affirm that a miracle is impossible even were it conceived of as an event produced by the immediate efficiency of God. From this it is clear that Hunzinger will neither accept nor reject the position that a miracle is an event in the external world due to the immediate power of God. Neither will he accept or reject the idea that a miracle is an event brought about in accordance with unknown laws of Nature. He will have nothing to do with this whole method of defining a miracle, taking an agnostic position upon this point.

If, however, we are to regard as a miracle any event in which we experience God's presence and power, it will follow that the factor which constitutes any event a miracle, is after all a subjective one. Hence, it will follow that miracles may still be experienced, and that too in regard to events in the external world as well as in regeneration and sanctification. Hunzinger is quite logical, therefore, in drawing this conclusion, and following theologians like Stange, Herrmann, and Wendland. In this way, however, he has left no room for any distinction between such so-called present miracles and those recorded in the New Testament which occurred in the history of redemption. As a matter of fact, Hunzinger offers no adequate basis for the distinction which he seeks to draw between these two classes of miracles. This is the weakest point in his treatment of the whole subject, and it has been seized upon as the point of attack by Wendland in reviewing Hunzinger's Volume (*Cf. Theologische Literaturzeitung*, Jahrgang 37, Nr. 19, S. 600).

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY.

The Minister and the Spiritual Life. Yale Lectures on Preaching. By FRANK W. GUNSAULUS, D.D., LL.D., Minister of Central Church, Chicago. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1911. 8vo. pp. 397. \$1.25 net.

These eight lectures were delivered, in a somewhat abbreviated form, in the year 1911 to the students of the Yale Divinity School on the celebrated Lyman Beecher foundation. As the title indicates, the author deals with the most vital elements in homiletic theory—the character of the man in the preacher. The topics discussed are as follows: (1) The Spiritual Life and Its Expression In and Through

Ministry; (II) The Spiritual Life and New View-points; (III) The Spiritual Life and Its Relations To Truth and Orthodoxy; (IV) The Spiritual Life and The Present Social Problem; (V) The Spiritual Life and Its Determinations and Deliverances; (VI) The Spiritual Life and The Minister's Message; (VII) The Spiritual Life and Its Communication To Men; (VIII) The Spiritual Life and The Minister's Power.

In this as in other works of his, Dr. Gunsaulus appears as a remarkable rhetorical impressionist. The discussion is full of life and power, of color and beauty; but in analytic skill, in logical vigor, and even in the fundamental quality of clearness it leaves much to be desired. Not only must some of the sentences and paragraphs be read a second and third time to disclose their meaning, but the connection of ideas within the limits of a chapter is often so hazy that the reader has an uncomfortable sense both of indefiniteness of statement and of lack of progress in the development of the subject. The writer's fervor ever and anon gets the better of his precision and clarity as a thinker. One feels himself plunged into, and borne along by, a powerful current, without having a satisfactory knowledge as to either the origin or the destination of the stream. Here and there we strike a notable landmark, where for the time being we can pause and get our bearings, but too often our pilot arbitrarily changes his course, regardless of the map and chart by which he has hinted or openly announced that he will conduct us.

"The minister is the minstrel of the soul", according to the author's favorite dictum, and judged by that test—valid enough so far as it goes—Dr. Gunsaulus, by reason of his buoyancy toward the poetic, has great power as a preacher and as an interpreter of some of the elements that make for good preaching. From this point of view the remark of a friend concerning the volume is perhaps the fairest and best thing to say about it: it is "the most intimate revelation of his inner life that Dr. Gunsaulus has given the world." And as such the book will occasion little surprise, among those at all acquainted with the author, by its presentation of views which to many will seem an inadequate expression of the truths of historic Christianity. Granting the major premise of the argument, the primacy and supremacy of the minister's spiritual life, we find many statements in the volume that are as true in content as they are beautiful in form. But it may be seriously questioned whether "the spiritual life" which the minister and his hearers ought to have does not call for deeper, more biblical conceptions of sin and grace.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Biblical Criticism and Preaching. By GEORGE ELLIOTT. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1912. 12mo; pp. 96. 35 cents net.

The author does not profess to be an "expert in the higher or any other sort of criticism;" but accepting the "main conclusions of

modern biblical scholarship", he aims to show that the preacher in this period of transition and trial must have satisfactory answers to such questions as these: "How far has the message of the Bible become obsolete through the change of attitude as to its origin and structure? Has its spiritual force as an aid in right living been in any way diminished?"

The author's own point of view and spirit may be inferred from a few statements taken at random from his pages. Carlyle's sentence is quoted without a challenge: "None of all the many things we are in doubt about, and need to have demonstrated and rendered probable, can by any alchemy be made a religion for us, but are, and must continue, a baleful, quiet or unquiet, hypocrisy for us." By the "assured results" of the higher criticism "the preacher has been delivered from the toils of apologetic sophistry, from insincere harmonizing, and from conscience-deadening casuistry. He is no longer called to the defence of an obsolete morality or a worn-out social order. Indeed, the traditionalists themselves are already reaping this benefit." "The modern method, which dares to discriminate between the temporal and eternal in Holy Scripture, sweeps away at once the trivialities of a credulous dogmatism and the shallow sophistry of a superficial skepticism." "That which is truly divine in the Bible is just the part which criticism cannot disturb, and its sacredness is the more completely attested by that fact."

These are typical declarations as to the quality and the temper of the discussion. Much is said that is illuminating and helpful to the preacher of the gospel in these days, but on the other hand much more will need to be said to establish the proposition to which the whole essay points: "There is but one final authority for the Christian faith: it is the historic Jesus, who is the present Christ." For what adequate knowledge can we have of "this historic Jesus who is the present Christ" apart from the record given us in the Bible, and who shall convincingly and authoritatively tell us, how in a given context of Scripture, we can avoid confounding "the form with the substance of Christian preaching"?

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Great Themes of the Bible. By Rev. LOUIS ALBERT BANKS, D.D., Author of "The Great Sinners of the Bible," "The Great Saints of the Bible," "The Great Portraits of the Bible," "The Great Promises of the Bible." New York: Eaton & Mains. 1911. 12mo; pp. 408. \$1.30 net.

"The Great Themes", thirty in number, that are here discussed in sermon form, deal with "those elemental problems which confront men and women in every age and which must find solution for each of us, if the soul is to know true peace." These discussions touch lightly and move rapidly upon the surface of the subjects; they are not designed to be either very thorough or very profound. But they are popular and helpful presentations of things fundamental in the

gospel, and we can readily understand how "in their delivery the blessing of God rested upon them to the comfort and consolation of many hearts."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

A History of Preaching. Vol. ii. From the Close of the Reformation Period to the End of the Nineteenth Century, 1572-1900. By EDWIN CHARLES DARGAN, D.D., LL.D., Author of "A History of Preaching from the Apostolic Fathers to the Great Reformers, Ecclesiology," etc., formerly Professor in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary at Louisville, Ky. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1912. 8vo; pp. iv, 591. \$2 net.

This is the second installment of Dr. Dargan's comprehensive work on the History of Preaching. The first volume appeared in 1905.¹ The delay in the appearance of this second volume has been due in large measure to the fact that in 1907 the author resigned his Professorship of Homiletics in the Southern Baptist Theological Seminary at Louisville and became the pastor of the First Baptist Church at Macon, Georgia. But he still cherishes the purpose of completing his task by publishing, at as early a date as his parish duties will permit, the final volume on "Preaching in the United States". We sincerely hope that this aim of his may in due season be realized: we should then have the first treatise in the English language that might fairly be regarded as an adequate, or at least satisfactory, treatment of this great subject.

The volume before us covers what the author designates as the Dogmatic Period (from the death of Knox to the beginning of the Wesleyan Revival) and the Evangelistic or Missionary Period (from the work of Wesley to near the end of the nineteenth century). Owing to the increased complexity of the conditions affecting the pulpit during these centuries in the various countries of Europe, the method used for the disposition of the material in the earlier part of the treatise has been exchanged for a simpler framework, in which, under the main chronological divisions by centuries, the preaching of the several countries is set forth with considerable detail as to the chief exponents of the homiletic art in the various branches of the church. One of the most valuable features of the work is the discriminating account, given in the form of a preliminary survey, of each main section. By this means the reader, with the aid of the Index, can readily acquaint himself both with the general facts pertaining to the preaching of a particular country or church in a given era and with the biographical details that relate the prominent preachers to the times in which they lived.

The book gives evidence throughout of painstaking investigation along many lines of historical study and intimate acquaintance with the standard works on special phases of the subject. The bibliographical helps are all that could be desired. The style is clear

¹ See this REVIEW, Vol. iv, p. 135.

and straightforward, rising here and there, in the treatment of the greatest names, to the heights of a noble eloquence. One could wish, indeed, that relatively more space had been given to the preachers of the highest distinction and the widest influence, since it is for the facts in regard to them and their work, rather than for the general historical information so largely connected with the more obscure names, that most readers will wish to consult this book. Something would have been lost, no doubt, in thoroughness and completeness, but the more suggestive mode of treatment would doubtless have yielded an even more instructive account of the various types of preaching that flourished in these three centuries.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Suggestions for the Spiritual Life. College Chapel Talks. By GEORGE LANSING RAYMOND, Professor of Oratory, Williams College, 1875-1881; of Oratory and Esthetic Criticism, Princeton, 1880-1893; of Esthetics, Princeton, 1893-1905; of Esthetics, George Washington, 1905-1911. New York and London: Funk & Wagnalls Company. 1912. Indexed, cloth bound, gold tops. 8vo; pp. 337. \$1.40 net.

All but the last two of these twenty-one sermons, we are informed in the Preface, were originally prepared for the church in Darby, Pa., of which the author was pastor before he entered upon his professorial career. Most of them were subsequently delivered substantially in their present form, to the students at Williams College and Princeton University. The method and aim of the discourses is fairly indicated by what Dr. Raymond says concerning his use of the term "Suggestions" in the title. "Faith," he affirms, "is an attitude of mind that has its source not merely in conscious intellection, but also in those subconscious tendencies of feeling and will which are particularly connected, though no one, perhaps, can satisfactorily explain how or why, with the spiritual nature. Philosophers, as a rule, recognize that the most effective way of influencing these tendencies is through using what is termed suggestion—in other words not through information or argument, nor, as applied to religious truth, through traditional or dogmatic appeals. These sometimes reach the conscious understanding only; and, at other times, if they affect feeling and will, they do so mainly by way of exciting more or less opposition."

The themes discussed are exceedingly varied. The style is penetrating, vital, interesting, and practical—truly "suggestive" in both the positive and the negative senses in which he has described this term. The psychological and philosophical elements so freely introduced into the discussion give these sermons a peculiar idealistic cast which adds great freshness, force and beauty to their prevailingly biblical character. Rich in thought, full of fine Christian sentiment, abounding in felicitous illustrations from nature and literature and human experience, and everywhere in touch with the spiritual life they seek

to promote, especially in young manhood,—these "Talks" are well adapted to minister to the religious needs of inquiring and thoughtful readers. As a student who had the pleasure of hearing a stimulating course of lectures by the author in a different yet related field of study, the writer expresses the hope that these sermons, which have had vitality enough to prove their serviceableness through four decades of use among college men, may now, in their printed form, have even a wider and longer range of influence for the cultivation of the spiritual life.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Sermons on the Epistles of the Ecclesiastical Year. By HENRY SIECK, Lutheran Pastor, St. Louis, Mo.; Concordia Publishing House, 1912. 8vo; pp. ix, 385. \$1.50 postpaid.

The volume contains sixty-five sermons, covering the festal days as well as the Sundays of the ecclesiastical year. The discourses are always well analyzed and generally have a decidedly expository character. In one respect many modern hearers and readers of sermons will regard these specimens as quite ideal—their brevity. But they have other decided merits, due to their fidelity in the handling of the texts and to their simple, clear, and direct style.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Katechismuspredigten über das erste und zweite Hauptstück. Katechismuspredigten über das dritte, vierte und fünfte Hauptstück. Von C. C. SCHMIDT, Pastor an der ev.-luth. Gemeinde zum heiligen Kreuz in St. Louis, Mo. St. Louis, Mo.: Concordia Publishing House. Two volumes in one, 6 x 9 inches; pp. vi, 273 and 136. Vol. I dated 1905; Vol. II, not dated. \$2.

After two introductory sermons on Holy Scripture, the first of these two volumes devotes forty-nine sermons to the Decalogue and the Apostles' Creed, while the second devotes twenty-two sermons to the Lord's Prayer, Baptism, the Power of the Keys, and the Lord's Supper. Most of the discourses were specially prepared by the pastor for catechetical instruction at his own afternoon service. But because the three discussions concerning the Lord's Supper were not in the first instance used as expositions of the Catechism, the title of the second volume makes no reference to this "sixth main division."

The sermons are well adapted to their purpose. They are the work of a man who is "apt to teach", if one may judge from the skill displayed in the analysis and arrangement of the biblical and confessional material and from the rhetorical form in which these lessons are set forth.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Man with a Conscience. By CHARLES ROADS, Author of "Abnormal Christian, Rural Christendom," etc. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1912. 8vo; pp. xiv, 233.

"The Man with a Conscience", as another has well said, "is an attempt to serve as a guide in cases of conscience, to point out the Christian principles that should apply, and to elevate the conscience above the fogs of selfishness and the false guides of conventional habit and association". In a word, it is "a treatise on casuistry, the science of the application of Christian principles to cases of conscience"; and in most respects it is one of the very best of them, ancient or modern. We have not often read anything much more helpful than the chapter on "The Scope and Limitations of Conscience", "In the Court of Conscience", "The Will, the Moral Executive", "How Habits hold us Fast", and, "Shall it be in His Steps"? or the remarks on competition in business, on Sunday excursions, on trades-unions, on the right course when duty seems doubtful, on Sunday reading, on family affection.

Indeed, it is just because Mr. Roads' work is so excellent that we deem it worth while to except to it in the following respects:

1. It is not true that "faith in God brings regeneration of the sinner" (p. 96). The fact is that faith in God results from his regeneration of the sinner. By nature "dead through trespasses and sins" (Eph. ii. 1), God must regenerate us if we are to believe on him.

2. It is true that "Jesus is the only authoritative precedent in all things in the court of Christian conscience" (p. 108), but it is not true that "no example, not even of the Apostles after Pentecost, nor of Paul, Peter, or John, is final authority" (p. 108). Christ is committed to the trustworthiness of the Apostles both as teachers and governors. He said that those who heard them would hear him, and that what they should bind on earth should be bound in heaven; and he said this because of his promise that they, the apostles, should be guided infallibly, both in the deliverance of doctrine and in the organization of the church, by his Spirit. In proportion, therefore, as the Apostles are discredited in these respects, in that proportion is Christ himself discredited. Thus the prevailing cry, "Back to Christ" is really a cry to go back on Christ.

3. It is not true that "our Lord drew no line of sacred and secular, but wiped out all such lines" (p. 157). What he did do was to affirm, that all of life, and all of life equally, belonged to God; that we ought to be as moral and as consecrated, on Monday and in the store as on Sunday and in the church: but he never even hinted that the distinction should be done away between Sunday and Monday, between worship and business, between what is set apart from the service of God in common things to his service in religion. On the contrary, we read that when the Sabbath came he entered into the synagogue, "as his custom was" (Luke iv: 16). Indeed, it is just because this distinction between sacred and secular is now so generally ignored that we are fast losing that Sabbath for which our author elsewhere contends so wisely and so vigorously.

4. We agree with Mr. Roads that while Moses taught retribution in kind, "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, a life for a life", Jesus

changed this command to love; but we cannot agree with him that in doing so Jesus affirms what is called the doctrine of non-resistance (p. 9). What he does affirm is that we ought not to take the law into our own hands and retaliate in kind, as under the Mosaic dispensation the individual was required to do. On the contrary, we ought to love those who oppose us. In our private relations to them we ought to remember that vengeance belongs to the Lord and to the state. We ought to love them so much that for our own sakes we shall do nothing to punish them; we shall prefer ourselves to suffer rather than to resist them; we shall be ready even to invite the continuance of the wrong done to us. But this does not imply that we shall not or that we ought not to resist them. We are all members of the state as well as private individuals. The state is "the minister of God, an avenger for wrath to him that doeth evil" (Rom. xiii. 4). The state can discharge its functions only as its members coöperate with it. It is for this reason that we are told, "Let every soul be subject unto the higher powers" (Rom. xiii. 1). Hence, as citizens we ought strenuously and incessantly to resist evil; while, as private individuals we ought so to love the evil doers whom we resist that, could we be only private individuals, we would never resist them. In a word, the doctrine of non-resistance means the abrogation of the state, and the abrogation of the state means the setting aside of what God has ordained (Rom. xiii. 1).

5. We can not approve Mr. Roads' attitude toward labor. He seems to regard it as a curse, as a consequence of the fall. "When right conditions at last prevail," he says, "in the labor and business world, probably five hours a day, with all men working at their best and all working steadily, will supply all the needs of mankind" (p. 28). He appears to forget, that God put Adam to work before he fell; that he was put to work, not to meet his own needs but to 'dress and keep' the garden of the Lord; and that if we are to be "perfect as our Father which is in heaven is perfect", we must give much more than a fifth of our time approximately to work. We cannot but think that our author's position at this point is calculated to do great harm. Hours of toil may be and often have been too long. Just because man is not God he cannot, like Him, work incessantly. We need rest, recreation, opportunity for higher culture, time to meet the various claims of our increasingly complex life. We need this, if for no other reason, that we may do the most and the best work. It must be remembered, however, that it is only an exceptional man who will or who can improve leisure, and that it is in his daily work that the child of God will see specially his heavenly Father's appointment for him and, hence, will recognize his highest dignity and try to find his most satisfying joy. Not the minimum of production, only what we need; but the maximum, all that we can produce consistently with our development in the image of our Father who "worketh hitherto"—this should be the ideal.

6. Our author's conception of a "threefold law of love" impresses us

as far-fetched and misleading. His statement is as follows (p. 43): "First, there is the love prescribed by the law, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself', a measured love by the scale of one's own rights and demands. This is the love that keeps the law which commands that we do no harm to another; the love for self-conservation of life which enjoins perfect harmlessness to all others, putting them also into our place to be guarded as we guard ourselves. Second, there is the love indicated by the command, 'Whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do ye even so unto them likewise'. This is also a measured love, but it calls for the putting of oneself into the other's place and studying his needs in full justice and veracity. This is the love that adds practical sympathy in our giving of justice to all men, that is just by a complete view of both sides in our dealings. The third and highest love is that which comes through sacrifice, limitless self-sacrifice". Now, as it seems to us, we do not have here "three laws of love", but three provisions of one law. Thus we are to be just, we are to be sympathetic, we are to be self-sacrificing, in all our relations. We are not only in our individual activity to do nothing that will work injustice to our neighbor; we are not merely in business to act with sympathetic justice toward our competitors; we are not simply in the broader and higher Christian life to practise "limitless self-sacrifice": but in all three spheres we are to be just and sympathetic and self-sacrificing. That is, when Christ gave his "new commandment" (John xiii. 34), "that ye love one another, even as I have loved you", he did not mean that in any relation of life justice was ever to be disregarded or that sympathy would be enough, but that justice was always to be administered and sympathy was always to be shown, by love that, as his own, was ever ready for any sacrifice.

Moreover, as already remarked, our author's distinction seems to us misleading as well as far-fetched. It implies, at least, that in our individual activities it is enough, if we do no wrong to our neighbor. What the law demands is "perfect harmlessness". But is this all that it demands? Ought not even our eating and drinking to be controlled and actuated by the spirit of self-sacrifice for others? Was it not so in Paul's case when he said, "If meat maketh my brother to stumble, I will eat no flesh forevermore, that I make not my brother to stumble" (I Cor. viii. 13)? So, too, ought not the sympathetic justice demanded in business relations even in these relations to rise to what we may call self-sacrificing justice? Surely our Lord did not mean that we should love others as He had loved us only in what our author styles "the larger Christian life". Would he not rather have all life lived on this higher plane? Is not the real reason why in business relations exact justice is demanded that in these relations such justice is, in the long run, the greatest kindness? And on the other hand, may justice be superseded even on this higher plane? Who has the right to sacrifice himself for any one, if it will involve injustice to some other? And though we could not follow Christ, unless, like him, we

might waive justice to ourselves, did he, or may we, in so doing be untrue to ourselves? No more than Christ may the Christian let it appear that his self-sacrifice is a debt. He is bound to assert that he "lays down his life of himself" that no man or legal obligation takes it from him. There is no mistake or wrong more serious than that committed, for example, by the mother who lets it be supposed by her children that as a matter of course and of obligation to them she should wear herself out that they may live in ease. But enough. We should be very sorry if these exceptions should make the impression that we do not approve Mr. Roads' book. On the contrary, they are the proof of our approval of it and desire for its usefulness. In our judgment works on casuistry, instead of resolving moral difficulties, have usually tended to destroy morality. It is the rare excellence of this book that its tendency is the other way. It is the farthest remove from the casuistical treatises of the Jesuits. It is calculated to invigorate and to develop conscience; never to weaken or confuse it; to prompt to the right, never to excuse in sin. May the Holy Spirit himself bless it and use it abundantly!

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Social Creed of the Churches. Edited by HARRY WARD. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 8vo, pp. 185.

"This volume is authorized by the Commission on the Church and Social Service of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, Samuel Zane Batten, Harry F. Ward, Graham Taylor, Walter Rauschenbusch, Jacob A. Riis, Charles S. Macfarland, Committee on Literature." Whatever difference of opinion there may be with regard to it, it must be admitted by all to be a work of exceeding value; and should it be circulated as widely as after revision it ought to be, it will, no doubt, do more than has been effected by almost any other one agency to overcome the indifference of society to social evils. These evils it sets forth clearly, exactly, and, therefore, appallingly; it shows what has been done to overcome or to mitigate them both in the United States and in other countries; it sets forth what ought further to be done by the Government in this direction; and, finally, it indicates what the Church could and should do along this line. Indeed, this little book is, both in itself and in its numerous references, a thesaurus of the information and of the suggestion needed, if the "divine order of human society" is ever to be established. It gives the knowledge demanded for true social service. We wish that we could say that it did not give anything more. Unfortunately, however, it insinuates error as well as teaches truth. We do not refer now to the "Social Creed of the Churches", which it would expound and command. That in itself we do not understand to be under review. It is rather our volume's exposition and defence of it that we are to criticize. Neither

do we take exception to the appeal which it makes at the close of every chapter to the church as an institute or in her organized capacity to give herself to social reform. That the individual Christian as a Christian and because a Christian ought to do this can scarcely be emphasized too strongly; but that the church should leave her special and appropriate spiritual sphere as the institute of worship—this is a conception of her mission with regard to which there is much more to be said than could be said within the limits of a necessarily brief book-notice.

The errors which, in closing, we would point out are two:

1. Apparent expediency is substituted for "the divine order of human society". Thus "one day's rest in seven is argued for on the ground of "urgent social demand" rather than because of its "religious sanction". Yet it is not so many years since a prominent official of the Pennsylvania Railroad said, "You can never hope to enforce the observance of the Sabbath on grounds of expediency: this can be done only on the basis of an express divine command." So, too, we read (p. 182), "Private property, then, stands or falls with its influence on the welfare of society. Or, putting the same idea in other words, private property is justified by social expediency."

2. The trend and outcome of the book is disguisedly and winningly socialistic. Indeed, its last sentence is, "Therefore, it would seem clear that a gradual extension of collective ownership is entirely in harmony with the best interests of society; but that this extension should be made no faster than the community develops effective administrative machinery, and is prepared for the new responsibilities."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Church in the Country Town (Social Service Series.) By CHARLES O. BERNIES. 8vo, pp. 72. Price 15 cents net. *One Rest Day in Seven*. By Rev. O. C. HORSMAN. 8vo, pp. 20. Price 10 cents net. *Working Men's Insurance*. By Prof. C. R. HENDERSON, D.D. 8vo, pp. 16. Price 10 cents net. *The Housing Problem*. By JOHN C. KENNEDY. 8vo, pp. 24. Price 10 cents net. *The Disruption of the Home*. By Pres. GEO. C. CHASE, D.D., 8vo, pp. 23. Price 10 cents net. *Child Labor*. By OWEN R. LOVEJOY. 8vo, pp. 30. Price 10 cents net. Published for the Social Service Commission of the Northern Baptist Convention, Shailer Matthews, Dean of the Divinity School, University of Chicago, Chairman of the Editorial Committee. American Baptist Publication Society: Philadelphia, Boston, Chicago, St. Louis, Toronto, Can.

Too much praise could scarcely be given to this Social Service Series. The individual pamphlets are models of comprehensiveness, terseness, clearness, wisdom and suggestiveness. The Social Service Commission of the Northern Baptist Convention, and especially the Chairman of their Editorial Committee, Prof. Shailer Matthews, deserve, and, doubtless, will receive, the heartiest congratulations. The

only one of the series from which the reviewer finds himself compelled to differ is the first named, that on *The Church in the Country Town*. This difference does not concern the comprehensiveness of the kingdom of God. The reviewer and Mr. Bernies agree in holding that the kingdom of God embraces all right human interests and exists to assimilate and to advance them all. The difference does concern the sphere and mission of the church. Mr. Bernies affirms that the sphere of the church is all embracing, as is that of the kingdom; and he denies that the church's exclusive mission is "to preach the gospel". The position which the reviewer would maintain is that the sphere of the church is as definite and as peculiar to herself as is that of either of the other two divinely constituted institutes of society, the state or institute of rights, and the family or institute of the affections; and that *the* mission of the church, and so her great business, is "to preach the gospel". In the judgment of the reviewer, such a church as Mr. Bernies contemplates, could it be realized, would be, as the jack-of-all-trades is bound to be, more or less of a failure in all. Especially would this be so as regards the church's distinctive mission. The true proclamation of "the everlasting gospel of the grace of God" is enough to tax to the utmost any man or angel; and yet if this gospel be not thus set forth, the indispensable condition of all genuine and permanent community betterment or social reform must be wanting. If the Christian is to live the gospel in every sphere and so transform it as he ought, the church as an institute must confine herself to her own sphere, which is that of the Spirit.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Parish of the Pines. The Story of Frank Higgins The Lumber Jack's Sky Pilot. By THOMAS D. WHITTLES. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. Illustrated. 8vo; pp. 247.

This is a great story of a great man and of his great work. "Twelve thousand firms are engaged in logging, employing approximately four hundred thousand men in the camps and nearly as many in the saw mills." "The Board of Home Missions of the Presbyterian Church is conducting, as far as can be learned, the only organized effort for the lumberjacks." Its present force consists of fifteen evangelists and one woman hospital visitor. More than to any other or to all others combined, the organization and development of this work have been due to the Rev. Frank Higgins. He would seem to have been qualified for it and called to it by God as really as ever was apostle of old, and his influence and success are among the most striking proofs of the power of the gospel in this or in any age.

It is the story of this man and his work that Mr. Whittles tells, and his telling is worthy of his subject. He knows, admires and loves his hero. He has been associated with him in his labors and in his triumphs. He, too, understands the lumberjack; and while keenly alive to his awful vices, he recognizes and appreciates his

virtues, and he longs with an intense yearning for his salvation. His style also is almost uniquely appropriate. His "narrative has the ozone and the spiciness of the great pine forests in which the scenes are laid." There is not a dull page in the book. If there is a sentence that is not clear, terse and vivid, the reviewer has not found it. There are eight capital full page illustrations.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Mission Problems in Japan. By the Rev. ALBERTUS PIETERS, M.A.

New York: The Board of Publication of the Reformed Church in America. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 188. Price 75 cents; postage 7 cents.

These seven lectures, delivered before the Western Theological Seminary, Holland, Michigan, should be read by all persons who have an interest in the evangelization of Japan, and especially by those who have not realized that missionary work in Japan is passing through a crisis, of which the character is serious, and the immediate outcome uncertain. The author speaks with the fervor of deep conviction, and with the weight of a witness who for twenty years has been personally concerned with the problems he reviews. Not the least important of these problems is that of the relation between the missions and the native church. Many who read these lectures will agree with the fundamental affirmation of the author that "The Missionary Purpose" is not merely the establishing of a self-supporting church in a heathen land, but the evangelization of that land, and will therefore question the wisdom of those mission boards which are surrendering their independence to the complete domination of "The Church of Christ in Japan". How much work the missions must do, in addition to what the native church can accomplish, is made evident by figures which show that in proportion to the population, Japan is less fully evangelized than India or Africa. The discussion shows "the conditions under which the missionary purpose is to be accomplished", the place and the perils of educational work, the progress and difficulties of evangelistic effort, and closes with a hopeful review of "What God is Doing in the Far East".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Romans XII-XVI. A Devotional Commentary. By the Rev. W. H.

GRIFFITH-THOMAS, D.D., Professor of Old Testament Literature and Exegesis, Wycliffe College, Toronto, London. The Religious Tract Society. Large crown. Cloth. Gilt. 8vo; pp. 217. Price 2s.

This third volume concludes the admirable commentary on the Epistle to the Romans, which has been prepared by Dr. Thomas for the series of devotional commentaries which is being published by the Religious Tract Society of London, under the editorship of the Rev. A. R. Buckland, M.A. No portion of the series which has yet appeared will surpass in interest or value these admirable volumes which have been prepared by one who is quite familiar with the extensive literature dealing with this epistle, and who holds tenaciously to the great

evangelical doctrines of the Christian Church. This concluding portion of the Epistle naturally lends itself most readily to the devotional treatment which has been followed in all the volumes of the series. The volume is rich in practical suggestions, which will prove helpful not only to the careful student of the New Testament, but to all readers who are seeking for spiritual guidance and inspiration. The volume closes with a fitting review which treats of the Apostle, of his Epistle, of his Gospel, and of his divine Lord.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Pupil and the Teacher. Lutheran Teacher-Training Series for the Sunday School. Book Two. By LUTHER A. WEIGLE, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy, Carlton College. Philadelphia, Pa.: The Lutheran Publication Society. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 218. Price 50 cents.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

GENERAL LITERATURE.

The Standard Rate in American Trade Unions. By DAVID A. McCABE, Ph.D., Preceptor in Political Economy in Princeton University. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press. 1912. 8vo; pp. vii, 251.

"This monograph," Series xxx, No. 2, Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science under the direction of the Departments of History, Political Economy, and Political Science, "had its origin in an investigation carried on by the author while a member of the Economic Seminary of the Johns Hopkins University. It was submitted as a dissertation in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy from that institution in June 1909. Some portions of it have been amplified and other parts rewritten since that time, but the discussion has not been brought beyond that date." While this is so, this monograph is fully up to the very high standard of the series to which it belongs. It sets forth clearly and exhaustively the facts as to the subject of which it treats. It should be, at least at present, the authority in its department.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, October: CLARENCE A. BECKWITH, Authority in Present-Day Religious Teaching; THEODORE D. BACON, Practical Aspects of the Doctrine of The Trinity; CAROLINE M. BREYFOGLE, Hebrew Sense of Sin in the Pre-Exilic Period; ERNEST DEW. BURTON, Office of Apostle in the Early Church; GERALD B. SMITH, Systematic Theology and Ministerial Efficiency; CURTIS H. WALKER,

Trend in the Modern Interpretation of Early Church History; CARL S. PATTON, Did Mark use Q? Or did Q use Mark?; JAMES H. LEUBA, The Definition of Religion: *a propos* of Mr. W. K. Wright's Definition.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, October: MELVIN G. KYLE, Professor Petrie's Excavations at Heliopolis; EDWARD M. MERRINS, The Ministry of Pain; HENRY C. SHELDON, The Question of a Reform of Romanism; GEORGE N. BOARDMAN, John Henry Newman: a Study; HAROLD M. WIENER, "Deuteronomy: Its Place in Revelation"; JOHANNES DAHSE, New Methods of Inquiry concerning the Pentateuch; ALFRED M. HAGGARD, Problems of Passion Week; LESTER REDDIN, Jesus the Rabbi.

Church Quarterly Review, London, October: F. E. WARREN, Influence of Celtic Art in England; W. YORKE FAUSSET, Neo-Christianity of Rudolf Eucken; F. A. HIBBERT, Croxden Abbey: Its Buildings and History; J. S. SPENCE JOHNSTON, Dr. DuBose and the University of the South; E. F. MORISON, St. Basil and Monasticism; C. F. BURNEY, The Book of Isaiah: a New Theory, II; W. H. FRERE, Reconstruction of Worship; The Banister-Thompson Case and the Law of the Church.

East and West, London, October: CECIL BOUTFLOWER, Humanism versus Christianity in Japan; F. X. RUXTON, Pagan Conceptions of God; DYCE DUCKWORTH, Lapses from Christian Conduct in the Lives of Young Men in the Tropics and How to Deal with Them; LATIMER FULLER, Separation of Black and White in Church; C. F. ANDREWS, Race within the Christian Church; H. P. K. SKIPTON, The Domiciled Community in India; NELSON BITTON, Responsibility of the Chinese Church towards the New China.

Expositor, London, November: W. M. RAMSAY, Luke's Narrative of the Birth of Christ; J. B. MAYOR, Reminiscences of the Parable of the Sower in the Epistle of St. James; JOHN OMAN, Personality and Grace. II Eternal Life; C. W. EMMET, Is the Teaching of Jesus Intermittent?; H. A. A. KENNEDY, St. Paul and the Mystery-Religions. 6 St. Paul and the Central Conceptions of the Mystery-Religions; F. J. FOAKES JACKSON, Consideration of the History of Northern Israel; B. W. BACON, Further Light on the Odes of Solomon; KIRSOPP LAKE, Date of Herod's Marriage with Herodias, and the Chronology of the Gospels; JAMES MOFFATT, Materials for the Preacher.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, October: Notes of Recent Exposition; ALEXANDER SOUTER, The Judging or Critical Temper; STEPHEN H. LANGDON, The Scape-Goat in Babylonian Religion; WILLIAM M. RAMSAY, What were the Churches of Galatia?; PAUL FEINE, Positive Theological Research in Germany; A. H. SAYCE, Recent Biblical and Oriental Archaeology. *The Same*, November: Notes of Recent Exposition; A. H. SAYCE, Recent Biblical and Oriental Archaeology; WILLIAM M. RAMSAY, What were the Churches of Galatia?; JAMES DONALD, The Call of Elisha; H. A. A. KENNEDY, Epictetus and the New Testament.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, October: ERNST TROELTSCH, Empiricism and Platonism in the Philosophy of Religion; BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD, Christless Christianity; W. ELLSWORTH LAWSON, Priestly

Function in the Modern Church; CRAWFORD H. TOY, Mohammed and the Islam of the Koran; JAMES H. LEUBA, Development of Emotion in Religion.

Hibbert Journal, Boston and London, October: L. P. JACKS, Democracy and Discipline; FRANK I. PARADISE, A Nation at School; A. J. FRASER BLAIR, Plea for the Higher Socialism; BERTRAND RUSSELL, Essence of Religion; P. LOBSTEIN, Modernism and the Protestant Consciousness; A Native Fijian on the Decline of his Race; J. W. SCOTT, Pessimism of Bergson; H. A. STRONG, Quintilian: a Study in Ancient and Modern Methods of Education; EDWYN BEVAN, The Gnostic Redeemer; T. R. GLOVER, The Daemon Environment of the Primitive Christian; M. J. LANDA, Future of Judaism in England.

Homiletic Review, New York, December: Editorial Comment; WILLIAM H. BATES, Early Minor English Hymnists—The Stennets; CLEMENT A. HARRIS, Religion of the Great Composers; JOHN E. MACFADYEN, How to Interpret the Bible; T. CALVIN MCCLELLAND, Murillo's Immaculate Conception; JAMES DENNEY, Life of Christ in the Synoptics; ERNEST H. MACEWEN, Analysis of Philipppians.

International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, October: E. BENJAMIN ANDREWS, The Decline of Culture; J. W. SCOTT, Originality and Culture; JOHN E. BOODIN, Identity of Ideals; HELEN WODEHOUSE, Value of Social Psychology; ARCHIBALD A. BOWMAN, Elements of Character in Tolstoy's *Weltanschauung*.

Interpreter, London, October: A. NAIRNE, Transformation of the Messianic Hope by our Lord and His Apostles: CANON FOAKES-JACKSON, Religion of Northern Israel under the Monarchy; E. H. ARCHER-SHEPHERD, Place of Temptation in the Genesis of the Church; W. L. MACKENNAL, Use of the Title Lord by the Synoptists; A. T. BURBRIDGE, Date and Interpretation of the XXIII Psalm; JESSE BERRIDGE, Christ in Nature and Nature in Christ; JOHN W. BUCKHAM, Origin and Pathway of Personality; CANON JOHNS, Orientalia.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin and New York, October: H. POPE, Prophecy and Prophets in the New Testament Times; P. J. TONER, The Supernatural, II; R. FULLERTON, Multiple Personality; THOMAS GOGARTY, The Eve of the Reformation; MATTHEW A. POWER, Who were they who "Understood Not"?; J. M. HARTY, Some Economic and Theological Aspects of the Catholic Teaching on Usury; Life of St. Columbanus; Decisions of the Biblical Commission.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, October: S. SCHECHTER, An Unknown Khazar Document; A. COHEN, Arabisms in Rabbinic Literature; ISRAEL FRIEDLAENDER, Jewish-Arabic Studies; M. H. SEGAL, Additional Notes on "Fragments of Zadokite Work".

Jewish Review, London and New York, November: The Cloud of Anti-Semitism; The Jews and Agriculture; The Balkan War; M. GASTER, The Biblical Lessons: A Chapter on Biblical Archaeology (con.); M. SIMON, Hebrew Culture; J. KLAUSNER, The Essentials of a Nation.

Journal of Biblical Literature, Boston, Vol. XXXI, Part III: PAUL

HAUPT, Prayer of Moses the Man of God; ROYDEN K. YERKES, Location and Etymology of *יהוה יראה* Genesis XXII, 14; JAMES A. MONTGOMERY, Notes on the Old Testament; H. J. ELHORST, Passover Papyrus from Elephantine.

Journal of Religious Psychology, Worcester, October: JAMES B. PRATT, Psychology of Religion; THEODORE SCHROEDER, Erotogenesis of Religion; JACOB H. KAPLAN, Jewish Religious Problems; JOSIAH MORSE, Psychology of Doubt; F. G. MORGAN, Pragmatism and Religion; LEWIS HODOUS, Chinese God of Hearth.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, October: O. C. QUICK, Mysticism: Its Meaning and Danger; A. RAMSBOTHAM, Commentary of Origen on Romans, III; EDMUND BISHOP, Liturgical Comments and Memoranda; F. H. COLSON, *Táŋu* in Papias; A. SOUTER, Cassiodorus's Copy of Eucherius's *Instructiones*; M. ESPOSITO, On Two Hagiographical Manuscripts in the Library of Trinity College, Dublin; H. C. HOSKIER, *Evan.* 157.

London Quarterly Review, London, October: P. T. FORSYTH, Pessimism of Mr. Thomas Hardy; E. WALTER MAUNDER, Jeremias and Astral-Mythology in the Old Testament; HENRY BETT, A German Minstrel of the Twelfth Century; W. S. URQUHART, Religious Development in the Rig-Veda; T. H. S. ESCOTT, Not made in Rome; G. S. STREATFIELD, Philip Henry, Puritan and Saint; W. BARDSLEY BRASH, Ethical Sayings of the Jewish Fathers; E. MIDDLETON WEAVER, The New Theology.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, October: A. TROELSTRA, Organic Unity of the Old Testament; H. E. JACOBS, The Making of the Church Book; H. PETERS, The Human Education of our Lord; PRESTON A. LAURY, Fear as an Element in Religion; Disease and History; E. BRENNKE, Interrelation of Body and Soul. II; L. A. FOX, Decline and Revival of the Lutheran Consciousness in the Carolinas; J. C. MATTES, The Reconstructed Christ and the Reconstructionists. III; CLARENCE E. KRUMBHOLZ, Hellenism and Christianity. II; FRITZ O. EVERS, The Law with Jesus and Paul; DUDLEY W. FITCH, The Choirmaster and his Problems; JOHN D. M. BROWN, Text of the Epistle of Jude. IV; PETER ALTPETER, Chemnitz on the Sacrament. II.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, October: DAVID H. BAUSLIN, The New Hierarchy; W. A. LAMBERT, The Opportunity of Lutherans; WILLIAM ROSENSTENGEL, The Ritschlian Theology; V. G. A. TRESSLER, Steps in the Development of New Testament Interpretation; CHARLES W. SUPER, Language Problem in New Testament Times; EDWIN H. DELK, The Minister and Modern Thought; C. W. HEATHCOTE, Discipline and Worship of the Church in the Middle Ages.

Methodist Review, New York and Cincinnati, November-December: H. C. STUNTZ, "The Ring and The Book"; DAVID G. DOWNEY, The Kingdom; ALBERT J. LYMAN, Apostle Paul as an Orator; J. B. THOMAS, The "Evolution" of Christianity; A. B. AUSTIN, the Two-Mind Theory; JAMES MUDGE, The Religion of Ruskin; E. S. NINDE,

Musical Tastes and Talents of the Wesley Family; G. F. WELLS, Rural Church in Community Service.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, October: P. T. FORSYTH, Faith and Mind; J. J. TIGERT, Our Senses: How we use them and What they tell us; G. B. WINTON, Work of William Makepeace Thackeray; JANE ADDAMS, The Church and the Social Evil; JOHN R. ALLEN, Do We Know God?; CHARLES F. SMITH, Religious Work in a State University; HENRY C. SHELDON, John Henry Newman as Roman Catholic Apologist; MARY HELM, The Problem of Domestic Service; GROSS ALEXANDER, The English Bible and the Anglo-Saxon People; W. E. TOWSON, Dr. Young J. Allen and the Chinese Revolution.

Monist, Chicago, October: L. COUTURAT, For Logistics; H. POINCARÉ, The Latest Efforts of the Logisticians; PAUL CARUS, The Philosophy of Relativity in the Light of the Philosophy of Science; ARTHUR E. BOSTWICK, Atomic Theories of Energy; GUENTHER JACOBY, Henri Bergson, Pragmatism and Schopenhauer; W. B. SMITH, Henri Poincaré: An Appreciation; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Henri Poincaré: Obituary; T. J. J. SEE, Capture Theory of Cosmical Evolution; ALBERT J. EDMUNDS, Progress of Buddhist Research; ALBERT J. EDMUNDS, Buddhist Loans to Christianity.

Moslem World, London, October: A. LE CHATELIER, A Moslem Policy; W. R. W. GARDNER, Jihád; FRANKLIN E. HOSKINS, Language Study; A. W. STOCKING, The New Woman in Persia; H. D. GRISWOLD, The Ahmadiya Movement; GEORGE SWAN, The Dhikr; GOTTFRIED SIMON, Islam and Backward Races; E. JOHN LARSON, Tiflis as a Moslem Centre.

New Church Life, Lancaster, November: A. CZERNY, The Word in the Letter; E. R. CRONLUND, Love, the Life of Man; J. E. BOWERS, Swedenborgians *versus* New Churchmen; C. TH. ODHNER, Decline of the Golden Age; M. C. FITZPATRICK, The Jovians.

Open Court, Chicago, October: PAUL CARUS, Hammurabi and the Salic Law; OSCAR L. TRIGGS, The Decay of Aboriginal Races; W. B. SMITH, Historicity of Jesus; AHASVERUS LVII, Ahasverus nearing the Goal of his Migrations; The Adulteress Before Christ. *The Same*, November: F. CRIDLAND EVANS, Pagan Prophecy; AMOS K. FISKE, Literary Genius of Ancient Israel; J. W. NORWOOD, Fish and Water Symbols; BERTHOLD LAUFER, Fish Symbols in China; A. KAMPFER, Prime Object of Original Christianity; GILBERT REID, Present Political Conditions in China; ARTHUR LLOYD, Poet Laureate of Japan; Union of Religions in Japan.

Philosophical Review, Lancaster, November; F. J. E. WOODBRIDGE, Consciousness and Object; CHRISTINE L. FRANKLIN, Implication and Existence in Logic; MARY W. CALKINS, Henri Bergson, Personalist.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, October: J. H. VON BERNSTORFF, Municipal Government in Germany; JOSEPH BUFFINGTON, A Recall of Benjamin Franklin; GEORGE F. BAER, Benjamin Franklin; R. C. SCHIEDT, The First President of Franklin College; H. M. J. KLEIN, Contemporary Religious and Theological Thought; A. S. WEBER, Historical

Sketch of the Beginning of Franklin College, A. V. HIESTER, Contemporary Sociology.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, October: JAMES ORR, Reality of Individual Piety in the Old Testament; HENRY C. VEDDER, First Epistle of John: Its Literary Character and Content; W. J. MCGLOTHLIN, The Permanence of Primitive Christian Institutions; R. B. HOYLE, Eschatological Significance of Baptism; J. H. FARMER, The Kingdom of God; T. WITTEN DAVIES, Some Notes on Hebrew Matters, Literary and Otherwise.

Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétiennes, Paris, Octobre: J. TIXERONT, La doctrine pénitentielle de saint Grégoire le Grand; GUSTAVE BARDY, Sur un synode de l'Illyricum; J. B. POUKENS, Sacramentum dans les oeuvres de saint Cyprien; PIERRE BATIFFOL, Le Pontifical romain.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Noviembre-Diciembre: JOSÉ FARPÓN, El conocimiento y la realidad; SABINO M. LOZANO, Demonstrabilidad de los misterios de la fe según Raimundo Lulio; P. TER MAAT, La doctrina de la predestinación; ANTONIO G. PELÁEZ, De Teología Moral; VINCENTE BELTRÁN, De Ciencia de las religiones; E. COLUNGA, De Derecho eclesiástico; JUAN INFANTE, La Legislación civil en sus relaciones con la Iglesia.

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DAVID LIVINGSTONE*

The heart of David Livingstone lies buried under a mvula tree in the heart of Africa. It is a great heart in a great continent. It is the heart of a missionary, a philanthropist, a traveler; for David Livingstone was eminently all of these. But he was a traveler because he was a philanthropist, and he was a philanthropist because he was a missionary. Whether he was an agent of the London Missionary Society in South Africa, or a British consul with a roving commission in East Africa, or the joint emissary of Government and the Royal Geographical Society in Central Africa, he was first and last, in motive and practice always, a missionary.

He might have been a missionary to China; only the Opium War and the hesitation of the London directors prevented it. But, by Providence, he was a missionary to Africa, a dark continent, through which he carried, from 1840 to 1873, a torch with an undying flame. Now Robert Moffat was also a missionary to Africa. He built an hearthfire and sat patiently by it for sixteen years before a single native came to warm himself. But David Livingstone took a brand from the hearth and carried it twenty-nine thousand miles across deserts and savannahs, through forests, up and down unknown rivers, to the margin of hidden inland seas. It shone on millions of men who might as well have been dead as far as Christendom was concerned; who might almost better have been dead as far as they themselves were concerned. No one will compare David Livingstone and Robert Moffat to the disadvantage of either. Each had his voice and vision. But the voice that came to Robert Moffat whispered, "Something lost and waiting for you. Stay!" While the voice to David Living-

* An address delivered at the Memorial Service in honor of the Centennial Anniversary of the birth of David Livingstone, March 19th, 1913, in Miller Chapel.

stone repeated day and night, with everlasting iteration, "Something lost and waiting for you. Go!"

In 1840, when Livingstone first set foot in Africa, the interior of the continent from ten degrees north of the equator to twenty-five degrees south was practically unknown. The European world had only the vaguest idea of its physical configuration, its commercial possibilities, and of the number, character and condition of its inhabitants. This is an astonishing situation when you reflect that Egyptian civilization is prehistoric, that the Phoenicians in Utica and Carthage, as elsewhere, were famous navigators and colonizers, that the Portuguese of the fifteenth century began a new era in the exploitation of the world, and that the Dutch had established themselves at the Cape in the seventeenth century. But the ancient opinion that the interior was a pathless desert was so persistent, and the difficulties of approach to it so terrible, that there had been no sufficient motive to go and see until the imperative voice came to Livingstone.

The geographical ignorance of the world, after the glory of Egypt, after the exploits of Carthage, after the Greek colonization and the conquest of Alexander, after the rule of the Ptolemies, in the period of the Roman occupation, is graphically exposed in the famous map of Ptolemy, the Alexandrian astronomer, about 150 A. D. He was a speculative geographer. Because he did not know the configuration of the west coast beyond twenty degrees north, he ran it out to the indefinite west, where dwelt, he said, the Ichthyophagi; because he did not know the southern limits of the continent, he filled the whole southern hemisphere with it; because he knew only vaguely the trend of the east coast beyond Cape Guardafui, he gave it a crazy twist into an imaginary Antarctic continent which swept on to the east, inclosing the Indian Ocean and joining China, and he set down the Anthropophagi as dwelling at the junction of Africa and the new continent. Because he knew nothing of the interior, he described it as a pathless

desert, "a land uninhabitable from the heat". This is the creative ignorance of Ptolemy, and so far as the coasts are concerned, it imposed itself on the Arabic geographers and through them on the Christian world until the days of Henry the Navigator; but so far as the interior is concerned, it was first dissipated by David Livingstone.

From the point of view of our present inquiry, the Vandal invasion of North Africa, and the occupation of it by the Byzantine Empire are mere episodes. But there is no point of view, least of all that of the historian or the Christian, from which the Islamic conquest, beginning with the raid of Amru Ibn al Aasse into Egypt in 640 A. D., can be regarded with indifference. In seventy years all the Mediterranean coasts, along which had flourished the Christianity of Tertullian, Cyprian, Origen and Augustine, had exchanged Jehovah for Allah. Between 740 and 1000 A. D. the east coast was occupied by Islamic Arabs with great centers from Magdoshu, through Brava, Melinde, Mombasa to Kilwa, and when, in the fifteenth century, the Portugese reached that coast, they found Islam established as far south as Sofala. While, beginning in the eleventh century, wave after wave of Arab influence poured into the Sudan; up the Nile and westwards through Kordofan, Darfur, Wadai and Kanem; through the Sahara to the bend of the Niger, where from Timbuctoo as a center it moved eastwards to meet the westward movement in the great Hausa empire of Othman dan Fodio in the early years of the nineteenth century. This movement brought with it great travelers, like Masudi and Ibn Haukal in the tenth century, Ibn Batuta in the fourteenth, and Leo Africanus in the sixteenth; but a better knowledge of the Sudan and the east coast was their only contribution to African geography. It brought with it also a culture easily adaptable to the native races, exceedingly expansive, and essentially inimical to Christianity; moreover, it established on African soil an immense foreign slave-trade, whose unhappy victims were hurried from the great centers on the east coast to

Arabian or Asian markets, or down the Nile to Egypt, or from Timbuctoo along the great trade-routes, through the Sahara, to Morocco, Algiers, Fezzan and Tripoli.

If the Moslems of the fifteenth century were unable to relieve themselves of the preconceptions of the old Greek geographers, there was a Christian to whose free genius the world owes the exploration of the African coast, east and west, the circumnavigation of the Cape and the discovery of a sea route to India, as well as the emergence out of the dreadful Atlantic of a New World. He caught the spirit of the age that was stirred by the irruption of the Northmen into the Old World, and that was inspired by the broadening influences of the Crusades to great eastward land journeys like those of certain Christian pilgrims, the Polos, and their successors. I refer to that Most Christian Prince, Henry the Navigator, who from his Naval Arsenal near Cape St. Vincent sent his sea captains southwards around Cape Bojador into the "Sea of Darkness", which sincere fancy peopled with sea-monsters and serpent-rocks and water-unicorns and over which hovered the mighty hand of Satan, around Cape Blanco, with its rush of waters, around Cape Verde, to the land of the blacks. And when he died in 1460, his spirit sent out Diego Cam to discover the mouth of the Congo in 1484, to reach Walvisch Bay in 1485, the stout Bartholomew Diaz to round the Cape in 1486, and Vasco da Gama to win the Indian goal in 1497-9. From those days until 1580, Portugal was the dominant power on the lateral coasts—but only on the coasts.

From the days of the Portuguese decline to Livingstone the story is soon told. The Portuguese dragged out a miserable existence in East Africa and Angola. The Dutch and English, the Spanish and the Danes dotted the shores of the Gulf of Guinea with trading posts. The French developed the Senegal country. The Dutch founded a port of call for the eastern trade at the Cape in 1652, settlers came, the French refugees trekked into the hinterland, the English seized the Cape settlement in 1795, the Dutch trekked into the Orange Free State and the Transvaal.

Bruce explored the eastern tributaries of the Nile. Mungo Park and Lander traced the mysterious course of the Niger to its mouth. Denham and Clapperton, Laing, Caillié and others explored the Lake Chad and the Niger regions. While Livingstone was in Africa, Barth made his remarkable scientific expedition to the central and western Sudan; du Chaillu penetrated the West African forests; information sent out by the missionaries Krapf and Rebmann sent Burton and Speke, and then Speke and Grant to the discovery of Lake Tanganyika and Victoria Nyanza; Sir Samuel Baker made his famous journeys up the Nile to Albert Nyanza; Schweinfurth revealed the condition of the Bahr-el-Ghazal district. But as yet the interior of Africa was Ptolemy's desert, "a land uninhabitable from the heat."

In 1840, the sources of the Nile were unknown; the Congo was a puny river conjecturally shorter than the Orange; the Zambesi was not known six hundred miles from the coast; Lake 'Ngami, Lake Nyassa, Lake Shirwa, Lake Bangweulu, Lake Mweru, Lake Tanganyika, Lake Kivu, Albert Edward Nyanza, Albert Nyanza, Victoria Nyanza, Lake Rudolph were still hidden; millions of the natives who now live under European protection in the lower Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, the Uganda Protectorate, the British East Africa Protectorate, German East Africa, Belgian Congo, parts of French Congo, Nyassaland Protectorate, the Rhodesias, and the extreme hinterland of Portuguese Angola were out of the world. Worse than that—they lived in an economic world of their own which forbade all progress, in a moral and social world so sensual that its details can be printed fully only in scientific books, in a spiritual world that, if there be a primitive revelation, had lost almost every practical trace of it, and that had in it not a single element of hope.

The slave trade on the west coast, begun by Henry the Navigator in order to win converts to Christianity, furnished countless slaves to the West Indies, to North and South America, languished under an awakened Christian

sentiment, and lingered in its death struggle, under the eyes of Livingstone, in Portuguese Angola. The northern slave trade, under Mohammedan auspices, drove wantonly on. The monster which had settled on the east coast stretched itself into the interior. But until Livingstone came, Christendom did not know the virulence of this Portuguese, Arab, half-caste curse. It did not know how many thousands of slaves were annually shipped from east African ports or carried down the Nile; it did not realize that the slaves who were actually exported did not form one-half, they did not form one-third, or one-fifth, it is doubtful if they formed one-tenth of the total number of the traffic's victims. For every slave exported, three or five or ten died in the night when the raid was made or in the torrid days on the march to the coast. Christendom did not know the ruin, the famine, the desolation that followed the traffic; or if Christendom was faintly aware of it, there was no adequate conception of it, no direct and damning proof of it, to catch the imagination and stir the blood. Here was a million square miles of Africa's most fertile and most populous territory waiting for a torch-bearer to discover its condition to the world.

What qualities must this torch-bearer have? Surely, he must first of all be a Christian, for it is the imperative voice of God that will drive a man into these regions and it is the sustaining presence of God that will enable him to endure their horrors. Now, to use his own words, the theory and practice of David Livingstone were rooted in "a secret feeling of being absolutely at the divine disposal as a sinner". His journals breathe an unsurpassed devotion to the service of God, and a sense of absolute dependence upon Him. The torch-bearer must be, moreover, a man of stubborn independence and dauntless resolution. These qualities in David Livingstone are positively thrilling. His stubborn independence made him the missionary by eminence to all of Central Africa, instead of one of a crowd of missionaries in South Africa. His dauntless resolution

carried him many a mile. On one of his first short journeys he overheard one of his native companions say, "He is not strong, he is quite slim, and only appears stout because he puts himself in those bags (trousers), he will soon knock up". That caused his Highland blood to rise, and he kept them at top speed for days together until he heard them expressing proper opinions of his powers. These are among the last entries in his journal: "(April) 23rd (1873), 1½; 24th, 1; 25th, 1; 26th, 2 ½"—just these simple entries which, being interpreted, mean that although too far gone to make the usual copious notes in his journal, on the 23rd he was carried an hour and a half's journey; on the 24th, one hour; on the 25th, one hour; on the 26th, two and a half hours; on the 27th and 28th, he could not be moved; on the 29th, too weak even to walk to the door, he had the side of the hut torn down so that he could be lifted directly into the native palanquin, and he was carried for miles that day in intolerable pain and an ominous stupor. These were not the forced marches of desperation in search of succor. He was having himself borne farther into the interior in the steadfast pursuit of his purpose. Nothing but death could stop him, and death was from God.

But how worse than useless are stubborn independence and defiant resolution if they are not in the service of a calm and constructive mind, or if they are not licensed and controlled by gentler emotions and sympathies? The man who is to arouse Christendom on behalf of Africa must not only startle the crowd by spectacular journeys, he must impress the minds of statesmen, and command the respect of scientists, and out of depths in himself call to the depths of the public heart. Contact with Africa evoked in David Livingstone powers of analytical and constructive thought of which no one had dreamed him possessed. He became a missionary statesman. Moreover, his scientific achievements as natural historian, geographer, and astronomical observer commanded the respectful admiration of the learned world. The armchair scientist yielded him all the

more generous praise because his accurate and painstaking results were worked out in a rotten tent or a filthy hut in the fever-stricken wilds.

To these qualities of will and intellect were added in David Livingstone a quick and lively sympathy, a tender and catholic affection, a meek and forgiving spirit, a delightful natural simplicity, and a saving portion of humor which broke out, under favorable conditions, into genuinely high spirits, or which showed itself in the amusing descriptions and deft phrases of his letters and journals. If his humor is a little grim at times, who can wonder? And more often the wonder is that he can keep so thoroughly sane and human in a perfectly mad environment. This is the man who wrote in his diary, "I will place no value on anything I have or may possess except in relation to the kingdom of Christ. If anything will advance the interests of that kingdom, it shall be given away or kept only as by giving or keeping of it I shall most promote the glory of him to whom I owe all my hopes in time and eternity". This man, who kept the faith and gave away his life, God sent to Africa to be His torch-bearer.

When Livingstone arrived at the Cape in 1840, he was offered a comfortable and useful position as minister of the congregation at Cape Town. He declined with emphasis. He would not build on another's foundation, and he was impatient of the petty jealousies and hesitating policies which impaired the efficiency of the missionary communities around the Cape. He longed for the freedom of the interior, and its opportunities invited him. For a short time he was at Kuruman in the Bechuana country, the most northerly station of the Society, made famous by the apostolic labors of Robert Moffat. And then he set to extending the frontiers. God thrust him further and further north, by successive droughts, by the obstructive tactics of the Boers, by rumors of the far interior until he understood his roving commission. But for twelve years, at Mabotsa, at Chonuane, at Kolobeng, he was builder, irri-

gator, blacksmith, doctor, student, teacher, preacher, and explorer. To Mabotsa he brought Mary Moffat to be the heroic companion of his labors; from Mabotsa he retired, quietly yielding to the intrigues of a fellow missionary who informed the London Missionary Society that Livingstone was a "nonentity". He moved northwards to Chonuane, whence, after a short stay, he was driven further north by the drought. The drought and the wanton conduct of the Boers, who put every obstacle in his way and were determined to prevent his northward progress, together with rumors of the great chief of the Makololo, Sebituane, confirmed him in his determination to move on from Kolobeng, his last settled station.

His first attempt to reach Sebituane's country, made in the company of two English hunting friends, Mr. Oswell and Mr. Murray, though it failed of its purpose, resulted in the discovery of Lake 'Ngami, in 1849, a lake which had been the unattained goal of several secular expeditions. A second attempt, Mrs. Livingstone and the children being of the party, was also unsuccessful. In the interval between the second and third attempts, Livingstone was compelled to go to the Cape for an operation on his throat, an operation which he had unavailingly tried to persuade Dr. Moffat to perform with a pair of scissors. The third attempt was successful. Sebituane was found all that rumor had pictured him, "unquestionably the greatest man in all that country", but he died within a few days after Livingstone's arrival, and although Livingstone and Oswell pushed on to the Zambesi River, another great geographical feat, for the Zambesi was not known to exist so far in the interior, they were unable to find in all that region of magnificent scenery a healthful site for a permanent mission.

What should he do now? He had been aroused by the need of one great tribe, and there were many more beyond. He had been horrified by the slave trade, newly begun among the Makololo by Zanzibar Arabs. He was convinced from what he had seen of the development of the Lake

'Ngami region that slave-trading in the interior could be prevented only by opening the country to peaceful traders and missionaries. Should he settle, in comparative comfort with his family, among a handful of Bechuana and stop his ears to the call of the north, or should he send his family to England and plunge boldly into the interior to throw the light of his torch on new peoples and their needs, on strategic citadels and sally-ports for new missionary enterprises, on trade-routes along which a commercial and spiritual revolution might be brought about for all of Central Africa? If you can hesitate to answer, Livingstone could not.

In 1853, with a company of Makololo, he translated his answer into action and began the transcontinental journey which astonished the world. Rivers are the great natural trade-routes. Livingstone knew that the Zambesi rose far in the interior, and an old map showed the Coanza, in Portuguese territory, as rising about where he conceived the Zambesi to rise. He would try to open that route. And so with no stores of European food and no trade goods, afflicted with countless attacks of intermittent fever, entranced by the beauty of the country but oppressed by the unspeakable degradation of the people, preaching so far as the native languages he knew served him, but preaching always in that Pentecostal language which every man hears in his own tongue, the language of a blameless life, he pushed northwards up the Zambesi through the Balunda country, westwards along the upper course of the river, and, although he did not find the Coanza where he expected, still ever westward to St. Paul de Loanda on the Atlantic. Nothing escaped his eye; and nothing failed to touch his heart. His journals are strange mixtures of solemn prayers and exalted reflections, lunar observations, details of the day's march, keen geographical conjectures, notes on the character and superstitions of the natives, zoölogical notes, botanical notes, notes on the Portuguese slave-trade, notes of the personal kindnesses which he received from the

Portuguese planters: everything is recorded with the same painstaking accuracy. And so he came to Loanda, utterly worn out by fever and dysentery, the fatigue and perils of the journey. There he recuperated his strength, and declining an invitation to embark for England, because he had promised to take his Makololo followers home, he turned his face eastward again. He had revealed to the public mind the fact that the country "uninhabitable from the heat" was a country of extraordinary beauty and fertility, teeming with native life, but he had discovered no healthful location for a mission nor he had found a natural trade-route to the west coast. He would retrace his steps to the Makololo country, and follow the Zambesi to the Indian Ocean. Perhaps that river would furnish the great highway for the relief of the interior. And so, in the same perils of nature, and east of the Makololo country, in deadly peril of men, he presses on, making by the way a virtual discovery of the great Victoria Falls in the Zambesi, until he reaches the east coast at Quilimane in 1856. Across Africa in the tropics, the greatest geographical feat of half a century! From Quilimane he writes, "But it does not look as though I had reached my goal. Viewed in relation to my calling, the end of the geographical feat is only the beginning of the enterprise". He has elaborate and statesmanlike views on his calling which he goes to England to spread before the London Missionary Society and the British public. He is received in triumph. His public appearances and his book, *Missionary Travels and Researches in South Africa*, are immensely popular. The London Missionary Society, which at first declined his proposals because they were too extensive, is eager to have him work in the service of the Society in his own way; but Livingstone feels that his freedom would be restricted and the Society criticised for what some might consider a misuse of missionary funds, and he prefers to draw down criticism, however unjust, on himself. And the criticism which attended his acceptance of a government commission as a

consul for the east coast with instructions to explore eastern and central Africa has persisted to this day in a sort of feeling that however great Livingstone was as a traveler he ceased to be a missionary. But Livingstone held a commission from a higher authority than the British government, and whoever is content to judge action by motive and to weigh the deep sentiments of the heart against casual appearance will always be sure that Livingstone was obedient to that great commission.

This second expedition, under government auspices, from 1858-1864, was not a complete success. The "Ma-Robert," a steamer named after Mrs. Livingstone, in the African fashion, proved unfitted for river navigation. There was a lack of harmony between the saintly but not angelic Livingstone and the military and naval officers under his command. However, the Zambesi was explored at its mouths, and up beyond the Kebrabasa Rapids; the beautiful Lake Shirwa was discovered and the great Lake Nyassa; the Makololo country was revisited; and the Rovuma was explored in the vain attempt to find another waterway into Lake Nyassa. The Universities Mission, sent out by the Universities of Oxford, Cambridge, Dublin and Durham, to begin the work of evangelizing the newly opened lands, met with sad disaster along the Shiré; and Mrs. Livingstone, who had come out to join the Doctor, died at Shupanga in 1862. How deeply affected Livingstone was one simple entry in his diary will show, "For the first time in my life I feel willing to die". But at once the great achievement and the immediate occasion for the recall of the expedition was the frightful revelation of the slave-trade in all the Nyassa country. Slave-trade between native tribes, slave-trade by east coast Arabs, slave-trade by Portuguese, slave-trade by the half-castes of both, everywhere war and famine, the slave-stick and the lash. A prodigiously rich country was being ruined. Commerce could not flourish; missions could not thrive until the curse was lifted. This very revelation, though it somewhat im-

pressed Christendom, strained the diplomatic relations of Great Britain with Portugal; and besides, the expedition was costing more than the government had expected, and it was recalled.

Dr. Livingstone returned to England, bitterly disappointed but resolute. He was greeted with the old enthusiasm. In his second book, *The Zambesi and its Tributaries*, he struck a tremendous blow against the slave-trade on the east coast. He was of course determined to go back to Africa. Sir Roderick Murchison proposed to him, on behalf of the Royal Geographical Society, the organization of a purely geographical expedition to examine the watersheds of central Africa. This proposition Livingstone declined, and wrote in his journal, "Answered Sir Roderick about going out. Said I could only feel in the way of duty by working as a missionary". Nothing could keep him from the discharge of what he conceived to be his duty as a missionary, and, as he was almost without funds himself, a friend provided a subsidy of £1000, the Royal Geographical Society added £500 and the government £500, and with that niggardly capital, with no salary and no pension, though technically a British consul, he set out on his last journey. He hoped to open a way for lawful trade and Christian missions which, together with the repressive efforts of British cruisers, he believed would stop the slave-trade, an half of whose horrors he did not yet know. In addition, he promised Sir Roderick that he would determine the watersheds of that part of Africa.

The first year of the expedition is devoted to a new exploration of the Rovuma country and the Nyassa district. Here he finds everywhere new evidences of the increasing trade in slaves; bones and wasting bodies along the paths, misery and famine in the villages. His renewed examination of the country confirms him in the belief that, in spite of the failure of the Universities Mission, the Zambesi-Shiré region is most strategic for a missionary center.

He is now free to undertake the apparently simple task

which Sir Roderick has laid on him. He did not know the difficulty of the enterprise. He did not dream of the years it would consume. Though he had for the Nile a feeling deepened by religious associations, and though he was convinced that to discover its sources would give him influence in Europe on behalf of Africa, he would not have put that Tantalus cup to his lips had he known. But he could not know, and he had promised. Deserted by some of his followers, half-starved, he pushes on to the southern end of Lake Tanganyika. Then he turns westward and discovers Lake Mweru, important for the determination of the watershed, he thinks. But at Lake Mweru he hears of another lake to the south. He will not go to Ujiji for letters and supplies yet; he will go south to the new lake. He is detained for months by the disturbed state of the country. He has a weird experience with a party of slaves who are singing, unmindful of their slave-sticks. Surprised at their untimely mirth, he asks the cause of it, and is told that they are rejoicing at the idea "of coming back after death and haunting and killing those who had sold them". He is stricken with famine, weakness, fits of insensibility. He loses his medicine chest, which he regards as a virtual sentence of death. But he thinks that in the spongy marshes around Lake Bangweulu he has perhaps come upon those fabulous marshes in which the Nile was anciently supposed to rise. There is, however, one step to be taken; he must prove that the river running northwards from Lake Mweru, the Lualaba, is really a western branch of the Nile. But he must first go to Ujiji for supplies. He makes the journey in such wretchedness that his constant prayer is that he may live to get there. When Ujiji is reached it is only to learn that his medicines and stores have been left at Unyanyembe and cannot be brought on because of native wars. He rests at Ujiji, and then goes to the Manyuema country where he stays for two years in a vain endeavor to trace the upper reaches of the Lualaba. He was utterly at the cruel mercies of the slave-raiders who robbed, deceived and

obstructed him. There was, too, a merciless irony in the inability of the natives to distinguish between this kindly man on mercy bent, and the other foreigners with a lust for flesh and blood. He was delayed by rains, stricken with pneumonia, crippled by virulent ulcers on his feet. He was oppressed beyond description by the misery of the country, a misery which surpassed the surpassing misery he had seen in the Nyassa country. He wrote, "Sorely am I perplexed, I grieve and mourn". Just as it seemed that he might get forward from Nyangwe, his farthest north, the people of the chieftain, with whom he has made a costly bargain for an escort, are implicated in a massacre which takes place under Livingstone's eyes, a massacre so senseless and wanton that Livingstone writes, "I got the impression that I was in hell". Of course he could not go forward with these people; he must go back to Ujiji for supplies which he had ordered up from Zanzibar. It was a distressing journey which met a crowning disappointment at its goal. The Arab Shereef at Ujiji had divined on the Koran and, discovering that Livingstone was dead, had sold off all his goods. Do you think this situation absolutely hopeless? All the world knows that by a multitude of providences, on this side and on that, David Livingstone was met at Ujiji on October 28th, 1871, by Henry M. Stanley with a relief expedition sent out by the *New York Herald*. Their months of delightful intercourse together at Ujiji, around the northern shores of Lake Tanganyika, on the road to Unyanyembe, were revivifying to Livingstone and big with spiritual and vocational destiny for Stanley.

Why did not Livingstone yield to Stanley's urgency; why did he not go home to England? Let an entry in his diary, made on his fifty-ninth birthday, five days after Stanley had left him, answer, "My Jesus, my King, my Life, my All, I again dedicate my whole self to thee. Accept me, and grant, O gracious Father, that ere this year is gone I may finish my task". He has a task to finish. Shut off from determining whether the Lualaba joins the Nile, he will at

least go southwards around Lake Bangweulu and westwards to great fountains which he has heard of at Katanga, and so assure himself that he has found the ultimate sources of some great river system. The stores and escort, which Stanley has sent up from the coast, having arrived, he goes forward with firm faith, on past Lake Tanganyika, southwards and westwards to Lake Bangweulu. He is vexed by native chiefs, but he has often been vexed before. He is distraught by evidences of the slave trade, but that is no new sorrow. He is smitten by fever, but he knows that stroke well. He is distressed by internal hemorrhages, but that is an old distress; overcome by fits of insensibility, but he has passed through that darkness before. It is all the old story, but it has been too often told. At Chitambo's village on the southern shore of Lake Bangweulu, the gallant body, worn by countless fatigues, fails the invincible will. On May 1st, 1874, he died on his knees beside his rough bed. The hand of the torch-bearer faltered, the torch fell, but it was not extinguished. He died in the faith, not knowing.

He did not know that his faithful followers, Susi, Chuma, Jacob Wainwright and the rest would for ever give the lie to the opinion that there is no Christian stuff in native Africans by their unparalleled march to the coast with his body. He did not know that through the labors and toils of many of whom time fails me to tell, the monstrous slave-trade would be bruised in the head by the Berlin Convention of 1885 and the Brussels Convention of 1890. He did not know of the marvelous developments that awaited South Africa. He did not know that the Paris Missionary Society would throw its great pioneer François Coillard up into the Makololo country to establish an heroic and successful mission along the middle Zambesi, among the then dominant Barotse. He did not know that in the Shiré district where the Universities Mission had failed, the Church of Scotland would firmly establish itself around a center named Blantyre in honor of his birthplace; nor

that the Livingstonia Mission of the United Free Church of Scotland would stretch a line of magnificent stations along the west shore of his own Lake Nyassa. He did not know that the Universities Mission would grow powerful at Zanzibar, at the heart of the slave business, and would eventually reach out into his Rovuma district. He did not know of the work his own London Missionary Society was to do along the southern shores of Lake Tanganyika. Nor did he know that from the Rovuma to the equator, German, English, Scotch Societies would begin to possess the land in the name of Christ. He did not know that a letter from Stanley, his own child in the African faith, almost incredibly preserved in its transmission from the court of King Mtesa to England, would startle the Church Missionary Society into one of the triumphs of modern Christianity, in Uganda. He would not have been distressed by the knowledge that Stanley's journey down the Congo would forever dispel his hesitating illusion that Lake Bangweulu was the birthplace of the Nile, if he could have known, too, of the sacrificial mission of the English Baptists, the Combers, Bentley, and that great riverine explorer and missionary, George Grenfell, along the lower Congo; and of the Guinness' Balolo Mission on the middle Congo; and of the American Baptist Mission on the upper Congo; and of the splendid work of the Southern Presbyterians on the upper waters of the Kassai, the Congo's great southern affluent. Nor did he know that in the very region where he died, Arnot would set up the Christlike Garenganze Mission on behalf of the Plymouth Brethren. He did not know all this as he died on his knees by his bed, but God knew it when He sent him to Africa to preach His gospel there.

He did not know, but God knows, that in this year of grace there are 100,000,000 heathen in Africa, 60,000,000 Mohammedans, and 10,000,000 Christians, of whom only 2,000,000 are native. He did not know and Stanley did not know to what unspeakable uses King Leopold of Belgium would turn the opening up of the Congo region in the

name of Christian civilization. There is an irrepressible thrill in divining what downright use of language Stanley, *Bula Matari*, the Rock-breaker, would have made, if he had lived to know what the world now knows about the once-called Congo Free State; but we can thank God that he died, as Livingstone died, not knowing. Livingstone did not know, he could hardly dream, but God knows and it ought to haunt the dreams of the Church, that the suppression of the slave-trade and the establishment of European peace over Africa has brought with it the great opportunity of Islam, the only religion that defies and denies Christianity, the only religion that has driven Christianity from a field before now, the only religion that is now discomfiting and forestalling Christianity. Down from the north and in from the east, Islam is advancing, with fanatic zeal or by the slower processes of racial infusion, by commerce and by education, with a culture pitched but a note above the dominant native tone, over the ground whose flesh it once led captive, to lay a deadlier captivity on its spirit. If God wills, Christianity must rouse itself for a mighty and bloodless crusade, born of love and not of hate, to keep forever inviolable the sepulchre of David Livingstone's heart.

Princeton.

HAROLD MCA. ROBINSON.

CONCERNING SCHMIEDEL'S "PILLAR-PASSAGES"

The publication by Paul W. Schmiedel in 1901 of the article "Gospels" in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica* marks (we do not say, creates) something very much like an epoch in the history of the criticism of the Gospel-narratives. For more than a century—"from Reimarus to Wrede"—"the quest of the historical Jesus" has been pursued with unflagging industry. That is to say, the energies of a long line of brilliantly endowed scholars, equipped with the instrument of the most extensive and exact erudition, have been exhausted in the effort to discover some historical basis for the "natural" Jesus which their philosophical presuppositions compelled them to assume behind the supernatural Jesus presented in the Gospel-narratives. "Exhausted" is the right word to use here. For precisely what Schmiedel's article advises us of, is the failure of this long-continued and diligently prosecuted labor to reach the results expected of it. After a half-century of somewhat unmethodical investigation, Ferdinand Christian Baur, in the middle of the last century, laid down the reasonable rule by which subsequent research has been governed: "criticism of documents must precede criticism of material."¹ But the subsequent half-century of criticism of

¹F. C. Baur, *Kritische Untersuchungen über die kanonischen Evangelien*, 1847, Introduction. Strauss had proceeded on the principle that a history which contains narratives of miracles can deserve no credit. Baur raises the question whether this is not a rash conclusion; whether the metaphysical notion of the miraculous is not too abstract a category to be made the test of the entire evangelical history; whether, in a word, some investigation into the origin of the narratives is not called for before a conclusion is drawn against their contents; and whether, therefore, Strauss has not erred in making his criticism so exclusively a criticism of the history to the neglect of criticism of the writings (p. 46). He recognizes a certain naturalness in Strauss' procedure in the state of the documentary criticism of the day. But he concludes: "The fault of the Straussian work is that it makes the Gospel history the object of criticism without first attaining a solid result with the criticism of the writings" (p. 71).

documents has issued in certainly nothing to the purpose, and, Schmiedel seems half-inclined to declare, nothing solid at all. The Synoptic problem, he tells us, remains as vexed at the end of it as it was at the beginning. Certain immediate sources of the Synoptics' material it is, of course, easy enough to discern lying behind them, and these are very generally recognized. But behind them in turn stretches a vista of sources, traveling down which the eye becomes weary; and the complications which result when an attempt is made to take these into consideration confound the most promising hypotheses. "The solution of the Synoptical problem which appeared after so much toil to have been brought so near," remarks Schmiedel, "seems suddenly to be removed again to an immeasurable distance."² "It cannot but seem unfortunate" therefore, he continues, "that the decision as to the credibility of the Gospel-narratives should be made to depend upon the determination of a problem so difficult and perhaps insoluble as the Synoptical is."³ Consequently he proposes a return to the pre-Tübingen position of criticism of the material independently of the criticism of the documents in which this material is presented. "It would accordingly be a very important gain," he says, "if we could find some means of making" the decision as to the credibility of the Gospel-narratives "in some measure at least independent of" the determination of the Synoptical problem.⁴

The procedure which Schmiedel here proposes is ob-

"However natural and in a sense unavoidable the way opened up by Strauss may be, it nevertheless remains undeniable that it is from the very nature of the case impossible to reach an assured result with the criticism of the history, so long as the criticism of the writings is so wavering and uncertain" (p. 72). Cf. Otto Pfeiderer, *The Development of Theology in Germany since Kant*, 1890, p. 224 ff.

² *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1868.

³ *Ibid.*, col. 1872.

⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1872; cf. *Protestantische Monatshefte* x. (1906), p. 400: "They [his 'pillar-passages'] provide the possibility of establishing very essential traits of the life of Jesus without the question of the origin and the mutual relations of the first three Gospels having to be solved."

viously revolutionary; so revolutionary that it marks, as we say, something very like an epoch in the history of the criticism of the Gospel-narratives. It is an express return to the methods of Strauss as opposed to the more scientific methods validated once for all by Baur as against Strauss; and in returning to Strauss' methods it returns in a very curious way to Strauss' exact standpoint of unreasoned scepticism with respect to the Gospel-narratives. What it particularly concerns us here to emphasize, however, is that it registers the failure of "literary criticism" of the Gospels as prosecuted during the last half-century, either, as Schmiedel intimates, to accomplish anything of importance, or, in any event, to accomplish anything to the purpose. There are many, no doubt, who will disown Schmiedel's low estimate of the formal results of Synoptical criticism. But no well-informed person will care to deny that for the ultimate purpose for which this criticism has been invoked its failure has been complete. No stratum of tradition has been reached by it in which the portrait of Jesus differs in any essential respect from that presented in the Synoptic Gospels. If the writers of the Synoptic Gospels were (in Schmiedel's phrase⁵) "worshippers of Jesus," no less were those who formed and transmitted to them the tradition on which they ultimately rest (also in Schmiedel's phrase⁶) "worshippers of Jesus." As we go back, and ever farther back, to the very beginnings

⁵This is the term employed in the English of the *Encyclopaedia Biblica* (e.g. col. 1872), the Preface which Schmiedel contributed to Arno Neumann's *Jesus* (e.g. pp. ix., xviii.), and his lecture on *Jesus in Modern Criticism* (e.g. p. 16) alike; and as all these discussions owe their English clothing to friends of Schmiedel, working under his eye, we should perhaps permit the term to stand. The German term which is rendered (*Verehrung, Verehrer*) we should not suppose necessarily expressed so specific a notion.

⁶Preface to Neumann, p. ix.: "The Gospels are, all of them, the work of worshippers of Jesus, and their contents have been handed down through the channel of tradition in like manner by His worshippers"; p. xviii.: "This tradition was itself really handed down by worshippers of Jesus." So also W. Heitmüller, in Schiele and Zscharnack's *Die Religion*, etc., III. pp. 357-359.

of any tradition to which literary criticism can penetrate, the purely human Jesus who is assumed to lie behind the Jesus of the Gospels still continually eludes us. Accordingly a Pfleiderer frankly despairs of ever recovering Him,⁷ and a Wellhausen leaves on his readers a strong impression that his drastic criticism must land us ultimately in the same desperation.⁸ Schmiedel's counsel is, in these circumstances, to reverse the established method of the last half-century, and, abandoning the criticism of documents which no longer seems hopeful, to seek to break a way to the assumed purely human Jesus by means of immediate criticism of the historical material itself. And he thinks he can blaze out the road directly to the desired goal.

It ought to be noted in passing that Schmiedel sometimes speaks as if he were not prepared to admit that the attainment of the purely human Jesus, so long sought in vain by literary criticism, were the determining motive of the change of procedure which he suggests.⁹ He everywhere speaks, indeed, as if the critical principle which he invokes were quite indifferent to this issue. He even asserts explicitly: "In reality, my foundation-texts were in no sense sought out by me for any purpose whatever; they thrust themselves upon me in virtue of one feature, and one feature only: the impossibility of their having been invented, and their consequent credibility."¹⁰ Except in a purely formal sense, however, this is manifestly absurd. It is its superhuman Jesus with His nimbus of the supernatural which is the sole *scandalon* of the Synoptic narrative, apart from which that narrative would be acknowledged by all as exceptionally trustworthy. "Precisely this," remarks Albert Schweitzer justly, "is the characteristic of the liter-

⁷ Cf. *The Princeton Theological Review* iv (1906), pp. 121-124.

⁸ Cf. H. Weinl, *Ist das "liberale" Jesus widerlegt?* 1910, p. 20: "And even now if Wrede and Wellhausen do not really mean that Jesus is a wholly imaginary figure, yet the judgment to which their work leads runs: 'Jesus is for us unknowable (*unerkenntbar*)'."

⁹ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1881.

¹⁰ Preface to Neumann, p. xxi.

ature of the Life of Jesus at the opening of the twentieth century,—that the purely historical, even in the productions of historical, scientific, professional theology, retires behind the interest in the world-view."¹¹ Schmiedel does not separate from his companions in this. He comes to the criticism of the Gospel-narratives with a definite world-view as the primary presupposition of his work; and this world-view is the current anti-supernaturalistic one. There is nothing of which he is surer than that Jesus was merely a man;¹² unless it be that miracles in general do not happen.¹³ The only reason why he rejects out of hand the Jesus given him by the Synoptic narratives is that the Jesus given him by the Synoptic narratives is not a mere man. And the precise thing he sets himself to look for behind the Synoptic narratives is evidence of some kind that the real Jesus was, despite the constant testimony of the tradition, nevertheless merely man. "What," he asks, "are the portions of the Gospels so persistently objected to?" And he replies: "We find that they are, to say all in a

¹¹ *Quest of the Historical Jesus*, p. 322.

¹² Hibbert Journal Supplement: *Jesus or Christ?* 1909, p. 601: "Since the divine and human nature cannot be united in Jesus, and since Jesus was undoubtedly man, we have simply to regard His human nature as given." *Jesus in Modern Criticism*, 1907, p. 86: "My religion, moreover, does not require me to find in Jesus an absolutely perfect model, and it would not trouble me if I found another person who excelled Him, as indeed, in certain respects some have already done. Convinced as I am that He was human, if another should have more to offer me than He had, I should consider this simply another instance of God's bounty and favour." *Ibid.*, p. 6: "It is no less pleasant to note at the same time that the person of Jesus is being explained in a more and more definitely human way by all theological parties, and in a more or less human way even by ultra-conservatives." Cf. *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1881; *Jesus in Modern Criticism*, p. 24.

¹³ "It would be clearly wrong," he indeed declares (*Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1876), "in an investigation such as the present, to start from any such postulate or axiom as that 'miracles' are impossible;" but he is soon found arguing that "even one strongly predisposed to believe in miracles would find it difficult to accept a narrative," like that of Lk. xxiii. 44 ff because it alleges a darkening of the sun at a time of the month when eclipses do not happen—that is because if it happened at all it must have been by miracle.

word, those in which Jesus appears as a Divine Being, whether in virtue of what He says, or in virtue of what He does."¹⁴ There is no other reason why the portrait of Jesus given by the Synoptics should be "objected to." And so firmly set is Schmiedel's reluctance to the admission of the possibility of such a Jesus that he even goes the length of declaring that were this representation consistent and unbroken, he, for his part might find it impossible to defend the actual existence of any Jesus at all.¹⁵ Either a purely human Jesus or no Jesus at all is the only alternative that he will admit, prior to entering into any critical inquiry into the evidence; and the sole object of his criticism is to discover some evidence of the existence of a purely human Jesus. The precise significance of his proposed revolution in critical procedure, therefore, is that it openly recognizes that literary criticism has failed to discover any evidence of the existence of a purely human Jesus behind the super-human Jesus of the Synoptic narratives, and suggests that another and more direct way be therefore tried to reach the desired end.

Schmiedel's criticism brings us, then, to a parting of the ways. Not only are we justified, therefore, in giving it an attention which in itself it might not seem to merit. It is in a sense required of us to subject it to a sufficiently careful scrutiny to assure us that we understand exactly what he proposes, and also, if possible, exactly what the significance of this proposal is.

So far as we are informed Schmiedel first propounded his new critical method in the article "Gospels" which was published in the second volume of the *Encyclopaedia Biblica* in 1901. The commendation of it to a German public seems in the first instance to have been made by expositions

¹⁴ Preface to Neumann, p. ix.

¹⁵ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1881: "If passages of this kind were wholly wanting in them, it would be impossible to prove to a skeptic that any historical value whatever was to be assigned to the gospels; he would be in a position to declare the picture of Jesus contained in them to be purely a work of phantasy, and would remove the person of Jesus from the field of history."

of it given by his brother, Otto Schmiedel, in 1902¹⁶ and by his pupil, Arno Neumann, in 1904.¹⁷ It was apparently not until 1906 that Schmiedel himself laid it before his countrymen, early in that year somewhat incidentally in a tractate on the Gospel of John as compared with the Synoptics,¹⁸ and later more at length in a lecture on the Person of Jesus in modern controversy, which was delivered at the meeting of the Swiss Association for Free Christianity on June 15, 1906, and published in the July number of the *Protestantische Monatshefte*, and afterwards separately.¹⁹ In the same year he returned to its exposition and defence in English in a preface which he wrote for the English translation of Neumann's *Jesus*;²⁰ and in the following year there was issued an English translation of his Swiss lecture.²¹ These publications constitute our sources of information with respect to the proposal we are to examine.²²

¹⁶ *Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu-Forschung*, von Otto Schmiedel, 1902, § vi., Auswahl absolut glaubwürdiger Stellen, pp. 39-41. The second edition, 1906, repeats this section without change, pp. 46-48.

¹⁷ *Jesus, wer er geschichtlich war*, von Arno Neumann, 1904, Die Vorfrage, § 5, pp. 16-18. English Translation: *Jesus*, 1906, pp. 9-11.

¹⁸ *Das vierte Evangelium gegenüber den drei ersten*, von Professor D. P. W. Schmiedel, Zürich, being the 8th and 10th parts of the first series of the well-known *Religionsgeschichtliche Volksbücher*, 1906, pp. 16-22, 31 f, 33, 81-83, 85-87.

¹⁹ *Protestantische Monatshefte*, x. (1906), 7 pp. 257-282. *Die Person Jesu im Streite der Meinungen der Gegenwart*, Vortrag . . . von D. Paul Wilh. Schmiedel . . . Leipzig, 1906. Also in an edition published at Zürich [1906] which contains also: Erstes Votum von J. G. Hosang, Dekan in Pontresina, samt Schlusswort der Referenten.

²⁰ *Jesus*. By Arno Neumann. Translated by Maurice A. Canney, M.A. With a Preface by P. W. Schmiedel, London: Adam and Charles Black, 1906. The Preface occupies pp. v.-xxviii.

²¹ *Jesus in Modern Criticism*. A lecture by Dr. Paul W. Schmiedel, Professor of Theology in Zurich. Translated into English (by permission of the publishers of the *Prot. Monatshefte*) by Maurice A. Canney, M.A. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1907.

²² A "Nachwort über die 'Grundsäulen' eines Lebens Jesu" in reply to an article in the same number (pp. 386-392) by Eduard Hertlein of Jena, entitled, "Neue 'Grundsäulen' eines 'Lebens Jesu'?" was published by Schmiedel in the number of the *Protestantische Monatshefte* for Nov. 1906 (x. 10, pp. 393-400).

In its primary publication²³ Schmiedel explains his suggestion, if succinctly, yet with sufficient clearness. Turning from literary to historical criticism, the investigator finds, he remarks, two lines of procedure open to him—a negative and a positive one. He must on the one hand, “set on one side everything which for any reason, arising either from the substance or from considerations of literary criticism, has to be regarded as doubtful or wrong.” On the other hand, “he must make search for all such data, as from the nature of their contents cannot possibly on any account be regarded as inventions.” Following out the former of these lines of inquiry with respect to the Synoptic Gospels Schmiedel points out a number of matters (including their accounts of miraculous occurrences) in which he considers them clearly untrustworthy.²⁴ With this negative criticism we are not for the moment concerned. We only note in passing that it is sufficiently drastic to lead Schmiedel to remark at the close of the sections devoted to it, “The foregoing sections may have sometimes seemed to raise a doubt, whether any credible elements were to be found in the Gospels at all.”²⁵ The method of the positive investigation is outlined as follows:²⁶

“When a profane historian finds before him a historical document which testifies to the worship of a hero unknown to other sources, he attaches first and foremost importance to those features which cannot be deduced merely from the fact of this worship, and he does so on the simple and sufficient ground that they would not be found in this source unless the author had met with them as fixed data of tradition. The same fundamental principle may be safely applied in the case of the gospels, for they also are all of them written by worshippers of Jesus. We now have accordingly the advantage—which cannot be appreciated too highly—of being in a position to recognise something as being worthy of belief even without being able to say, or even being called on to inquire, whether it comes from original Mk., from logia, or from oral tradition, or from any other quarter that may be alleged. The relative priority becomes a matter of indifference, because the absolute priority—

²³ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1872 ff.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, col. 1873-1880.

²⁵ *Ibid.*, col. 1881.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 1872.

that is, the origin in real tradition—is certain. In such points the question as to credibility becomes independent of the synoptical question. Here the clearest cases are those in which only one evangelist, or two, have data of this class, and the second, or third, or both, are found to have taken occasion to alter these in the interests of the reverence due to Jesus.

"If we discover any such points—even if only a few—they guarantee not only their own contents, but also much more. For in that case one may also hold as credible all else which agrees in character with these, and is in other respects not open to suspicion. Indeed the thoroughly disinterested historian must recognise it as his duty to investigate the grounds for this so great reverence for himself which Jesus was able to call forth; and he will then, first and foremost, find himself led to recognise as true the two great facts that Jesus had compassion for the multitude and that he preached with power, not as the scribes (Mt. ix. 36; vii. 29)."²⁷

²⁷ The meaning of these last sentences is practically that, having by the processes of criticism outlined in the preceding paragraph secured a merely human Jesus, Schmiedel now sets himself to present as high a conception of this merely human Jesus as he can without overstepping the bounds of His mere humanity. Consequently he is willing to point to such passages as Mt. vii. 29; Mk. vi. 34; Mt. xi. 28 as "of the same truthful nature" as the "pillar passages," though the principle of their selection is now the opposite one, that they enhance the character of Jesus (*Jesus in Modern Criticism*, pp. 25-26). He is even on this principle prepared to run directly in the teeth of the principle of his "pillar-passages." Those passages, he says, have thrust themselves upon him because the statements in them are too inconsistent with the reverence in which Jesus was held by the community to represent their view, and must therefore have come from an earlier tradition which is true. But there are passages which in his judgment attribute to Jesus teachings which he refuses to believe was genuinely Jesus' because they are altogether too inconsistent with reverence for Him. There is, for example, the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, in which (in his view) mere poverty is made a virtue, and mere riches a vice (Lk. xvi. 25). There is the parable of the unrighteous steward in which mere relaxation of financial claims without any consideration of the rights and duties involved, is made a shining virtue (Lk. xvi. 1-9). Why not reason that these are obviously fragments of an earlier tradition inconsistent with the worship in which Jesus had come to be held, and demonstrate to us that Jesus was an "Ebionite," a fanatical leveler? But Schmiedel draws back and remarks: "It should be obvious that Jesus cannot have said such things as these" (*Jesus in Modern Criticism*, pp. 72-73), arguing against their genuineness after a fashion which sounds very strange on his lips, and raises the question whether he himself really believes in the principle of his "pillar-passages."

Proceeding after this fashion Schmiedel fixes primarily on five passages which seem to him to meet the conditions laid down; that is to say, they make statements which are in conflict with the reverence for Jesus that pervades the Gospels and therefore could not have been invented by the authors of the Gospels, but must have come to them from earlier fixed tradition; and they are preserved in their crude contradiction with the standpoint of the evangelists, accordingly, only by one or two of them, while the others, or other, of them, if they report them at all, modify them into harmony with their standpoint of reverence.²⁸ These five passages are: Mk. x, 17 ff ('Why callest thou me good? None is good save God only'); Mt. xii. 31 ff (blasphemy against the Son of Man can be forgiven); Mk. iii. 21 (His relations held Him to be beside Himself); Mk. xiii. 32 ('Of that day and of that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son but the Father'); Mk. xv. 34, Mt. xxvii. 46 ('My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?'). To these he adds four more which have reference to Jesus' power to work miracles, viz.: Mk. viii. 12 (Jesus declines to work a sign); Mk. vi. 5 ff (Jesus was able to do no mighty works in Nazareth); Mk. viii. 14-21 ('The leaven of the Pharisees and of Herod' refers not to bread but to teaching); Mk. xi. 5, Lk. vii. 22 (the signs of the Messiah are only figuratively miraculous). These nine passages he calls "the foundation-pillars for a really scientific life of Jesus." In his view, they prove, on the one hand, that "Jesus really did exist, and that the Gospels contain at least some trustworthy facts concerning Him,"—a matter which, he seems to suggest, would be subject to legitimate doubt in the absence of such passages; and, on the other hand, that "in the person of Jesus we have to do with a completely human being, and that the divine is to be sought in Him only in the form in which it is capable of being found in a man."²⁹

²⁸ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1881.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

From them as a basis, he proposes to work out, admitting nothing to be credible which is not accordant with the non-miraculous, purely human, Jesus which these passages imply.

The principle of procedure which Schmiedel invokes, it will be seen, he represents as one which is in universal use in like circumstances among profane historians. He represents it as altogether independent of literary criticism and as finding its chief value in this fact. He represents it further as yielding results which may be confidently depended upon. And he represents these results as totally reversing the portrait of Jesus presented in the documents subjected to this critical scrutiny, substituting for the divine Jesus which they depict a purely human Jesus. All this will become clearer as we attend to the subsequent expositions he has given of his method.

The subject is introduced, in the little book on John,³⁰ in the course of a discussion of the miracles attributed to our Lord by John. John, it is remarked, represents our Lord as working miracles as "signs;" but we learn from Mk. viii. 11-13 that Jesus refused to give a "sign" to that generation. "And," continues Schmiedel, "He must really have made this declaration; for no one of His reporters would have invented it, since they, each and every one of them, believed that Jesus did work miracles with this purpose." Then he continues:

"In order to place the significance of such passages in its full light, we give them the name of *foundation-pillars of a really scientific life of Jesus*. Every historical investigator, no matter in what field he works, follows the principles to hold for true in the first instance, in any account which testifies to reverence (*Verehrung*, 'worship') for its hero, that which runs counter to this reverence, because that cannot be based on invention. Since we possess a plurality of Gospels we can further observe how in one or more of them such passages are in part transformed, in part wholly omitted, because they were too objectionable precisely to reverence for Jesus. In their original form such passages show, therefore, in the most certain way how Jesus really thought and lived, namely after a fashion which we—with all

³⁰ Pp. 16-17.

recognition that there was something divine in Him—must call a genuinely human one. On the other hand, it is only such passages which give assurance that we may, at least in some degree, depend upon the Gospels in which they occur, that is to say the first three Gospels. Were they wholly lacking in them, it would be difficult to withstand the allegation that the Gospels *everywhere* give us only a sacred image painted on a gold ground, and we could not at all know what kind of an appearance Jesus really made, or indeed perhaps even whether He ever existed at all. The 'foundation-pillars' upon which, along with the one already mentioned, we can rely in order to obtain a right idea of the miraculous works of Jesus, we speak of at pp. 31ff, and in chapter iii., paragraphs 18 and 19; and of the remaining ones which are of importance for other aspects of Jesus' nature at pp. 18 f, 19 f, 21, 22, and 33.

"It is self-evident that what we find to be credible in the Synoptics is in no wise confined to these nine 'foundation-pillars.' It belongs to the chief tasks of an historical investigator, from His words and acts, to make the effect (*Erfolg*) which a great historical figure has had intelligible. This effect in Jesus' case is, however, so great that even an investigator who stands entirely cool in His presence must seek out and accept as true everything which is adapted to establish His greatness and to make the reverence felt for Him by His contemporaries intelligible,—it being premised, of course, that it does not contradict the portrait of Jesus obtained from the 'foundation-pillars,' and also does not otherwise rouse well-grounded doubts."

There is perhaps observable in this statement a certain heightening of what was more cautiously expressed in the initial statement, in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*. There, for example, we were told that it was when a historian found himself before a unique document testifying to the worship of a hero unknown to other sources that he resorted to this method of investigating the credibility of his otherwise uncontrollable informant. Here all this qualification falls away and it is spoken of as if this were a universally practised method in all historical research. The general untrustworthiness of the evangelical portrait of Jesus and the closeness of the alternative that we should have no credible account of Jesus and perhaps be left in doubt of his very existence seems also to be somewhat more extremely suggested.

We are in a different atmosphere in the Preface to Arno

Neumann's *Jesus*. Here Schmiedel is defending his critical method and its results against the strictures of John M. Robertson, who holds that Jesus is a pure myth and that therefore the Gospels cannot contain any credible testimony to His existence. Schmiedel is concerned accordingly to throw into emphasis the positive side of his method, and to make plain that he obtains by it not mere probability but certainty as to Jesus—both as to His existence and as to His true character. He concedes that the Gospels present the appearance of altogether untrustworthy narratives, and that we are, therefore, with them on our hands as our sources of knowledge of Jesus, in a very unfavorable position. But he reasons thus:³¹

"Yet let us examine a little more closely. What are the portions of the Gospels which are so persistently objected to? We find that they are, to say all in a word, those in which Jesus appears as a Divine Being whether in virtue of what He says or in virtue of what He does. And the reason why exception is taken to these passages may be stated thus: The Gospels are, all together, the work of worshippers of Jesus, and their contents have been handed down through the channel of tradition in like manner by His worshippers; the portions to which exception is taken are open to the suspicion that they are the outcome of these feelings of devotion, and not purely objective renderings of the facts as they actually occurred. But how, let us ask, if the Gospels also contain portions which are absolutely free from any suspicion whatever of this sort? So far as the difficulty just referred to is concerned, these at least may be historical. May be; yet it is also possible that they may not be; plainly, in fact, they cannot be if the person of Jesus is altogether unhistorical. For example: moral precepts which in themselves might justify no suspicion against the historical character of the person to whom they are attributed, could yet very easily be put into the mouth of a purely invented and in no sense historical Jesus.

"Thus we find ourselves still left in the unfavorable position already indicated—unless peradventure, we should be able to find in the Gospels some passages which far from being equally appropriate alike to an invented and to a historical Jesus, should be wholly impossible in the former case. If Jesus is an imaginary person, the things which are, without historical foundation, ascribed to Him are entirely due to the reverence in which He was held. If, accordingly, we find in the Gospels any passages

³¹ Pp. ix. ff.

which cannot by any possibility have found their inspiration in the worshipful regard in which He was held, and which in fact are, on the contrary, incompatible with it, they in themselves prove that the Gospels contain at least something that has been rightly handed down; for if these passages had not been handed down to the Evangelists and those who preceded them, in a manner that made doubt impossible, they would never have found admission into our Gospels at all.

"Such was the underlying thought when in the *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, § 131, 139 f, I characterized nine passages in the Synoptical Gospels as 'the foundation-pillars for a truly scientific life of Jesus.' I limited myself to so small a number because I desired to include no instance against the evidential value of which any objection could possibly be taken with some hope of success; and further, I, of set purpose, selected only those passages in which it is possible to show from the text of the Gospels themselves that they are incompatible with the worship in which Jesus came to be held. Thus they are, all of them, found only in one Gospel, or at most two; the second and third, or the third, either omits the passage in question, although by universal consent, the author who omits must have known at least one of the Gospels in which it occurs, or the source from which it was drawn; or alternatively, he turns it round, often with great ingenuity and boldness, in such a manner that it loses the element which makes it open to exception from the point of view of a worshipper of Jesus."

What is most insisted upon in this statement is that there are sought (and found) in Schmiedel's "pillar-passages" not merely affirmations which are appropriate to a human Jesus, but affirmations which are impossible for a Divine Jesus. Their characteristic is, as Schmiedel expresses it on a later page,⁸² that "they are not consistent with the worship in which Jesus had come to be held;" that they "are appropriate only to a man, and could never, by any possibility, have been written had the author been thinking of a demi-god." There are in the Synoptic Gospels, as Schmiedel explains,⁸³ three classes of "sayings of Jesus (or, to speak more correctly, passages in the Synoptics about Jesus):" "first, those which are plainly incredible; secondly, those which are plainly credible; and in the third category those which occupy an intermediate

⁸² P. xvii.

⁸³ P. xiv.

position as bearing on the face of them no certain mark either of incredibility or of credibility." This is Schmiedel's way of saying that there are some passages which clearly ascribe a supernatural character to Jesus; some which are clearly inconsistent with a supernatural character in Him; and still some others which do not raise the question of His supernatural character at all. This third class of passages Schmiedel is perfectly willing to accept as transmitting a true tradition: he actually does so accept them. But not on their own credit, but only on the faith of the small class of passages—his "pillar-passages"—which assure him of the actual existence of a merely human Jesus to whom, then, it is natural to ascribe these "indifferent" passages also. For, as he says in his primary statement,⁸⁴ and repeats here:⁸⁵ "If we discover any such points—even if only a few—they guarantee not only their own contents but also much more. For in that case one may also hold as credible all that agrees in character with these, and is in other respects not open to suspicion." The fundamental characteristic of the "pillar-passages," without which they would not be "pillar-passages", is, therefore, that they are absolutely irreconcilable with a supernatural Jesus.

The statement in the lecture on *Jesus and Modern Criticism*⁸⁶ is made from the same standpoint as that in the Preface to Neumann's *Jesus* and adds very little to it. We are told that "it is of little use merely to say in a vague and general way that the figure of Jesus portrayed in the Gospels could not possibly have been invented." What is of importance is that we should recognize that "the Gospels, though they seem to be very much exposed to doubt, actually contain in themselves the best means of overcoming it."

"All that we require to do is to limit the statement that their contents could not have been invented, which in its vague and general form possesses no evidential value, to specific passages in which it is not open to question. I select nine such passages,

⁸⁴ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1872, § 131.

⁸⁵ Neumann, p. xiii.

⁸⁶ Pp. 15 ff.

and, in order to emphasize their importance, give them a special name; I call them the *foundation-pillars of a really scientific life of Jesus*.

"Now the important point is that they are chosen on the same principles which guide every critical historian in extra-theological fields. When we make our first acquaintance with a historical person in a book which is throughout influenced by a feeling of worship for its hero, as the Gospels are by a feeling of worship for Jesus, in the first rank for credibility we place those passages of the book which really run counter to this feeling; for we realize that the writer's sentiments being what they were, such passages cannot have been invented by the author of the book; nor would they have been taken from the records at his service if their absolute truthfulness had not forced itself upon him. In the case of the Evangelists, moreover, we are so fortunate as to be able to note how a record of this kind which runs counter to the author's feeling of worship for Jesus is often incorporated by one or by two of them, while the other has omitted it or has altered it with the clear intention of emphasizing Jesus' higher rank. I have included among my foundation-pillars only such passages as have been passed over or altered by at least one of the three Evangelists. Of course, in the case of almost every one of these, it has already been said once, perhaps often, that it could not be the product of an inventive mind. What scholars had previously neglected to do was to make these passages the starting point for the critical treatment of the life of Jesus. . . .

"What then have I gained in these nine foundation-pillars? You will perhaps say, 'Very little.' I reply, 'I have gained just enough.' . . . In a word, I know, on the one hand, that his person cannot be referred to the region of myth; on the other hand, that he was man in the full sense of the term, and that, without of course denying that the divine character was in him, this could be found only in the shape in which it could be found in any human being.

"I think, therefore, that if we knew no more, we should know by no means little about him. But, as a matter of fact, the 'foundation-pillars' are but the starting-point of our study of the life of Jesus. . . . We must, therefore, work upon the principle that, together with the 'foundation-pillars,' and as a result of them, everything in the first three Gospels deserves belief which would tend to establish Jesus' greatness, provided that it harmonizes with the picture produced by the 'foundation-pillars,' and in other respects does not raise suspicion."

Certainly, with four such extended expositions of his method, it would be difficult seriously to misapprehend Schmiedel's essential meaning. Nevertheless some difficulty

has apparently been experienced in grasping at once what we may call the principle of direct contradiction which forms its core. Even Otto Schmiedel, for example, seems to lose hold of it,—although, no doubt he does not profess to do more than to follow his brother's scheme "in its essentials." His version of it runs as follows:⁵⁷

"The criticism of the sources has brought us thus far. I will now make a further attempt, from general considerations which are independent of the search for sources, to find certain points of support to give the necessary certainty to the portrait of the life of Jesus which we are seeking to sketch. We have recognized it as an essential characteristic of the presentations of the lives of the founders of religions and redemptive personalities, that they glorify, and indeed deify these personalities. The more this tendency increases the more does the account lose its historical character and become legendary. Let us turn the matter around. If we find in the Gospels passages which declare of Jesus something in contradiction to this tendency to glorification, which, however, have been altered or omitted by *later* Gospels, because they take offence at these human things, at this lack of glorification, then we may with assurance infer from this that these passages which do not glorify Jesus are *old* and *authentic*."

He then adduces five examples of such passages, intimating in passing that many more might be produced, and declares of them in the mass that they form the skeleton of what is incontestable and thus provide a solid basis for the Life of Jesus. Three of his five passages, he takes over from P. W. Schmiedel. The two that are added can scarcely be said to preserve perfectly the characteristic feature claimed for the "pillar-passages,"—express contradiction of the deity ascribed to Jesus in the historical tradition. They are expounded by Otto Schmiedel thus:

"In the oldest Gospel, Mark, it is continually emphasized that Jesus forbade His disciples to make His deeds of healing known. In the later Gospels this trait retires, and indeed the number and importance of the deeds of healing steadily increases. This last serves for glorification. *Therefore* the representation of Mark, Jesus' horror of being trumpeted as a miracle-worker, is all the more certainly historical."

"The older Gospels relate, with assignment of reasons, that Jesus was betrayed by Judas Iscariot. Luke and John seek

⁵⁷ *Die Hauptprobleme der Leben-Jesu Forschung.* 1906 pp. 46 ff.

all kinds of explanations for this, while the enemies of Christianity mock at the betrayal of the Master by one of His own disciples: all the more certain is it that the betrayal was not invented by Jesus' adherents, but is old and historical."

It does not appear why a divine, no less than a human Jesus, might not, for reasons of His own, forbid His cures to be heralded abroad; or why a divine, no less than a human Jesus, might not be betrayed by one of His own disciples. The stress which P. W. Schmiedel lays on the contradiction to the deity of Jesus in his "pillar-passages," Otto Schmiedel lays rather on modifications by later Gospels of statements in the earlier which struck the Christian feeling of the time as making too little for the glory of Jesus. The alteration or omission of the statements of his "pillar-passages" by one or another of the Gospels had been appealed to by P. W. Schmiedel only as a secondary consideration; it bears the character of a verification of the asserted offensiveness of these passages to the Christian feeling of the day. The hinge of his argument turns on the intrinsic inconsistency of these statements with the deification of Jesus. He infers immediately from this their "uninventibility" by the authors of the Gospels and of the tradition which the Gospels represent, and their consequent originality. The hinge of Otto Schmiedel's argument, on the other hand, turns on the modifications which these statements have suffered at the hands of later Evangelists. From these he infers the relative originality of the simpler statement, and by further consequence the unpretentiousness of Jesus' self-manifestation. The movement of thought in the two cases is not only different but directly opposite. This is particularly apparent in the diverse treatment given by the two writers to "the pillar-passages" which are adduced by both. On Mark vi. 5f P. W. Schmiedel writes:⁸⁸

"When He appeared in His native city of Nazareth He was sneered at as one of whom it was known whose son and brother He was and was made to feel that a prophet finds no honor in His own country. Now in Mark (vi. 5f) we read further:

⁸⁸*Das vierte Evangelium*, etc., pp. 31-32.

'And He could not do any mighty work there, except that He healed a few sick folk by laying His hands upon them; and He marveled at their unbelief.' He could not. This is another narrative like that of the sign of Jonah; it most certainly would not be found in our Gospels if it had not been handed down by someone who had himself witnessed the occurrences and then been repeated unaltered. How unacceptable it must have been to the later narrators, all of whom, Mark not excepted, were convinced of Jesus' power to work miracles, is shown by Matthew, who (xiii. 5 f) reports it thus: 'And He *did* there not many mighty works, because of their unbelief.'

In Otto Schmiedel's hands, we find, on the contrary, this essentially different representation (we do not stop to point out the misreport of what Mark says, or even the remarkable illation):³⁹

In Mk. vi. 5 there stands: In Nazareth Jesus *could* work no miraculous cures because of the lack of faith in His fellow-townsmen. In Mt. xiii. 58: 'He did there *not many* miracles.' It is, therefore, historically certain His healing work was *dependent* psychologically on the *trust* of those who sought the healing."

Of Mk. xiii. 32, P. W. Schmiedel, contrasting it with John's ascription of omniscience to Jesus, writes:⁴⁰

"In the Synoptics we find His express declaration (Mk. xiii. 32) that 'of that day,' that is to say that on which He was to return from heaven in order to establish the kingdom of God on earth, 'or of that hour, knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, nor yet the Son, but the Father only;' another one of the statements which certainly no one of His worshippers invented. Luke leaves it out altogether; Matthew (according to the probably original text) at least the decisive words 'nor yet the Son.'"

What we find in Otto Schmiedel is:

"Mk. xiii. 32 says: Time and hour *when* the Son of Man returns on the clouds of heaven knoweth no one, *not even the Son*. Mt. xxiv. 36 leaves out 'not even the Son' as offensive to him. Therefore these words are *genuine*. Jesus claims for Himself therefore *no* knowledge of the future."

In the treatment of the remaining passage adduced by them both a more primary place seems to be given by P. W. Schmiedel to the forms in which it appears in the several Gospels. This, however, is an illusion, and is due largely

³⁹ P. 47.

⁴⁰ *Das vierte Evangelium*, etc., p. 22.

to the circumstance that his primary discussion of it happens to be introduced at that point in his argument where he is preoccupied with the relations of the Gospels to one another.⁴¹ As in the other cases we quote what he says about it in his booklet on John's Gospel:⁴²

"And equally unacceptable to the Evangelist would be the record in Mk. (x. 17 f) and Lk. that Jesus, to the address of a rich man, 'Good Master, what must I do to obtain eternal life?' replied: 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good except God alone.' And yet beyond question, this reply came from Jesus' lips. How little it could have been invented by anyone of His worshippers, who drive the pen in the Gospels, Matthew shows. With him (xix. 16 f), the rich man says, 'Master, what good thing must I do in order to have eternal life? And Jesus answers, 'Why askest thou me concerning the good? There is One that is good.' How does Jesus come here to the six last words? Should He not, since He was asked concerning the good, proceed: 'There is *one thing* that is good'? And that would be the only suitable reply not only because of what had preceded, but also because of what follows; for Jesus says further, 'If, however, thou wouldst enter into life, keep the commandments.' Accordingly, in Jesus' opinion, the good concerning which He was asked consists in keeping the commandments. How did Matthew come to the words, 'There is One that is good'? Only by having before him, as he wrote, the language of Mark. Here we have our finger on the way in which Matthew, with conscious purpose, altered this language in its opening words, so that it should no longer be offensive, and on the way in which, at the end, he has left a few words of it unaltered, which betray to us the manner in which the thing has been done."

Here also Otto Schmiedel's whole case is summed up in the relations of the Synoptical reports:

"Here also belongs the passage which has been mentioned in another connection,^a where Jesus, in Mk. x. 18, said to the rich young man, 'Why callest thou me good. No one is good except God.' Jesus denies, therefore, His absolute sinlessness. Mat. xix. 17 seeks to efface this."

^a *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1847 (b).

^b P. 19.

^c Cf. p. 27: "In Mk. x. 18 Jesus says to the rich young man, 'Why callest thou me good? No one is good except God.' To Matthew (xix. 17) this statement seemed to put the sinlessness of Jesus in danger, and so he changed it to, 'Why askest thou me concerning the good (neuter)?' Now, however, the following, 'No one is good,' etc., naturally no longer fits on."

The same imperfect grasp upon the exact point of the "pillar-passages" which deflects Otto Schmiedel's treatment of them, has affected also the use made of them by Schmiedel's pupil, Arno Neumann. Neumann does, indeed, quite purely reproduce Schmiedel's point of view in his general statement. After having likened the attempt to get at the true tradition of Jesus' life, to working through a series of geological strata, he raises the question whether this does not "make the whole foundation of our knowledge of Jesus precarious, and open a door to all kinds of arbitrary conjecture." He then proceeds:⁴⁴

"It would do so if we did not come upon such elements in the tradition as the worshippers of Jesus would never have preserved unless they had been handed down as facts in the story of Jesus' life, or if we were no longer able to show from the parallel accounts how worship has constantly changed the old data handed down by traditions and adapted them to its own wishes. But we do find sayings and incidents of this description in one or other of the Gospels, be they few or many, and, this being so, we are entitled to draw from them general inferences as to what is credible in the life and work of Jesus. For it is impossible (here every historian will agree) for one who worships a hero to think and speak in such a way as to contradict or essentially modify his own worship."⁴⁵ Statements which do this can be nothing more or less than survivals of the truth, precious fragments which have been covered and well-nigh hidden for ever by the deposits of later times. For this reason a scholar of our own time, Dr. Schmiedel, has called these portions of the tradition, 'foundation-pillars of the life of Jesus.' The existence of such statements is the salvation of the Synoptic Gospels, giving them a definite value of sources."⁴⁶ The Gospels cannot be pure sagas or legends when material so intractable is enshrined in them."

Perhaps a certain imperfection in Neumann's appreciation of the stringency of the presumed effect of the "pillar-passages" is already betrayed by the admission of an alternative expression into the phrase declaring it impossible

⁴⁴ *Jesus*, pp. 9 ff.

⁴⁵ More literally: "For every historian will pronounce it impossible that one who reverences" (or "worships") "a hero should invent or assert things which contradict his own reverence" (or "worship"), "or modify it fundamentally."

⁴⁶ More literally: "By their presence a certain source-value is preserved to the Synoptic Gospels."

for a worshipping writer to invent or assert anything not merely which contradicts but also which "essentially modifies" his own worship. We perceive clearly his defection from this stringency, however, only when we scan his illustrative passages.. He adduces eight of these, two of Schmiedel's being omitted, and a new one added and indeed given the premier place in the list. The two omitted—Mk. viii. 14-21, and Mt. xi. 5—are both, in Schmiedel's view, "transformed parables" and the inclusion of them in the "pillar-passages" is in any case surprising, so that we need not wonder that Neumann omits them, although perfectly agreeing with Schmiedel that they are "transformed parables."⁴⁷ The passage added is however, as little stringent as any could be. It is, "Lk. ii. 52 (*cf.* iv. 16), which says that Jesus grew in stature in a truly human way." "Had the writer been a worshipper of Jesus as a deity," Neumann comments, "he would have presented Him to us as full-grown,"—of which we have no other assurance, however, than this expression of opinion by Neumann himself, in opposition to the example of Matthew and Luke, both of whom were "worshippers of Jesus" and both of whom record the story of His infancy. But what most clearly shows us the imperfection of Neumann's grasp on the peculiarity of the "pillar-passages" is a remark he adjoins at the end of the list, in which he endeavors to make them do double duty. "All these passages," he tells us, "are of such a nature as neither the worship of Jesus in the growing church, nor yet the religious socialism of the masses, could ever have invented."⁴⁸ But why could not a "religious socialist" believe that Jesus grew up like any other boy? Or that Jesus refused to work "signs," or indeed that He could not work miracles; or that He did not

⁴⁷ See pp. 86, 76. Neumann calls attention on p. 11, note 1, to his passing them by here, apparently in order to avoid giving the impression that he is correcting Schmiedel.

⁴⁸ The German is perhaps a little more lucid: "The list of passages which the common reverence of the growing church, or for that matter the religious socialism of the masses could never have invented."

know all that the future had in store for Him or His followers? Or, indeed, that He was not absolutely without sin, or could be thought by His kinspeople to be out of His head, or could have felt Himself deserted by God in the end? Socialists in our own day seem to have no difficulty in believing such things. Neumann has obviously temporarily lost the exact point of view of the "pillar-passages," and consequently has confused the argument which is built upon them. We say he has "temporarily" lost their point of view; for he immediately recovers it and writes:

"They prove, it is true, that we have before us in Jesus originally a 'genuinely human figure.' Of 'deity' we can therefore speak in connection with Him only as it is possible within the limits of the human. . . ."

He was, no doubt, greatly human, and we must of course paint Him so; but

"We must now still add the critical limitation: so far as it readily (*müheles*) permits itself to be ranged within the iron limits of that knowledge derived from the 'foundation-pillars.'"

We know much more of Jesus than we can learn from the "pillar-passages"; but the Jesus we know cannot transcend the Jesus of these fundamental texts. They give us the absolute norm of what Jesus was.

The tendency of Schmiedel's followers to abate a little of the stringency of the idea of the "pillar-passages" means, of course, a tendency, more or less developed, to look at them broadly as passages which do not find their explanation in "the faith of the community" and may therefore very well be (or perhaps we may insist, are most probably, or even quite certainly) genuine traditions; rather than narrowly, as passages which, because they directly contradict the reverence for Jesus which forms the primary bias of the vehicles of the tradition, oral or written, that has preserved for us the memory of Jesus, must therefore necessarily preserve true traditions and give us not only our most reliable knowledge of Jesus but knowledge of Him which is absolutely trustworthy. And this change in point of view, as we cannot have failed to observe, is accompanied by an associated tendency to treat the appeal to such "pil-

lar-passages" not so much as a substitute for literary criticism—though this is the precise thing which commends the appeal to them to Schmiedel himself—as rather as a supplement to it, called in only after it has done its work, to enable us to take a step farther than it can lead us. These tendencies, in proportion as they are yielded to, are tantamount, of course, to desertion of all that is distinctive in Schmiedel's critical method and reversion to the common methods of "Liberal" criticism, which first employs literary criticism in order to ascertain what the oldest sources contain, and then calls in historical criticism,—operating on the single canon that we are to penetrate by its aid behind "the faith of the community"—that we may ascertain what, in that which is transmitted by the sources, is true. It will conduce to a better understanding, both of the general "Liberal" method and of the peculiarity of Schmiedel's method if we bring into view a tolerably full account of the "Liberal" method in one of its most consistent and yet genial recent exponents. We cannot do better for this purpose than turn to the exposition of it by W. Heitmüller, in his interesting article "Jesus Christ" in Schiele and Zscharnack's encyclopaedia, published under the title of *Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart*.⁴⁹ The circumstances that Heitmüller is writing for a general, educated and not merely a technically theological public, and that Schmiedel's criticism is apparently not wholly out of his thought, only add to the value of his exposition for our purposes.

At the point at which we enter his discussion he is engaged in searching out the trustworthy sources of knowledge of Jesus. He has just outlined the processes by which the evangelical documents are tested. It has been a long and difficult task to penetrate by this criticism to their Sources, and when we have reached these Sources our labors are far from being at an end. Mark and the Discourse-Source are after all not the *ultimate* Sources. The *ultimate* Sources are "the separate narratives and separate declarations or

⁴⁹ Vol. iii. 1912, pp. 356 ff.

discourses of Jesus to be obtained from these and from the peculiar portions of Matthew and Luke, by the help of critical labor." And then, when we have got these well before us, we have to raise the question whether they give us "immediately historical, utilizable, trustworthy material." "Is the portrait of Jesus,—no, are the separate features of this portrait which look out upon us from these separate fragments—really genuine features"?⁵⁰ From the Discourse-Source and Mark (which with Heitmüller is the Narrative-Source), on to John we have found everything in a flux. What was there previous to the Discourse-Source and Mark? Were not the same forces which modified the transmission subsequently already at work before these Sources arose? The question requires only to be put for the answer to come clearly back to us.

"These narratives and declarations were taken from the oral tradition of the Christian community and written down about 60 or 70 A.D.; thus they had lived for thirty or forty years in the oral tradition, they were handed on from mouth to mouth, from hand to hand, through how many hands! What lived on further and was preserved was necessarily conditioned in its very substance by the nature and the need of the community. Accordingly, we must suppose it at least possible that these separate materials, as they are accessible to us in Mark, say, have been influenced by the faith of the community and those other entities. That means, however, that the ultimate direct Sources which can be reached by us, the separate declarations and narratives, do not, when taken strictly, carry us beyond the portrait of the Christ of the Palestinian community of about 50-70 A.D. To turn aside here from everything else for the sake of brevity, we need only to realize that the community which transmitted orally knowledge of Jesus, stood under the influence of belief in the resurrection of Jesus; how this belief must already have steeped even good reminiscences in an alien, new light! Nay, must we not assume that even for the immediate disciples recollection was disturbed in many points by the influence of the Easter experience and the faith which attaches itself to it? And in point of fact a more careful scrutiny shows that even in this oldest obtainable memorial, of separate declarations and separate narratives, legendary traits are present, that the belief and usage of the community have already exerted their moulding and forming power and activity."⁵¹

⁵⁰ P. 356.

⁵¹ Pp. 356-7.

It is in this circumstance that the difficulty of research into the life of Jesus lies. "The starting-point of all further investigation is recognition that the ultimate Direct-Sources carry us only to the portrait of Jesus of the primitive community of about 60 A.D."⁵² The question is whether we have any means—any possibility—of getting behind the portrait of Jesus of the community to the actual reality. Some are utterly sceptical of doing so. But this extreme scepticism is unreasonable. It is not difficult to show that the portrait of Christ current in the community of 60 A.D. is not a simply imaginary one.

"That in spite of legendary, mythological elements, in spite of the repainting by the faith of the community, which must be admitted, in this Evangelical representation, there are historical elements in the ultimate sources of which we have spoken, will, in accordance with universally recognized principles, have to be allowed to be certain if *constituents* are found in them which are not reconcilable (*vereinbar*) with the faith of the community to which the whole portrait belongs. What does not stand in harmony with it can certainly not owe its origin to it. Not a few constituents, now, of this kind are found. They not seldom betray themselves as contradictory to the faith of the community by this—that they are omitted or altered by the later narrators. Let us indicate some of them."⁵³ In Mk. x. 17 ff. Jesus repudiates the address of 'Good Master' with the words, 'Why callest thou me good? None is good but God only.' The community looked upon its Lord as sinless; this account is not then the product of their belief. How little the declaration of Jesus pleased the community is shown by its alteration by the later Mt. xix. 16 ff, which formulates the question of the young man thus: 'Master, what good thing must I do?' and makes Jesus answer: 'Wherefore askest thou me concerning the good? Only One is good.' . . . The Gethsemane scene, Mk. xiv. 32-42 which shows Jesus in deep dis-

⁵² P. 357.

⁵³ It will be observed that of the six passages here adduced by Heitmüller, two are common to him and Schmiedel (Mk. x. 17; iii. 21), and a third is of the same character (Mk. ix. 22-32, and is, of course, looked upon by Schmiedel in the same light as the others (see *Das vierte Evangelium*, etc., p. 20); a fourth, the Parable of the Lost Son (Lk. xv. 11 ff) although belonging to another category is, of course, also accepted as genuine by Schmiedel with the same heartiness as by Heitmüller (*Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1841, 3); while the two remaining ones concern the sensitivity of the early community for the honor of the Apostles, not of Jesus.

tress, could never have been invented by the believing community; it glorified Him precisely as one who went of His own will to His death. Luke softens down the account; John omits it. The story of Mk. iii. 21, according to which His own people say of Jesus, 'He is beside Himself,' cannot be understood as an invention of the faith which glorified Jesus: Matthew and Luke pass the story by. The community saw in Peter its chief Apostle: it cannot have invented his shameful denial. The community glorified the disciples: the story of their cowardly flight (Mk. xiv. 58) when Jesus went to His death, was certainly not the product of their fancy: Luke and John suppress this also. It was early the belief of the community (1 Cor. xv. 1 ff) that Jesus died for the sins of men. And yet in the old tradition there are very few declarations in which this belief has found any sort of expression (Mk. x. 45; ix. 24); but there has been preserved on the other hand a parable (Lk. xv. 11 ff), that of the Lost Son, which is utterly irreconcilable with this dominant idea.⁶⁴ These and other observations suffice to prove with compelling convincingness that in the community's portrait of Jesus, about 50-70 A.D., there are in any case contained and are recognizable some indubitably genuine original traits. This fact, now, is adapted to strengthen confidence in the tradition in

⁶⁴ We may ask in passing what ground on Heitmüller's principles there is for assigning Lk. xv. 11 ff to the oldest tradition, seeing that it occurs neither in Mk. nor in the Discourse-Source. Heitmüller's account of the parables (p. 361) is: "With respect to the apothegms and parables the principle that that will pass for genuine which seems individual, striking and original, will not be wholly rejected, but as a principle which is not decisive, will be applied only with the greatest caution." Cf. Schmiedel, *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1841. From our own point of view, there is of course no reason why the matter peculiar to Luke should not be of as indisputable originality as that which is common to him with Matthew or with Matthew and Mark. Cf. Schmiedel, *ibid.*, col. 1868; and especially Weinel, *ZThK*, 1910, i. p. 24: "Finally Wellhausen has ventured on the proposition: 'The presupposition is self-evident that we must recognize in the peculiar matter which is found in one of the Evangelists, the latest literary stratum' (*Einleitung*, etc., p. 73). That is true—provided only, precisely in Wellhausen, it does not mean more than it says, provided only there is not continually connected with it an attempt to assign to these passages a lower rank not only literarily but also *historically*, that is to say with reference to their value as sources. It is however, wholly false to hold a narrative better attested for this reason—that three Evangelists (that means, however, Mark, which the others follow) or that two (that means, however, the Discourse-Source) report it—than if only one (that means another tradition) reports it. That a tradition has been written down say ten years after Mark does not weight it with a presupposition against it."

general. For if, as we see here, the community has transmitted declarations and narratives which contradict its own conception, it follows that this community has shown respect for the tradition, and in any case has not set itself simply to suppress what was unpleasant to it. And now, there force themselves on the attentive eye other observations also which operate greatly to strengthen confidence in the oldest tradition."⁵⁶

Heitmüller then proceeds to adduce the Aramaic coloring of the basis of both Mark and the Discourse-Source, their particularity in intimate details, the general tone of the Discourse-Source, the cultivated memories of the men of the day, as conducing to the conclusion that there is much gold mingled with the dross in the tradition.⁵⁶ The question is how the gold is to be extracted. And the answer is that first, by literary criticism, the oldest attainable form of each narrative or declaration is to be established, and then historical criticism is to be called in. At the foundation is to be laid "the material which runs counter to the belief, the theology, the customs, the cultus of the primitive community, or which at least does not completely correspond with it." "We may have," he declares, "unconditional confidence in such material." We may admit, along with this, much that stands in close relation with it, and yet is in harmony with the belief of the community. On the other hand, we must pronounce ungenueine everything which "all too plainly corresponds with the belief, the cultus, and the dogmatic and apologetical needs of the community, or can be explained only from them." Our scrupulosity must be particularly active "against everything that lay especially at the heart of the oldest Christianity"—such as belief in Jesus' messiahship, His approaching return, the whole domain of so-called eschatology, His passion and resurrection, His miraculous power. In this careful and laborious fashion it will be possible to penetrate behind the community's portrait of Christ at about 60 A.D. and approach the truth about Jesus.

The critical methods of Schmiedel and Heitmüller are

⁵⁶ Pp. 359 ff.

⁵⁷ P. 361.

fundamentally the same; and yet they differ at cardinal points. Heitmüller, as well as Schmiedel, acknowledges the failure of literary criticism to reach a stratum of tradition in which Jesus is other than the divine figure which the Evangelists paint Him; and like Schmiedel he calls in historical criticism to recover some trustworthy traces of a merely human Jesus. He applies this historical criticism, however, only to the Sources which literary criticism has unearthed, and therefore finds his "pillar-passages" not, as Schmiedel does, in any of the Synoptic Gospels indifferently, but all in Mark, which is to him the Narrative-Source.⁵⁷ The principle of his "pillar-passages" is not as with Schmiedel (or at least not so openly) narrowly that they directly contradict the deifying conception of Jesus which dominated the transmitters of the tradition, but more broadly that they contradict, or at least do not find their explanation in the general point of view of the early Christian community, they do not reflect "interests" of that community. Accordingly the evidential value of these "pillar-passages" as witnesses to the real Jesus is hardly as great with Heitmüller as with Schmiedel. With Heitmüller they form no doubt as with Schmiedel the nucleus of "all sound historical knowledge of Jesus," but they scarcely come with the demonstrative force which they take on in Schmiedel's hands, placing beyond all possibility of question both the actual existence and the purely human character of Jesus. From the "pillar-passages" both work outwards to the same general results with respect both to the compass of the transmitted material which may be utilized in forming our picture of Jesus and His life and work; and with respect to the actual portrait of Jesus which is derived from this material as the genuine Jesus of history. The principle of the construction of the real Jesus of history in both writers alike is that of contradiction to the whole mass of the testimony concerning Him, which is set aside on no other ground than that it is possible to find here and there

⁵⁷ For exceptions, see above note 54.

imbedded in it a statement which seems to these writers not perfectly consistent with its general drift. As to the legitimacy of this procedure, particularly when the mass and weight of the testimony is considered, and the number and character of the contradictory passages, we for the moment leave the reader to judge for himself.

Although Schmiedel's critical method has been before the public since 1901, and very fully since 1906, it has as yet been subjected to very little formal criticism. This has been due partly, no doubt, to a feeling that it is only a modification—and that not a very important modification—of the ordinary critical procedure in general use among "Liberal" theologians, and partly to a greater or less failure to apprehend precisely the nature of the modification in the ordinary "Liberal" procedure which it proposes. Perhaps also account should be taken of the circumstance that no separate work has been devoted by Schmiedel himself to the exposition of his proposals, but they have been presented only incidentally in works whose chief concernment lies elsewhere. In reviews of these publications there has been, of course, some expression of opinion upon this portion of their contents also, more or less fully supported by reasoning. Only here and there, however, has there been any extended discussion of the new critical method in its details, except indeed at the hands of the extreme radicals, who deny the very existence of Jesus.⁵⁸ It is part of Schmiedel's contention, it will be remembered, that his

⁵⁸ E.g. John M. Robertson, *Pagan Christs*, 1903, pp. 227-238; Friedrich Steudel, *Im Kampf um die Christusmythe*, 1910, pp. 88-110; William Benjamin Smith, *Ecce Deus: die urchristliche Lehre des reingöttlichen Jesus*, 1911, pp. 104-224 (E. T. under same title, 1912); Arthur Drews, *Die Zeugnisse für die Geschichtlichkeit Jesu*, 1911, pp. 212-225 (E. T. *The Witnesses to the Historicity of Jesus*, 1912, pp. 144-156). With these writers, no doubt, Eduard Hertlein *Protestantische Monatshefte*, x. (1906), pp. 390 ff may be classed for the essence of the matter without danger of great injustice. Cf. also F. Ziller, *Die moderne Bibelwissenschaft und die Krisis der evangelischen Kirche*, 1910, pp. 117-118. Schmiedel replies elaborately to Robertson in his preface to Neumann's *Jesus*, and to Hertlein in the next number of the *Protestantische Monatshefte*.

method supplies a short and easy demonstration of the actual existence of Jesus. This side of his contention has attracted the attention and drawn the fire of those writers who are engaged in an attempt to persuade the public that the whole figure of Jesus is mythical. Little of value in the way of general criticism of Schmiedel's method could be expected from this quarter; and in point of fact these writers usually lose themselves quickly in discussions of the exegesis of the passages adduced by Schmiedel as "pillar-passages," ordinarily in an effort to vacate their literal sense and to impose on them a purely symbolical significance, which would make them part and parcel of the myth of Jesus, the pure product of the invention of His votaries.

"There are no passages in the Gospels," declares W. B. Smith,⁸⁰ "which testify to a pure humanity for Jesus. It is of course set forth how He teaches, journeys from place to place, how even He sleeps and (in a very transparent parable) hungers, how he works miracles, is arrested, imprisoned, tried, condemned, executed, buried and rises again. But all this is intended only figuratively; it is only the linen cloth that is thrown around the divine form of the 'new doctrine'; it is only the historical projection of a system of religious ideas. The profound thinkers who invented these parables and symbols were fully conscious of their real inward meaning, as were also those who first heard them, and repeated and recorded them."

Nevertheless the broader question is not wholly left to one side, nor are there lacking in the remarks devoted to it criticisms which, if they do not quite go to the root of the matter, yet have real validity as against Schmiedel's modes of presenting his argument. It is common to all of these writers, for example, to point out that this argument proves too much; that, if it were valid, there are few characters of fiction, professed or mythical, which we should not have to recognize as having really existed. Thus, Friedrich Steudel urges:⁸⁰

"There is a fatal flaw involved in the whole of the demonstration which Schmiedel essays. It is, no doubt, true that when a historian portrays a personality the historicity of which is *oth-*

⁸⁰ *Ecce Deus*, p. 199.

⁸¹ P. 98.

otherwise established, most credit will be given to those accounts which stand in a certain contradiction to the characterization which is intended to be given of him in general. But it could never be erected into a universally valid method, to conclude solely from the presence of such traits in a tradition to the historicity of a personality depicted in it. For in that case, to speak plainly, even a Zeus to whom his worshippers have imputed all sorts of vicious, human—only too human—traits must be a historical personality because it cannot be otherwise understood how his worshippers could have ascribed to him such human traits. Indeed any contradictory trait which a critic discovers in the characters of a dramatic poem must, according to the requirements of Schmiedel's method, bring him to the view that the poet cannot have been inventing here but must have had a historical model. Or, to make the application to our own case,—if the historicity of Jesus,—which, however, is just the thing that stands in question—*did not stand in question*, then it could be said that when the writer who deifies Him, nevertheless adduces human traits, there the historical element lies most certainly before us; but historicity can and may never be concluded merely from the fact of apparent contradictions within a portrait which on other grounds has become questionable, especially when, as in the case in hand, these contradictions find their simplest and most natural explanation in the dogmatic and literary peculiarity of the sources."⁶¹

Following out the same line of remark, John M. Robertson⁶² directs us to Grote's famous chapter on Greek myths, and cites from it a series of apt sentences in which Grote argues that no trustworthy historical facts can be extracted from such mythical stories. The passage aduced runs in its entirety, as follows:⁶³

"The utmost which we accomplish by means of the semi-historical theory even in its most successful applications, is, that after leaving out from the mythical narrative all that is miraculous or high-colored or extravagant, we arrive at a series of credible incidents—incidents which *may, perhaps*, have occurred,

⁶¹ Similarly Arthur Drews (*Die Zeugnisse*, etc., p. 221; E. T. p. 152); "If the historicity of Jesus was *otherwise established*, then it would be justifiable to conclude from the presence of such traits to the historical tradition which the author could not evade." On this reasoning, he remarks, we could prove the historicity of Heracles from the presence in his legend of traits which accord very ill with the otherwise noble figure of this hero.

⁶² P. 230.

⁶³ George Grote, *History of Greece*, American reprint of the second London ed., 1856, i., p. 429 (Robertson cites London, 1888, i., p. 382).

and against which no intrinsic presumption can be raised. This is exactly the character of a well-written modern novel (as, for example, several among the compositions of Defoe), the whole story of which is such as may well have occurred in real life; it is plausible fiction and nothing beyond. To raise plausible fiction up to the superior dignity of truth, some positive testimony or positive ground of inference must be shown; even the highest measure of intrinsic probability is not alone sufficient. A man who tells us that, on the day of the battle of Plataea, rain fell on the spot of ground where the city of New York now stands, will neither deserve nor obtain credit, because he can have had no means of positive knowledge; though the statement is not in the slightest degree improbable. On the other hand, statements in themselves very improbable may well deserve belief, provided they be supported by sufficient positive evidence; thus the canal dug by order of Xerxes across the promontory of Mount Athos, and the sailing of the Persian fleet through it, is a fact which I believe, because it is well attested—notwithstanding its remarkable improbability, which so far misled Juvenal as to induce him to single out the narrative as a glaring example of Grecian mendacity."

The hinge of Grote's position, it will be seen, turns on the distinction between the possible and the actual, the credible and the certified. We may purge a narrative of impossibilities and not make a single step towards authenticating it. "The narrative ceases to be incredible, but it still remains uncertified,—a mere commonplace possibility."⁶⁴ "By the aid of conjecture we get out of the impossible and arrive at matters intrinsically plausible, but totally uncertified; beyond this point we cannot penetrate without the light of extrinsic evidence, since there is no intrinsic mark to distinguish truth from plausible fiction."⁶⁵ In the absence of positive evidence of reality, no superior intrinsic credibility attaching to certain events above others in the same narrative can accredit them as real.

Schmiedel has fairly laid himself open to a rejoinder of this kind by his reprehensible dallying with the suggestion that Jesus may never have really existed. If Heinrich Weinel thinks it necessary to rebuke the levity of his Preface to W. B. Smith's *Der vorchristliche Jesus*,⁶⁶ what

⁶⁴ P. 431.

⁶⁵ P. 418.

⁶⁶ *Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild widerlegt?*, 1910, p. 13: "It was not,

shall we say of his repeated intimation in the exposition of his method of criticism, not merely that the real existence of Jesus is an open question, but even that it is a question which is all but closed, which apart from the "pillar-passages" would be closed, in an adverse sense? To say that "if passages of this kind were wholly wanting in them, it would be impossible to prove to a sceptic that any historical value whatever was to be assigned to the Gospels; he would be in a position to declare the picture of Jesus contained in them to be purely a work of phantasy and could remove the person of Jesus from the field of history;"⁶⁷ or even, as it is elsewhere perhaps not quite so strongly put,⁶⁸ that "if they were wholly wanting in them, it would be difficult to withstand the allegation that the Gospels *everywhere* give us only a sacred image painted on a gold ground, and we could therefore not at all know what kind of an appearance Jesus really made, if not indeed even whether He ever existed at all;"—is of course mere fustian: nobody knows better than Schmiedel that even were there no Gospels at all the actual existence of Jesus would be exceptionally attested and altogether beyond question. But the effect of permitting himself to give utterance to such inconsiderate assertions is to hand himself over bound hand and foot to his enemies. He has treated the whole tradition of Jesus as if it were pure myth, and has represented the task of the historian to be to seek out and isolate the kernel of fact which lies at the center of this myth. It is open to anyone to rejoin that this task is hopeless; that on this

however, a merely tactical blunder in Schmiedel, to write for the German translation of Smith a Preface in which he not only maintained that it is not easy to refute Smith, but further that Smith's learning is 'by no means at the disposal of every one who works after a strictly scientific fashion'; and in which he speaks of the 'art of his scientific method.' This is simply untruth. And Schmiedel only gets what he deserves, when, despite his protestation that he does not think anything in Smith's construction right, he is everywhere invoked as compurgator—after allowance for the 'theological arabesque.'"

⁶⁷ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1881.

⁶⁸ *Das vierte Evangelium*, etc., p. 17.

pathway we can reach only the plausible, not the attested, while it is only the attested that can claim to be the actual. It is ineffective to urge in rebuttal that the statements appealed to do not range with the merely "credible" elements which are selected out from the body of the myth by those whom Grote speaks of as advocates of "the semi-historical theory," but have the peculiarity that they could not have been invented by the framers of the myth, because they are inconsistent with its whole substance and must therefore have been carried over unchanged from the pre-mythical tradition. It is easy to rejoin (with W. B. Smith) that an impossibility is attempted here; that no limits can be set to the invention of man; and it is equally easy to point out (reverting to Grote) that what is here claimed as a peculiarity of the "pillar-passages" is a common phenomenon in all divine myths. In them all express inconsistencies abound and in the nature of the case must abound, since human invention is incompetent to the task of consistently dramatizing deity. Let a poet be of the highest genius and do his utmost to realize his picture of the divine actor he is depicting: "If he does not consistently succeed in it the reason is because consistency in such a matter is unattainable, since after all, the analogies of common humanity, the only materials with which the most creative imagination has to work upon, obtrude themselves involuntarily and the lineaments of the man are thus seen even under a dress which promises superhuman proportions."⁶⁹ And what the most supreme art must fail in—how can we attribute that to the blind working of the mythopoeic fancy? But above all it is pertinent to rejoin that thus the whole ground of the argument has been shifted. It was assumed that the entire story of Jesus is mythical, and it was represented that unless some kernel of truth could be found embedded in this myth the historicity of Jesus could scarcely be defended. It is now assumed that the story of Jesus is, rather, essentially history. We are in effect betrayed into

⁶⁹ *History of Greece*, i., p. 385.

a vicious circle of reasoning: and we assign an underlying reality to statements like those contained in the "pillar-passages" only because we have from the beginning assumed that a reality lay behind our so-called myth and our task was merely to ascertain its nature. If there exists indeed good reason, extraneous to the myth itself which we are investigating, to believe in the actual existence of the hero it celebrates, why undoubtedly *cadit quaestio*. "Grote," even Robertson tells us,⁷⁰ "never argued that history proper, the record of a time by those who lived in it, is to be so tried; and he constantly accepts narratives which might conceivably be plausible fictions,—nay, he occasionally accepts tales which appear to some of us to be fictions. It is when we are dealing with myths that he denies our power to discriminate; in history proper he undertakes—at times too confidently—to discriminate." We must really settle in our minds whether we are dealing with myth in which there may possibly be embedded some historical kernel, or with history which may possibly be encrusted with some mythical adornments, before we can profitably proceed with our criticism.

It is not worth our while to pause here to inquire into the justice of the extreme attitude taken up by Grote with reference to the possibility of extracting matters of fact from pure myths without the aid of extrinsic attestation.⁷¹ This,

⁷⁰ P. 232.

⁷¹ Grote himself tells us (pp. 408-9 note) that exception was already taken to the extremity of his views as well by an able article in *The Quarterly Review* for October, 1846 (what is meant is No. clv. pp. 113 ff) as by Professor Kortüm writing in the *Heidelberger Jahrbücher der Literatur* for 1846. The former contended that "the mythopoeic faculty of the human mind, though essentially loose and untrustworthy, is never creative, but requires some basis of fact to work upon;" the latter similarly that the myths always contain "real matter of fact along with mere conceptions." Grote responds that this may very well be; all that he asserts is that apart from extrinsic attestation we are without criteria for singling out the matters of fact. Robertson refers us to the criticism of Grote's position by Sir Alfred C. Lyall in his *Asiatic Studies*, First Series, ed. 2, 1884, p. 30 ff; see also Second Series, 1899, pp. 324 ff. The difference between Grote and Lyall seems to reduce actually to something like this: Whether

at the moment, not merely because of the absurdity of treating the tradition of Jesus as if it were pure myth. But because of the absurdity of the proposal to treat it as if it were pure myth coming from Schmiedel. For despite this implication of his suggestion Schmiedel does not really believe that the historicity of the Jesus whose figure is presented to us in the Gospel narratives is without sufficient attestation apart from the Gospels to render it indisputable. He may minimize the amount and force of this attestation, speaking, for example, of "the meagreness of the historical testimony regarding Him, whether in canonical writings outside the Gospels, or in profane writers, such as Josephus, Tacitus, Suetonius and Pliny."⁷² But this is only part of the attempt to give an external appearance of propriety to his dealing with the tradition of Jesus as if it were, if not pure myth, yet at least almost pure myth; and it does not in point of fact even so far fairly represent his own point of view. The plain fact is that Schmiedel comes to the Gospel narratives with the historicity of Jesus already immovably established on extrinsic grounds, and therefore cannot properly represent the historicity of Jesus as in any sense dependent on his power to separate out from those narratives on intrinsic grounds items of information about Jesus which cannot in the nature of the case be their invention. Whatever we may think of the validity of the argument that the presence of such statements in such a

myths are ordinarily a specific product of imagination and feeling distinct in kind from both history and philosophy (as Grote contends), or concretions gathered around a nucleus of fact (as Lyall contends). In the former case they are fundamentally fictions and plausibility in their contents is no evidence of reality. In the latter, they are fundamentally history, however bad history, and the kernel of fact in them may be sought and conceivably found. The difference is, however, only relative; and the real crux is, as Grote insists, Granted that there is a kernel of truth in myths, how are we going to get at it? The Quarterly Reviewer confesses: "We pretend to no key by which we can extract the history from the legend" (p. 119) and Sir Alfred C. Lyall suggests none.

⁷² *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1881, cf. Preface to Neumann, pp. vii., viii.; *Jesus in Modern Criticism*, p. 14.

narrative can be accounted for only by the imposition of them upon it by primitive tradition, so that they must be recognized as preserving fragments of historical truth, in the actual case before us this argument can possess only corroborative value with reference to the historicity of Jesus, and acquires primary importance only with reference to the character of the historical Jesus already given. It is nothing less than a reprehensible misrepresentation of the state of the case to endeavor to convey an impression that the recognition of the historicity of Jesus is in any sense dependent on this argument. In point of fact no one is more assured than Schmiedel that it is quite firmly established altogether apart from this argument.

Even when we have settled it well in our minds, however, that we have to do in the Gospel narratives, not with a myth in which we may hope to find, perhaps, some relics of tradition, but fundamentally with historical tradition, we have not yet escaped from misleading suggestions of the state of the case. Schmiedel is very eager to have it understood that the critical procedure he proposes is the common method of historians. "Every historical investigator," he tells us, therefore, in commending it to us,⁷³ "in what field soever he may be working, follows the principle of holding for true, in the first rank, in any account which testifies to reverence for its hero, that which runs counter to this reverence, since that cannot rest on invention." The broad generality of this representation is not, however, always retained. Sometimes the suggestion is rather that it is only when the historian "makes his first acquaintance with a historical person from a book which is pervaded by reverence for its hero as the Gospels are for Jesus," that "he places in the first rank of credibility those passages of the book which run counter to this reverence."⁷⁴ Sometimes indeed, as in the primary statement,⁷⁵ we are carried into an even narrower sphere, and actually read: "When a

⁷³ *Das vierte Evangelium*, pp. 16-17.

⁷⁴ *Jesus in Modern Criticism*, p. 16 (German edition. p. 6).

⁷⁵ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1872.

profane historian finds before him a historical document which testifies to the worship of a hero unknown to other sources, he attributes first and foremost importance to those features which cannot be deduced merely from the fact of this worship, and he does so on the simple and sufficient ground that they would not be found in this source unless the author had met with them as fixed data of tradition." It is amazing to read here farther: "The same fundamental ciple may safely be applied in the case of the Gospels, for they also are all of them written by worshippers of Jesus." We get further and further from the actual state of the case with the narratives of the Gospels, of course, as each of these limitations is added. Nobody first learns of Jesus from the Gospel narratives. To suggest that Jesus is "unknown to other sources" than the Synoptic Gospels, or that these Gospels may be treated as if they were a single document, fairly attains the absurd. If an analogy to the critical method which Schmiedel recommends us to apply to the Gospels can be found in the practice of "every historical investigator in the extra-theological field" only in such dissimilar cases as are here indicated,—why, then, there is no analogy. The appearance is very strong that Schmiedel, wishing to appeal to the example of secular historians in support of the critical method he is propounding, and finding among them no exact analogies, except in the very specific case which he alludes to, vacillates between simply claiming the example of secular historians in general, and assigning the case of the Gospel narratives to the obviously unsuitable category in which he finds in practice the closest analogy to his proposed critical method.

The question having thus been raised it may be interesting to inquire what established methods of research are in use among historians in general which may be thought to present analogies more or less close with the manner of dealing with the Gospel narratives proposed by Schmiedel. Anything like close analogies we shall, of course, find only among the methods which have been devised for as-

certaining what may be regarded as trustworthy in generally untrustworthy accounts, or, to put it baldly, for eliciting the truth from the accounts of partizan writers. The fundamental presupposition of Schmiedel's criticism—as indeed of the whole “Liberal” criticism—is that we have to do in the historical tradition of Jesus with intensely partizan reports. The entire tradition is the product, in Schmiedel's phrase, of “worshippers of Jesus,” and has consequently been cast in the moulds of their worship of Jesus; in the phrase of the common “Liberal” criticism it is the work of the primitive Christian community and reflects at every point the beliefs of that community. How, then, do the methodologists deal with bias? Ernst Bernheim describes the general procedure as follows:⁷⁶

“We must keep clearly in view with what particular circle an author has more or less personal relations, of what nation, of what station he is, whether he belongs to a particular political or confessional party, whether he is a one-sided patriot, whether he has had part in the determining of the events which he describes, whether he gives accounts of personal enemies or friends. In all these relations there can lie reasons, on the one side, for keeping silence as to, or smoothing over, what is obnoxious, for immoderately emphasizing and praising what is congenial; on the other side for ignoring what is meritorious and emphasizing what is obnoxious. The statements of a writer who is involved in such relations, cannot be taken as absolute matters of fact, without some testing, so far as they may be affected by these relations; and the old methodologists already emphasize strongly enough that a partizan writer deserves unqualified credit only when he relates what is good of his enemies, what is prejudicial of his friends, fellow-partizans, compatriots.”

Accordingly, a little later, speaking of the possibility of extracting trustworthy facts out of an untrustworthy narrative he writes:⁷⁷

“It is especially to be observed that there often meet us, in the midst of untrustworthy communications, statements which, precisely in these surroundings, we may hold to be unqualifiedly trustworthy: to wit, when an author who is governed by distinctly marked interests or tendencies, adduces facts, passes judgments, which stand in contradiction with his tendency, since he here

⁷⁶ *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*,² 1908, p. 509; cf. pp. 485-6, 492-3.

⁷⁷ P. 523.

involuntarily pays homage to the pure truth, and does not observe, or at least does not heed, the contradiction with his tendency,—as in the case of admissions of defeats, blunders, weaknesses of his own party, or on the other hand in the case of communication of victories, services, virtues of the enemy. The testimony of Lambert of Hersfeld, for example, must be taken as altogether trustworthy when, in involuntary recognition, he relates individual honorable traits of Henry IV, because Lambert is animated throughout by a strong enmity to the King. We can generalize this observation to the effect that statements in general, which have a content obnoxious for the communicator and his personal interests—obnoxious, that is to say, not according to our opinion, but in his own view—are thoroughly trustworthy; for, if it is already for most men difficult to communicate truths which are unfavorable to themselves and those associated with them, it runs entirely counter to human nature falsely to set itself in an unfavorable light."

To the important qualifying clause, "obnoxious, that is to say, not according to our opinions, but in his own sense," Bernheim attaches a note which tells us that Charles Seignobos, "has rightly emphasized this," in the *Introduction aux études historiques* which he published in collaboration with Langlois.⁷⁸ In the passage referred to, Seignobos is pointing out the kinds of statements which, occurring in historical documents, authenticate themselves. Thus, for instance, he tells us,⁷⁹ *bona fides* at least may be inferred when "the fact stated is manifestly prejudicial to the effect which the author wishes to produce." "In such a case," he remarks "there is a probability of good faith." But we must take good care to reach our judgments in such matters from the point of view of the writer, not our own. "It is quite possible that the author's notions of his interest or honour were very different from ours." We need not accredit good faith to Charles IX, for example, when he acknowledged that he was responsible for the massacre of St. Bartholomew's day; to us that would be to confess an infamy, to him it was a boast of glory. There are even cases, Seignobos proceeds to intimate, in which more than *bona fides*,—in which truth itself—may be inferred, viz.

⁷⁸ 1898, p. 158.

⁷⁹ *Introduction to the Study of History*, E. T., 1908, p. 186.

when "the fact was of such a nature, that it could not have been stated unless it were true."⁸⁰

"A man does not declare that he has seen something contrary to his expectations and habits of mind unless observation has compelled him to admit it. A fact which seems very improbable to the man who relates it has a good chance of being true. We have then to ask whether the fact stated was in contradiction to the author's opinions, whether it is a phenomenon of a kind unknown to him, an action or a custom which seems unintelligible to him; whether it is a saying whose import transcends his intelligence, such as the sayings of Christ reported in the Gospels, or the answers made by Joan of Arc to questions put to her in the course of her trial."

And then the caution is again added that in all such cases we must be very careful to judge according to the ideas of the author, not our own.

That the whole case may be before us we append an additional citation from another writer on general historical method. H. B. George remarks:⁸¹

"If a particular writer is our only authority for this or that matter, concerning which his sentiments are obvious, it is inevitable that we should feel a tinge of *prima facie* suspicion that the facts may not be fairly represented. Our belief in his statement will not be quite so confident as if there were separate and independent testimony in support of it, but we have no ground for carrying our mistrust further. In such a case, as continually when dealing with historical evidence, we must be content with something short of unhesitating conviction." "Internal criticism may indeed suggest that the author was a partizan, and in general knowledge that partizanship is liable to lead authors into misrepresenting facts may reasonably render us suspicious; but no merely internal indications could justify our totally disbelieving the author's specific statements on a matter concerning which, *ex hypothesi*, we have no evidence but his." "The most bigoted partizan may be giving a thoroughly true account of a transaction which is of special importance to the cause that he favors; the most credulous of writers may be telling a palpably true story, even if it sounds improbable."

The principles of procedure outlined in passages like these are in general those which Schmiedel wishes to invoke in his criticism of the Gospel narratives. We could almost conjecture that he wrote with the very words of

⁸⁰ P. 188.

⁸¹ *Historical Evidence*, 1909, pp. 84, 96, 95.

Bernheim in his mind. Nevertheless a different spirit breathes in them from that which animates his procedure. And in attempting to apply such principles to the criticism of the Gospel narratives, he has been misled into a number of violences in dealing with his material.

In the first place, there is the flagrant absurdity, of which something has already been said, of suggesting that the Synoptic Gospels may be treated as the sole source of our knowledge of Jesus. The evidence, not merely of the existence of Jesus, but of the manner of man he was, quite independent of the Synoptic Gospels, is altogether exceptional, as well in consistency and contemporaneousness, as in sheer amount. This evidence culminates, of course, in the testimony of Paul, though it is by no means confined to his testimony. Schmiedel, it is true, minifies the testimony of Paul; but he cannot deny it, much less can he evacuate it. It only betrays the exigencies of his position when he permits himself to speak regarding it in such studiously disparaging terms as these:⁸²

"If, as Dr. Neumann and the present writer believe, it is possible to show that the genuineness of these Epistles"—the major Epistles of Paul—"is unassailable, and that the figure of Jesus cannot be projected back into a period earlier than the Christian era, we shall be justified in regarding the existence of Jesus as historically established. Only, by this we have gained exceedingly little for the construction of a Life of Jesus; the number of data supplied by Paul is but small."⁸³

"With reference to the Epistles of the Apostle Paul, which no doubt unquestionably presuppose an actual Jesus, appeal can be made to the fact that according to many investigators they all came into being only in the second century. And if the composition of the most important of them be assigned to the years 50-60 A.D.,—which is my view also—nevertheless it must be acknowledged that they relate deplorably little about Jesus, and do not in the least afford a guarantee for all that is commonly regarded as credible about him from the first three Gospels."⁸⁴

If it be borne in mind that the question at issue does not concern the details of the daily life of Jesus, but His very existence and the manner of person He was, the unhappy

⁸² Cf. *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1881.

⁸³ Preface to Neumann, p. viii.

⁸⁴ *Die Person Jesu* etc., p. 6; E. T. p. 14.

art of these statements will be apparent. Much more justly Heinrich Weinel not only tells us that Paul's letters "contain so much about Jesus that he is our best and surest witness in the controversy that has just been started afresh about the historicity of the person of Jesus," and that, however few references he makes to events in His life, Paul has yet "preserved the picture of Jesus for us very clearly and distinctly,"⁸⁵ but, addressing himself to the precise point now engaging our attention, says plainly:⁸⁶

"The critical theology has continually emphasized how little we learn of Jesus from Paul. I too myself have formerly placed the matter in this false light. What Paul gives us of Jesus and His words is little, if we measure it by the standard of a Gospel; it is little too if we demand that a Paul shall buttress all his ideas with declarations of Jesus. It is, however, not merely enough to find the existence of Jesus attested in the Epistles of Paul; rather in all important matters the echoes of Jesus' sayings are heard in Paul, and there is not only a whole multitude of details which Paul knows and transmits, but also all the distinguishing traits of the preaching of Jesus and His nature are preserved to us by Paul. There is therefore a great deal, if we do not carry the old prejudice with us to these Epistles which are after all occasional writings and are not written with the express design of informing us of Jesus."

Even Schmiedel's own pupil, Arno Neumann, indeed, rebukes the madness of his teacher, when, in the Introduction to the little *Life of Jesus*, to the English translation of which Schmiedel contributed a Preface, coming to speak of Paul's testimony to Jesus, he tells us that to give any scientific character to the denial of Jesus' existence, we must first push incontinently out of the path that "historical Rock whose name is Paul." By Paul, the genuineness of whose chief Epistles is indubitable, he adds,⁸⁷

"there are accredited not only the manifestation (*Auftreten*) of Jesus Christ in general, His epoch, the peculiarity of His character, and His death, but also some of His fundamental ideas, His twelve disciples, and the remarkable impression He must have made,"—

in a word, the entire fact and figure of Jesus. But that the

⁸⁵ *St. Paul, the Man and his Work*. E. T., 1906, pp. 316, 321: the whole passage should be read.

⁸⁶ *Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild widerlegt?* 1910, p. 16.

⁸⁷ *Jesus, wcr er geschichtlich war*, 1904, pp. 10-11; E. T. pp. 4-5.

force of Paul's testimony may be fully appreciated it must be kept in mind that it is original testimony, properly so-called contemporaneous testimony.⁸⁸ Paul, it is true, was not himself a companion of Jesus; but he connected himself with the Christian movement in its very earliest days, lived in constant communication with Jesus' immediate disciples, enjoyed the fullest opportunity to learn at first hand all they knew, and wrote under their eye.⁸⁹ In a true sense his testimony is theirs; he is in it their mouth-piece; and it is accordingly supported in all its extent by every line of tradition which comes down from them.⁹⁰

The absurdity of treating the Synoptic Gospels as the sole source of our knowledge of Jesus is fairly matched by the absurdity of attempting to treat them as together constituting but a single source of that knowledge, and that a source of the value of which we are ignorant. Schmiedel warns us not to imagine that a narrative which is found in all three of the Synoptic Gospels comes to us

⁸⁸ "Original authorities," according to Bernheim (pp. 413-507) are *strictly* only actual eye-and-ear-witnesses of what is narrated. But as even these must fill out what they relate from the testimony of others, it is usual to widen the notion and to call "contemporary accounts which rest on their own immediate perception and on that of other contemporaries" "original authorities." This is reasonable. On the other hand, E. A. Freeman (*The Methods of Historical Study*, 1886, p. 168) unduly extends the notion when he accords the name of "original authorities" to derived accounts in case the original sources are lost. To deserve the name of "original authorities" the element of contemporaneousness must not be wholly lacking.

⁸⁹ Accordingly Neumann adds (p. 11; E. T. p. 5): "It is accordingly no impairment of the value of Paul as reporter that he never personally saw Jesus; for certainly there was nothing left lacking to this new convert of the most eager inquiries (1 Cor. xi. 23; vii. 10 ff; 2 Cor. x. 18 ff)."

⁹⁰ Out of the immense literature of the subject, cf. especially: R. J. Knowling, *The Testimony of St. Paul to Christ*, 1905; Th. Zahn, *Einleitung in das N. T.* I. pp. 164 ff (ix. § 48, Anmerkungen 4, 5); R. Drescher, *Das Leben Jesu bei Paulus*, 1900; H. J. Holtzmann, in *Die Christliche Welt* xxiv. (1910), col. 151-160; A. J. Mason, *Cambridge Theological Studies*, edited by H. B. Swete, 1905, pp. 425 ff; J. G. Machen, *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, 1912, pp. 561 ff.

therefore accredited by three witnesses; for, says he, "all are drawing from one source."⁹¹ But he does not take the same trouble to warn us that this one source lies, therefore, distinctly nearer to the events it narrates than any of the three Gospels that have drawn from it; or that the circumstance that they have all drawn so largely from it accredits it as a very excellent source, everywhere depended upon in its own day; or, even, that it is not the only source from which these Gospels draw,—that by its side lies another source, certainly equal in age and value to it, from which two of them at least draw, and by their side lie still other sources from which one or another of them draws, which need not be inferior in either age or value to either of them. If we are to break up the Gospels into their sources and appeal rather to these sources than to the Gospels themselves (which is not the method of procedure which Schmiedel is in act to commend to us, presenting his critical method rather as independent of literary criticism) we do not lose but profit by the process. Instead of three witnesses of about the seventh decade of the century we have now in view quite a number of witnesses, all earlier than the seventh decade of the century, some of them perhaps very much earlier; and all commended to our favorable consideration by their selection as trustworthy sources of information concerning Jesus by writers so earnest and careful as the authors of the Synoptic Gospels, and by the remarkable completeness of their harmony with one another in the portrait of Jesus which they draw, a harmony which extends also to the portrait of Jesus given us by Paul and by all other witnesses which we may be willing to accept as coming to us from the same general period. No fault in the historical criticism of the Gospel narratives could be more gross than the obscuring of the existence or of the impressiveness of this consistent tradition concerning Jesus, stretching back of the Synoptic Gospels to the very beginning of the Christian movement. And nothing

⁹¹ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1872.

requires to be more strongly emphasized than that it is just because of the impressive consent of the whole tradition of Jesus, running back of the Synoptic Gospels to the beginning, that critics whose presuppositions will not permit them to accept this tradition as trustworthy appeal from literary criticism to historical criticism in an endeavor to get behind the consistent tradition to a Jesus unknown to it. The Synoptic Gospels come before us, meanwhile, not as new phenomena relatively to the portrait of Jesus which they embody, but distinctly as merely the bearers of a tradition of the richest and most consistent sort, which from all that appears is aboriginal; in a word, as witnesses of really contemporaneous value to the Jesus who was known by those who companied with Him and could give first-hand information about Him. This great fact is obscured by Schmiedel, by suggesting unreasonably late dates for the composition of the Synoptic Gospels, thus lengthening unwarrantably the interval which separates them from the facts which they narrate; by leaving in the background the richness and trustworthiness of the tradition which bridges this interval; by treating the Synoptic Gospels as "flying leaves" of wholly unknown provenience and value; and by dealing with them as if they were a single unsupported document.

It must not be supposed that Schmiedel speaks dogmatically upon all these matters. That is not his ordinary manner. The whole drift of his reasoning is towards a late date for the Gospels; he seems indeed to wish to cluster them in the last few years of the century.⁹² But he is careful to guard his readers against supposing that it would affect his estimate of the value of their contents if they should turn out to be earlier. He says:⁹³

"The chronological question is in this instance a very subordinate one. Indeed, even if our Gospels could be shown to have

⁹² Otto Schmiedel, who may possibly consider himself the follower of his brother in this matter, gives more distinctly the following dates: Mark, A.D. 80; Matthew 90, with reworking up to 120 or even later; Luke, 100.

⁹³ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1894.

been written from 50 A.D. onwards, or even earlier, we should not be under any necessity to withdraw our conclusions as to their contents, we should on the contrary only have to say that the indubitable transformation in the original tradition had taken place much more rapidly than one might have been ready to suppose. The credibility of the Gospel history cannot be established by an earlier dating of the Gospels themselves in any higher degree than that in which it has been shown to exist, especially as we know that even in the life-time of Jesus miracles of every sort were attributed to Him in the most confident manner. But as the transformation has departed so far from the genuine tradition, it is only in the interest of a better understanding and of a more reasonable appreciation of the process that one should claim for its working out a considerable period of time."

On the peculiarities of the reasoning of this paragraph we do not feel called upon to comment. Each sentence seems to neutralize its immediate neighbors. But in any event few will be found to agree with Schmiedel that it will make no difference in our estimate of the credibility of the Gospels whether we place their own composition about A.D. 100, and that of their chief sources about 70; or their own composition somewhere around 50, and that of their chief sources—shall we say about 40 or 35, or even earlier? To assert otherwise is indeed to deny a fundamental canon of criticism. For it is quite obvious that if our Gospels were composed from 50 to 70 (it is our own belief that they were composed in the sixties) and rest on sources, to a considerable extent recoverable from them, which come from a period ten or twenty years—or more—earlier, we possess in them in effect contemporaneous testimony. And contemporaneous testimony of such mass and constancy cannot be lightly neglected. It is not easy to believe in a transformation so great as that which is assumed, taking place so rapidly as in this case it must have done; though, of course, this will not appear formidable to Schmiedel who allows that Jesus was looked upon as a supernatural person even in His lifetime, thus admitting in effect that it is not a question of transformation with which we are concerned but a question of the credibility of contemporaneous testimony. From our point of view, at any rate,

it is not a matter of indifference whether the Gospels are dated near 100 A.D., or between 50 and 70, and we therefore think it worth while to insist that there is really no reason for removing any of them to a time later than A.D. 70, as even a Harnack has (somewhat tardily) come to see.⁹⁴

No more than the early dates of the Gospels does Schmiedel dogmatically deny the richness of the tradition that lies behind them. He even elsewhere fully recognizes it, investigating with great diligence the sources of the sources and intimating the far-reaching consequences which the recognition of them has upon the literary criticism of the Gospels.⁹⁵ But when he comes to consider the credibility of the Gospel narratives he ignores altogether the fulness and constancy of this historical tradition of which they are merely the vehicles. We do not forget that this is in accord with his professed procedure; that precisely what he proposes to do is to turn away from literary criticism and to seek to reach a decision upon the credibility of the narratives by a historical criticism which, wholly inde-

⁹⁴ Cf. W. P. Armstrong, in the *Princeton Biblical and Theological Studies*, 1912, pp. 348-9: "With the increasing recognition of the evidence for the early date of the Synoptic Gospels, their sources—of whatever kind and constitution—being still earlier—carry back the witness of the documents to the time of the eye-witnesses. And among these there was no difference of opinion concerning the factual basis which underlies the tradition recorded by the Gospels in concrete and varying forms. To admit with Harnack that the Gospel of Luke was written before 70 A.D., and early in the sixties (*Neue Untersuchungen zur Apostelgeschichte*, pp. 81 ff), is to accept a fact which has an obvious bearing on the origin of the sources of the Synoptic Gospels,—a fact which makes it difficult, as Harnack himself foresaw (*Die Apostelgeschichte*, p. 221. n. 2), to regard as legendary their account of supernatural events. For if the Gospels embody the view of Jesus which was current in the primitive community about 60 A.D.,—as Heitmüller admits—or earlier—as Harnack's dating of Luke requires—the rejection of their witness cannot be based upon their differences or upon purely historical considerations. Recourse must be had to a principle springing ultimately out of philosophical conceptions by which their unanimous witness to essential features in their portraiture of Jesus may be set aside." Cf. also the accompanying note 180.

⁹⁵ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1862 ff §§ 128-129.

pendently of literary criticism, works directly upon the transmitted material itself without consideration of the modes or channels of its transmission. But precisely what we are complaining of is the impropriety of this method. It is in essence an attempt to ignore a fundamental fact, the fact, that is, that the Synoptic Gospels do not stand off in isolation, and cannot be dealt with as if they were,—or even as if they were only possibly—a body of inventions; but are known to rest on a background of copious, consentient and contemporary historical tradition. To lose sight of this fact is to lose sight of the primary fact in the case, and to do violence to the fundamental law of evidence which demands that well-attested facts shall not be treated as unattested facts. What Schmiedel asks of us is to begin our investigation into the credibility of the Synoptic Gospels by abstracting our attention from the primary evidence of their credibility, viz., that they are but vehicles of a copious and unbroken historical tradition which is contemporaneous with the facts which it transmits. Having failed to shake this testimony by literary criticism he proposes—not to allow it its due weight but—to neglect it and direct his assault upon the credibility of the Gospel-narratives to another point!

It is part of this studied disregard of the real conditions of the case, that Schmiedel treats the Synoptic Gospels as documents of entirely unknown provenience and value. Here indeed he becomes even dogmatic. He is quite sure that the Third Gospel, for example, is not the production of Paul's companion, Luke, although he is equally sure that this Gospel and the Book of Acts are from the same pen;⁹⁶ he will not concede to Luke even the "we"-sections of Acts, which he considers to come from a different hand from the rest of the book. We take it however, that,—as even a Harnack again has come to perceive⁹⁷—a sober criticism

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, col. 1893.

⁹⁷ See especially nos. i. iii. and iv. of Harnack's *New Testament Studies* (Crown Theological Library, xx., xxvii., xxxiii.): *Luke the Physician*, 1907; *The Acts of the Apostles*, 1909; *The Date of the Acts and of the Synoptic Gospels*, 1911.

must allow that Acts is all of a piece—"we"-passages and all—and Acts and the Third Gospel are from the same hand, and this hand is that to which a constant historical tradition has from the earliest times ascribed both books,—that of Luke. This being so, the Gospel of Luke is entitled to the credit which belongs to a book by a known author, of known opportunities to inform himself of the subject-matter of which he treats, and of known will and capacity to treat that subject-matter worthily. Luke is known to have been an educated physician, who as a companion of Paul's was exceptionally favorably situated for learning the facts concerning Jesus. Whatever Paul knew, he knew. Whatever was known by other companions of Paul's into contact with whom he came, some of whom (as for example John Mark) had come out of the circle of Jesus' immediate disciples, he knew. He even visited Jerusalem in company with Paul; and resided with him for two years at Caesarea in touch with primitive disciples. What such a writer has given us concerning Jesus, set down in such an obviously painstaking narrative,—especially when it proves to be wholly at one with what is given us by Paul, as well as by his fellow evangelists in equally painstaking narratives, and indeed with the whole previous tradition so far as that tradition can be penetrated,—cannot be treated simply as floating reports.⁶⁸

⁶⁸ It may conduce to a better understanding of the trustworthiness of Luke as a biographer if we will look at it in the light of an analogous case. Why is not Luke's relation to the subjects he deals with in his Gospel much the same as that of, say, Mr. Clement R. Shorter to the Brontës? Mr. Shorter did not know the Brontës. But he has diligently sought out the facts from those who knew them, and from those who have described them at first hand. His title page very fairly parallels Luke's prologue: "The Brontës: Life and Letters. Being an attempt to present a full and final record of the lives of the three sisters, Charlotte, Emily and Anne Brontë, from the Biographies of Mrs. Gaskell and others, and from numerous hitherto unpublished Manuscripts and Letters." That is not far from the way Luke might have phrased his title page: "Jesus Christ: Life and Teachings. Being an attempt to present a trustworthy record of His life from the biographies which have been published of Him, and from hitherto unpublished recollections communicated by those who

With elements of the actual state of the case like these clearly in mind, we shall know what estimate to place on the extremely sceptical attitude which Schmiedel takes up with reference to the Synoptic narratives. He does not approach them with the deference due to an exceptionally well-attested historical tradition, but with an already active assumption of their untrustworthiness, in the portrait of Jesus which they transmit. Of this assumption no justification is possible and none is attempted. We cannot rank as such the pages in which there are accumulated elements in the Synoptic narratives "which for any reason arising either from the substance or from considerations of literary criticism" seem to Schmiedel "doubtful or wrong;"⁹⁹ and which he closes with the words: "The foregoing sections may have sometimes seemed to raise a doubt whether any credible elements were to be found in the Gospels at all."¹⁰⁰ But these sections register the effects not the

knew Him." Of course, this is second-hand biography; Luke, like Mr. Shorter, belongs to the second generation. But, like Mr. Shorter, he enjoyed exceptional opportunities to learn the truth, and exhibits exceptional zeal in ascertaining and recording the truth of the matters with which he deals. In the circumstances in which he wrote the trustworthiness of his communications, and particularly of the general portraiture he gives of Jesus, is not lessened,—it is perhaps even enhanced—by his secondariness. Mrs. Gaskell's *Life of Charlotte Brontë* cannot be superseded; but Mr. Shorter's account is not inferior in trustworthiness to it. The sources from which Luke drew are, of course, more original than his own narrative; but his narrative resting on these written sources, supplemented by his own inquiries, does not yield in trustworthiness to them. It is, in fact, just these sources themselves, tested and supplemented by competent inquiry in original quarters, and these sources do not lose but increase in value by being incorporated in such a work as Luke's. By all means let us go back to the Narrative-Source, and to the Discourse-Source, and to any other sources we can identify, so far as we can isolate them; but let us not fancy that out of Luke they are more trustworthy than they are in Luke, or that the cement in which Luke imbeds them is less trustworthy than they are—this cement itself is from original sources. It is not merely what Mr. Shorter repeats from Mrs. Gaskell or other formal biographies which is worthy of credit in his book.

⁹⁹ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1873-1881; §§ 132-138.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, col. 1882.

cause of the scepticism with which Schmiedel approaches the Synoptic narratives and form a body of what is little better than special pleading. Nowhere are the Synoptic narratives given the benefit of the presumption which lies in their favor; that is to say, nowhere is any consideration shown to the weight of the historical tradition of which they are but the vehicles, and which confessedly stretches back to the very beginning of the Christian movement. The one aim of all his criticism is to set aside this tradition; the principle he invokes is that of contradiction; and the effect of his criticism is to substitute for the portrait of Jesus handed down by the entire tradition a new portrait related to it as its precise opposite.¹⁰¹

It is needless to say that in this extreme scepticism as over against the whole historic tradition Schmiedel receives no encouragement whatever from the general practice of historians. We have only to glance over even the brief extracts we have cited¹⁰² from the methodologists to perceive in how different a spirit historians are accustomed to approach their task. The attitude they commend to us is one of general deference to positive testimony; and if they point out conditions which in particular instances may rightly modify this deference or even neutralize it, and indicate methods of procedure by which, when suspicion is justified, the more trustworthy elements of a tradition may be sifted out, they never suggest an attitude of general scepticism as over against positive testimony; they even expressly deny the propriety of altogether rejecting positive testimony on merely internal grounds. The whole tendency of the recommendations of the methodologists is towards respect to positive testimony, and they test it with a view rather to discovering what we can most completely trust than with a view to disregarding it in principle.

¹⁰¹ Johannes Weiss, *Jesus von Nazareth*, etc., 1910, pp. 84-85 has some wise words on "the really morbid scepticism" which is too often permitted by modern critics (his example is Wrede) to intrude between the source and the reader.

¹⁰² See above pp. 234-6.

Schmiedel, on the contrary, begins with the rejection of the tradition in principle although it is exceptionally copiously and harmoniously attested; and sets himself to seek in it not the most trustworthy elements in a generally trustworthy tradition, on the basis of which the whole positive testimony may be given its rightful coloring and validity; but encysted elements of an underlying truth in contradiction to the whole testimony, on the basis of which he can reverse the tradition and recover the lost truth submerged by it. For a procedure of this sort, applied to a historical tradition such as that embodied in the Synoptic Gospels, supported as that tradition is by a wealth of extraneous testimony such for example as that of Paul, and traceable as it is back to contemporary sources, it is safe to say no support can be found in the recognized practice of secular historians. It is in fact not a historical procedure which is proposed at all; it is pure anti-historism—a bold attempt to pour history into the mould of an *a priori* construction. Against such a procedure the methodologists protest with all their strength. No one has less respect than the critic who—as Bouché-Leclercq expresses it—“after having discredited all his witnesses, claims to put himself in their place, and sees with their eyes something quite different from what they saw.”¹⁰³ “The one thing which is illegitimate for criticism,” remarks H. B. George,¹⁰⁴ “is to assume that it can divine the truth underlying the existing narrative, which it declares to be more or less fabulous.”¹⁰⁵

Certainly it will be admitted that if a historical tradition like that transmitted to us in the narratives of the Synoptic Gospels is to be reversed on the faith of fragments of a

¹⁰³ Quoted by Seignobos, in Langlois and Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History*, 1898, p. 156, note 2.

¹⁰⁴ *Historical Evidence*, 1909, p. 69. He adds: “It can put forward conjectures and they may seem probable; but nothing can transform them into ascertained facts.”

¹⁰⁵ F. J. A. Hort long ago warned us that “criticism is not dangerous except when as in so much Christian criticism, it is merely the tool for reaching a result not itself believed in on that ground, but on the ground of speculative postulates” (*Hulsean Lectures*, p. 177).

rival tradition which, if not older (for there can scarcely be a tradition older than that which confessedly was shared by the immediate disciples of Jesus) is yet truer, imbedded in it like flies in amber, then these fragments of the truer tradition must authenticate themselves with absolute certainty as quite irreconcilable with the tradition which is to be replaced by them. Schmiedel, in point of fact, does not fail to claim this absolute contrariety with the tradition in which they are imbedded for his "pillar-passages." It is because he finds imbedded in the Synoptic narrative occasional statements which run absolutely counter to it in its fundamental tendency, and therefore cannot owe their origin to the invention of those to whom this narrative (immediately or ultimately) is due, that he feels able to point to them as fragments of an underlying truer tradition which would have perished save for the vitality of these fragments. They were too firmly established in the minds of the followers of Jesus to be passed by; and have therefore been taken up into the growing legend to preserve the memory of the real Jesus, which it was obliterating. When we come to scrutinize these relics of truer recollection, however, we are surprised to note how little they are able to bear the burden of the argument which is erected upon them. Schmiedel selects nine of them for special remark. He intimates that these are by no means all that might be gathered out of the fabric of the narrative.¹⁰⁶ But it lies in the nature of the case that they are fairly representative of the whole body; and indeed that they present the clearest and most convincing instances of the phenomenon adverted to. Schmiedel himself divides them into two categories. Five of them, he tells us, "throw light on Jesus' figure as a whole;" the other four "have a special bearing on His character as a worker of wonders."¹⁰⁷ To speak more plainly the five former of them are supposed to stand in irreconcilable contradiction with the deification of Jesus which had grown up in the Christian community; the latter

¹⁰⁶ See e.g., Preface to Neumann, p. xiii.

¹⁰⁷ *Die Person Jesu*, etc., p. 7. E. T. p. 18.

four are supposed to stand in equally irreconcilable contradiction with the ascription of miracles in the strict sense to Jesus, which had also become the custom of the Christian community. On the basis of the former five Schmiedel thinks that we are entitled to assert that Jesus was originally fully understood by His followers to be merely a human being; on the basis of the latter four that He was equally fully understood by His followers originally to be a wholly non-miraculous man. The two classes of statements together make it clear that Jesus was not at first the object of worship by His followers: they are "not consistent with the worship in which Jesus came to be held;" "they are appropriate only to a man, and could never by any possibility have been written had the author been thinking of a demi-god."¹⁰⁸

Now, the singular thing is, that some of the "pillar-passages," at least, even with the meaning which Schmiedel puts upon them, do not obviously have the directly contradictory bearing upon the attribution of deity or of the possession of supernatural powers to Jesus, which is ascribed to them, and which is required of them if they are to serve the function put upon them. It is not immediately apparent, for example, that the statement in Mk. iii. 21 to the effect "that His relations held Him to be beside Himself"¹⁰⁹ contradicts the attribution of deity to Jesus. Why must a divine Jesus be supposed to have been fully understood "in the days of His flesh," even by those nearest to Him? Or, for the matter of that, why should not worshipers of Jesus even invent such a statement? "As if," exclaims Friedrich Steudel,¹¹⁰ with considerable force, "a poet would depreciate his hero, by representing him as one who was misunderstood in his closest surroundings!" As if, in a word, the tendency of such an incident as is here recorded might not easily be,—on the supposition that it is part and parcel of a mythical account of a divine being for

¹⁰⁸ Preface to Neumann, p. xvii.

¹⁰⁹ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1881; cf. *Das vierte Evangelium*, p. 18.

¹¹⁰ P. 89.

a time on earth—precisely to show His greatness by representing that not only did His enemies accuse Him of working wonders by the power of the Evil One, but His very friends thought Him mad. And certainly Schmiedel himself must have felt some difficulty in including among his "pillar-passages" Mk. xiii. 32 (*cf.* Mt. xxiv. 36),¹¹¹ in which, if Jesus is made to confess that there was at least one thing He did not know, He is at the same time made to range Himself in dignity of being above the angels—and on the side of God in contrast with even the highest of creatures. Upon others of the "pillar-passages" a most unnatural meaning has to be imposed before they can be thought of in that connection. For example, in the narrative connected with Jesus' warning of His disciples to beware of "the leaven of the Pharisees and of Herod" (Mk. viii. 15, *cf.* Mt. xvi. 6), it is only by the most sinuous exegesis that we arrive at the conclusion that the miracles of the feeding of the five thousand and the four thousand (both of which are narrated both by Matthew and by Mark) are only "transformed parables"—though even if they were, that fact would scarcely prove that Jesus never wrought miracles. So, it is not a natural interpretation which reduces Jesus' enumeration of His miraculous works in reply to the inquiry of John the Baptist's message (Mt. xi. 5, Lk. v. 22), to a series of figurative statements which mean only that He was exercising notable spiritual power among the people—though again, even were that the true interpretation, it would scarcely prove that Jesus wrought no miracles. At the most, it would suggest that He laid greater stress on His spiritual than on His physical miracles; and surely that is obvious enough in any case. It is unreasonable, further, to insist on an interpretation of Jesus' refusal to give a "sign" (Mk. viii. 12, *cf.* Mt. xv. 4, and further Mt. xii. 39, Lk. xi. 29) which makes it a categorical declaration on Jesus' part that He would work in no circumstances any sort of miracle, and therefore a confession by Him

¹¹¹ See *Das vierte Evangelium*, p. 22.

that He could work no miracle. The context suggests a very different interpretation, and Schmiedel himself is free elsewhere to point out a distinction between miracles as such and miracles as "signs."¹¹² Similarly, it is an unreasonable interpretation of Jesus' inability to work miracles at Nazareth (Mk. vi. 5: "He could not") to make it teach that it was never He that worked miracles, but the people themselves by the ardor of their faith; and to infer from this that the real Jesus wrought no other wonders than "faith cures."¹¹³ The narrative itself includes in the broader category of "mighty works", as of like supernatural character with them, these "faith cures" (if we insist on describing them by this name) which He worked also at Nazareth; attributes these "mighty works" to Him as ordinary acts;¹¹⁴ and leaves no other interpretation possible than that His "inability" to work these mighty works at Nazareth was a moral and not a natural "inability"; it was unsuitable for Him to do so.¹¹⁵ Even were it otherwise it still would not be clear why a limitation upon Jesus' power to work miracles imposed by unbelief should argue a general inability in Him to work miracles. Precisely what Jesus meant to imply when He declared that speaking against His person might be forgiven, while blasphemy against the Holy

¹¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 15 ff.

¹¹³ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, §§ 141, 144; e.g. col. 1885: "It is quite permissible for us to regard as historical only those of the class which even at the present day physicians are able to effect by psychical methods" . . . ; *Jesus in Modern Criticism*, p. 17. The same conclusion is reached on the same grounds by W. Heitmüller, Schiele and Zscharneck's *Die Religion*, etc., III. 1912, p. 372.

¹¹⁴ Mk. vi. 2, 5: "Whence hath this man these things—and what mean such mighty works wrought by His hands?" "And He could there do no mighty work save that He laid His hands upon a few sick folk, and healed them."

¹¹⁵ Cf. H. R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, 1912, p. 14: "The verdict passed on Nazareth to the effect that, owing to the unbelief He encountered there, Jesus could work no miracle (Mk. vi. 5), has often been misconstrued. The meaning is not that the people's mistrust deprived Him of Messianic power; it is rather that the ethical conditions of reception being absent, a moral impossibility existed that He should put His power in active operation."

Spirit would not be forgiven (Mt. xii. 31) may be an open question.¹¹⁶ But it is not obvious that He must have meant that His person was inferior in dignity to that of the Holy Spirit, as Schmiedel assumes;¹¹⁷ and if He did, it is not obvious that this implies a self-confession of His mere humanity. It may be plausible to argue that He refuses the address "Good Master" (Mk. x. 17) and in doing so spoke out of a human consciousness; but this interpretation of the passage is by no means to be accepted as certain, or even probable,—or, we might justly add, even possible.¹¹⁸ The cry of dereliction on the cross (Mt. xv. 34) certainly seems the expression of a human consciousness, though why of a merely human consciousness does not appear.¹¹⁹ If then recognition of Jesus as human is equivalent to denying Him to be divine, there is a single passage among Schmiedel's nine which clearly contradicts the ascription of deity to Jesus: and others of them may, no doubt, be put forward with more or less plausibility in the same interest, if we are set upon making out an argument *vi et armis*. But to advance these passages as definitely inconsistent with the attribution of deity or miracles to Jesus, so inconsistent that they must be recognized as remnants of a truer tradition of a merely human, non-miraculous Jesus, and able to bear the weight of a structure which must supersede the portrait of

¹¹⁶ W. Lütgert, *Die Liebe im N. T.*, 1905, p. 99, wishes to explain the passage from the general principle that Jesus' anger burns against offenses against God, never against offenses against Himself: "The same simple rule lies at the bottom of the declaration about the blasphemy of the Spirit. What is spoken against the Son of Man, that is, against Him personally, Jesus pardons; what on the other hand is spoken against the Spirit, that is, against God,—that is unpardonable."

¹¹⁷ *Das vierte Evangelium*, p. 33. Cf. the good reply of Karl Thieme, *Die christliche Demut*, I. 1906, p. 139, who says that the clause "and whosoever shall say a word against the Son of Man, it shall be forgiven him" here has the same effect as the clause "nor yet the Son" in xxiv. 26, and is "less an offensive minification than a great glorification of Jesus."

¹¹⁸ Cf. what Karl Thieme has to say, as cited, pp. 106 ff.

¹¹⁹ Schmiedel himself will not admit that it was a cry of *despair* (*Jesus in Modern Criticism*, p. 50).

the divine, miraculous Jesus drawn in the Synoptic tradition, and in all other extant tradition, can strike us as nothing but a counsel of despair.

A further consideration, which has already been hinted at in passing, requires emphasizing at this point. W. B. Smith has urged with some persistency that if these "pillar-passages" are really inconsistent with the Synoptic tradition, the writers of the Synoptic Gospels are strangely unaware of it. That the Synoptic Gospels record these statements must, he thinks, at least be recognized as evidence that their asserted inconsistency with the fundamental tendency of the Synoptic Gospels, is imaginary. And then Smith adds with force:¹²⁰

"They may seem to us what they will; in the view of the authors of the Gospels, who were worshippers of Jesus, they certainly were *not* incompatible with that worship. The ground of this contention is obvious. Had these passages been felt as irreconcilable with worship of Jesus, with the cult of Jesus as a God, they would have been altered, and their disharmony corrected."

It is easy, no doubt to rejoin that it is by no means inconceivable or even unexampled that inconsistent elements of fact should be preserved in a growing legend; this is, as Bernheim expresses it,¹²¹ the homage which legend pays to truth, and it may easily occur without consciousness, or at least clear consciousness, of it on the part of the writer. As to the harmonizing of these statements with the legend, why, is it not part of Schmiedel's contention that this is precisely what was done, and that we can trace the process in the Synoptic record itself?¹²² This rejoinder scarce-

¹²⁰ *Ecce Deus*, etc., p. 179. Cf. the summary on p. 181: "I permit myself to repeat: The mere fact that a declaration or an act is ascribed to Jesus by the author of a Gospel is a positive proof that it did not stand in conscious contradiction to the conception of Jesus held by that author; and it is moreover not probable that an unconscious contradiction is present, for these Gospels are very unusually well thought-out works".

¹²¹ *Lehrbuch der historischen Methode*, p. 523 (see above pp. 234-5).

¹²² Preface to Neumann, p. xi.: "I, of set purpose, selected only those passages in which it is possible to show from the text of the Gospels themselves that they are incompatible with the worship in

ly, however, meets the objection. The Synoptic Gospels are not simply sections of a growing legend, gradually working its way to the consistent presentation of a germinal conception. They are, each of them, the careful composition of a thoughtful, alert writer alive to his purposes to his finger-tips. And the method by which the supposed progressive harmonization of the incongruous elements of truth with the demands of the legend is detected, is one of extreme untrustworthiness, in the conclusions of which, to speak frankly, no dependence whatever can be placed. The general canon which governs it is justly challenged as without foundation in fact;¹²³ and the processes by which under this general canon findings are reached in individual cases are fatally mechanical and confessedly capable of making out an equally plausible case for any finding desired.¹²⁴ After all said, we must revert to the fundamental canon of all criticism of this order, emphasized as such by all the Methodologists.¹²⁵ We must not impute ourselves to the writers we are criticising, but

which Jesus came to be held. Thus, they are all of them found only in one Gospel, or at most in two; the second and third, or the third, either omits the passage in question, although by universal consent, the author who omits must have known at least one of the Gospels in which it occurs, or the source from which it was drawn; or, alternatively, he turns it round, often with great ingenuity and boldness, in such a manner that it loses the element which makes it open to exception from the point of view of a worshipper of Jesus." Cf. *Jesus in Modern Criticism*, p. 16; *Das vierte Evangelium*, p. 17; *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1872.

¹²³ Thus, for example, Franz Dibelius, *Das Abendmahl*, 1911, remarks that the canon of literary criticism, which is uniformly followed, runs: "Where there are differing accounts, that one deserves the most credit which is the simplest, that is, commonly, which is the briefest; where important elements of the one are lacking in another, they are later, interpolated additions" (p. 2); and then he criticises its validity sharply (p. 7).

¹²⁴ Schmiedel himself remarks (*Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1846) that "every assertion, no matter how evident, as to the priority of one evangelist and the posteriority of another in any given passage, will be found to have been turned the other way round by quite a number of scholars of repute.

¹²⁵ Cf. Bernheim above, p. 235; Seignobos, above, pp. 235-6.

must judge of alleged contradictions occurring in their narratives not from our own point of view but from theirs. We cannot avoid raising the question, therefore, whether the statements declared in Schmiedel's "pillar-passages" to be inconsistent with the historical tradition embodied in the Synoptic narratives merely seem to us incompatible with the fundamental tendency of that tradition, or are such as must have been felt by the authors of the Synoptic Gospels themselves to be contradictory to their fundamental conception of Jesus. In the former case we may perhaps be in a position to pronounce the legend of Jesus, as presented in the Synoptic Gospels, not quite self-consistent; that is our own affair and concerns only our personal attitude towards the figure of Jesus. It is only in the latter case that we should be in a position to point to such passages as evidence of the existence of a better tradition underlying the Synoptic tradition on the basis of which the latter should be corrected. When this only relevant question is fairly faced it is by no means impertinent to point out that if the statements of the "pillar-passages" are really inconsistent with the historical tradition embodied in the Synoptic Gospels, it is strange that these Gospels are so completely unconscious of it.

In point of fact the argument based on the "pillar-passages" has been pushed through with very little consideration for the point of view of the Synoptic Gospels, or of the historical tradition they represent. It has been made to run much as follows. The Synoptic Gospels represent a tradition in which worship of Jesus is the dominating feature: they make it their business to present before adoring eyes the figure of a divine, miraculous Jesus: but we find embedded in their narrative statements which present to us the figure of a human Jesus, a Jesus with the limitations that belong to a man: these statements must be as yet unassimilated fragments of a truer tradition: otherwise their presence in this tradition of a divine Jesus would be unaccountable: we must, therefore, base our conception

of the real Jesus on these unassimilated fragments, and reject all in the tradition embodied in these Gospels which is inconsistent with them. The underlying assumption is that Jesus must have been either divine or human; so that the discovery of a Jesus who was human abolishes the legend of a Jesus who was divine. The question is never once raised whether, in the sense of the Synoptic tradition, Jesus might not have been both divine and human. If that question were raised and answered in the affirmative, then the inconsistency with the Synoptic tradition of the statements alleged to be found in the "pillar-passages" would at once vanish, and the whole argument founded on it evaporate. At best it would remain only a new mode of putting the common "Liberal" procedure of setting over against one another the divine and human traits ascribed to Jesus in the Gospels and, on the assumption that both cannot be true, choosing the human and rejecting the divine.¹²⁰ Its only advantage over the ordinary presentation of that argument would be in its concentration of the evidence of a human Jesus into a few passages, set forth as its quintessence. It could claim superior validity over the common "Liberal" argument only if it could be shown that the passages in which it concentrates the essence of the argument for a human Jesus present to our view an exclusively human Jesus, that is, a Jesus who is in such a sense human that He cannot also be divine. These matters will require some brief consideration.

That the Jesus of the Evangelists, while truly God and as such claiming our worship is not exclusively God, but also man, ought not in these days to require argument to prove. Certainly for those who hold the position of Schmiedel with respect to the origin and dating of the Synoptic Gospels, all motive for failure to recognize the

¹²⁰ Thus, for example, Johannes Weiss (*Jesus von Nazareth*, pp. 132-133) enumerates first the divine traits attributed to Jesus in Mark, and then the human traits—and concludes that the divine traits belong to the Jesus of legend and the human to the Jesus of fact. See *The American Journal of Theology* xv. (1911), pp. 553-5.

divine-human character of the Jesus of these Gospels would seem to be removed. To say no more, the Jesus of Paul is distinctly conceived as a divine person who became man on a mission of mercy for men,¹²⁷ and His true humanity is as persistently presupposed as His deity itself. If He is in His essential nature rich, He became poor that by His poverty we might become rich; if He subsists in His proper nature "in the form of God," He did not consider His being on an equality with God so precious but that for the good of men He was willing to take "the form of a servant." He was no less, as concerns His flesh, of Israel, of the seed of David, than He was in His higher nature "God over all, blessed for ever." And Paul does not present this conception as a novelty, a peculiarity of His personal thought, an invention of His own. He tells us distinctly, on the contrary, that it was the common faith of the Christian communities among which he moved: "for ye know," says he, "the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ, that although He was rich, yet for your sakes He became poor." What reason is there for doubting that it was the conception of the writers of the Synoptic Gospels, and is the account to give of their frank representation of Jesus now as divine, and now as human, with inextricable intermixture of the traits of deity and humanity? Consider only that "pillar-passage," Mk. xiii. 32, which in one breath ascribes to Him an exalted being above all creatures and ignorance of so simple a matter as the time of the occurrence of an earthly event. In point of fact, the historical tradition of Jesus of which the Synoptic Gospels are the bearers, and which stretches back of them as far into the past as literary criticism enables us to penetrate, is the tradition of an exclusively divine Jesus as little as it is the tradition of an exclusively human Jesus; it is distinctly the tradition of a divine Jesus who is living and moving in the flesh. To represent statements in this tra-

¹²⁷ Even B. W. Bacon (*Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress*, 1910, p. 268) can speak briefly of "Paul's Christology of incarnation and atonement."

dition which emphasize the humanity of Jesus as on that account contradictory to its fundamental tendency is nothing short of absurd. Only if they could be shown to ascribe to Jesus a clearly exclusive humanity could they run athwart the drift of the tradition in which they are embedded.

We are not forgetting the currency of the representation that the two-natured Jesus is a contribution of Paul's to Christian thought. That the Synoptic Gospels are "Pauline" in their conception of Jesus scarcely anybody doubts now-a-days. But it is still widely held that they are Pauline because their conception has been moulded by Paul, not, as is more nearly true, because Paul was moulded by the historical tradition of which they are the repositories. In point of fact, however, the two-natured Jesus is aboriginal to Christian thought; and the proof of this lies in that very failure of literary criticism to find a tradition of a Jesus different from its own back of the Synoptic record, which has provoked Schmiedel into seeking such a tradition by the more direct path of immediate historical criticism. The assumption that has ruled "Liberal" criticism for a generation that between Paul and the primitive community there lies a deep gulf and again another between the primitive community and the actual Jesus, must give way before this fact. It is already giving way. Franz Dibelius is but voicing a growing better understanding of the state of the case when he declares roundly that it is quite unjustified, and altogether contrary to historical reality, to assume, as has so long been assumed, "that there are two deep clefts in the history of primitive Christianity, one between Jesus and the Jerusalem community, and the other between the primitive community and Paul; that the theology of Paul—Paulinism—is substantially different from the theology of the primitive community and the theology of the primitive community substantially different from the faith of Jesus; that our whole tradition as to the life and words of Jesus is strongly influenced—'painted over'—by the conceptions of Christ of the primitive community and of Paul."¹²⁸ Even

¹²⁸ *Das Abendmahl*, 1911, p. 8.

an Adolf Harnack warns us that the place of Paul in the history of Christian thought was not that of a creator, and that the gospel Paul preached was already preached by the primitive community and coalesces in substance with that of Jesus Himself; so that a crass contrast between what he calls "the first" and "the second" gospels can by no means be erected.¹²⁹ It will be observed that the effect of this revulsion from the current opposition of Paul and the primitive community, or of Paul and Jesus, is not exhausted in wiping out the difference between Paul and Jesus which it has been the custom to emphasize; it also wipes out the difference between the early community and Jesus which it has been equally the custom to emphasize. That is to say, it sets aside the canon on which "Liberal" criticism has been accustomed to act when it has assigned a large part of the Gospel tradition to "the Christian community," whose faith, it has been asserted, has been carried back into the historical tradition and imposed on Jesus. There is no evidence, as Dibelius rightly insists, that any such process took place, and, in the absence of that evidence, we may claim even a Weinel as a witness to the impropriety of assuming it. He is telling us how the work of criticism is to be prosecuted. Literary criticism, he says, must first be carried to its utmost extent. Its business is to make clear what the oldest sources contain. After that has been ascertained, historical criticism is to be called in. Its business is to determine what has been added to the true tradition in the course of oral transmission. He adds:¹³⁰

¹²⁹ "Das doppelte Evangelium im Neuen Testament" (1910) in *Aus Wissenschaft und Leben*, ii., 1911, p. 216 (E. T. in *The Proceedings and Papers of the Fifth International Congress of Free Christianity and Religious Progress*, 1911, p. 101). Cf. *What is Christianity?* E. T. 1901, pp. 153-4. Also H. Weinel, *Ist das "liberale" Jesusbild widerlegt?* 1910, pp. 15-16; "Seven Oxford Men," *Foundations*, 1912, pp. 77, 157.

¹³⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 31. Weinel presents here the common "Liberal" canon of criticism in its most reasonable form. He rejects it in the sweeping positive form that everything is to be rejected which can be explained from the "interests" of the early Christian community, and validates it only in the narrower negative form that only that is to be rejected which cannot be explained from an "interest" of Jesus but only

"For this, now, the sole canon for distinguishing the genuine from the non-genuine is the principle that only such traits of the tradition are to be excluded as not genuine which *can* not come from an interest of Jesus, but only from an interest of the community. This principle—as was shown above against Wrede—is not to be stretched into the different one that wherever the community has an interest—where, however, no reason forbids that Jesus may have also had it—the tradition is to be rejected as wholly ungentine. Rather—since here it is always a matter of exclusion—proof must first be adduced that the interest in question can have arisen only later."

As long, then, as evidence is lacking that the conception of Jesus as divine was the product of the faith of the community, we are not only justified in holding that the claims to a divine nature attributed to Jesus by the historical tradition are genuine, but we are bound so to hold.

But, it may be demanded, is not, as Bousset phrases it, faith the foe of fact?¹³¹ And are we not justified in discounting the claims to a divine nature placed on the lips of

from an interest of the community. In this form, however, it remains still unworkable. It involves, indeed, circular reasoning: we are to determine what is true of Jesus by omitting all that is not true of Jesus; and of course we must know what is true of Jesus before we can determine what is not true of Jesus. We may search the literature of criticism almost in vain for workable *formal* canons of criticism. E. A. Abbott does indeed suggest one (*Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col 1782, note 2; cf. col. 1788, note 2 and Schmiedel's allusion to it, col. 1872) in the form that "the presence of stumbling-blocks in a narrative is proof of an early date"; and this is a canon which is recognized in general by the methodologists (cf. E. A. Freeman, *The Methods of Historical Study*, 1886, pp. 128, 136; H. B. George, *Historical Evidence*, 1909, p. 165) as analogous to the rule in Textual Criticism that "preference should be given to the *difficilior lectio*." But this canon is very plastic in its application as may be observed from Abbott's exposition of it on the one hand, and Schmiedel's reading of it as equivalent to his canon of contradiction on the other (cf. *Das vierte Evangelium*, etc., p. 86 bottom). Bernheim (*op cit.*, p. 507) remarks on the slowness of the emergence into recognition in general historical science "of the great simple maxims of investigation."

¹³¹ *Was wissen wir von Jesus?* 1904. p. 56: "It has been rightly emphasized that in this regard our first three Gospels are distinguished from the fourth only in degree. Must there not, then, have taken place here a complete repainting from the standpoint of faith? For there is a certain propriety in saying that faith is the foe of history. Where we believe and honor we no longer see objectively."

Jesus by the Christian community, by the mere fact that this community was a worshiper of Jesus and therefore predisposed to represent Him as making the claims which would justify that worship? This is, however, precisely what we have just seen Weinel telling us it is illegitimate to do. The fact that the community believed Jesus to be divine is no proof that Jesus did not Himself also believe that He was divine. It must first be proved (assuming it, is not enough) that Jesus could not have made a claim to divinity, before the otherwise credible representation of the community that He did make such a claim can be set aside. We must not fall into the banality of pronouncing the testimony of earnest men to facts within their knowledge untrustworthy, just in proportion as they have themselves believed these facts and yielded themselves to their influence. Rather, their adherence to these facts, and their manifest profound belief in them, is the strongest testimony to their actuality which they could give us. So far from faith being the foe of fact, faith is the correlate of fact and its proper evidence. "Faith," in other words, as a recent writer puts it,¹⁸² "did not incapacitate the evangelists as narrators; it showed them, rather, how infinitely the life of Jesus deserved narration." "What mandate of historical method," exclaims Johannes Weiss,¹⁸³ "tells us that the interested parties [*die Betheiligten*] are to be distrusted under all circumstances? . . . The truly unprejudiced man will say: 'With reference to the nature of a personality we shall always reach ultimately a clearer notion along with these who have surrendered themselves to his influence

¹⁸² Hugh R. Mackintosh, *The Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, 1912, p. 8. He continues: "The impulse to select, to fling upon words or incidents a light answering to the later situation of the Church, is natural and intelligible; what is not so is an impulse to deform or to fabricate. 'Fidelity to the historical tradition', a sympathetic writer [it is of E. F. Scott, *The Fourth Gospel*, p. 2 that he is speaking] has said, 'was undoubtedly the chief aim of the Synoptic writers. Their work may here and there bear traces of theological coloring, but their first interest was the facts. Their part was not to interpret, but simply to record.'"

¹⁸³ *Jesus von Nazareth*, etc., 1910, p. 93.

than with those whom hate has made blind, or who have simply taken no interest in him.' " The matter is placed in a fair light by some remarks of W. Heitmüller's:¹⁸⁴

"For all particular accounts we are indebted altogether to *Christian* sources, that is, to sources which come from followers of Jesus. It is a sign of the presently reigning anxiety with respect to the knowledge of Jesus and especially a proof of the defective training of the opponents of Jesus, that this fact is regarded as a ground of uneasiness, and, on the other side, as a weapon to be used against the historicity of the Nazarene. Who, on such grounds, doubts the historicity of Socrates, because we are indebted to his votaries (*Verchrern*), Plato and Xenophon, for the chief accounts of him? And whence do we have any knowledge of Buddha save from the Buddhist literature?"¹⁸⁵

In the absence of all positive proof that Jesus was not what His followers represent Him, we must accept Him as what they represent Him. To refer subjectively to the faith of His followers what they refer objectively to His person, for no other reason than that it would seem to us more natural that He should have been something different—what we choose to think Him rather than what they knew Him to be—is only to be guilty ourselves, in the portrait which we form of Jesus, in an immensely aggravated form, of the fault of which we accuse them.

We have allowed that Schmiedel's "pillar-passages" might be worthy of more consideration as evidence of a contradictory tradition underlying that which alone has

¹⁸⁴ Schiele und Zcharnack's *Die Religion*, etc., iii. 1912, p. 345.

¹⁸⁵ Cf. H. Weinell, *Ist das "liberale" Jesus widerlegt?* 1910, p. 28. "The whole tradition about Jesus is Christian,—Mark too, even Wellhausen's 'Primitive Mark,' has Christian traits; and what is Christian must be cleared away from the portrait of Jesus before He Himself is found. But, then, only what is in a particular sense Christian. Jesus was certainly no Jew, but something new; what is Christian is to be warded off from Him only so far as it concerns thoughts and ideas and tendencies which only the later community could have." The emphasis upon the word "only" here is strong; see p. 31 (quoted above, p. 260) and also p. 21 when in opposition to Wrede, Weinell declares: "We must give credit to a tradition so long as it is not clearly proved to be impossible." We must not reject tradition *in principle* and demand that historical facts be shown to be *necessary*, before we accept them as *actual*.

survived and become embodied in the Synoptic Gospels, if the Jesus which they bring before us was not merely a Jesus who possessed truly human traits and who sometimes would not work miracles, but a Jesus who was merely a human being and was quite incapable of working miracles in any circumstance. Of such an implication of these "pillar-passages," however, there can be no question, as has already sufficiently appeared. He in whom a truly human soul dwelt (though in conjunction with the Divine Spirit) might well—nay, needs must—have been the subject, as respects that soul, of ignorances (Mk. xiii. 32) and the sense of desolation in the throes of mortal agony (Mk. xv. 34); and might take a secondary place in comparison with the pure Divine Spirit (Mk. xii. 34). Refusal to work miracles in given circumstances and on particular demands cannot be held to carry with it sheer inability to work them in all circumstances (Mk. vi. 5; viii. 12). Even in the instances (Mk. x. 18; vi. 5) in which a certain surface plausibility may attach to the contention that a less than divine Jesus is implied, this plausibility depends upon a particular interpretation which does not do justice to the actual language of the passages. The chief interest which attaches to Schmiedel's "pillar-passages" accordingly lies in the exposure which they supply of the weakness of the case against the consistency of the portraiture of the divine Jesus drawn in the Synoptic narratives. Innumerable passages may be pointed out in which the true humanity of Jesus is presupposed and illustrated; but when passages are sought in which the true deity of Jesus is denied or excluded, they are discoverable with great difficulty and are verifiable only at the price of a method of interpreting them which does extreme violence to them.

Schmiedel is not alone in his failure to unearth such passages. Others too, have sought for them and have come forward with as meager a fruitage of their searching in their hands. For example, H. J. Holtzmann thought that he could adduce a few passages—they are five in all—in which

Jesus ranked Himself in dignity of being distinctly below the Divine. It may be worth while to place Holtzmann's passages by the side of Schmiedel's that the weakness of the general case may become more apparent. What Holtzmann is contending for, is that, however high the self-estimation may be which is involved in Jesus' claim to the Messiahship—a claim which Schmiedel also allows that Jesus certainly made, and against the "presumption" involved in which, to call it by no uglier name, he also strives to defend his Jesus¹³⁶—He nevertheless distinctly ranks Himself below the Divine in dignity and thus guards Himself against the imputation of claiming "superhumanhood" (*Ueberschmentum*). The central portion of his argument runs as follows:¹³⁷

"Let the title of Messiah betoken the highest exaltation of human self-esteem (*Selbstgefühl*), there is at least given in the unqualified subordination of the idea of the Messiah to the supreme idea of God an absolutely sufficient guarantee against a self-glorifying superhumanness. Immutable facts establish this, such as that sins against the Son of Man are adjudged pardonable, in contrast with sins against the Spirit of God (Mt. xii. 32 = Lk. xii. 10), and that He recognizes as His own not those that call on Him as Lord, but only those that do the will of His Father (Mt. vii. 21-23 = Lk. vi. 46, Mk. iii. 35 = Mt. xii. 50 = Lk. viii. 21).¹³⁸ He even indeed declines to be

¹³⁶ *Die Person Jesu*, etc., pp. 10-18 (E. T. pp. 28-52). It was in no sense due to presumption (*Ueberhebung*, *pride*), he contends, that Jesus held Himself to be the Messiah. He reached that conception of Himself only through severe struggles (p. 16). Therefore, though in so thinking of Himself, He cannot be cleared of the charge of being a visionary (*Schwärmer*), if this means only that "He cherished expectations concerning Himself which go too high and are afterwards not realized," yet these too exalted expectations were not the product of pride (*Selbstüberhebung*) and He was not a visionary in this sense. "It certainly is a misfortune that the highest up to which Jesus reached out in order to fulfil His mission, His belief in His messianic dignity, led also to expectations such as these, which could never really be fulfilled; but I do not see that any shadow is cast by this upon His character or His purity" (p. 17: E. T. p. 51).

¹³⁷ H. J. Holtzmann: *Das messianische Bewusstsein Jesu*, 1907, p. 82.

¹³⁸ On these passages, cf. Karl Thieme, *Die christliche Demut*, I., 1906, p. 137: "But with reference to such judgments on such pas-

addressed as 'Good Master', because this would involve assumption of God's exclusive property (Mk. x. 18 = Lk. xviii. 19). It is not His but solely God's concern to dispose of dignities and honors in the Kingdom of Heaven (Mk. x. 41 = Mt. xx. 25). Jesus rather knows Himself (Lk. xxii. 27) with each of His followers as a servant, and when He enforces upon His disciples that all true greatness which avails with God reveals itself in service (Mk. x. 40-45 = Mt. xx. 20-28; Mt. xxiii. 11 = Lk. xxii. 20) this applies to Himself too. These are declarations incapable of being invented (*unerfindbare*), which surpass in eternal value all that is eschatological, in the mouth of Him whom nevertheless the very next generation exalted to the throne of the Judge of the world (Mt. xxv. 31-34) and in the end made equal with God.¹²⁰

It was not, however, the next generation which "exalted Jesus to the throne of the Judge of the world," but Jesus Himself; it is involved, to go no farther, in His favorite self-designation of Son of Man. Nor was it merely "in the

sages, the question is to be asked whether there are really set over against one another here God and Jesus' ego, a demeanor toward the one and a demeanor towards the other. What Jesus brings into opposition to one another is rather two kinds of demeanor towards Himself and His preaching—the one, calling Him 'Lord, Lord,' pleading rights of kinship with Him, giving Him extravagant admiration, envying His mother, and so forth, and not doing what He commands (*cf.* Lk. vi. 46); the other, according obedience to the word of God with which He comes forward, and doing what He announces as the will of God. The general meaning of these declarations is not that Jesus points in any way away from Himself to God, but that He deprecates every manner of relation to Him which does not include the doing of His moral requirements."

¹²⁰ It is interesting to observe how little advance has been made on the Arians in this method of argument. Athanasius (Migne, *Patr. Graec.* xxvi. col. 985c) tells us that in attempting to discover a less than divine Jesus in the Scriptures they said: "How can [the Son] be like [the Father] or of the Father's essence, when it is written, As the Father has life in Himself, so He has given also to the Son to have life in Himself? There is, they say, a superiority in the giver above the receiver. And, Why callest thou me good? they say, No one is good except one, God. And again, My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me? And once more, Of the last day no one knoweth, not even the Son, except the Father. And again, Whom the Father sanctified and sent into the world. And again, Whom the Father raised from the dead. How, then, they say, can He that is raised from the dead be like or of the same nature with Him that raised Him?" This is to all intents and purposes Holtzmann before Holtzmann.

end" that He was made "equal with God;" Jesus Himself placed Himself not only "at the side of God" in contradistinction to all creatures, above the angels of heaven themselves (Mk. xiii. 52, one of Schmiedel's "pillar-passages"), and asserted for Himself an interactive reciprocity with God in knowledge of one another, such as implies His equality with God (Mt. xi. 27, a passage admitted by Schmiedel to be authentic), but also combines His own person as Son with the Father and the Spirit in the One Name which is above every name (Mt. xxviii. 19). The difficulty with Holtzmann as with Schmiedel is only that he cannot think in the terms of the historical tradition of Christianity and is consumed by zeal to get behind the tradition and impose his own forms of thought on the "real" Jesus. The marks of lowliness of spirit which he discovers in Jesus—who, being man, declared Himself to be meek and lowly in heart—seem to him to be inconsistent with a claim for Jesus of a Divine nature for no other reason than that he sets before himself the irreconcilable dilemma, either Divine or human, and never once entertains the wider conception of both Divine and human. And yet it is really undeniable that this is the conception which rules the whole historical tradition of Christianity, underlies the narratives of the Synoptic Gospels as truly as the reasoning of Paul, and provides the one key which will unlock the mysteries of the self-consciousness of Jesus as depicted in the earliest tradition known to us. To tear the elements of this self-consciousness apart, and assign fragments of it to Jesus and other fragments to the "faith of the community" on no other ground than that thus a view of Jesus and of the development of Christian feeling and thinking about Jesus is attained which falls better in with the paradigms of our preconceived conceptions of what were "natural," or even of what were possible, is utterly illegitimate criticism, in the complete absence of evidence for any such discrimination of facts in the tradition, or for any such development of feeling and thinking concerning Jesus, as is supposed. We

must awake at last to the understanding that the historical tradition of Jesus is of a Divine-human Jesus and that this tradition is copious, constant, and to all appearance aboriginal. To break with this tradition is to break with the entire historical tradition of Jesus, and to cast ourselves adrift to form a conception of the real Jesus purely *a priori*, in accordance with our own notions of the fit or the possible, unaided by the least scrap of historical evidence.

But surely, it will be exclaimed, we must exclude the impossible from our conception of the actual Jesus. Undoubtedly the impossible cannot have been actual. It is a reasonable custom of historians therefore to exclude the manifestly impossible from the constructions of the actual which they extract from the testimony before them;¹⁴⁰ though it is worthy of remark that they recommend a wise wariness in declaring attested occurrences impossible.¹⁴¹ Of one thing we may meanwhile be sure,—that what was actual can scarcely be impossible; and it is not a bad way—among others—of determining what is possible to observe what is actual. The testimony to the actual existence of the supernatural Jesus is simply overwhelming. Shall we set it all aside on the bald assumption that the supernatural is impossible? Two remarks fall to be made here. The first is that Schmiedel at least is committed not to treat the supernatural element in the Synoptical account of Jesus as *a priori* impossible. "It would clearly be wrong," he says,¹⁴² "in an investigation such as the present, to start from any

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Langlois and Seignobos, *Introduction to the Study of History*, 1898, p. 206 ff; H. B. George, *Historical Evidence*, 1909, pp. 138-167.

¹⁴¹ H. B. George, for example wishes us to be chary of rejecting all miraculous accounts (though on grounds which only go part of the way) and not only enunciates the general proposition that "when a statement is made by a real contemporary it requires something beyond mere intrinsic improbability to lead us to disbelieve it" (p. 164), but, with his eye directly on miracles, declares that although when the document narrating them is of low credibility they may be safely neglected, yet when the general credibility of documents must be rated high, "it becomes more difficult to disparage any statement contained in them, whether it is called miraculous or not" (p. 169).

¹⁴² *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1877.

such postulate or axiom as that 'miracles' are impossible,"—though, as we have seen, if he does not start from this postulate he soon calls it in as the determining principle of his criticism.¹⁴³ The second remark is that the supernatural element cannot be excluded from the life of Jesus except on the ground of its *a priori* impossibility. To all critical efforts to exclude it, it proves absolutely intractable. The whole historical tradition testifies to an intensely supernatural Jesus. It is only on the ground of a philosophical presupposition that the supernatural is impossible that the supernatural Jesus can be set aside.¹⁴⁴ But thus the question as to the supernatural Jesus is shifted into a region other than the historical. Whether the supernatural is possible is a question not of historical criticism but of philosophical world-view. For the present it may be permitted to go at that. It is enough to have made it plain that if the supernatural Jesus is to be displaced from history, it is not on historical grounds that He can be displaced.

¹⁴³ *Encyclopaedia Biblica*, col. 1878: "Lk. xxiii. 44 expressly, and Mk. xv. 33, Mt. xxvii. 45 also to all appearance, allege an eclipse of the sun, a celestial phenomenon which, however, is possible only at the period of New Moon,—i.e., shortly before the 1st of Nisan—and cannot happen on the 15th or 14th of a month", that is to say the phenomenon of the darkening of the sun *cannot* have happened unless it happened *naturally*. Cf. above, note 13.

¹⁴⁴ "For," says Strauss (second *Life of Jesus*. I. p. 19), "if the Gospels are really and truly historical, it is not possible to exclude miracles from the Life of Jesus; if, on the other hand, miracles are incompatible with history, then the Gospels are not really historical records."

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

A First Book in Metaphysics. By WALTER T. MARVIN, Collegiate Professor of Logic and Mental Philosophy in Rutgers College. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912. 8vo; pp. xiv, 271. \$1.50 net.

In writing this book the author has had in mind to fulfil the following three purposes: "First, he wished the book to be simple, clear and definite, and as brief as possible in order that the student using it might devote by far the larger part of his time to further reading." "Secondly, he wished to write, not an outline of the historical development of the problems of metaphysics, nor a long discussion regarding the definition and division of philosophy, nor again an account of rival philosophical schools and their theories, but a book in metaphysics, a book representing consistently one contemporary philosophical tendency." "Lastly, he wished to adapt the book especially to the Oxford or preceptorial method of instruction."

These three aims have been realized. Professor Marvin's work is a model of clear, concise and interesting statement. It demonstrates that even the metaphysician can speak in the language of the people. Again, he has given us, not a history of metaphysics, but a consistent presentation of neo-realism; and in this we think that he has done most wisely. "The beginner demands, and has the right to demand, a modern philosophical creed." In the opinion of the reviewer, nothing has done more to bring metaphysics and even philosophy in general into disrepute than the fact that in modern times they have come to be discussed as though the writer had no creed of his own and did not deem it important that any one else should have one. Nor has the author failed to adapt his book to the Oxford or preceptorial method of instruction. He has almost given a convincing object lesson of what this method of instruction is. The classified and graded references for private reading on the part of the pupil are invaluable. They not only show him what to read, but they suggest, and even constrain, that free discussion with a competent instructor which is the distinctive feature of the Oxford method. Would that we had enjoyed it in our college days!

As to neo-realism and its claim to be the true metaphysic, the reviewer, because a layman in philosophy, asks for more light and more time. Accustomed to ground his thinking on the natural-realism of Dr. McCosh, there is not a little that seems at least strange to him in neo-realism. With its purpose to learn from science and to be true to fact he is, of course, in fullest sympathy, and he believes that in

emphasizing this it will fulfil a high and an important mission; but he is not prepared to say unqualifiedly, as has been said, that "philosophy must follow the sciences rather than pretend to lead them." Doubtless, she should and must ever learn from them and check herself by them, but could metaphysics be the science of fundamental truth and resign leadership? It cannot determine facts, but must it not ultimately determine our view of facts?

In Professor Marvin's presentation of neo-realism there is much, as it seems to us, which commends it to the Christian apologist. Such, for example, are the emphasis that he lays on the discontinuous in evolution and the contingency of the world. These appear, not only to allow, but to demand, creation and the Supernatural. On the other hand, there is that which must afford difficulty to the apologist, and which, consequently, he cannot accept without further light. Thus, the teaching that faith is "unfounded assertion" (p. 54). Of course, it is unfounded in the sense which the author intends; that is, what is believed is neither perceived nor demonstrated: but would it be genuine faith, if it did not rest on adequate evidence? and can it rest on adequate evidence, as unimpeachable testimony, and be properly called "unfounded"? Again, we cannot reduce causation to implication merely. A cause does imply its effect, but we cannot escape the conviction that it implies it because it is a substance with power to produce it. Once more, we cannot agree with our author in his rejection of the theistic proofs. In this respect neo-realism seems to us to have borrowed too much from Kant, as in that just noticed it would appear to lean too much toward Hume. Doubtless, as the great thinker of Königsburg stated the theistic proofs they did issue in antinomies, but is his statement of them the only one or the true one? Finally, must the independence or real existence of the soul be left in suspense until the psychologist settles it by "discovering some crucial experiment" (p. 266)? This is a question which psychology has been relegating to metaphysics, and now the new metaphysics kicks it back into psychology; and yet, as it seems to the unsophisticated reviewer, the real existence of the soul is *the* condition of either metaphysics or science. In writing thus, however, we would not decry the volume under review. We would simply call attention to some of the points at which we would like to have more light from neo-realism. The book before us is a real and important contribution to metaphysics. Perhaps, the least thing that it has done has been to show the wide extent, the positiveness and the practical nature of the content of this branch of philosophy; but this is both great and unusual.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Nature of Personality. A Course of Lectures. By WILLIAM TEMPLE, Headmaster of Repton; Late Fellow of Queen's College, Oxford; Chaplain to the Archbishop of Canterbury. London: Macmillan & Co. 1911. 12mo; pp. xxxii, 120.

This book consists of eight brief lectures on "Personality" delivered

in Oxford in the Lent Term of 1910, to which has been prefixed as an introduction a lecture on "Materialism and Agnosticism" delivered in Melbourne in August 1910. The style in which it is written is singularly clear and direct, even conversational; and it makes admirable reading. The object of the lectures is to attain a good working notion of the nature of personality and the method pursued is, as the author himself explains, partly inductive and partly deductive, but mainly inductive. Starting with the simplest notions as expressed in the contrasting ideas of Thing, Brute, Person, the conception of Personality is gradually built up in crisp sentences and by means of the most homely and striking illustrations. The ultimate result is that "purpose is the highest and most distinctive mark of Personality" (p. 71); and this result is right if only we bear fully in mind that the purpose is not the Person but the Person's. We do not know that Mr. Temple would altogether forget this; but in view of the obviously voluntarist tendency of his thought it seems worth while to make the remark.

Mr. Temple's fundamental interest is theological and therefore he does not stay in his inquiry until he reaches the idea of God and indeed of what he calls "the triune personality of God." In his view complete personality is found only in God in whom the series begun with the Thing finds its end term; since in Him alone we find a "spiritual Being wholly determined by Himself." Or rather, to be more explicit, four ideas enter into the grounds of the judgment that God is alone completely personal: He is a "spiritual Being to whom all time has a value, and to whom therefore, in some sense, all time is present, but for whom the future is always the governing element in time; a Being determined by Himself alone and in His action always guided by His whole Purpose, never by any single impulse or caprice; a Being moreover whose Purpose is absolutely self-less—a Being who realizes Himself in spending Himself for others" (p. 79). To this typical Personality our incomplete personalities make only a qualified approach.

There are scattered through the discussion many admirable remarks which at once stimulate and satisfy thought. No doubt there are others which rather stimulate than satisfy it. It is quite startling to be told, for instance, that so completely is morality a social affair that: "The isolated individual may be wise or foolish; he cannot be moral or immoral. An atheistic debauchee upon a desert island is not liable to moral censure" (p. 51). And we revolt equally strongly when we are told that God cannot be conceived apart from the world. "If it is said that, at least before the Creation, God existed alone and in no relation at all, then I say that 'before the Creation' is a phrase to which I can attach no meaning, for I cannot see why the world should ever have begun at all. God is its Creator, not because He made it at a moment of time, but because from all eternity to all eternity it depends upon the Will of God" (p. 87). "God as He is in Himself is God in relation to the world; God out of that relation is precisely God as He is not, either in Himself or otherwise" (p. 98). He has therefore no need to posit

a "social Trinity" to give him a self-conscious and a living God: he therefore does not teach a "social Trinity"—what he teaches as to the Trinity he himself feels requires to be defended from the charge of Sabellianism: "We cannot with safety go further in this direction than to say that in the Unity of the Godhead there must be a wealth of Being adequate to support three essential and essentially distinct relations in which we know that we stand to God" (p. 115).

Enough has doubtless been said, however, to suggest the general trend of Mr. Temple's philosophising. Possibly even the few brief quotations that have been made may suggest the crispness of the language in which he gives it expression. Perhaps when we have said his book is a stimulating book we have said all that needs to be said. This is probably all he intended it to be.

Princeton.

B. B. WARFIELD.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

A Psychological Study of Religion. Its Origin, Function, and Future.

By JAMES H. LEUBA, Professor of Psychology, Bryn Mawr College, U. S. A. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1912. 8vo; pp. xiv, 367. \$2.00 net.

The author of this quite elaborate work does not pretend that "his concern in it has been purely scientific". On the contrary, he feels that "religion is too vital a matter to leave even the theoretically minded person altogether indifferent to its destiny". Hence, it is that he would bring to it "the purification and guidance" that only science can provide, and "particularly the insight into the dynamics of conscious life which can be contributed, not by studies in comparative religion nor by criticism of sacred texts, but only by psychology." But this is not all. It soon becomes evident that he does not aim at what we would consider the regeneration of religion through psychology: he would rather undermine the religious view of God and the world. Almost at the opening of his discussion he frankly informs us: "I cannot persuade myself that divine personal beings, be they primitive gods or the Christian Father, have more than a subjective existence (p. 10), and at the close of his book he affirms "theism to be logically impossible" (p. 21). That is, as the context shows, though he offers the reader the alternative between the objective and the merely subjective existence of the gods, he indicates that he himself has prejudged the question and announces himself an agnostic, if not an atheist. Nor are these the only instances of his bias against religion and specially against Christianity. On page 309 he writes: "Belief in individual immortality is not as necessary to man as the small minority who talk about it would make it appear. Man gets along perfectly well without it. Our behaviour shows that we are very well organized to live an individually finite life on this temporary planet"; and on page 275 he lets us into the secret of his

position when he tells us: "The author was brought up in a religious atmosphere. During adolescence and several subsequent years, he was deeply stirred by religion and passed through conversion. And although now he finds little acceptable in the Roman Catholic and the Protestant dogmas, he has retained a sympathetic appreciation and understanding of religious life." That is to say, the book which is under review is not, as its title would imply, a dispassionate scientific discussion of religion from the standpoint of psychology; but it is a polemic specially against the Christian religion by a psychologist who writes with all the bias and temper of a lover who has turned against his first love. This is a hard thing to say and, like every argumentum ad hominem, it proves nothing as to the main issue. But it is necessary that it should be said. Otherwise, the unsophisticated reader might easily be misled by such frequent slurs and insinuations as that the religion of the future "must be free from the dishonest shifts to which traditional Christianity is now driven" (p. 333).

Returning, however, to the criticism of the book in itself and without reference to its author, we are constrained to take exception:

1. To its conception of religion. "Religion," says Dr. Leuba, "is that part of human experience in which man feels himself in relation with powers of psychic nature, usually personal powers, and makes use of them" (p. 52). This definition, however, misses the point. It does not tell us why the religious man believes that psychic powers can help him. It is because he apprehends them as able to influence his destiny and himself as necessarily subject to them. In a word, the use of psychic powers characteristic of religion is not a use of them as merely helpful; it is a use of them as powers that must be reckoned with. This is true, if not always clear, in the case of the lowest religions; it is self-evident in such a religion as Christianity: and the reason why our author has made his mistake is that, like so many, he would look for the essence of religion in its lowest rather than in its highest forms. As Edward Caird has well said, "In the first instance, at least, we must read development backward and not forward, we must find the key to the first stage in the meaning of the last" (*The Evolution of Religion*, vol. I, p. 48).

2. His explanation of magic. He would regard it as originating in the belief in impersonal force; he would call this belief "dynamism"; and he holds that this belief in impersonal force "not only arises first, but persists after more complex notions of power have been added." Whence, however, the idea of force at all? Is it not from the beginning conceived personally? Is it not from our own consciousness of self as willing and so energising that we derive our idea of power? It would seem as if our author's judgment had been shaped by his *à priori* theory rather than by psychology. In the light of the latter, it is impersonal power which is the more abstract and difficult conception.

3. His account of morality. He traces it, not to the discernment and appreciation of an objective law, but to the presence of the needs arising in the course of social development. That is, society instead of being

determined by it, evolves it. Why, then, is it that there are certain *fixed* principles of expediency? Why is that we find that true self-realization must follow *definite* lines? Why is it that in both history and individual experience there is evident a distinct power that makes for a distinct and *immutable* something which we call righteousness? All this would be impossible, it could not when appreciated even be conceived, but for a standard above expediency, objective to self, and grounded in the nature of things only because expressing their true purpose. When the essentially mutable tends thus to realize the immutable, there is implied an immutable standard, and this, of course, must be above and thus objective to the mutable. In a word, our author mistakes the occasion for the cause. We may grant that it is only in the course of social development and in response to its needs that morality emerges; but that does not make it, just as we have seen that it could not be, the product of social development. Here, as elsewhere, ideas determine needs rather than needs ideas.

4. The origin of religion. Our author's account of this is vitiated by the same loose and false reasoning that we have been criticizing. We should anticipate that it would be so, if for no other reason, from the naïve assurance with which he undertakes to show us just how religion began. He seems incapable of appreciating the difficulty of discerning and describing the origin of the prehistoric. He tells us precisely how primitive man first came to conceive of and to rely on psychic powers, with as much confidence as if he had himself been with him. "The observation of a variety of phenomena suggests to the primitive mind the existence of unseen agents of various sorts": (1) dreams, trances, and allied phenomena generate the belief in ghosts and spirits of human form and attributes; (2) the personification of natural objects leads to the belief in nature-beings conceived frequently as animals; (3) the problem of creation gives rise to the belief in a Maker or Makers in the form of man" (p. 110). This idea of God thus suggested is then developed and elevated according to the ascending needs of men. In a word, God does not make us, but we make God. The question, however, at once arises, Why do not the animals also make God? Essentially the same phenomena appear to them as to us. Their need of God is as real if not so great as ours. Why is it, then, that they never become religious? Thus this, as every purely naturalistic explanation of religion, ends in mystery. As Bavinck has well said, "They all have the defect that they cannot derive religion from non-religious factors, and either cannot find the transition, or, if they indicate such a transition, always presuppose religion; they thus oscillate between a *metabasis eis allo genos* and a *petitio principii*" (*The Philosophy of Revelation*, p. 159). This is admitted by the most competent scholars. "How religion arose and out of what causes is entirely unknown to us", says Troeltsch, "and just as in the case of morals and logic, will always remain unknown to us" (*Die Christ. Religion*, in *Die Kultur der Gegenwart*, p. 483). Openly or secretly all turn back to a unique inborn disposition, to a *religio insita*. Not only

does Troeltsch do this, but also Schroeder, adherent of the doctrine of descent though he is. Tiele went back to an inborn feeling and need of the infinite, and even Hugo de Vries speaks of the need of religion as an inborn quality of man (H. de Vries, *Afstammings-en Mutatieleer*, p. 36). If, however, religion as *religio insita* is an essential element of human nature, "it points", as Bavinck says, "directly back to revelation. We stand here before essentially the same dilemmas as in the case of self-consciousness. If self-consciousness is not a delusion or imagination" (and Dr. Leuba admits that religious belief is neither [p. 110]), "the reality of the self is necessarily included in it; hence religion is either a pathology of the human spirit, or it postulates the existence, the revelation, and the knowableness of God" (*Phil. of Rev.*, p. 159). That is, in order to validate our author's explanation, we must assume what he, by means of it, would explain away.

5. His sources of information. These are: "the present customs and beliefs of the most primitive peoples known to us; the behavior and ideas of children; and the teachings of general psychology" (p. vii). The first two of these, at least, are worthless. It is not the case that the conditions of the life of the embryo, of childhood and of youth are a recapitulation of those of the ancestors of men and of the first men themselves. Thus the small stature of human beings in youth certainly should prove that primitive men were very small; but according to Stanley Hall, they were rather of gigantic stature (*Adolescence*, I, p. 107; II, p. 67). It is no wonder that the same writer concludes that there are "many inversions" in the ontogenetic law: "ontogeny often reverses the order of phylogeny" (*Adolescence*, I, p. 241). Nor do the nature-peoples afford us better means of learning to know primitive man. "The name itself is misleading; nature-peoples are nowhere to be found, any more than wild or culture-less people", in the strict sense. As Fr. Ratzel says, "The peoples can not be arranged in succession, one after the other; it is arbitrary to place the nature-peoples at the beginning of the genealogical table of the human race and to represent their condition as the original condition of mankind" (*Volkerkunde*, I, p. 14). That is, our author's chief sources of information as to the origin of religion become available only on a one-sided theory of the development of the human race. Degeneracy is a fact as truly as progress.

6. Loose reasoning. An example of this appears in the criticism of the cosmological argument and, indeed, of the theistic proofs generally. Because no one of them, when interpreted strictly, realizes the complete idea of God, it is held that all of them, when combined, cannot. Nor is this non-sequitur the only error. The law of causal resemblance is entirely overlooked; viz., that "nothing can be in the effect which is not potentially in the cause", and that "the cause must always be, in its nature and possibilities, superior to its effect". Thus, if personality be in the world—and it is that in it which is highest,—how can the First Cause of the world be less than personal, that is, be impersonal?

7. The general assumption really underlying the whole discussion, that

expediency and truth are distinct and that as a stimulus of religion expediency is of more value than truth. Thus our author reviews the benefits which would accrue to mankind from a "belief in non-existent gods" (p. 11), and he concludes that we may "affirm with confidence that the mere belief in gods", though an utterly false belief, "may of itself produce results sufficient to make of religion a factor of the highest biological importance" (p. 14). This, reduced to the lowest terms, means the abrogation of truth and thus the stultification of the writer. On his principle, honesty need not be the best policy and the impulse to true progress may be untruth.

8. The future religion. This is the religion of humanity conceived idealistically rather than positivistically. "There is no question," says our author, "but that Humanity idealized and conceived as a manifestation of Creative Energy possesses surpassing qualification for a source of religious inspiration" (p. 335). . . . "A religion in agreement with the accepted body of scientific knowledge, and centered about Humanity conceived as the manifestation of a Force tending to the creation of an ideal society, would occupy in the social life the place that a religion should normally hold,—even the place that the Christian religion lost when its cardinal beliefs ceased to be in harmony with secular beliefs" (p. 336) "And I see no sufficient reason why a religion of Humanity should not incorporate in a modified form elements of the therapeutic cults" (such as Christian Science) "which have been found effective in the healing of mind and body" (p. 336). There are at least two reasons why this prophecy can never be fulfilled, even with the help of Christian Science and other therapeutic cults. One is that man is a person. It is a necessity of personality to enter into communion with other persons. As Illingworth has written, "We are so constituted that we cannot regard inanimate property, uncommunicated knowledge, unreciprocated emotion, solitary action, otherwise than as means to an end. We press on through it all until we have found persons like ourselves with whom to share it, and then we are at rest" (*Personality Human and Divine*, p. 37). Our rest, however, is not permanent. Because persons we must love other persons, but it is only the infinite love of the Infinite Person that can satisfy us. As Augustine said, "Thou hast made us", O God, "for thyself, and our souls are ever restless till they rest in thee" (*Confessions* I, 1). It is because of his ineradicable, since essential, demand of humanity for an infinite person to love and by whom to be loved that no impersonal cult can ever become the religion of the human race or can ever take the place of its religion. But there is another reason. Man is a sinner. He is under condemnation. We may differ much as to our conception of salvation; but as a race, at least in our more serious moments, we all feel that salvation is our deepest need. Hence, Royce is right when he says, "The higher religions of mankind—religions such as Buddhism and Christianity—have had in common this notable feature, namely, that they have been concerned with the problem of the Salvation of Man. This is sometimes expressed by

saying that they are redemptive religions—religions interested in freeing mankind from some vast and universal burden, of imperfection, of unreasonableness, of evil, of misery, of fate, of unworthiness, or of sin" (*Sources of Religious Insight*, p. 8). This is a need quite unrecognized by Dr. Leuba and that his Idealized Humanity could not possibly meet, and yet it is man's deepest and in reality his most urgent need. By his own argument, therefore, he is contradicted. He tries to prove that religion has been created by man's needs, and then he offers as the religion of the future an abstract cult which can stand in no sort of relation to his most abiding needs.

Much the most interesting and important chapter of this book is that on "Theology and Psychology". In this, after virtually affirming that the only Protestant theology of to-day is Ritschlianism and "grounds itself solely upon so-called inner experience, which, it is claimed, leads directly or through 'faith' to a knowledge of God, without the mediation of science and of metaphysics", the author proceeds to expose the weakness of this position and in so doing to annihilate, as he thinks, Protestant Christianity. With reference to this assault the reviewer would in closing remark:

1. It is not true that the theology of Ritschl has become the theology of Protestantism. This is not so, if we judge by the symbols of the historic Protestant Churches. It is not so if we judge by the belief of the rank and file of their membership. In the missionary work of the churches we discern the real spirit of Christianity, and this missionary work is not being done by the Ritschlians.

2. Our author's charge against the pragmatism of the new theology is just, and we thank him for making it. "Henceforth," he says, "the only question they are willing to acknowledge as relevant is, 'Does this or that belief produce the results we want?' If it does, they think themselves justified in holding to it by an act of faith, even against science and philosophy." This, however, does not invalidate the argument from experience as used by the old theology. That argument is not that the Christian feels such a need of the peace of God that he must believe in him; nor is it that he has a vision or immediate experience of God: but it is that he is conscious of a change and a work within him such that the causal judgment insists that they must go unexplained or an immediate intervention of God in the soul be presupposed. Nor is it any answer to this reasoning to say that this change and this work occur within the sphere of psychology and can be accounted for on psychological grounds alone. They do occur within the sphere of psychology—we may admit that, Professor James to the contrary,—and they can be studied by the psychologist; but there is a transcendent element in them, and this he, if only a psychologist, cannot see and, of course, cannot explain. The old word is as true as ever, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; and he cannot know them, because they are spiritually judged" (1 Cor. ii. 14). Nor does Dr. Leuba's reply help matters. "One does not have to be a painter," he says, "in order to be an

art critic" (p. 275). No: but one must have the taste, the spirit, of the painter. Otherwise, he will see little difference between the masterpieces of a Raphael and the daubs of a sign-maker. In a word, our author's criticism of the argument from experience bears only against the modern perversion of it. It is valid, as ever. The Christian should see in it the infallible evidence of the Divine Spirit within him that he is the child of God, and the Christian's testimony to this evidence ought to constrain even the carnal psychologist to make trial of Christianity for himself.

3. This will be so also because science and philosophy concur with Christian experience. The argument based on it is not at variance with them, though many suppose so. It is not necessary to cut Christianity loose from metaphysics and history. We agree with Dr. Leuba that that would be the death because the stultification of Christianity. Psychology has proved that man is not built in segments. We cannot believe with the heart what we must deny with the head. We cannot accept as valuable in religion what we have found to be untrue in science. But we do not have to. The evidence of Christian experience does not stand alone. It rests firmly on the philosophical and historical evidences. It is their crown, their fruit, their confirmation. Christian experience is such an experience as the great facts of Christianity make possible: it is the only experience which in view of these facts would be rational. Again we thank Dr. Leuba for his exposure of the weakness of the new theology. May it turn some back to "the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints!"

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Psychology of Religious Sects. A Comparison of Types. By HENRY C. MCCOMAS, Ph.D., Assistant Professor, Preceptor in Psychology, in Princeton University. Author of "Some Types of Attention." New York, Chicago, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. 8vo; pp. 235.

This is a book with a purpose. It is avowedly a plea for church unity. It is based on the conviction "that the differences which appear in the religious life of different denominations have their justification in the differences of human disposition and not in any divine preferences." Therefore, our author thinks that "nothing is more necessary to-day than the proclamation of this fact; for the heart of sectarianism is the belief that each sect is peculiarly a divine favorite. When all religious people freely acknowledge that their differences are matters of individual tastes and temperaments the real barriers to church unity will be brushed away."

This is an exceedingly informing and illuminating book. Dr. McComas knows both his subject and how to present it. He demonstrates what most of us have felt, that the teacher of religion, as regards at least his methods, must take counsel of the psychologist. Indeed, one could scarcely rise from the reading of these lucid chapters and not feel that what Pope said of mankind in general is specially true of the

Christian minister, and that, after the gospel, his proper study is "man".

The discussion, moreover, is conducted in an admirable spirit. We are not, as is often the case, in order that we may study the psychology of religion, compelled to breathe an atmosphere laden with naturalism. Dr. McComas purposely avoids the theological standpoint; but, unlike most psychologists of religion, he is at pains even to inform us that "it is his conviction that what the old theologians called the Holy Spirit is an actual working reality in the world of man" (p. 233). Had he not made this avowal, however, we could scarcely have questioned his position. What he has said might, as he claims, "be accepted by the Theist or by the Atheist, as it has to do with observable facts"; but nowhere in his book is there discoverable that insane passion to substitute mental reactions, if not nerve actions, for the power of God, which passion is probably the most striking characteristic of the modern psychologists of religion.

Our author's positions, moreover, are fair and sane. He is not carried away by any one conception of religion, but views it in its totality. Thus while distinctly recognizing and strongly asserting the feeling element as essential in all religion, he affirms also, "that a system of theology which commands intelligent assent is the great demand of this age"; that "no one can think one thing and believe another"; "that no one can have a religion which does not rest on a *creed* (*italics his*), not definite, perhaps, but definite enough for him to know what, in general, he thinks about God, the Soul, Duty and the Future"; "that every religious experience must have some thought basis".

With what we conceive to be Dr. McComas' aim we are in hearty accord. For we do not understand the organic union of all the sects to be his proximate end. "No greater mistake can be made," he says, "than to attempt to unite church sects that are naturally far apart." What he would work for is that unity of the Spirit for which our Lord prayed and for which we all ought to pray. If he cherishes a vision of a day when all Christendom and, indeed, all the world shall be united in one church organization, it is as the fruit of the outpouring of the Spirit upon all flesh that he cherishes it; and it is not by means of any mechanical, since man-made, unions that he would hasten it.

Our differences with him, and they are differences which ought to be frankly stated, are, in the main, four:

1. We do not believe that "every group of worshippers has been drawn together by influences which may be explained naturally". Christianity, as we are sure that our author will grant, had a supernatural origin. Protestantism, as it would seem that he must allow, was begun and continued by the Holy Spirit himself. The divisions of Protestantism had their occasions, and, doubtless, their necessary occasions, in differences of temperament, of race, of nation, etc.; but were these differences their causes? Calvin's intellectual preëminence may well have been a reason why the Holy Spirit gave to him and to his disciples a deeper insight into the things of Christ than he gave to Luther and to his followers, but did this insight come from Calvin's intellectual grasp or from the Holy Spirit?

2. Moreover, though the natural occasions by which Dr. McComas would explain the differences of the sects were their causes, this would not affect our contention. These causes, if you please, though not supernatural, were as divine as though they were. Intellectual qualities, however within the sphere of the psychologist's observation, are ultimately the gifts of Him who "divides", not to all men equally, but "to every man severally as He will" (1 Cor. xii. 11). National and racial distinctions, though they emerge as the result of natural selection in the course of social evolution, are due in the last analysis to the sovereign providence of Him who "hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation" (Acts xvii. 26). Therefore, these differences would seem to argue for the continuance of all sects not rooted in sin. Inasmuch as they are founded on divine, though natural, gifts and appointments, they would appear to indicate the will of the Lord.

3. In so far as our author conceives of church unity as essentially organic, we must also disagree with him. Neither nature nor revelation points toward such as the perfection of unity. Both declare in the words of Paul, that "the body is not one member, but many" (1 Cor. xii. 14); that these members "have not the same office" (Rom. xii. 5); and that all this finds its best and highest illustration in our union in "the body of Christ" which is his church (1 Cor. xii. 27, 28). While, therefore, many sects, because rooted in sin and continued by it, are wrong, sectarianism itself is not wrong. The result of divinely appointed and determined differences, it is indispensable to the manifestation of the true unity of the people of God, "the unity of the Spirit." "The pillar and ground of the truth," each division of the church is bound to witness to that phase of the truth which He who is "the truth" has specially committed to it.

4. There are some errors of statement important enough to call for correction.

a. While Calvin's feelings were to a high degree subject to his intellect, as every one's should be, it is not the fact that he was "a man of very little feeling" (p. 85). Prof. Doumergue, in his monumental life of the greatest of the reformers, has abundantly established and illustrated this. Calvin was a man of warm heart and of strong friendships.

b. It is not the fact that what are popularly called the Northern and the Southern Presbyterian Churches are kept apart by the political animosity "of fifty years ago" (p. 67). Political animosity would scarcely be thought of in this connection did not the Southern Church question, whether rightly or not, the faithfulness of the Northern Church to that system of doctrine which is the common heritage and should be the most sacredly guarded possession of both. Moreover, it may well be doubted whether at the time of separation the efficient cause was political animosity so much as honest doctrinal differences as to the attitude of the church towards participation by the church and as the church in civil affairs.

c. On page 84 it seems to be implied that, with the exception of the Cumberland Presbyterian Church, subscription to the Westminster Confession of Faith is required by the other branches of the Presbyterian Church of those who wish to join the church. This is a mistake, at least as regards the Northern and the Southern Presbyterian Churches. Subscription to the confession of faith is required of all ministers, elders and deacons; but of church members, only a confession of "faith in Christ and obedience to him."

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Croyances, Rites, Institutions. Par COMTE GOBLET D'ALVIELLA, Sénateur, Membre De L'Académie Royale De Belgique, Professeur A L'Université De Bruxelles. Paris: Librairie Paul Geuthner, 68, Rue Mazarine. 1911. 8vo; Tome I, Archéologie et Histoire Religieuse, *Hierographie*. Pp. xx, 383. Tome II. Questions de Méthode et d'Origines, *Hierologie*. Pp. 409. Tome III. Problèmes du Temps Présent. *Hierosophie*. Pp. 386.

Comte D'Alviella is the author of several well known works on the history of religions, some of which have been translated into English. The best known of these is perhaps his Hibbert Lectures, *The Idea of God on the Basis of Anthropology and History*. The present volumes consist of a republication of miscellanies prepared by the writer during the last thirty-five years. He confesses to some hesitation at this republication on account of a modification of some of his views and conclusions since the original composition. He claims, however, to have remained faithful to his method and general principles.

A human touch is given in the Preface by an interesting description of his struggles for personal recognition in this science, as well as his battle to secure a standing for the science of religion itself, in which few believed three decades ago. The additional difficulty presented itself, when he first came forward offering to introduce into the University of Brussels instruction in the history of religions, that he was not a doctor in philosophy and letters. Since the canonical law in this respect could not be broken, there was nothing left for the University to do but to confer upon him the doctorate *honoris causa*,—so that he was able at last to teach in peace.

The author defines religion at the outset as, "la façon dont l'homme réalise—spéculativement et pratiquement,—ses rapports avec la puissance surhumaine et mystérieuse dont il croit dépendre." This, though not a complete definition, is much better than many others that have been given by writers on the subject. The science of religion is the science which attempts to systematize religious knowledge and is divided into the three branches, Hierography, Hierology, and Hierosophy. Each of these three names gives a title to one of the volumes of this work. Hierography has for its object to describe all known religions, and to explain their development. Hierology seeks to establish relationships of concomitance and succession between religious phe-

nomena; in other words, to formulate the laws of religious evolution. This synthesis is more frequently called the comparative history of religions, or simply comparative religion. Hierosophy attempts to formulate the logical consequences in the religious sphere of a rational conception of our relation to God and to the universe (II, 192-193). It must be said, however, that the author does not make a very strenuous attempt to confine the contents of each volume to the subject-matter of the title. In fact the grouping of the papers is of the loosest character. This three-fold classification of the study of religion adopted by D'Alviella is a comprehensive one, and indicates fairly well the current divisions of the subject, though the nomenclature varies, of course, with different writers.

In the three volumes before us there are some eighty papers altogether. Some are articles previously published in periodicals; some, short book-reviews; some, addresses delivered on different occasions; and others, synopses of a few of the author's university lectures. These papers are, therefore, as was to be expected, of varying value. Some are of importance, but others too fragmentary or too much out of date to be of special significance. The range of subjects treated is enormous. The titles of some of the articles will indicate the encyclopaedic character of the work. In the first volume (*Hierography*): Prayer Mills, Liturgical Wheels, Art and Religion in the Roman Catacombs, The Archaeology of the Cross (the French version of the article *Cross* in the *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*), The Responsibility of Religious Influences in the Destruction of Ancient Civilization, Non-Christian Trinities, Pagan Christs, the Problem of the Fourth Gospel, The Origins of Christianity (Syllabus of Six Lectures), the Worship of Reason and of the Supreme Being, The Heavenly Twins, Buddhist Dogmatics, With the Mormons. In the second volume (*Hierology*), some of the subjects treated are: Prejudices in the Scientific Study of Religions, the Beliefs of Non-civilized Peoples and the Primitive Form of Religions, The Comparative Method of the History of Religions, Animism and its Place in Religious Evolution, The Congress of the History of Religions at Oxford, Auxiliary Sciences of the Comparative History of Religions, The Evolution of Ecclesiastical Institutions According to Herbert Spencer, Mythology and Anthropomorphism, Religion in Animals, Historical Connections between Religion and Morals. In the third volume (*Hierosophy*), some of the titles are: A Visit to the Rationalistic Churches of London, The Harmony of Genesis and Geology, Conditional Immortality, Harrison against Spencer on the Religious Value of the Unknowable, The Religion or Irreligion of the Future, The Law of Progress in Religions, Sociology and Psychology of Religions, Religious Progress in the United States, the Notion of the Divine and the Method of Evolution, the New Psychology and the Religious Sentiment, Free Masonry in Relation to Politics and Religion, The Religion and Superstition of Life.

On these topics and others in the work the author writes always interestingly and in a clear and often charming style. He is, of course,

more of an authority on some of the subjects treated than on others. He can write with a better claim on our *a priori* acquiescence when he discourses on religious archaeology and certain aspects of the history of religions, than when he gives his views on the problem of the Fourth Gospel and the relation of Paul to Jesus.

The author adopts the ordinary view as to the phenomenistic character of the history of religions (hierography), declaring that we cannot insist too much on the fact that its essential object is not to pronounce on the validity or value of religious beliefs, but to study their formation. What should be the attitude, then, of the history of religions towards the supernatural? The scientific students of this study, he thinks, have the right to explain everything in religious phenomena in accordance with the natural order of things until proofs are furnished of supernatural action. It belongs really to philosophy and theology to consider metaphysical questions connected with the supernatural. The history of religions should be descriptive, not philosophical. Yet Comte D'Alviella, like some other hierologists who make similar professions, does not preserve this impartial attitude toward the supernatural when he comes to the life of Jesus. In the very volume which treats of hierography or the history of religions, he arbitrarily eliminates the miracles of Jesus in the following summary fashion: "La tradition rapporte qu'il guérissait les malades et délivrait les possédés, comme le faisaient tous les inspirés de son temps. Les miracles qu'on lui attribue ne sont que le récit amplifié de ces phénomènes psychiques, quant ils ne sont pas des légendes introduites après coup pour accroître son prestige" (I, p. 247). Also the Jesus of history disappears with his death (p. 248). Perhaps the author would say that in these cases the proofs of supernatural action demanded were not forthcoming, but it is probably doing the author no injustice to say that no proofs of supernatural action in any case could ever be furnished him that would be satisfactory.

On an exceedingly large number of topics, some of which have been mentioned, these volumes constitute a perfect mine of information which the student of the science of religion will find invaluable.

McCormick Theological Seminary.

BENJAMIN LEWIS HOBSON.

The Religion of the Ancient Celts. By J. A. MACCULLOCH, Hon. D.D. (St. Andrews), Hon. Canon of Cumbrae Cathedral. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911. Pp. xv, 399.

Dr. MacCulloch has elaborated, in the present volume, his useful account of the religion of the ancient Celts which appeared, *sub voce* "Celts", in Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, volume iii, pp. 277 ff. The Celtic field has always been inviting to the revels of the "mythological" school, but Dr. MacCulloch has restrained himself from enjoying even the relatively sane and certainly brilliant indulgences of Sir John Rhys, and has resolutely kept himself to the strait and narrow anthropological way. He has been hampered, as all students of Celtic antiquities are, by the fragmentary and mediate

character of the sources. This initial disadvantage has been overcome, as far as may be, by the careful use of the comparative method and the study of folk-survivals. The discussion, always conducted with scholarship and discrimination, ranges from the origin of the Celtic peoples, through accounts of the gods of Gaul and the continental Celts, the Irish mythological cycles (the Tuatha Dé Danann, the Cúchulainn, and the Fionn), the worship of the dead, of Nature, of rivers and wells, trees and plants, and animals, the Celtic cosmogony, sacrifice, prayer, divination, tabu, festivals, and accessories of cult, to culminate in several chapters on the Druids and on Celtic eschatology.

Particularly interesting is the display of evidence for the worship of mother-goddesses (*Deae Matres*, etc.), though it would perhaps be better to guard more carefully the implication that all of them alike are "the descendants of the primitive Earth-mother" (p. 45), unless Dr. MacCulloch desires us to understand that, in his opinion, there was a pan-Celtic Earth-mother, comparable to those in the Mediterranean area,—an opinion which it would be difficult to substantiate. Dr. MacCulloch successfully refutes the view, maintained on various grounds by Sir John Rhys, Sir G. L. Gomme and M. Salomon Reinach, that the Druids were a pre-Celtic priesthood which imposed itself on the conquering Celts, and he completes the dissolution of the classical illusion that they were possessed of esoteric and recondite doctrines of a monotheistic or pantheistic trend, as also, by the way, the popular idea that the mistletoe rite occupied a central place in their cult-practice. They had their mysteries, which were guarded with all the jealousy of an organized and ambitious priestcraft, but "their doctrine of metempsychosis, if it was really taught, involved no ethical content as in Pythagoreanism. Their astronomy was probably astrological; their knowledge of nature a series of cosmogonic myths and speculations" (p. 303). Their didactic and magical powers gave them firm root in the veneration of the Celts until they were eradicated by the Romans in Gaul and by Christianity in Ireland and Britain. The chapters on "The State of the Dead", "Rebirth and Transmigration", and "Elysium" reduce to comparative order the ardent belief of the Celts in a world beyond the grave, a belief which yielded in vividness to that of none of the ancient races except the Egyptians, and are of peculiar interest in view of the common human belief in an after life and the imaginative and poetic gifts which the Celts brought to its adornment.

Princeton.

HAROLD McA. ROBINSON.

Religion in China. Universism: A Key To The Study Of Taoism And Confucianism. By J. J. M. DE GROOT, Ph.D., LL.D., Professor of Sinology in the University of Berlin. American Lectures on the History of Religions Series of 1910-1911. G. P. Putnam's Sons. \$1.50.

Prof. T. W. Rhys-Davids in 1894 was the first to lecture in the course of "American Lectures on the History of Religions" and Prof. De Groot is the ninth. Others, such as Prof. Cheyne, Prof. Karl Budde,

Prof. George Steindorf, and Prof. A. V. W. Jackson have occupied this lectureship and very valuable have been the contributions which they have made to a correct understanding of the religions of the world. The latest of the series to be published is this work on the Religion of China and it is a worthy successor to the able treatises which have preceded it.

Dr. De Groot is eminently qualified to speak with authority. He has spent years in the Far East and is thoroughly familiar with the ancient Classics of China. As the author understands it, the three religions now found in China are in reality all branches of the same root: a worship of the universe as the only right norm of belief and conduct. In the universe are to be distinguished two great opposing elements which have themselves been produced by Chaos. These are the Yang and the Yin. The Yang is Heaven with all its powers capable of enriching and blessing the lives of men. The Yin is Earth cold and sterile except as it is rendered warm and fertile by the influences of the Yang. Man is the product of the union of these elements. If a man is to be happy he must learn to live governed by the same laws that govern the earth. To the devout Chinaman the world is filled with good spirits and with demons. If he will live true to the "Tao" or "the way of the road of Yin and Yang" he may escape the power of the demons and have the aid of the good spirits. His whole religious life therefore must be made to conform to the laws of nature.

Certain universal principles were discovered in nature such as impartiality, justice, compliance, forbearance, abnegation, absence of passion, inaction, taciturnity, and quiescence and perfection. Holiness, and divinity are sought by their means. The government of the empire was believed to be in exact accord with the rule of the "Heavenly Tao" and the Emperor a god revealing the truth to his people. To properly interpret nature to man very complex systems based on astrology and geomancy, chronometry and chronomancy were invented and every act of life was to be regulated according to the rules therein given. The whole nation was controlled by a religious system based on the worship and the deification of the universe. Real scientific knowledge was impossible. Should it enter it would perforce destroy the whole religious system of the people and with it the basis for their morality.

Dr. De Groot confines himself to a very clear analysis of the origin foundations, and present development of the Religion of China but he closes his book with these suggestive words. "The only power that can explode it" (i.e. the present all dominating system of Universism), "is sound science, based on an experimental and mathematical investigation of the laws of nature. But such science is only just born in China. Should there come a time when it is seriously cultivated there, then, no doubt, a complete revolution in its religion, philosophy, ethics, literature, political institutions, and customs will take place: a process by which China must be either thoroughly disorganized and ruined or reborn and regenerated. Then China will cease to be China and the Chinese will no longer be Chinese. . . . Should the Order of the

world have decreed that the cruel work of demolition shall be done, and that the days of China's universalistic civilization are numbered—then may its last day not be for that hapless ancient nation the crack of doom!"

Since Dr. De Groot delivered these lectures the process of change in China has gained remarkable acceleration. The Monarchy, a fundamental part of the religious system, has been destroyed. Hundreds of young men are being sent abroad by the government to study in our great universities, and schools and colleges are springing up all over the ancient Empire. The time of change has come. Soon the nation will be compelled to give up its ancient beliefs. What shall replace them? Agnosticism, Anarchy and Immorality or the Gospel of Christ? All Christians who are inclined to discount the present agitation made by the Foreign Mission Boards of our churches and to think that they exaggerate the present crisis in China might well read this scholarly work by Dr. De Groot and then study the present condition of China.

Cranford, N. J.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Pentateuchal Studies. By HAROLD M. WIENER, M.A., LL.B., of Lincoln's Inn, Barrister-at-law, Author of "The Origin of the Pentateuch", "Essays in Pentateuchal Criticism", etc. Oberlin, Ohio, U. S. A.: Bibliotheca Sacra Company. London: Elliot Stock, 7 Paternoster Row, E. C. 1912. Pp. xvi, 353.

These studies consist of twenty-three essays. The shortest is a comment covering but half a page, the longest is an article of fifty pages. All of them are reprints, and with three exceptions have appeared in the pages of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* between January 1910 and April 1912 inclusive. "A large group of these studies is concerned with the textual criticism of the Divine appellations in Genesis, and the larger question of which it forms part, the textual criticism of the Pentateuch" (p. v). An unpleasant feature of the book is the personal polemic in which the author indulges (Studies viii, ix, and x). The correspondence with Dr. Briggs and Dr. Driver (Studies ix and x) should, in our opinion, never have been published. It is unedifying, contributes nothing of value to the debate, and does not comport with the prevailingly genial tone of the book.

Mr. Wiener is zealous for the law and the prophets, but is indifferent to the rest of the Scriptures. Chronicles, Ezra, and Nehemiah are "only hagiography" (pp. 232, 272). This attitude towards the books contained in the third division of the Hebrew canon vitally affects his discussion of the "Priests and Levites" (Study xx).

Textual criticism is a prominent feature in these essays. He comes to the task a competent Hebrew scholar with a mastery of Latin and Greek and with access to western learning through his knowledge

of the modern European languages. But Mr. Wiener is not discriminating in his textual criticism. The Hebrew text is on the whole vastly superior to that of the Septuagint; and the fact of a different reading in the Septuagint, on the ground of which Mr. Wiener ever and anon impugns the Hebrew text, does not in itself cast reasonable suspicion on the soundness of the Hebrew text. The recension of the Greek version in which the divergent reading appears, and likewise the occurrence or non-occurrence of this reading in the other recensions and in the other ancient versions, must be considered before judgment is passed on the question of the original text. The divisive critics, however, have erred in the same direction as Mr. Wiener. They have been equally hasty in citing or neglecting the versions according as these versions do or do not accord with the demands of the hypothesis; and notoriously in reference to the divine names and the names Jacob and Israel have they been hasty in assuming a textual corruption, introduced by the editor, whenever the name is not the one which on the hypothesis should appear in the document. Mr. Wiener is clearly right in his general contention that objective textual criticism has a voice, and must be heard, in the literary criticism of the Scriptures.

Mr. Wiener's statement of the critical theory is occasionally at fault or, as it would be better to say, is ordinarily correct; for the defect of distorted statement is rare in his pages. When met with, it comes as a surprise. But at times he does caricature a theory almost out of recognition. The theory of projection, for example, is not so crude as he represents it on page 241.

In his exposition of the Scriptures he seems not always to have examined exegetical literature with the necessary care, but to have overlooked important interpretations. Otherwise he would scarcely have adopted such inferior explanations as appear, for example, on pages 26, 28, 30, 149, 237 note, and 266. One passage in particular which he exegetes requires notice, since upon its meaning depends much in his theory regarding priests and Levites. The passage is 1 Sam. ii. 27-36, which contains the denunciation of the house of Eli by an anonymous prophet (p. 272). Mr. Wiener unfortunately omits verses 29 and 31^b-34. Wellhausen, whom he cites, likewise quotes this passage, but begins with verse 30 and ends with verse 35; and he also omits verses 31^b-34 (*Prolegomena*, S. 126-127); but of these he excinds only 31^b and 32 as interpolations (*Text der Bücher Samuelis*, S. 49, 51). It is unfortunate that one who lays such stress upon the text of the Septuagint as does Mr. Wiener should omit these verses, 31^b-34; for except the latter part of verse 31 and the former part of verse 32, all the material in the Hebrew text of these verses is represented in the Septuagint. The large omission is unfortunate also because it is these verses especially which contain the explicit prophecy concerning the house of Eli. The reader will notice that even in the verses quoted by Mr. Wiener a distinction is observed between the father's house of Eli and Eli's own house. In the opening verses, 27

and 28, the prophet speaks of the father's house, whereas in the latter part of the prophecy, from verses 31^b to 36, he pronounces doom on Eli's house. So definite and exclusive is the reference in these closing verses to Eli's house, that Löhr and Nowack look upon the mention of Eli's father's house in verses 30 and 31^a as interpolation. In omitting to quote verses 31^b-34 Professor Wellhausen and after him Mr. Wiener destroy the emphasis which the prophet places upon the punishment of the house of Eli, and thereby they give a prominence, not found in the prophecy itself, to the calamity that awaits the father's house.

Looking now at the prophecy as a whole (verses 27-36), it will be seen that Eli's house and Eli's father's house are carefully distinguished. Generally in the Old Testament the term father's house is technical, and denotes a clan, a secondary division of the tribe. Eli's father's house or clan was the family of Aaron, belonging to the tribal division of Kohath. The opening verses of the prophecy, verses 27 and 28, refer in express words and exclusively to Eli's father's house. God appeared to this house in Egypt (verse 27; Ex. iv. 27; xii. 1), and during the sojourn in the wilderness separated Aaron and his sons to be priests (verse 28). God promised to them, and consequently to Eli's house as a part of this clan, an everlasting priesthood (verse 30; Ex. xxix. 9; xl. 15; Num. xxv. 13). But Eli's house, although it obtained preeminence at the sanctuary, grossly sinned and dishonored God (verse 29). Accordingly the limitation, which is implicit in all the promises of God, is announced. The promise of everlasting priesthood was made, indeed, to the house of Aaron as a whole; but the general truth applies in this case also: God will honor those who honor him, and they that despise him shall be lightly esteemed (verse 30). The sinful members of the house, and in them and along with them to a greater or less degree the whole house, shall be punished; but those who honor God he will honor. Therefore, as the prophet addressing Eli continues, the days are coming when God will cut off the arm of thee and of thy father's house (verse 30^a), so as to leave the body of each maimed and its power broken; or, if the reading of the Septuagint is preferred, God will cut off thy posterity and the posterity of thy father's house. But not utterly (verse 33^a, R.V. text and margin; verse 36). To use the figure either of lopping off the branches or of hewing down the tree (cf. Is. ix. 10 [Heb. 9]), a trunk or stump would be left, from which indeed new sprouts might spring (cf. Is. vi. 13; xi. 1). But such sprouts from the house of Eli shall not attain to great age or glory (verses 31^b, 32^b, 33^b, 36). In the latter part of the prophecy, from verses 31^b to 36, as already stated, it is Eli's own house that is threatened. The father's house as a whole was defiled by the sin of its leading family, and must suffer in the ruin (verse 31^a). But the sin was committed in Eli's own family, that particular family was the primal cause of the guilt, and upon that family the punishment falls most heavily (verses 31^b-36). Speaking expressly to Eli's own house, the prophet says: In thy house there

shall not be an old man forever (31^b, 32^b), but they shall die [by the sword of] men (33^b; cf. Septuagint; see 2 Sam. xii. 10); and every one that is left in thy house shall be subordinate and dependent (36). "And I will raise me up a faithful priest" [perhaps out of the remnant of thy father's house, out of the priestly clan of Aaron, from among thy fellow-clansmen descended from Eleazar or Ithamar, from the number of those who honor me and whom consequently I will honor],—I will raise me up a faithful priest, and I will build him a sure house, and he shall walk before mine anointed forever (35). The prophecy outlines the course of events in the large and for a long time to come. With the death of Eli's sons in battle and his own death, with the capture of the ark by the Philistines, the abandonment of Shiloh by Jehovah, the cessation of worship there, the long seclusion of the ark, and the slaughter of the priests at Nob (of whom not all of the eighty-five were descended from Eli), not only Eli's house, but the entire father's house of Aaron, to which Eli belonged, was shorn of its power for several generations and was diminished in numbers. Samuel was more prominent in religious affairs than any priest, and performed priestly functions even on national occasions. Later still the surviving representative of Eli's house in the highpriestly office, after sharing for a time the honors and duties of that great office with a colleague not descended from Eli, was deposed altogether from the highpriesthood and Eli's house sank into permanent obscurity (1 Kin. ii. 27). Zadok was made the sole incumbent of the office, and he and his descendants walked before the Lord's anointed from David's reign onward. If any descendants of Eli remained, they were subject to the highpriest of Zadok's line. Of Zadok's parentage not a word is said in the passage, save that the prophecy in verse 36 makes clear that he was not descended from Eli. The later records trace Zadok himself and all the priests to Aaron (1 Chron. xxiv. 3; 2 Chron. xiii. 9, 10; Ezra vii. 2-5; Neh. x. 38; xii. 47; Ps. cxv. 10; cxxxv. 19).

The best articles in the volume are the two entitled "The Laws of Deuteronomy and the Arguments from Silence" and "Deuteronomy and the Argument from Style". These studies appeared originally in the pages of this REVIEW. It is not, however, from that circumstance that they are commended, but because the defects of Mr. Wiener's argument do not appear in them, but the excellences of his debate and the character of the real contributions which he has made to the study of the Pentateuch.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

Personal Names from Cuneiform Inscriptions of the Cassite Period. (Yale Oriental Series. Vol. I). By ALBERT T. CLAY, William M. Laffan Professor of Assyriology and Babylonian Literature, Yale University. New Haven: Yale University Press. London: Henry Frowde. Oxford University Press. 1912. Pp. 208.

This book is a valuable instrument for use in several fields of in-

vestigation, philological and historical. The names which it contains were current "when the Cassite rulers held sway over Babylonia, from about 1750 B.C. to about 1173 B.C., a period of nearly seven hundred years." The names have been gathered both from published texts and from unpublished tablets belonging to the University of Pennsylvania and the Hoffman Collection of New York. The list occupies one hundred pages (pp. 46-147), contains probably more than four thousand names, and includes reference to the inscription where each name is found. As supplementary material there is given a list of the hypocoristic terminations which were in use during the Cassite period. Also for supplementary purposes there is a table of personal names which consist of a sentence containing a divine name. In this tabulation the theophorous names are analyzed according to the form of the verb and the position of the divine name; for each verbal form represented one example is cited from three periods of history, the Neo-Babylonian, Cassite, and First or Hammurabi dynasties; while a footnote accompanies each name belonging to the Cassite period and gives all the names of the type that have been collected from that period. There is, further, a list of the elements which make up the names (pp. 148-207), among which the Hittite-Mitannian and the Cassite elements, already listed on page 28-41, are distributed alphabetically.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

De Naam Gods in den Pentateuch. Eene Studie naar Aanleiding en tot Toelichting van Ex. 6:1 vv. Door DR. A. TROELSTRA, Predikant bij de Herv. Gem. te 's-Gravenhage. Utrecht: G. J. A. Ruys. 1912. 8vo; pp. viii, 77.

The Name of God in the Pentateuch. A Study—Introductory and Explanatory—of Exodus VI. vv. 1 *et seq.* By DR. A. TROELSTRA. Translated from the Dutch by Edmund McClure, M.A. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, Northumberland Avenue, W.C.; 43, Queen Victoria Street, E.C. Brighton: 129, North Street. 1912. 8vo; pp. xiv, 15-92. Price 2s.

The title-page of the English version bears the introductory words "The Base of Biblical Criticism Re-examined," as a preface to the title. The treatise itself is concerned with the interpretation of Ex. iii. 12-14 and vi. 2, 3. The old explanation of Ex. vi. 3 is based on the constant meaning of the phrase "to know the name of Jehovah" and on the usage of the rhetorical negative. The name is the character, the sum of attributes; and the meaning of Ex. vi. 2, 3 is that God was known to the patriarchs preëminently and distinctively as the Almighty, and not in that aspect of his character which is denoted by his name Jehovah. The perfections denoted by the latter name are henceforth to be manifested in their fulness in the history of Israel. Dr. Troelstra thinks that there are objections to this interpretation (p. 63). His exegesis of the passages is recondite, his treatment is unnecessarily discursive, and the meaning withal which he finds in

Ex. vi. 3 seems not to differ essentially from the meaning discerned in the verse by the older expositors. He holds that Ex. vi. 3 is not intended to declare that the name Jehovah was unknown to the patriarchs (35). He claims that "in Ex. iii. the aim is to show to Moses, and through him to the people, that in the name Yhvh an 'Ehyeh (I shall be), a promise, is involved," while "in Ex. vi. the aim . . . is to show that by the phrase 'I am Yhvh' God gives himself to his people" (pp. 47, 48). "For the first time God assumed . . . in regard to his people all that was involved in this Yhvh-name, by saying 'I am Yhvh'" (p. 62).

Dr. Troelstra justly contends that "the work of the text critic must precede that of the historical critic" (p. 86; cf. 26-35). The divisive critics rely upon the use of the names Yhvh or Elohim as a criterion for determining the literary source of a passage in the book of Genesis; but they are attaching too great value to the readings of the Masoretic text, for on comparing the present Hebrew text with the ancient versions it is found that where the Hebrew has Jehovah the version very frequently has God, and *vice versa* (p. 29). This matter has engaged Mr. Wiener's attention, it will be recalled, and it is taken up also in a little pamphlet of twenty-four pages bearing a title-page which reads:

Is a Revolution in Pentateuchal Criticism at Hand? By the Rev. JOHANNES DAHSE. [Translated by Edmund McClure, M.A., from an article in the *Neue Kirchliche Zeitschrift*, for September, 1912.] With a Preface by the Rev. Professor Sayce, D.D. London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, Northumberland Avenue, W. C. 1912.

This article, entitled in the original *Naht ein Umschwung in der Pentateuchkritik*, by Pastor Dahse of Freirachdorf in East Friesland, calls attention to (1) The caution which investigators have urged, and the facts which they have adduced, against basing the partition of the text of Genesis, and the assignment of the parts to specific documents, on the assumption that the divine names have been correctly transmitted by the Masoretic Hebrew text. (2) The embarrassment caused the divisive critics by the usage of the names Israel and Jacob. (3) The narrative of the flood and the question of its partition in the light of the Babylonian tradition.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

Life and Times of the Patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. Being a Supplement to "The Land and the Book." By WILLIAM HANNA THOMSON, M.D., LL.D., Author of "Life, Death and Immortality," "Brain and Personality," etc. With Illustrations Furnished by the Author. New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls Company. 1912. Pp. 285. \$1.20 net; by mail \$1.32.

We have read this book with mingled feelings: surprise at the errors scattered through it, such as the ascription to the plain of Gennesaret of four times its real length (p. 53), the remarks on the

meaning of the names John and Judah (pp. 63, 239, 241), the confusion regarding the work of Ashurbanipal (78), the statement that logarithm is an Arabic word (p. 94), the inference that the order of narration must be the chronological order and consequently the event recorded in Gen. xxv. occurred after the death of Sarah (p. 138), the remark that Christ was born during the reign of Tiberius (p. 168), and the like; delight in reading the experiences and impressions of the boy as he rode about Palestine in company with his distinguished father or ranged the hills with his gun in search of game; gratitude at the faith in the Scriptures awakened and confirmed in the author by reason of the minute correspondence between the land, its life, its customs, and the Book, a contagious faith as the reader is apt to find; and joy at the light flashed from nearly every page upon the biblical narratives. Chapters i and ii prove to be the boy's recollections of the trip which the father describes in chapters xxv and xxvi of *The Land and the Book*.

Princeton.

JOHN D. DAVIS.

God's Oath: A study of an Unfulfilled Promise of God. By FORD C. OTTMAN. New York: Hodder and Stoughton, George H. Doran Company, 1911. Pp. 278.

This product of the pen of a lover and diligent student of the Bible, and one whose power as a preacher of it has been proved in many lands, is designed to lead its readers to share the author's view of the fulfillment of predictive prophecy. He is very positive in his own convictions, frankly confesses his inability to understand the point of view of those who disagree with him, and even betrays impatience with equally evangelical interpreters of Scripture, who seem to him by their erroneous opinions to be misleading others and bringing the Word of God into ridicule and abuse. In a word, Dr. Ottman holds that "the kingdom to be established here upon the earth by the Lord Jesus when He returns in glory is the kingdom that God promised to David." Owing to Israel's sin, culminating in the rejection of Jesus at the First Coming, the promises to Israel are suspended and as yet unrealized. With these promises the establishment and spread of the Christian Church have nothing to do. Only when the Church shall have been removed from the earth—caught up to be with the Lord—will the kingdom of David be established, with Jerusalem as its capital and the Holy Land (including Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Syria and part of Egypt and Arabia!) as its seat; then shall be literally fulfilled all the visions of prophet and seer concerning Israel and Israel's King. The author's treatment of our Lord's parables furnishes an excellent illustration of the literalistic type of biblical interpretation.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

ARTHUR DREWS. *Die Christusmythe: Zweiter Teil. Die Zeugnisse für die Geschichtlichkeit Jesu.* Ein Antwort an die Schriftge-

lehrten, mit besonderer Berücksichtigung der theologischen Methode. Nebst einem Anhang: Ist der vorchristliche Jesus widerlegt? Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Weinel, von W. B. Smith. 1-3. Tausend: verlegt bei Eugen Diederichs, Jena. 1911. 8vo; pp. xxii, 452.

The Witnesses to the Historicity of Jesus. By ARTHUR DREWS, Ph.D., Professor of Philosophy in the Techn. Hochschule, Karlsruhe (author of "The Christ-Myth", etc.). Translated by Joseph McCabe. Issued for the Rationalistic Press Association [Limited]. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1912. 8vo; pp. xii, 319. \$2.25.

The occasion of this notice is the publication of an English version of the book issued by Drews early in 1911 as "the second part" of his *Die Christusmythe*, which had first seen the light two years before. We have placed the German title also at the head of the notice, not at all as if it were our intention to enter into an extended review of the book itself with respect to its material contents—a proceeding scarcely called for in a notice of a translation; but only as intimating from the outset that the notice of a translation involves some comparison of it with the original. This translation, prepared by that doughty anti-Christian controversialist, Joseph McCabe, and issued as one of the tractates in its anti-Christian propaganda by the Rationalistic Press Association of London, has been imported in sheets and reissued on this side of the water by our most vigorous American anti-Christian publication society, the Open Court Publishing Company, of Chicago. Its shortcomings as a translation are to be charged, therefore, to the British rather than to the American house. These shortcomings are many.

It is doubtless not worth while to dwell on the less attractive form in which the book is issued in English than in German. It is only necessary to remark in passing that, while the German edition is artistically pleasing, of the British and American it can only be said that a serviceable volume has been produced. With reference to the contents, the English edition professes to be "an abbreviated and amended version, for English readers" (p. 14). We have not made a sufficiently precise comparison of the two volumes to detect the amendments. They doubtless concern minutiae here and there. The abbreviation lies open to view. The amount of it is perhaps not unfairly indicated by the difference in the number of pages (nearly 150) between the two volumes, though the English page seems to contain a little more matter than the German. It is at once apparent in the omission of the long and very interesting German preface and of the long Appendix by W. B. Smith in defense of his *Der vorchristliche Jesus* against the strictures of Weinel. It is operative, however, throughout the volume, in the omission here and there of a paragraph, and more frequently in a general compression of the language.

This compression takes not infrequently the form of the elimination of direct allusions to opponents by name, or of fragments of

their remarks incorporated in the argument. Drews wields a keen and tireless blade, and incorporates into his discussion numberless more or less direct and more or less indirect thrusts at his opponents. This sword-play may or may not be deadly, but it adds gaiety to the page, and the elimination of a considerable part of it gives flatness to many a passage which is as far as possible from being flat in the original. This flattening process extends further, however, than is demanded by the compression which has been attempted. It is a general fact incident to Mr. McCabe's method as a translator. For Mr. McCabe does not attempt an absolutely literal version; he allows himself—very properly—a certain freedom in reproducing his author's thought in another tongue. Unfortunately, however in this freedom of reproduction he not infrequently substitutes general for specific terms and phrases, and thus takes away much of the freshness and precision of Drews' language. Thus, to adduce but a single instance, Drews crisply writes of Weinel (p. 185): "He seems not to know that it was not by a Bruno Bauer and Kalthoff, but already by the philosophy of the Enlightenment more than a hundred years before Bauer, in the circle of a Bolingbroke and of the English Deists, that the question of the existence of the historical Jesus was first raised and denied." Mr. McCabe transmutes this into: "He does not seem to know that it was not Bruno Bauer and Kalthoff who first questioned or denied the historicity of Jesus but philosophers who lived a hundred years before Bauer, Bolingbroke and the English Deists" (p. 130),—which preserves no doubt a plain statement of the main matter but loses all the touches which give that statement life.

We must go even further and say that Drews' sense is not always conveyed to the English reader. Thus, for example, when we read (p. 37): "As regards the passage in Tacitus, the simple credulity with which it had hitherto been accepted led to a sceptical attitude—," we have to turn to the original German to learn that Drews is not here assigning an originating cause to the sceptical attitude in question, but only harmlessly recording the historical fact (as he thinks it is) that the simple credulity which has hitherto reigned in this matter "has now given place to a sceptical attitude." So again when we read (p. 13), relatively to the well-known passage in the tractate "Sabbath" of the Babylonian Talmud: "It is possible that we really have here a reference to the text of Matthew—," Drews of course has said not "the text," but "a text;" and when we read on p. 14 that "Jesus, on the contrary, often expressly dissuades from mingling in these quarrels about inheritance," Drews proves to have more truly said only that "Jesus rather expressly refuses to interfere at all in disputes about inheritance." Still again when we read (p. 1) that Trypho said to Justin of the Messiah: "If he was born and lived somewhere, he is entirely unknown," we are not surprised to find that Drews wrote rather: "If he has been born and is sojourning somewhere, he is nevertheless entirely unknown." The matter is made worse by the circumstance that the proof-reader has been somewhat careless, so

that typographical errors enter in further to confuse things. On the page before the Preface three *errata* are noted, and the prominent notification of these bare three may give the reader a very misplaced confidence in the general soundness of the text he is to face. In their immediate vicinity he will find Strack spelled "Strach" (pp. 13, 15), Joël repeatedly spelled Joel (without the diaeresis) (pp. 15, 30, 32, 44, 54), "lost" printed "last" (p. 43 note), "Zeuge" printed "Zewge" (p. 74 note), and such havoc made with a footnote (p. 19)—if indeed it is the printer who is responsible here,—that we have to go to the German edition to learn what it is all about. The reader may perhaps infer that we do not think Drews' book has been placed satisfactorily before its English readers.

This is the more a pity that Drews needs—and deserves—to be placed satisfactorily before his public. It is of course impossible to take his argument seriously. It is not only crowded with absurdities, but it is itself an absurdity from beginning to end. But Drews is the prince of special pleaders and there is a certain pleasure to be derived from following him as he takes his brief and pleads to it up to the hilt. Not a single point is left uncovered, and not a single point but what is covered with layer on layer of reasoning. Paul, for example, knows nothing of an actual man Jesus; but it is not left at that,—Paul's epistles are of doubtful genuineness anyhow. He who undertakes to refute Drews in detail must not expect to triumph by refuting a single line of reasoning. He must refute patiently one after the other every possible and impossible supposition which on the hypothesis that it is true—generally a most violent hypothesis—could make at all for the truth of the main contention. The shiftiness of the man is past belief; you may put your finger on him a score of times only to find that—he is no longer there. In the present volume in which he pays his respects to the assailants of his *The Christ-Myth* his resourcefulness in fence is in full manifestation and compels a reluctant admiration. The reader feels that if only he had a thesis to prove which was capable of being proved, and materials to work with which were real, he would make a master reasoner. A doubt, it is true, insinuates itself. It is after all easy to build "castles in Spain"; and it is not every one that can illimitably weave gossamer who can build at all in solid stone.

We are not suggesting that Drews may be safely neglected. His assault on the historicity of Jesus may be safely neglected; and this elaborate second volume in which he takes up the witnesses to the historicity of Jesus—the extra-Christian witnesses, the witness of Paul, the witness of the Gospels—and "deals with them" *suo more* one by one, only makes it the more clear (if that were possible) how safely it may be neglected. But Drews is not fairly represented by his unfortunate assault on the historicity of Jesus; and, it may well be believed that he will himself after a while look back upon it as the mistake of his life. It is all froth; but in it he is for the moment the most prominent representative of a movement which has real

significance in the confused conditions of our modern life, and beneath it there lies something which has body enough. The contrast between the reception accorded to the assault on the historicity of Jesus of a Bruno Bauer little more than half a century ago, and that which the same assault receives now in the hands of a Kalthoff and a Kautsky, a Jensen and a Drews, gives one, as the French say, furiously to think. A change has taken place in the attitude of thousands to Christianity. There was always unbelief; now there is something more than unbelief,—there is enmity. There was always some enmity,—in a narrow circle of "emancipated spirits"; now there is passionate hate diffused through wide circles of the masses themselves. There was always violent enough attack on this or the other element or aspect of the Christian faith; now the assault is delivered with the *élan* of anticipated victory on the whole Christian position. Possibly there is some exaggeration in the picture of the present situation, which Rudolf Eucken paints in the Introduction to the tractate he has published under the significant title of *Können wir noch Christen sein?* But there can be no doubt that the unchristian world has become in large part distinctly an anti-Christian world; that it no longer stands on the defensive but has aggressively taken the offensive; and that Drews' *The Christ-Myth* is only a symptom of this general movement. "In this relation," remarks Eucken, in the midst of his sombre sketch of the present situation, "the Monistic agitation is a significant sign of the times." It must be borne in mind in any estimate passed upon Drews' *The Christ-Myth* in either or both of its parts, that this work is to him merely an incident, and merely a negative incident, in his general propaganda. In it he is only trying to clear an obstacle out of the path of the march of his philosophical faith to its inevitable victory. He has been ill-advised in turning away from the positive commendation of the monistic conception of religion to do this piece of clearing work. It is an excursion into a region with which he is unfamiliar and in which he lacks the equipment necessary for successful activity. But it would be a mistake to judge him solely by the flimsiness of his performance here. It is not Drews the credulous retailer of fantastic etymologies and grotesque historical combinations with which the Christian apologist has really to do, but Drews, the leading living disciple of von Hartmann, the strong reasoner from idealistic premises. It is remarkable how even in a book like that before us the tone subtly changes when the last chapter is reached and Drews puts off the armor of Saul and appears in his own person for a few closing words armed only with smooth stones from his own familiar brook. Here there at last comes into view some measure of dignity, sincerity, and strength.

It is no doubt difficult for the reader of the two volumes of *The Christ-Myth* to believe it, but it is important that we should understand that Drews is animated by an earnest and even religious purpose. Yes, even—hard as it is to credit it—in writing *The Christ-Myth*. He conceives himself to be engaged in a struggle in behalf of

the freedom and independence of the human spirit, and indeed for the very existence of religion (p. 4). "The religion of the future" he is assured "will either be a *belief in the divine nature of the self*, or will be nothing" (p. 307); and that there can be "no other redemption of man than redemption of himself, *by the spiritual and divine nature of the self*" (*ibid.*) he feels certain. Filled with zeal for this high—"mysticism," we may be permitted, for the purposes of effect, to call it, though of course it is too purely pantheism to be properly called "mysticism"—he finds Christianity with its emphasis on the separation of man from God, its proclamation of redemption in Another than one's self, its "historicism" as opposed to his "idealism", athwart his path. It must be got rid of at all hazards. "I insist," he declares "that the belief in the historical reality of Jesus is the *chief obstacle to religious progress*; and therefore the question of his historicity is not a purely historical, but also a philosophic-religious question" (p. 307).

We must even go so far as to allow that there is a certain measure of justification which may be pleaded for Drews' berserker rage against "Christianity", and for his violent arraignment of it as an obstacle to religion, perhaps the chief obstacle to religion in our day. For we must bear in mind that it is not the Christianity of Christ and the Apostles, of the suffering and triumphing church, which he has in his thoughts, but that so-called "Christianity" of the "Liberal Theology", which has usurped its place in the German academic circles in which he lives and moves and has his being. We shall never understand Drews until we fully realize that the notion against which he is directing his shafts is that which holds not only that the whole great religious movement which we call Christianity is rooted in a mere human life that was lived in Palestine two thousand years ago and then, like other human lives, passed away, but that men are still to-day dependent on the influences of that merely human life for their religious inspiration and vitality. It is this that he has in mind when he exclaims, "What a situation it is when the deepest thoughts of the modern mind must be measured by the teaching of Jesus, and referred to a world of ideas that has nothing to recommend it but the antiquity of its traditions and the artificially engendered appreciation of everything connected with it" (p. x)! Against such a notion he has the right to protest, and as against it his protest is sound. He is perfectly right when he declares: "The earlier Christian literature is acquainted with a Jesus-God, a god-man, a heavenly high-priest and Saviour Jesus, a metaphysical spirit, descending from heaven to earth, assuming human form, dying, and rising again; but *it knows nothing whatever* about a merely human Jesus, the amiable author of fine moral sentiments, the 'unique' personality of liberal Protestantism" (p. 59). He is perfectly right when he asserts; "There is not one single early Christian document that speaks not of the God-man Jesus Christ, but unequivocally of the mere man Jesus, which modern liberal theology conceives him to have

been" (p. 131); and adopts Ernst Krieck's plea: "Precisely because the liberal theology has constructed its Jesus in contradiction to the entire Christian tradition, we have a right to ask for the proof; precisely because, as Weinel admits, records are lacking for its Jesus, such as are ordinarily used to prove the reality of historical personages, the demand for proof is not so absurd as Weinel represents it to be" (*ibid.*). He is perfectly right when he explains more at length; "From the first Christianity meets us not as the religion of the historical man Jesus, but as the religion of the *superhistorical God-man Jesus Christ who has only passed through history*. He it is who is represented as having appeared to a Paul and revealed Himself to him as the true Saviour. His figure also shines clearly enough through His human clothing in the Gospels, the purpose of which is certainly not 'subsequently to lift to a heightened sphere the life of the historical Jesus, by means of imaginary myths and stories of miracles, but vividly to bring home the superhuman divine nature of Jesus by a historical presentation.' That God Himself exchanged His heavenly glory for earthy humility and lowliness, that Christ was the 'Son of God' and descended to the earth, that God stripped Himself of Himself, took the form of man, led a life of poverty with the poor, suffered, was crucified, was buried, and rose again, and thus mediated also to men the possibility of resurrection, the forgiveness of their sins, and a blessed life with the heavenly Father,—*that is the mystery of the figure of Christ*, that is what this figure has brought to the hearts of believers, what has stirred them to ecstatic reverence for this deepest divine revelation" (p. 297). Of course Drews in accordance with his extreme Idealism, which makes nothing of personalities in history and finds the "idea" all-sufficient for every effect sublimates this figure of a Divine-human Jesus into a mere idea; this is his fatal error. But he is perfectly right in insisting that it is this Divine-human Jesus or nothing: that there is not a particle of historical justification for the merely human Jesus of the "Liberal" theology, and that it is a degradation of Christianity and a deadly blow at religion to find in this purely imaginary merely human Jesus the central point and impelling source of all of our religious life.

Professor Shirley Jackson Case of the University of Chicago has lately warned us against making common cause with "the extremists who would wipe the historical Jesus entirely off the slate" (*The Historicity of Jesus*, 1912, pp. 29-30). "When the conservatives rejoice over the fate which the Jesus of liberal theology has met at the hands of these modern radicals," he writes, "they would seem to be sounding the death knell of their own Christological views. For if the earthly Jesus must go, how much more completely must any supposed reality of a supernatural Christ be abandoned!" This reasoning lacks a little in stringency. It is not "the earthly Jesus" which "must go" but only the *merely* earthly Jesus. And the reason why the merely earthly Jesus must go is that there is not the smallest

scintilla of historical evidence that he ever existed and there is not the smallest necessity for his assumption discoverable in the religious development of the race or the religious life of the individual. The reason why the Divine-human Jesus does not "go" with him is that His existence is historically testified to by evidence which is overwhelming, that He is historically necessary to account for the religious life of the world for two thousand years and indeed for the whole course of historical development since His life on earth, and that His real existence is historically verified in the experience of thousands of men living in every region of the earth to-day. The possibility of the denial of the existence of Jesus is dependent upon the obscuration of the Divine-human Jesus by the merely human Jesus of modern "Liberalism": Drews and his compeers are the legitimate offspring of the "Liberal theology." Without the discrediting in wide-circles of the evidence for the existence of the Divine-human Jesus for whom alone is there historical evidence this new radicalism could never have arisen; and the "Liberal theology" must not be permitted to repudiate the fruit of its own loins. It is a great evil that this obscuration has taken place and men have been led to imagine that a merely human Jesus is the only Jesus whose actual existence in the world it is worth while to consider. But it is a good work that Drews and his compeers have wrought when they have called men's minds sharply back to the realization that there is no evidence that such a merely human Jesus ever existed. That therefore no Jesus ever really existed is a violent *non sequitur*, which may safely be left to take care of itself. Why should the Jesus whose existence is certain be discarded, because the Jesus whose non-existence is certain is freshly perceived to be impossible?

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Historicity of Jesus. A criticism of the contention that Jesus never lived, a statement of the evidence for his existence, an estimate of his relation to Christianity. By SHIRLEY JACKSON CASE, of the Department of New Testament Literature and Interpretation in the University of Chicago. Chicago: the University of Chicago Press. 1912. 12mo; pp. vii, 352. \$1.50 net; \$1.62 postpaid.

The descriptive sub-title sets forth the purpose of this volume as threefold. It is 'a criticism of the contention that Jesus never lived, a statement of the evidence for his existence, an estimate of his relation to Christianity.' We learn from the Preface that the emphasis is to be thrown upon the second item: "The main purpose of the present volume is to set forth the evidence for believing in the historical reality of Jesus' existence upon earth" (p. v). The first item is included only "by way of approach" to this; the third only in order briefly to indicate "the practical bearing of the discussion." The book thus finds its occasion in the contention that Jesus never lived to which considerable vogue has been given during the last decade, and undertakes to refute it. We must confess to some surprise

that this contention has been thought worthy of a formal and extended refutation. It certainly demands our attention and study. But we should as little have thought of undertaking a serious refutation of it as we should of Pastor Russell's "Millennial Dawn" vagaries, or of Mrs. Eddy's Christian Science or of the Book of Mormon. The interest of such movements lies in the revelation they bring us of the currents of feeling which are flowing up and down in the obscurer regions of modern life: their study belongs to the pathology of modern culture. We cannot afford to neglect them; they attract our most intense curiosity; for they make known to us as nothing else does with the same poignancy the seamy-side of our boasted modern enlightenment. He who would know our times must know these things too; and he will find his profit in knowing them intimately and in not minimizing their significance. But to approach them as if they were possible or even plausible accounts of reality, with claims to consideration sufficient to require serious refutation, is a very different matter. We might indeed imagine circumstances in which mere charity might impose on us the objectively superfluous task, we will not say of disproving, but of exposing their claims. Chance might throw us temporarily into contact with a circle in Brooklyn, or Boston, or Salt Lake City, for whose sake we might be compelled patiently to go through the weary task of pointing out in detail after detail the monstrosity of the obviously monstrous. Is there a circle in the neighborhood of Chicago University which requires to have it proved to it that Jesus really lived, to which the "conclusion" that Jesus never lived seems an entertainable contingency, and for which the so-called "arguments" by which this "conclusion" has been commended to us need to be analyzed that their true character may be perceived? Professor Case writes as if such might be the case, and, to tell the whole truth, as if even he himself might be a member of it. The hypothesis that Jesus may never have lived, in other words, although decisively rejected by him is treated as a debatable suggestion. And herein lies the significance of his book. Our interest in it centers therefore not in the point on which he throws the emphasis, but in the closing chapters in which he outlines positively his own opinions. We wish above everything else to know the point of view to which a serious argument against so impossible a contention seems natural.

Having said this much, let us add at once that Professor Case, from his own point of view, has done the work he set before himself very well. His book contains ten chapters. The first two of these lay the basis for the discussion by giving some account of the critical movements out of which the denial of the historicity of Jesus has emerged. The next two criticise the grounds on which the denial has been based. Then follow five chapters in which the positive argument for the historicity of Jesus is presented. The last two chapters outline Professor Case's own views as to the historical place of Jesus and His significance for religion to-day.

The first two chapters, as we have said, are occupied with a very

lucid historical account of the critical movements the results attained by which have raised the question of the historicity of Jesus. The substitution by the so-called "Liberal" theology of its so-called "historical Jesus" for the Jesus of the New Testament records is first explained, and it is very fairly pointed out that this reduction of Jesus both in His person, to purely human measures, perhaps to something less than normal humanity, and in His significance to the religious movement we know as Christianity, to at most its first teacher, more probably only its first exemplar (and possibly not very purely that), perhaps even nothing more than its accidental actual starting-point in history, leaves the way open to question whether any Jesus need be recognized at all. If the only Jesus whose portrait has been transmitted to us by historical tradition is fictitious, why may not the whole figure of Jesus be a work of fancy? If the only Jesus which can be plausibly unearthed as lying possibly behind this creation of fancy, is psychologically impossible, exhibiting if not supernatural, then infranatural traits in an inextricable intermixture with normal ones,—why not simply admit that such a being never really lived? If the rôle played by this Jesus was so insignificant why not frankly recognize that he has no significance and therefore no reality in the actual course of things? Thus it cannot be thought strange that in the moment of the greatest diffusion of the "Liberal" criticism with its "historical Jesus," a movement should arise which proposes that we should simply "wipe this historical Jesus entirely off the slate." To understand the movement it must be clearly recognized that it is directed precisely against the "historical Jesus" of the "Liberal" theology (pp. 3, 31), and the problem is therefore posited in this form: Can the existence of Jesus be defended from the position of the "Liberal" theology? When the question is so posited, it must be allowed to be a very debatable one. In the second chapter a good running account is given of the various attempts which have been made to sublimate the historical Jesus into a myth. The chief exponents of this general view are named and the peculiarity of the method of each is explained.

The way having been thus prepared the argument against the denial of the existence of Jesus is taken up with the third chapter. Chapters three and four are negative and are devoted to a searching criticism of the argument which has been developed against the historicity of Jesus. It has been the misfortune of the radical movement that its leaders, though often men of learning in other departments, have been unwonted to historical research and have unfortunately sought their guidance from untrustworthy sources. Their attempts whether to break the force of the traditional evidence of the historicity of Jesus or to construct a plausible account of the origin of Christianity without Jesus, have been therefore no less than pitiable in their weakness, and offer a shining mark for telling criticism—if indeed the exposure of their open nakedness can be dignified by the name of criticism. This part of Professor Case's task is ac-

cordingly very easy, and he performs it thoroughly. Now and then, his own standpoint no doubt blunts the edge of his criticism, and sometimes we find ourselves even compelled to disallow it entirely. Thus, for example, when he adduces against Drews' assumption that the idea of a suffering deity is genetically vital to Paul's thought his own construction of the development of the doctrine of the deity of Christ and raises the alternative, "Is it the God-man Jesus or the Man-god Jesus that stands as corner-stone of the Pauline gospel?" (p. 126)—we can only reply, in accordance with Drew's contention,—that it certainly was the God-man Jesus and not the Man-god Jesus, of which latter indeed Paul knows nothing. To Paul undoubtedly the center of his thought of Jesus was that He was God become man for our salvation, and we do not even understand what Professor Case means when he says (p. 127): "The point of supreme importance for his gospel, that which he makes the central item of his preaching, is the transition from . . . 'Jesus' to 'Christ and him crucified.'" To Paul it was undoubtedly "Jesus Christ" who was crucified, and this "Jesus Christ" was the "Lord of Glory" (1 Cor. ii. 8), and He was the "Lord of Glory" already when He was crucified and did not wait to become such until He had been exalted to the right hand of God. One would think a mere glance at such a passage as Phil. ii. 8 would suffice to indicate what was Paul's movement of thought with respect to Jesus and what was the center of his conception of Him. Like Paul, like his pupils Luke and Mark. It really is undeniable, as Drews asserts, that "in the gospels we have to do not with a deified man but rather with an anthropomorphized God" (p. 128). The "deified man" is a pure invention of the "Liberal" reconstruction of the historical development in the interests of its mythical "historical Jesus." We are grateful to Professor Case, however, for a very true remark he lets fall in the course of his discussion. Quite unintentionally on his part no doubt, it suggests the key to certain modes of speech characterizing the early chapters of Acts on which the "Liberals" have laid hold to supply the much needed Biblical basis of their reconstruction of the historical development. "What troubled the first missionaries of the new religion," he says (p. 128), "was not the reluctance of their hearers to believe that God had become a man, but their hesitation about believing that a man, especially an obscure Jew who had been ignominiously put to death, was really the Son of God." That was it. It was not the "missionaries" themselves in whose thought Christ was a deified man; this was the false appearance of things, which they had to overcome.

In his second four chapters (Chs. v.-viii.), Professor Case develops his positive argument for the historicity of Jesus. In the first of these, which he designates "Pragmatic phases of primitive tradition" he works out a purely speculative scheme of the development of early Christology on the assumption that Jesus was a mere man, recognized as such by His followers at first, and only gradually transmuted in their thought into a Divine being under the pressure of

their apologetic needs; and pleads what he apparently looks upon as the verisimilitude of this construction as a proof that therefore this "historical Jesus" lies behind the whole evolution of Christianity. The three chapters that follow treat in turn of the Pauline evidence, the Gospel evidence and the Extra-Biblical evidence for Jesus' existence. Of course he writes here too from his own standpoint, and there is much assumed—as for example in the Gospel criticism—with which we cannot accord. But the results are for the main point satisfactory. We advert in passing only to a matter or two of detail. We are surprised by the looseness of the handling of the facts about Papias (pp. 208 *sq.*). When it is asserted that "the fact seems to be that many persons in this period," that is, early in the second century, "prized oral tradition above written records," on the strength of the report that Papias "said that in his youth he did not think he could derive so much profit from the contents of books as from 'the utterance of a living and abiding voice'," there is a reversion to pre-Lightfootian misinterpretation of Papias which is lamentable. More distressing still is a persistent confusion of *λόγια* with *λόγοι* which really ought to be no longer possible. "According to Eusebius" we read, "Papias, in his expositions of the 'sayings' of the Lord." . . . But Eusebius says nothing of Papias' Expositions of the 'sayings' of the Lord (*λόγων τοῦ κυρίου*). What he speaks of is Papias' Expositions *κυριακῶν λογίων*—which is something very different, viz. "the Oracles concerning the Lord," that is to say, those particular Holy Scriptures which we know as the Gospels. Neither does Papias say either that Mark in recording what he remembered of Peter's reports of what was said or done by Christ "had no design of giving a connected account of the Lord's 'sayings'"—but (if this reading is right as it seems to be) *τῶν κυριακῶν λογίων*, that is, of the Oracles that concern the Lord; or that "Matthew composed the sayings in the Hebrew language" but rather that Matthew composed his Oracles, that is his Gospel, in the Hebrew language. We wonder again why the *Ἰησοῦ τοῦ λεγομένου χριστοῦ* of Josephus *Ant.* XX. ix. 1. is persistently rendered "of Jesus the so-called Christ" (pp. 251, 254). The phrase means nothing more or less than simply "Jesus, surnamed Christ," and intimates neither denial nor doubt that Jesus was really the Messiah, but only informs us that He had another name, viz. Christ (cf. Dalman, *Words*, p. 503; Meyer on Mat. i. 16). If we will bear in mind that Josephus thus knew Jesus also by the name of "Christ" and—as is also intimated here,—knew that He was more widely and better known by the name of "Christ" than by that of "Jesus", as was certainly true for the time at which Josephus wrote—perhaps it will not seem as strange as it might otherwise seem, that recent opinion appears to be becoming more favorable to the genuineness of the famous passage in *Ant.* XVIII. iii. 3. If the central phrase in that passage, *ὁ χριστὸς οὗτος ἦν*, may be read, not "This was the Messiah," but "This Jesus whom I am describing was the well-known Christ"—Christ being taken as a proper name,—the chief difficulty at

least to accepting the passage as genuine disappears. That there is little in the rest of the passage that Josephus might not be supposed to say in his zeal to take credit for the Jews from anything great which was reported of their hero by "the race of Christians"—from which he separates himself—is illustrated, not contradicted, by what he says of Vespasian (*War*, VI. v. 4). For it is inaccurate to say that there he identifies Vespasian "with the promised Messiah", just as it may be inaccurate to say that he identifies Jesus with the Messiah here. He only says that the prophecy that one from the country of the Jews should become the ruler of the world was fulfilled in Vespasian,—glorying in this manifest mark of Divine favor to the Jews in granting them supernatural knowledge of what was to come. So in *Ant.* XVIII. iii. 3 he may be only glorying in similar supernatural marks of Divine favor in connection with a Jew who had become famous.

In the last two chapters (ix. and x.) we reach the portion of the book which has the most interest for us. For here we learn most fully what Professor Case's own point of view is. The former of the chapters he entitles, "Jesus the historical founder of Christianity" and in it he inquires into the sense in which Jesus can justly be called the founder of Christianity. In the latter, which he entitles, "Jesus' significance for modern religion," he inquires into the relation in which a modern man may properly conceive himself to stand to Jesus. Christianity, he tells us, "was not a finished product in Jesus' day," "it is a growth," "a movement to whose origin and development many factors contributed," and not merely many factors, but also many persons, extending through several generations (pp. 272-3). We can say that any individual "founded" such a religion in no other sense than "that he furnished the initial impulse without which historically speaking the new movement would not have come into being" (p. 274). In this sense we may say Jesus was the founder of Christianity. The impulse which He gave to His followers was, in brief, the impression which His personal religious life made on those who enjoyed personal association with Him. "In the last analysis it was his power as a religious individual that made possible the early faith; the personal religion of Jesus was the foundation of the disciples' religion about Jesus" (p. 281). Jesus, then, may be said to be the founder of the Christian religion because His personality, His teaching, His activity "made Christianity possible" (p. 303). We may even call Him "the minister of salvation to men," if we mean only that He made men understand, by His teaching and example, that "God's presence means salvation," and so led them—of course by virtue of their own free will (for Professor Case is a great stickler for the autonomy of the human will, p. 297)—to enter into communion with God. But what, after the passage of time has made it impossible to come under the personal influence of this purely human Jesus who lived so impressive a religious life two thousand years ago and then fell on sleep? What is the significance of Jesus, in this sense the

founder of Christianity, for the men of to-day? Professor Case posits the question, states, expounds and criticises the several main views which have been held in the matter, and finally arrives at the conclusion that the passage of time has not essentially altered the relation in which the movement which we call Christianity stands to its "founder". He may speak indeed of "the shadowy form of Christianity's traditional founder" (p. 304). But His form has not become so "shadowy" as to lose entirely the power to stimulate and inspire which it manifested in those who knew it at first hand. It was "his personal religion" which was the source of Jesus' influence then: "He lived religiously and thus inspired believers to live similarly" (p. 336). We can have no immediate contact with Him now, but still "history discloses his superior personal efficiency in the spiritual sphere." "He has for men to-day the same essential value that he had for the primitive disciples, in so far as history permits acquaintance with him and he answers modern needs" (p. 336). "In so far!" But is it not, for men who occupy this standpoint, just the question of questions, how far history permits acquaintance with Him, how far He answers modern needs? And have we not just been told that it is only a "shadowy form" that looms through the mists of history? And have we not had it carefully explained to us that in the flux of things, men's needs have continually changed, and Christianity has changed with them, and if Christ was to be saved for this developing Christianity, He too must needs endlessly change? And yet we read (p. 336), "Nevertheless, the power of his person and his message continues to be a mighty inspiration prompting modern men to the worthiest spiritual attainments and encouraging them to realize in their own lives a genuine experience of God." Dimly seen through the murk of time the shadowy form of Jesus still inspires men to the religious life. That is all. We get from Him a great religious ideal. "Moderns" may prefer to describe it in "more secular language" and say we are encouraged by the memory of Jesus ourselves also to endeavor "to establish right relations with the universe." Call it what we may, however, "the ideal remains, and not the least important feature in Jesus' significance for many moderns will be the fact that his religious life reveals the secret of transforming the ideal into the real" (p. 337). Question may be raised whether these things would not have been realized without Him. It is a theoretical question. Is it not enough to know that they have often been realized in the past, that they are still realized, under the influence of His memory? In this sense, and to this extent, Jesus has significance for the religion of to-day.

Professor Case does not in the least imagine that his "interpretation" of Christ and Christianity has hitherto been the usual one. "It has been the Christ-idea," he says frankly (p. 308), "the idea of a Saviour-God perhaps we may say, that has held the first place in Christian thinking." This is far too little to say; but it is enough to point the moral. What reason is there to suppose that the new

"interpretation" of Christ and Christianity will "work" as the old has worked? And what justification is there derivable from history for calling the new Christ, Christ, the new Christianity, Christianity? The new "interpretation" stands out of all relation to fact,—whether the facts of history or the facts of experience. The Christ which it offers us is not the Christ of the historical tradition; the Christianity it teaches is not the Christianity which has conquered the world; nor can the Christ and Christianity which it provides meet the needs of sinful men. Its idea of sin must be deepened, its idea of salvation must be heightened, its conception of the function of Christ in salvation must be illimitably enlarged, before this "Christianity" can possess the slightest historical claim to that name, or become in the slightest degree glad-tidings to a sin-cursed race.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Historic Jesus. Being the Elliott Lectures delivered in the Western Theological Seminary, Pittsburgh, Pa. By the Rev. DAVID SMITH, M.A., D.D., Professor of Theology in the McCrea-Magee College, Londonderry. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1912. 12mo; pp. iv, 119.

The Western Theological Seminary is to be felicitated upon the admirable course of Elliott Lectures which it has shared with the world in this delightful volume. Professor Smith has chosen a living subject and has treated it, if somewhat slightly, yet with insight and grace. Readers of *The Expositor* will recall, in its volumes for 1901, a series of articles from his pen bearing the general title of "Recent New Testament Criticism" in which the topics here dealt with are discussed at somewhat greater length, and, from which indeed the present lectures have been extracted and popularized. They were worth repeating; and in their repetition here a greater unity has been given them and a wider appeal. What Professor Smith has undertaken to do is to vindicate the Jesus of the Evangelists against the attacks of modern naturalistic criticism, as the really historical Jesus; or, as he himself puts it, "to reassure ourselves of the trustworthiness of the evangelical records, that we may enjoy the certainty that their testimony is true, exhibiting our Lord as He appeared to the eyes of His contemporaries." Addressing, however, a general audience, he has eschewed "the intricate and fascinating problems of New Testament Criticism," and elected rather "to pursue a line of argument, which," as it rightly seemed to him, "is at once simple and effective, instituting a comparison between the Evangelic portraiture as it stands and the pictures which the decadent imagination of the second century produced." Two of his five lectures, at least, are devoted to this comparison, the former of them adducing for this purpose the Apocryphal Gospels and the latter, the heathen religious romances of the time. These are preceded by a brief account of the critical contention, which supplies the starting-point for the argument, and are followed by lectures in which the self-evidence of the

uninventible Evangelical portraiture and the evidence of the experience of the living Jesus are adduced. The whole forms an apologetic of great attractiveness and it is worked out with the aid of a rich body of literary illustrations and in a charmingly simple and flowing style.

We shall not attempt to follow Professor Smith's argument throughout. We need not deny ourselves the pleasure, however, of calling attention to one or two passages of exceptional beauty. Such is, for example, the appeal to the success of the Evangelists in depicting a supernatural life as a proof of its reality (pp. 34-35). The writers of the Apocryphal Gospels were no mean artists. They exhibited a fine imagination, not unworthy of comparison with that of Dante or Raphael. But for the task they had undertaken imagination will not suffice. "It was not for lack of art that the writer failed, but rather for this—that he attempted the impossible task of dealing imaginatively with the supernatural." How then "did it come to pass that when others with every resource of genius and art disastrously failed, our Evangelists have so conspicuously succeeded? The reason is simply this—that they were not creators but historians; they were not dealing imaginatively with the supernatural but reporting an actual manifestation." A similar passage sets aside finally the notion that our Jesus was the creation of Paul (pp. 87-88). "When men make themselves a God they always fashion him in their own likeness—St. Paul was a Pharisee, and, had he been the Creator of the Evangelistic Jesus, he would have made Him in the likeness of a Pharisee. It is unthinkable, and contrary to all our knowledge of him, that he should have risen so far above himself as to conceive that transcendent ideal. . . . To conceive so divine an ideal he must have been himself no less than divine, and it remains that we should transfer to him the adoration which we have paid to Jesus." The evidence of experience is treated with unwonted caution and convincingness. "Here," Dr. Smith concludes (p. 117), "lies the supreme and incontrovertible evidence of the historicity of the Gospels. The final decision rests not with the critics but with the saints; and their verdict is unanimous and unflinching. They know the Divine Original, and they attest the faithfulness of the portrait." Decidedly this is a book to enjoy.

As no human work is quite perfect it is our duty to point out, in closing, that Dr. Smith's Elliott Lectures are not impeccable. Here and there there is a slight slip; here and there a phrase or a statement which we deprecate. It is not quite fair to Schmiedel to speak of his nine "foundation-pillars" as "all that is left—this shattered remnant of that precious heritage the Evangelic Tradition" (p. 11); Schmiedel's nine passages are only his starting-point in seeking credible elements in the Evangelical narrative, not his ending-point. Luke does not speak of the Evangelical writers who preceded him in the depreciatory tone which Dr. Smith attributes to him (p. 27). The Evangelic miracles can not be said with strict accuracy to have been "always works of mercy and compassion" (p. 38). The legends

of the Apocryphal Gospel of Thomas cannot be properly described as "rank Docetism" and "a denial of the Incarnation" (p. 40): they are examples of the grossest kind of mythologizing, but they have nothing to do with docetism and they assert the incarnation in the strongest way. To say that "our Lord in the days of His flesh was not God walking the earth in the semblance of a man," comes perilously near (when taken in Dr. Smith's sense) to contradicting Paul's "being made in the likeness of man; and being found in fashion as a man" (Phil. ii. 8): the whole passage, as also one or two others, asserts the Lord's true manhood in the days of His flesh with too little regard for His coexistent true Deity. There is an unhappy passage (p. 41) of which we cannot say less than that it slanders the God of Israel as "jealous" and "vindictive," with proof texts from Exodus and 2 Samuel; after which it is a small matter to add that the closing words of the same paragraph (p. 42) slander the Pharisees; it is bad enough that the Pharisees accused our Lord of working His miracles by Satanic help without asserting that the reason why they thought these miracles Satanic was that they were deeds of mercy—nothing was to be looked for from God except terrible things. We see no justification for the crude criticism of the Gospel text illustrated in the note at the foot of p. 74: and we doubt the justice of certain remarks on p. 83, and strongly deprecate the insinuations on pp. 84-90 that the Evangelists "frequently misconstrue" our Lord and possibly "were liable to error and subject to the deflections of contemporary opinion and personal prejudice" in their reports of Him. It is an odd use of terms when we are told (p. 93) that "demonstration" "can never attain to more than probability;" and we do not think that Dr. Smith quite exactly apprehends Calvin's and the Reformed doctrine of the *Testimonium Spiritus Sancti* (pp. 105-106). That is to say, there is some chaff mingled still with Dr. Smith's wheat, and the reader must winnow it away, if he desires only good grain.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Resurrection and the Life. A Study of the Resurrection and Ascension Narratives in the Gospels, and of the threefold Version in the Acts of Christ's Appearance to Saul on the Way to Damascus. By G. HANSON, M.A., D.D., New York, Chicago, Toronto: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. Pp. xi, 372. \$1.00 net.

"The purpose that the author had in view in writing this book was to lead all, whom his words may reach, to a deeper and firmer sense of Christ's victory over death, and of His close comradeship with men to-day as yesterday." After a characterization of various naturalistic theories of the resurrection and a statement of certain preliminary considerations touching the general subject of miracles, the relation of body and soul, the hypothesis of coma, and the honesty of the Apostles, the historical objections urged against the New Testa-

ment account of the resurrection are reviewed. In this discussion special attention is given to the view of Schmiedel. The concluding part of the book is interpretative and devotional. Meditation on the significance of the risen and living Christ for Christian faith and life and earnest exhortation springing out of deep conviction are more congenial to the author than the processes of historical criticism and lend to the discussion of his theme the attractiveness of sympathetic appreciation.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

The Modern Student's Life of Christ. A Textbook for Higher Institutions of Learning and Advanced Bible Classes. By PHILIP VOLLMER, Ph.D., D.D., Professor of New Testament in the Central Theological Seminary, Dayton, Ohio. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. Pp. xix, 353. \$1.00 net.

This book is intended for advanced Bible study. Its point of view is "uncompromisingly evangelical" and its method the "modern scientific". The subject is treated broadly, including themes usually discussed in the histories of New Testament Times. Selected bibliographies are given and much valuable information. The form is analytical, the various divisions being indicated both by number and by type. The book will serve a useful end. Its chief defects are the mingling of the certain and the uncertain, particularly in the display of a greater precision than the sources justify; a somewhat mechanical organization of the subject matter; and rather striking omissions in the references to literature.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

The Text and Canon of the New Testament. By ALEXANDER SOUTER, Sometime Professor of New Testament Greek and Exegesis in Mansfield College, Oxford. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. Pp. x, 254. 75 cents.

This book fills well an important place in the series ("Studies in Theology") which has called it into being under limitations which otherwise might cause regret. Students of the New Testament and those interested in the spread of trustworthy information about its history will be grateful for this compact, clearly written, widely informed and instructive discussion. The author brings to his work the training and attainments of a critical student and editor in the field of patrology as well as the special knowledge of the phenomena of the textual history of the New Testament evidenced by the critical notes of his edition of the Revisers' text (cf. this *Review*, ix [1911], pp. 325f). The Text of the New Testament naturally receives a fuller treatment than the Canon; and much that is common to the literature of these subjects is repeated. This is necessary and might be tedious but for the need of the testing to which these com-

mon elements are subjected in the light both of the evidence at present available and of recent and contemporary discussion. Here and there things once considered well established disappear; but in the main the fundamental facts and formative principles remain. This is a valuable and reassuring result. The progress in these subjects, Souter remarks, "is such, that every ten years or so, a brief treatment of them, an attempt to gather together the results of multitudinous books and articles, is a necessity." And the author has done this thoroughly, especially with reference to the work of English scholars, giving at times information in regard to literature which is still in preparation. In the matter of the Text of the New Testament the author still—and wisely—adheres to the principles of Westcott and Hort. In his treatment of the Canon he recognizes the early influence of the principle of tradition but scarcely does full justice to the idea of authority, its source and significance in the early Church. But the discussion as a whole serves its purpose. It will introduce the readers to its subjects, give them accurate information, stimulate their interest, and indicate the literature to which they should go for fuller and more detailed treatment.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

Agnostos Theos. Untersuchungen zur Formengeschichte religiöser Rede. VON EDUARD NORDEN. Leipzig und Berlin: B. G. Teubner. 1913. Pp. ix, 410. M. 12, geb. M. 13.

In the winter term of 1910-1911 the Acts of the Apostles was being read and discussed in the "Graeca" at Berlin. When the xviiith chapter was reached chaos reigned in the realm of opinion; and in the midst of this Diels formulated the religio-historical problem in the words: "What ἄγνωστος θεός means is ἄγνωστον, therefore ζητητίον." This formulation—significant for its source—impressed Norden and together with the publication by Wünsch in 1898 of Laurentius Lydus' *περὶ μηνῶν* containing a passage *περὶ τοῦ ἀγνώστου θεοῦ* contributed to the production of this book.

The discussion takes its starting point from the inscription on the altar in Athens which according to the narrative in Acts was made by Paul the text of an address. The contents of the book are distributed into three sections—the Areopagus speech in Acts; an investigation concerning the history of prayer and predication formulae in respect of their style; and a series of appendices on various related themes.

The point of view of Norden's book—as of his earlier *Die antike Kunstprosa*—is primarily literary. The formal element in the literature bearing on the historico-religious problems of the first century is handled with a skill and a minute acquaintance with the phenomena which few command and none can fail to appreciate. And it will be generally agreed that such concrete formal matters must enter into and influence the treatment of the religious elements in the world of thought and action in which Christianity had its birth, its early

struggles, and its ultimate triumph. The phenomena are certainly various and complex but are not without common elements. These demand careful study not only on their formal side but in respect of their informing principles, their respective provenance, and their influence, in order that the distinctive elements may not be lost or neglected in the background upon which they are portrayed. These problems are not new, but they are especially dominant in contemporary literature. The religio-historical method in the study of early Christianity owes much to Wendland, Reitzenstein, Dieterich, Usener, Bousset, Gunkel, Cumont and others; and if results have been claimed by its representatives which are subversive of historical Christianity as embodied in the New Testament, there is additional reason to examine with care the phenomena upon which these results are based and the validity of the inferences that are drawn from them. And in this respect Norden's book makes a valuable contribution, treating as it does with such fulness of detail the formal and philological elements of certain aspects of these problems; but like some of the literature with which it is affiliated, in respect of the material element,—the distinctive content of the religious ideas embodied in certain modes of expression—it too is not altogether free from the leveling tendency so readily begotten by the comparative method.

It will not be possible to give an account of the philological detail or the wealth of literary material which Norden's book contains, or of the purely formal elements of style which are discussed,—the significance of the cola and commata or of parallelism and different modes of sentence construction, the manner of address and predication in prayer, the use of participle and relative clauses, or even of the fine discussion of the Stoic background of the Areopagus address. For these the book itself must be consulted. The significant feature of the discussion, as the title suggests, concerns the discourse in Acts xvii and thus, in general, missionary discourses, together with the idea involved in its text,—the unknown God—and its religio-historical implications.

An examination of similar phenomena in the *Poimandres*, the *Odes of Solomon*, the *Kerugma Petri* (Clement of Alexandria) and the discourse of Barnabas (Clementina) discloses a common conception,—the *γνώσις θεοῦ* and a common type having constant elements (*τόποι*). These elements are: worship in ignorance, attack on idolatry, call to repentance, immortality (resurrection of Christ). From the fact that the Areopagus address breaks off without bringing the resurrection of Christ into connection with individual immortality it is inferred that the type had been applied in Christian circles to the production of missionary discourses before this connection became the center and end of the whole doctrine of the resurrection, i.e. prior to the composition of 1 Cor. xv. 12ff,—an inference which at least faces the problem raised by the hypothesis that the discourse is a literary fiction after its type but which presupposes rather than shows the existence of such a time and condition and is unnecessary if its author had knowledge that an actual speech—however this knowledge

was communicated to him and however reproduced—reached its climax in a reference to the resurrection.

This type of address, common in the literature of Paul's time, was of pre-Christian origin and had been formed under Hellenic influence. It had been strongly affected by oriental Hellenism, especially by Jewish propaganda. Two of its elements,—the *γνώσις θεοῦ* and *μετάνοια*—were foreign to Hellenism in its purity, and a third,—the attack on idolatry—has Stoic ingredients. The address in Acts moreover forms part of a journey narrative after the manner of the Odessey composed in the memoir or hypomnemata style in which the first personal forms have place with the third. The analogies in this respect make it evident that the former can not be regarded as indicative of the extent of a source, while one of them is thought to be especially significant both of the type and for an even more intimate relation to the narrative in Acts. Philostratus used the narrative of Damis, the companion of Apollonius. Moreover he represents Apollonius as taking note of inscriptions on the base of altars (ii. 43; iv. 13) and as saying on one occasion (vi. 3): *σωφρονέστερον γὰρ τὸ περὶ πάντων θεῶν εὖ λέγειν, καὶ ταῦτα Ἀθήνησιν, οὓς καὶ ἀγνώστων δαιμόνων βώμοι ἱδρύνται*. Though spoken on the journey to Ethiopia the local reference to Athens (*Ἀθήνησιν*) indicates the *περὶ θυσίων* of Apollonius as source, and if so the reference to the worship of *ἀγνώστοι θεοί* must have constituted an element in the Athenian address of Apollonius (iv. 19). This and other points of contact suggest the possibility, the probability, the certainty (p. 46) that the redactor of Acts, who added the address to the original narrative—[Grundschrift]—*cf.* the detailed criticism of this by Harnack in *Texte und Untersuchungen* etc., xxxix. 1, "Ist die Rede des Paulus in Athen ein ursprünglicher Bestandteil der Apostelgeschichte?" 1913—knew either the *περὶ θυσίων* or a fuller account of its contents than Philostratus has given (pp. 45 ff, 55, 332). Both speeches belong to the same soteriological type and that in Acts is shown to be dependent by its transformation of the plural into the singular. The singular form is not supported by tradition, but like the plural owes its origin to an influence which was oriental rather than Greek. The author of the Areopagus speech, however, did not invent but simply made use of an idea that was current in the circles in which he moved; for there are other instances quite independent of Acts in which mention is made of an unknown God (Livy and Lucan in Laurentius Lydus' *περὶ μνηῶν* with reference to the God worshiped in Jerusalem; the prophets of the Old Testament; frequently in the New Testament, including Q; pre-Christian Gnosticism, especially in the creation myth of an Hermetic document *Κόρη κόσμου* in which the *ἀγνώστος θεός* is identified with the demiurge,—an identification which the Christian Gnostics under dualistic influence transformed into principal opposition; a Coptic Gnostic hymn; the Christian Gnostics; the Catholic Fathers, especially Irenaeus; Gregory's hymn *εἰς θεόν*; and the Platonist Proclus). *Ἀγνώστος* as a predicate

of God does not appear in sources which are purely Hellenic, and its absence is rendered the more significant by the presence of related predicates such as *ἀόρατος*, *ἀθεώρητος*, *ἀκατάληπτος*, *ἀφανής*, *νοητός* (even *νοῦ κρείσων*) in writers after Plato. Even Philo and Josephus do not have it, though their approach to it is closer by reason of oriental influence and the idea of the divine transcendence. The usage of the correlates of *ἄγνωστος* both in Latin and in Greek is similar so that it may be said in general that the *γνώσις θεοῦ* and its verbal connections was a central idea about which the religions of the Orient moved in concentric circles. The reason for this difference is not doubtful. The Greek sought to ground his world view by speculative processes in which the *νοῦς* was dominant, the end an intellectual apprehension by means of the methods of reason in which the mystical, ecstatic element was excluded, at least in principle. In the Orient the knowledge of God was attained, under the influence of an aroused emotionalism and the exclusion of the intellect, by supernatural means in that God revealed Himself in grace to the upward striving disposition. Here faith and enlightened vision take the place of knowledge and reasoned apprehension, a deep inner experience the place of reflection. The two modes of thought are incommensurable; and the fundamental historical antithesis is not Christianity and Judaism (Marcion) but Christianity (Orientalism) and Hellenism. But in the theocrasie (syncretism) of the time, to which mystical elements in Plato contributed and in which Poseidonius was widely influential, the soil was prepared for the fruitage of the first century. And thus the monotheistic transformation of a polytheistic altar inscription in the Areopagus address, like the address itself, was a comparatively harmless fiction since the conception was not invented,—only as a religio-philosophical abstraction an altar was not its proper place. The address itself is thus, according to Norden, a missionary discourse not without an historical occasion but freely composed by its author and not in accord with Paul's ideas,—a discourse of a common type, influenced by Stoic conceptions in the *τόπος περὶ τοῦ θείου*, the situation and the starting point by a redactional change of number being fashioned after a well known *διάλεξις* of a contemporary and nearby countryman of Paul's [Apollonius], in which similar propaganda was made in behalf of the right knowledge of God, and entirely lacking in independent ideas (p. 125). It is made up of two elements; Old Testament ideas and citations and theological commonplaces of the Stoa. It misrepresents Paul's view of the heathen as set forth in Rom i. 18ff,—a passage certainly influenced by the *Σοφία Σαλωμών* xii. 27ff. The Christianizing of the type appears in the threatened judgment and the demand for faith in the risen Jesus, the idea of repentance being common to the type, though the words *μετάνοια* and *μεταμέλεια* (cf. also the discussion of *συνέλιξις* pp. 136ff note 1 and 391) are of oriental rather than Hellenic origin.

The second part of Norden's book is concerned with forms of

prayer and divine predication, and this is divided into three sections,—Hellenica, Judaica, Christiana, with a concluding section devoted to the logion of Mt. xi. 25-30 [beside Harnack's discussion in *Sprüche und Reden Jesu*, 1907, to which Norden refers in "Additions and Corrections" pp. 394 ff., cf. also Schumacher, *Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Mat. xi. 27 (Luc. x. 22)*, 1912 and W. Bauer, *Theologische Literaturzeitung* 1913, 167 f]. The most significant feature in the discussion is the inference which is drawn from Origen's report of the manner of speech employed by an oriental (Samaritan) pseudo-prophet (c. *Cel.* vii. 8f). This passage shows formal agreement with certain aspects of the Johannine discourses of Jesus which are thus understood to be the product of a powerful theosophic, gnostic, mystical movement (pp. 188ff, 194). And this is true likewise of certain elements in the Synoptic account of Jesus' teaching. The criticism therefore that seeks the historical Jesus in the Gospel palimpsests [the figure is not Norden's but my own] must disregard the superior script in the one case as in the other and recognize that both alike are formed by a common influence which is of pre-Christian origin,—a soteriological type of religious propaganda address extending back to the early Hellenic prophets and later quickened by oriental ideas. This to know is to be possessed of the criteria by which the character of the superior script is disclosed. But the difficult task of deciphering the underlying script remains. Norden believes in the existence of this script and thinks that it may be read with the help of a reagent; and he holds this faith in spite of the admission that Jesus Himself may have known a type so widely current in His time. He is sure, however, that Jesus did not adopt it, for His manner (*Art*) was too simple (*schlicht*) to need such pomp (p. 201; cf. pp. 272, 279, 304, 351). Yet it should be evident that what may well have been pomp in the words attributed to a Samaritan pseudo-prophet, *ἐγὼ ὁ θεός εἰμι ἢ θεοῦ παῖς ἢ πνεῦμα θεῶν κτλ.*, may have been not pomp but simple truth in words attributed to Jesus in the Fourth Gospel, the Synoptic Gospels, and the primary sources of the Synoptic Gospels (especially the *ἐγὼ εἰμὶ* utterances in John, and in Mk. xiv. 55 ff and parallels, and Q=Mt. xi. 25-30 and parallel). And is the positive criterion which Norden employs—simplicity of manner—sufficiently well grounded and adequate to its function? These are fundamental questions. Their answer cannot rest on formal considerations alone. It implicates a whole world view before which Jesus stands in simplicity, it is true, yet clothed with a dignity which is neither exhausted nor explained by the literary relations of its expression.

The Appendices contain important matter. The treatment of the composition of Acts is especially instructive in its analysis of the proem, the conclusion, the "we"-sections and style in relation to the character of the book and the problem of its sources. There are few typographical errors, the form of the book being worthy of the publishers as its contents reflect the philological accuracy and literary knowledge of the author.

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

The Religious Experience of Saint Paul. By PERCY GARDNER, Litt.D., F.B.A. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; London: Williams & Norgate. 1911. Pp. vii, 263. (Crown Theological Library.)

The author tells us in the Preface that he has prepared this book by way of experiment on the principle of setting aside the books about St. Paul and making use exclusively of his Epistles. The "books about St. Paul" are meant to include the Acts of the Apostles as well as more modern literature on the subject, for Luke "though a delightful personality" and to some extent rehabilitated by Harnack, "is by no means fully in sympathy with his hero." This does not hinder the fact that in several instances, where the statements of Luke prove convenient for pressing a point or commending a construction, Dr. Gardner makes free use of them, and that not merely where they are taken from the "we-pieces," but also otherwise cf. pp. 27, 30, 44. The exclusion of extraneous sources of information is not extended to the author's "knowledge of the religious surroundings and religious institutions of the Hellenistic age." In point of fact, so far from being an attempt to interpret the Epistles by themselves, the book could be more properly characterized as an attempt to interpret Paul's faith and experience as largely receiving its form and not a little of its substance from the mystery-cults prevalent in contemporary Hellenism. The whole treatise, the author tells us, "was originally suggested by the discovery that the word "mystery" and the ideas which it conveys play a much larger part than is generally recognized in the writings and the thought of St. Paul." The discovery is quite in line with similar discoveries made in Germany by *Reitzenstein* and others. For some time to come the interpretation of Paulinism is likely to stand in this sign of the mystery-cults. It is the new fashion that will have its day, just as the other view-points have had theirs in the past. Dr. Gardner makes an effort not merely to place the make-up of important strands of the Apostle's thought in this light of a Christian adaptation of the mystery-religion, but also seeks to apply the principle in question to the Pauline use of the word *μυστήριον* itself. In this, we think, he has small success. The use of the word in the singular in most passages does not favor it. Then there is the all-important fact that the idea of carefully guarded secrecy is entirely absent from the Apostle's use of the term. The Pauline "mystery", to be sure, is something that as a matter of fact *has been* secret, as the divine purpose of salvation which was for ages hidden in God, or *is* recondite as the mystic adumbration of the union between Christ and the Church in the marriage-bond, but it is never something that *should be kept* secret, and this latter feature the word *μυστήριον* in connection with the mystery-cults seems specifically to connote. After the mystery of the divine purpose has been *σεσχηγμένον χρόνους αιώνιους* it is now at last *φανερωθέν* (Rom. xvi, 25, 26). Similarly in 1 Cor. ii. 7. 10 the divine "wisdom *ἐν μυστηρίῳ*" has been hidden, because contained in the purpose of God, and now has been revealed through the Spirit. And so in the other passages with Paul

as well as with other New Testament writers. That after the revelation of the mystery to Christians it must be kept confined to their circle, there is nothing to indicate. It is only through arbitrarily importing this into the Pauline conception that the author makes out a resemblance in this point of usage. The Pauline "mystery" has been a mystery but is so no longer, the Hellenistic "mysteries" are recondite in their very nature and intended to remain so: they are for the initiated, whereas the Apostle publishes the content of his Gospel openly to the world. In a recent article in the *Zeitsch. f. d. Neutestam. Wiss.* (1911, pp. 188-227) Von Soden has convincingly shown, that the New Testament usage of *μυστήριον* is to be explained on eschatological principles and has nothing to do with the technical cult-usage of the word in Hellenism. Of course, this does not settle the larger question as to whether Paul's teaching, apart from the use of the word, was influenced by or indebted to the "mysteries". Von Soden, who, as we have seen, denies the linguistic influence so far as the word is concerned, at the same time affirms that there is, materially considered, a real connection between Paul's trains of thought and the ideas associated with the technical Hellenistic use of *μυστήριον*, as advocated by Reitzenstein (*ibid.*, p. 197, note 2). But here also the question may be raised whether, like the peculiar use of the word, perhaps these ideas in question, do not receive a more natural and more adequate interpretation from the Messianic, eschatological background of Paul's teaching and that of the New Testament in general. With reference to the *πνεῦμα*-doctrine, we believe that this can actually be shown. What, if in other points also the resemblances on which so much stress is laid, proved to be purely apparent and due to the fact that the eschatology of revelation centering in the Person of Christ posits the same questions and brings an authoritative answer to the same problems, which after their own groping and confused fashion the followers of the mystery-cults were perplexed about? Such a parallelism would by no means necessarily involve that in the approach to the problem and in the formulation of the questions, far less that in the answers and solutions supplied, there was historical dependence. The line of revelation and the line of pagan religious development might meet at a predestinated point, and yet the antecedents of the two lines might be far different. When Gardner thinks that the dependence of Paul on the mystery-religions can be traced on the three points of rites of purification and tests of entrance—means of communication with some deity as the head of believers—the extension of the view into the world beyond the grave—the question arises, whether Paul in covering these three points in his Gospel, introduces something new that had not been represented in primitive Christianity before him. The author actually asserts this: "In all these ways he moves away from the earliest teaching of Christianity towards the Church of the Roman Empire" (p. 81). But this seems to us in conflict with patent facts. Was there no baptism in pre-Pauline Christianity? Or was not baptism at that

time a rite of purification or a test of entrance? Paul hardly makes enough of baptism to warrant the view, that he can have had much to do with its introduction or even interpretation. Was there not an identification with Christ as the head of the disciples before Paul appeared on the scene? Was there no doctrine as to the future life even in the specific sense of an outlook beyond the grave in the late Jewish and early Christian Church? In inclining to a negative answer on these questions the author seems to us to take too little account of the higher, transcendental eschatology, which certainly existed in the teaching of our Lord, and perhaps was not without its representatives in pre-Christian Judaism.

Another question that should be raised is, whether the alleged spiritualisation of the mystery-religions, which is supposed to have facilitated the incorporation of their forms of expression into the Christianity of Paul, is not in the main a development of the post-Pauline period. To Reitzenstein's method the objection has been raised, we think not unjustly, that he works with later texts, whose content by a rather strained and precarious critical reasoning, he seeks to carry back into an older period. If the mystery-cults had not yet undergone this spiritualizing transformation at the time of Paul, but retained their original gross and sensual character, what likelihood is there that Paul would borrow from them or consider their forms fit vehicles for the expression of Christian experience? Gardner himself admits that when Paul speaks of pagan religion, including the mystery-cults, he does so in terms of the greatest dislike and contempt. It was not a field in which he would choose to dig. But the Apostle's borrowing was an unconscious process. The thing was caught by a sort of infection, without any notion, whence it came (p. 80). This representation does not seem quite in accord with the writer's earlier attempt to prove that Paul used the word *μυστήριον* in a technical sense. Such a use he certainly could not have fallen into by an unconscious lapse. And, apart from that, the whole theory of unconscious assimilation of ideas fits ill into the avowed purpose of the Apostle to keep his Gospel pure from all admixtures of a worldly source. Paul was not the unsuspecting, easily-impressed mind that on this theory he would have had to be. We may safely infer from all we know about him that he would be on his guard against contamination of the Gospel at his own hand no less than against its corruption by others.

That not all scholars, even of the liberal type, are prepared to admit any appreciable influence of the mysteries on the thought of Paul, will appear from a paper read by Prof. Clemen at the meeting of the International Congress for the History of Religions recently held at Leiden. According to the report in the *Theol. Literaturz.* of Sept. 28, 1912, col. 618, Prof. Clemen maintains that the oldest Christianity was in no wise affected by the mystery-religions, Paul only in some forms of expression, the post-Pauline development in a few respects was materially affected, but a deeper-going influence they did not

exert until the rise of Gnosticism and subsequently to this on the Catholic church itself.

Although the book under review professes to give a comprehensive account of Paul's religious experience, yet as a matter of fact the writer, owing to his partiality to the alleged mystery-aspect of Paulinism, almost entirely neglects another side which in the Epistles attains to equal if not greater prominence. We refer to the Apostle's experience as connected with justification and faith as the means of attaining to it. To treat this as a negligible quantity must needs put the picture badly out of focus. We know that it has become a fashion of late to put all the material in the Epistles connected with this question to the account of controversial exigencies, and to assign to it next to no importance for the center of Paul's own religious life. How such a view can for a moment be entertained in the face of such passages as Rom. v. and Rom. viii. we have never been able to understand. An inevitable corollary of this one-sided appreciation of the subjective aspect of the Apostle's religion, is that in the objective sphere also the corresponding importance attached by Paul to Christ's death as a means of reconciliation, redemption and propitiation is unduly minimized. Dr. Gardner's book illustrates this. He has very little to say about the place which the death of Christ occupies in Paul's objective soteriology. His own interest is so absorbed by the mysteries—as in his view throughout shaping the subjective side of Paul's experience, that one receives the impression as if for the Apostle himself also all religious interest was swallowed up in this one matter.

In regard to the last chapter of the book entitled "St. Paul and Modernity" we hardly know what to say. Dr. Gardner here presents Paul to us in the light of a theological pragmatist, not, of course, in the conscious sense, but in so far as his disinclination to place the emphasis on formulas and doctrines, and his desire everywhere to place it on facts and experience and religious efficiency and profitability, put him in line with this modern trend of thought. "To discover that St. Paul was at heart a pragmatist and in deep sympathy with this modern way of regarding religion, is a happy theory" (p. 228). This will be a sufficiently novel point of view to many who have hitherto felt as if the Apostle who could pen such a word as Gal. i, 8 stood at the farthest remove from the standpoint in regard to truth represented by pragmatism. One cannot help thinking that the ease with which the author presents this paradoxical comparison has something to do with the one-sided portrayal of Paul's religious experience above commented upon. If the center of gravity lay entirely on the subjective side, where Christianity could assimilate to itself, the forms and impulse of the mystery-religion, and if this assimilation was so easily and unhesitatingly accomplished, because it was a mere question, what would help the movement along as a religious force in the world, then it comes somewhat within the range of the conceivable that Paul must have more or less felt in

regard to religious truth as the modern pragmatist feels. But if the question paramount in the Apostle's mind was a question of objective relation to and communication with God, if the problem of justification was a real vital concern to him, then it will immediately appear that not merely, had the question been put to him, he could never have for a moment regarded the pragmatist frame of mind as possible or allowable, but that also his whole trend of mind must have moved in the opposite direction. To Paul the possession of objective religious truth as expressive of objective divine reality is of the very essence of religious experience. To call its possibility in doubt is to cut the nerve not merely of theology but of religion itself. The author in taking the opposite ground not merely draws a caricature of the Apostle, but also leaves us in a veritable quagmire so far as the question is concerned in what the imperishable essence of Paul's religion, not to speak of his religious views, consisted. He talks glibly about this or that not being of paramount value or significance, and gives the impression of being in possession of an infallible standard by which such matters can be determined. But we must frankly confess our inability to gather from the writer's statement any positive summary of the abiding substance of Paulinism. The standard in the background seems to be that that is of permanent value which approves itself as beneficial and helpful to the cause of enlightened spiritual religion in the world. This is no doubt an answer that would satisfy the pragmatist. It is, however, subject to the criticism that an objective standard of truth will even so still be required for determining what constitutes an enlightened spiritual religion. There can be no form of progress without a normative goal, and no normative goal without objective cognition. Because religion is the province of the highest goal it is of all domains the least suited to pragmatic treatment. And inasmuch as in Paul this specific character of religion found a most profound appreciation, the attempt to make of him a precursor of modern pragmatism can in our opinion result in nothing else but the de-Paulinizing of Paul.

Princeton.

GERHARDUS VOS.

St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians by the REV. CYRIL W. EMMET, M.A., Vicar of West Hendred. With index and map. London: Robert Scott, Roxburghe House, Paternoster Row, E.C., 1912. Pp. xxxi, 68.

The chief significance of Mr. Emmet's commentary is to be found in its advocacy of the early date of the Epistle. Like Professor Lake (*Earlier Epistles of St. Paul*), Mr. Emmet supposes that Galatians was written before the apostolic council which is described in the fifteenth chapter of Acts. The conference between Paul and the original apostles which is described in the second chapter of Galatians is accordingly referred to the "famine visit" of Acts xi. 30, xii. 25. This view can no longer be dismissed as a mere curious aberration. If it is to be refuted at all, it can be refuted only by pains-

taking examination of the weighty arguments which are being urged in its favor. Certainly it explains admirably many of the facts. Why does Paul pass over without mention the apostolic decree of Acts xv. 23-29? If the Epistle to the Galatians was written after the apostolic council of Acts xv, and if Gal. ii. 1-10 refers to that same visit of Paul to Jerusalem, then the failure to mention the apostolic decree becomes surprising. Indeed it has been one of the chief grounds for impugning the trustworthiness of Acts. According to Mr. Emmet and Professor Lake, the difficulty disappears altogether. Paul does not mention the apostolic decree in the Epistle to the Galatians because the decree had not yet been issued. It was issued at exactly the time assigned to it by the book of Acts. But that time had not yet arrived. Perhaps the difficulty with regard to the apostolic decree is not so insuperable as is sometimes supposed, even if the ordinary dating of Galatians be adopted. But the earlier dating affords at least the simplest solution of this particular difficulty.

Of course the early dating can be held only in connection with the "South-Galatian" view of the address of the Epistle, which identifies "the churches of Galatia" with the churches at Pisidian Antioch, Iconium, Lystra and Derbe, which were founded on the first missionary journey. In a popular commentary, Mr. Emmet could not argue "the Galatian question" in detail. But the considerations which he adduces are well chosen and cogently expressed.

Mr. Emmet's commentary is intended for the general reader, and presupposes no knowledge of the Greek text. But the notes are evidently based upon careful study, and bring the chief exegetical problems clearly before the reader. Unfortunately, the point of view from which the commentary is written will not commend itself altogether to those who maintain a lofty view of supernatural revelation. The author's attitude with regard to the exultant supernaturalism of the Epistle is, to say the least, not uncompromisingly favorable; his opinion of some of the argumentative passages is distinctly derogatory; and he is inclined to allow to the mystery religions a larger measure of influence upon Pauline thinking than the most cautious scholarship would permit. Finally, Mr. Emmet's negative attitude towards the "forensic" element in Paul's conception of the work of Christ is exegetically unjustifiable. Perhaps it is also unfortunate from the point of view of the religious needs of the modern Church. Of course if the substitutionary view of the atonement really involved a neglect of the transforming influence of the living Christ in the heart of the believer, then the aversion which Mr. Emmet displays towards it would be well grounded. But why should the two elements of Christian truth be regarded as mutually exclusive? They are not so regarded either in the thinking of Paul or in the theology of the Church. Paulinism will really be effective only when it is accepted in its entirety. Such acceptance will involve some modification of modern thinking. It is not easy, in these days, to lay hold upon the truth of the Gospel. It is far easier to adapt the gospel

to modern culture than to make modern culture subservient to the gospel. To a considerable extent, the Church is adopting the easier alternative. And she is suffering a tremendous loss of power. Paulinism is waiting to be rediscovered. Understood in its overpowering entirety, it might again transform the world.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Pierre Viret: sa Vie et son Oeuvre (1511-1571). Par JEAN BARNAUD, Pasteur, Docteur-ès-lettres. Saint-Amans (Tarn): G. Carayol. 1911. 8vo; pp. 703. 12 francs, franco, to be had of the author, Clairac (Lot-et-Garonne), France.

Quelques Lettres Inédites de Pierre Viret, publiées avec des notes historiques et bibliographiques, par JEAN BARNAUD, Pasteur, Docteur-ès-lettres. Saint-Amans (Tarn): G. Carayol. 1911. 8vo; pp. 156. 3 francs, to be had from the author, Clairac (Lot-et-Garonne), France.

Peter Viret has the distinction of being the only one of the Reformers of Romance Switzerland of the first rank who was native-born. His place among these Reformers is a distinguished one. Beza indicates it by placing him by the side of Calvin and Farel as constituting with them "le trépied d'élite" of the Reformers; and, on their side, the Catholics, in their reminiscences of those whose assaults had left the deepest impression in the lands of French speech, rang the changes on the names of Luther, Calvin, Viret and Beza. There has hitherto been no adequate biography of this notable man accessible; those of Schmidt and J. Cart were written without access to adequate material, that of Ph. Godet is only a sketch. This lack has now been supplied by Dr. Barnaud with this detailed study prepared as a thesis for obtaining the degree of Docteur-ès-lettres at the Sorbonne. The works before us are two. One is a collection of fifty hitherto unpublished letters of Viret's (forty in Latin and ten in French) which forms a natural complement to the *Correspondance des Réformateurs* published by Herminjard and the letters gathered in the works of Calvin published by Baum, Cunitz and Reuss. These letters are not all that are extant from Viret's pen: Dr. Barnaud has published only those which seemed to him important. They possess, he tells us, a double interest. "On the one side they reveal certain traits of Viret's character, his disinterestedness, his gratefulness, his profound seriousness which does not, however, inhibit a certain playfulness, a gaiety sometimes very delicate. On the other hand they give us precise information as to his life and the rôle which he played. They enable us for example to follow him closely in his contests with the Libertines, in his disputes with the Bernese government, in the crisis which culminated in his expulsion from Lausanne, and in his journeys in the South of France." On the basis

of a careful study of all the material now accessible, Dr. Barnaud has written his *Life of Viret*, which is characterized at once by fullness of detail, and a happy handling of the material, so as to present it in readable form. He gives us in effect the first adequate biography of this great man, who stands out in his pages the worthy companion and aid of the greatest of the Reformers.

Born at Orbe in 1511, Viret had already in his pious youth learned of the new doctrines from one of the few capable pedagogues who taught at Orbe in his day, Marc Romain; and after a sojourn in Paris at the reactionary collège de Montaigu (where he missed Calvin but sat on the same benches with Loyola) in the height of the Reformation excitement, he returned to Orbe in 1530-1531 "with a solid literary culture, a profound conviction of the truth of the Reformed doctrines, and an exact knowledge of the abuses of the Church for the correction of which he was urgent." Like Calvin he was drawn into the public work of the Reformation by the "attestations and adjurations" of Farel and preached his first sermon at Orbe on May 6, 1531—a youth, he it noted, of scarcely twenty years of age. Retiring in native disposition, he became a bold evangelist who feared not the face of man, and drawn by a tender conscience rivaled Calvin himself in the firmness and persistency with which he pressed on in the complete reformation and organization of the Church. "His soft and insinuating speech, his affable manners, did more to advance the Reformation and to assure its success than the aggressive impetuosity of Farel"; but his steady persistency in consolidating and purifying the Church broke on the determined Erastianism of Bern and ended in his being driven from his beloved native land to complete his days, full of labors, in the South of France at the age of sixty.

The peculiarity of Viret by which he is distinguished from his compeers, Dr. Barnaud finds in his predilection for the work of a pastor. "No doubt he labored with zeal for the evangelization of the masses and met with remarkable success as an evangelist. No doubt also he taught theology and composed theological works which are not without value even by the side of those of Calvin. But the Church formed the sphere in which he exercised by preference the gifts which he possessed." "To instruct, to counsel, to edify, to exhort, to say all in one word to 'shepherd'—these are the functions to which his aptitudes and his tastes most naturally led him." "His history shows that his principal preoccupation was the organization of the Church, considered as a religious society and in its relations with the civil power." No labor was too great, no care seemed to him to be exaggerated, which promised either the better training of the individuals of his flock in the Christian life, or the more complete equipment of the organized Church for its work in the world. He was only twenty-five years of age when he was named pastor of the Church at Lausanne and from the first the care of the parish fell on his shoulders and was taken by him most seriously. Herminjard

infers from one of Farel's letters, that, troubled by the ignorance of his parishoners, Viret went about from house to house, patiently explaining to each household in turn, the details of the Lord's prayer, that they might use it intelligently. Of course he did not neglect the public services of the "Temple". He was a great preacher. Dr. Barnaud describes his preaching for us in connection with his work at Geneva, after he had been driven out of Lausanne. "He filled there first of all," he says, "the function of preacher. His services were appreciated: the registers of the Council say that the 'multitude' was urgent to hear him. It attended his preaching and that of Calvin in such numbers that, in the month of June, it became necessary, on account of the excessive heat, to hold the weekly worship in St. Peter's and no longer in St. Germain. It is difficult for us to form any exact idea of Viret's eloquence. His oratorical successes are attested by his contemporaries. Theodore Beza, among others, places him first in the charm of his discourse. Later writers also represent him as one of the most remarkable orators of the Reformation. 'He had,' says Verheiden, 'a speech so sweet that he kept his audience always alert and attentive. His style had so much force and a harmony so caressing to the ears and the mind that the least religious among his auditors, the most impatient with others, listened to him without effort and with pleasure. It was said that to see them hanging as it were on his lips, it was evident that they wished him to speak longer.' 'At Lyons,' says Melchoir Adam, 'where he preached in the open air, he brought thousands to faith in Jesus Christ. By the power of his divine eloquence, he arrested passers by who had no intention of listening to him and constrained them to hear him to the end.'—As he spoke extemporaneously and his sermons were not regularly taken down, as Calvin's were, we are left to contemporary accounts to inform us of their character. Five of them have come down to us, however, in reports made by the "scribe," Denis Ragaimier, and they bear out the encomiums passed on his ordinary preaching. We are interested to note that his sermons were about an hour and a half long: a fact which gives point to Verheiden's remark that his auditors evidently wished that he would go on. No good and effective preaching can be short: short sermons are an unfailing index of times of decaying faith. It was the warmth and life of his discourses which gave them their attractiveness. "They breathed a profound conviction, which did not permit itself to be bound in by a prearranged form and which yielded to the inspirations of the moment. On the other side the preacher was not remote from his audience. He came into contact with them, alert to draw from the circumstances which were interesting the Church the lessons that flowed from them, interesting himself in the affairs of everyday life and counseling everyone as his experience dictated to him." "We find," adds the narrator "in Viret's preaching, in general, the same virtues and the same imperfections which characterize his writings. In default of profound thought, of a vigorously logical plan, they give easy developments in language

familiar, free and picturesque, eminently popular. Here also he has before his eyes the great public which was in his mind as he wrote his Dialogues. As an intelligent and cultivated man, he avoids the trivialities from which so many others do not know how to guard themselves, but on every page of his discourses, as of his books, there is apparent the preoccupation of placing himself at the level of the most humble."

Viret's place in literature is already suggested by the words we have just quoted. "As has been justly said," Dr. Barnaud remarks in another connection, "Viret filled a rôle of his own in the teaching of the Reformation. While the higher instruction is the work of Calvin, he makes popular instruction his own." In an excellent preface which contains valuable biographical suggestions, and which reveals to us a truly Apostolical soul, Viret advises his readers that his object is "to instruct and enlighten the 'poor people', to reassure poor consciences which have fallen into trouble and doubt. Skilful in popularising, intelligent, learned, he seeks to diffuse the truths of the Gospel brought to light by the Reformation, but he does not make a contribution of his own to the religious or philosophical thought of his day." Here is the secret of Viret's whole literary product, of its strength and of its weakness. It was all written for a practical end—the instruction in the Gospel of the "poor people"; and that end attained, he was careless of all else. It is merely incidentally, therefore, that he has won for himself a place as one of the most remarkable writers of the French Reformation, and indeed a permanent position in the history of French Satire. He wrote copiously, too copiously; even his most characteristic form of composition, satirical dialogue, is copious in the extreme. But all that he wrote was directed to one end. "On every page of Viret's work, there is displayed the triple preoccupation of combatting his adversaries, of instructing, of jeering. He employs to reach the end in view, all the resources of an ingenious and fecund mind, leaving nothing to chance, utilizing every legitimate means of securing the victory for what he deemed the truth. He recoils before no obstacle, permits no difficulties to arrest his task, neither the reputation nor the authority of his opponents; he combats the doctrines which they impose on the ignorant multitude, he unmasks the sophisms, the pride and the ambition of those who cannot endure to see their influence in the Christian world contested; he unveils their bad faith; he drags to light their ignorance and their pretensions; he exposes the absurdity of their superstitions; he uses against them every weapon which could be employed without failing in the duties of charity,—instancing usages without naming names except when he has himself been personally assaulted. To expound his own ideas objectively, to manifest their value, or to make plain the error and insufficiency of the doctrines which he attacked, are the sole instruments of conviction which he possesses, and we must acknowledge that he uses them with consummate skill." His satirical dialogues composed in this spirit cannot be said to be models of literary art.

But they were effective; they did their work; and incidentally they have vividly reflected the manners of his day, created types, and won for themselves a permanent and not unenviable place in the history of French literature.

Out of the shadows cast by four hundred years, Dr. Barnaud has drawn the figure of this admirable man and stood him before us in the light. It is a pleasant figure to look upon, and it is pleasantly presented to us in Dr. Barnaud's pages. We rise from the perusal of Dr. Barnaud's memoir with a higher admiration for Viret than ever before—because we know him better. Perhaps no better tribute could be brought to a man,—or to a biographer.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Confessional Principle and Confessions of the Lutheran Church as Embodying the Evangelical Confession of the Christian Church. By THEODORE E. SCHMAUK and C. THEODORE BENZE. With Translations from the Introduction and Writings of Theodor Kolde, Professor in Erlangen. Philadelphia: General Council Publication Board. 1911. Pp. cxxxii, 962. \$4.00.

The authors of this work remind us in the Preface that there has not appeared in the English language any complete work devoted to Confessional Lutheranism, with the exception of one small volume, since Krauth's *Conservative Reformation* about forty years ago. The researches of German scholars in the last two decades and the changed circumstances of to-day therefore make necessary a new and strictly historical examination of the Confessional structure of the Lutheran Faith. This is here undertaken "in the belief that our Confession comes direct from Christ in the word of Scripture as the answer and testimony of Faith unto its Lord and unto all the world; and in the assurance that this Faith will ever enlarge its circles of contact, and that it holds in its embrace the strength of the past the potency of the present, and the hope of the future". The late Professor Richard's work on *The Confessional History of the Lutheran Church* appeared while the volume was in the press but receives notice in the Preface, where it is stated that Prof. Richard's purpose is almost the reverse of that of this work, and in criticism it is added that "in this age it is impossible to maintain uncritically the dogma of Biblical infallibility in the same breath with a loose, critical and destructive dogma of confessional fallibility". The character of Messrs. Schmauk and Benze's work is evident from these quotations. It is a contribution in the first place and chiefly to American Lutheran controversial literature, and its publication shows how deeply the members of that historic Church are still exercised over their differences. The authors maintain throughout the thesis that "the Apology of the Augsburg Confession, the Schmalkald Articles, Catechisms of Luther and the Formula of Concord—are with the Unaltered Augsburg in the perfect harmony of one and the same Scriptural faith". In other words this is a manifesto of the General Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in North America.

Of the forty-two chapters, the first thirteen are devoted to Confessions and Confessionalism in general and the Symbols of the early Church; the following thirteen trace the rise and development of confessionalism in the Lutheran Church to the Formula of Concord; and the remainder of the volume is a defence of the Formula, with a short account of its fortunes until the present day and an examination of conditions in America calling for cooperation and union, concluding with a strong assertion that the basis of union is not to be compromise but the acceptance of the confessions here defended.

This unity of plan which is so obvious in the table of contents is frequently obscured in the body of the book by long quotations which frequently over-lap, and over-load the argument. This is partly intentional, for the authors have embodied in their work seven of Professor Kolde's essays on the early Lutheran Confessions and regard the presentation of these in English dress as a large part of their offering. But apart from these the frequency and length of quotations throughout suggest the editor rather than the author.

In attempting to prove the essential harmony of the Lutheran Confessions two lines of argument should be developed, the external, dealing with the outward events of the formative period, and the internal, dealing with the contents of the several confessions in their relation to one another. In this volume the former of these receives more attention than the latter. The best part of the work is that which deals with the origin of the Augsburg Confession, and of the variations introduced later. This is chiefly in the words of Professor Kolde. The authors make much, of course, of the differences between Luther and Melancthon, accusing the latter of duplicity and laying at his door the blame for the dissensions of later times. That the two great leaders differed is, of course, indisputable, also that the latter hoped and strove for peace with Rome after his leader had ceased to be willing to make concessions; moreover his broad humanism seems to have led him to regard as indifferent some matters of dogma for which Luther and the Gnesio-Lutherans earnestly contended. But that duplicity can be successfully charged against him, or that he may be rightly called "effeminate, crafty and complaining", does not appear even from the portions of Luther's letters carefully italicized by the authors. Nor does the ascription of these same qualities to the Melancthonians past and present augur well for a speedy union of the Lutheran Churches. It is regrettable too that Gieseler's membership in a Masonic Lodge should be made to detract from his worth as an historian.

The inner history of Lutheran dogma before 1580 is not adequately treated. We may illustrate this from the chapter on the Person of Christ and the Formula of Concord. The terms "ubiquity" and "consubstantiation" are both rejected. The presence of Our Lord's body in the Supper and the *Communicatio Idiomatum* are said to be dependent upon the action of his will, by which is meant his divine will. That is to say, instead of ubiquity we have multivolipresence or

ubivolipresence. But nothing is said of the contributions of Brenz (whose name is variously spelt) and Chemnitz, nor are their theories related to those of Luther. It is indeed affirmed that the doctrine of the Concordia was held by Luther from the beginning, and Professor Lindsay is pilloried for teaching that Luther believed Our Lord's body to be extended in space. The authors had here an excellent opportunity to re-examine the whole question of the Lord's Supper and the Communicatio Idiomatum and have not done so. On the contrary, to them "in the beginning" means the year 1528, the date of the Larger Catechism, and no attempt is made to trace the distinctive features of the Lutheran Christology farther back than 1527, ten years after the break with Rome. If, as is affirmed, these features were as prominent in Luther's thought as in that of the strict Lutherans half a century and more later, we have a right to demand that signs of their presence be pointed out in his earlier works. We remember that when he was tempted to give up the bodily presence in order to "give the Pope the greatest thump", he was restrained, not by the necessities of his religious experience or the implications of his view of the mode of salvation, but by the plain words of Scripture, that is, by a literal interpretation of the words "this is my body". Moreover it was only when the symbolic view was, to his mind, associated with a claim to supernatural illumination, which threatened to wreck the cause of reform, that he attacked it; and only in the progress of this debate did he develop his peculiar views of Our Lord's natures and person. A reading of the Larger Catechism does indeed leave the impression that both Brenz and Chemnitz could trace their theories to Luther, but we are also convinced that the great reformer would not have favored the elevation of his speculations as to the possible modes of bodily presence to the rank of dogma. It was Brenz and not Luther that symbolized the Communicatio Idiomatum. These are some of the problems that we think should have been illuminated in this volume, and they have not been.

One excellent result of the publication of this work is that we have now two American works, the other being that of Professor Richard, that deal with Lutheranism in its relation to modern America. Each represents a strong section of that great denomination, and from both together the reader may learn of the greater differences that keep them apart and judge of the possibility of union.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

Sewanee Theological Library. Manual of Early Ecclesiastical History to 476 A.D. By CHARLES L. WELLS, Ph.D., Lecturer in History, McGill University, Montreal. Formerly Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Seabury Divinity School, Faribault, Minn. Author of "The Age of Charlemagne". Sewanee, Tennessee: The University Press. At the University of the South. 1912. Pp. xxxv, 259.

The object of the series of which this volume is a part "is to pro-

vide for the clergy and laity of the Church a statement, in convenient form, of the Doctrine, Discipline and Worship—as well as to meet the often expressed desire on the part of Examining Chaplains for text-books which they could recommend to candidates for Holy Orders". In other words, we have before us a text-book for the use of theological students of the Protestant Episcopal Church, and a manual for laymen. As a guide to the study of Church History it will be found very helpful, for the Bibliography in the introduction and the references at the end of each chapter are well chosen and up to date. As to its value as a text-book for beginners, opinions will differ. The author writes from the standpoint of the High Anglicans, laying stress upon Holy Unction, Confirmation and Orders in the New Testament, and upon the rites and organization of the Church throughout the period. He carries the Monarchical Episcopate back into New Testament times, though not denying that the terms "bishop" and "presbyter" at times overlap. His attitude is seen in the sentence: "But the three-fold order of Christ, the Twelve and the Seventy; of James, the Apostles and the Elders, at Jerusalem; of the Bishop, Presbyters and Deacons in the Ignatian Epistles, shows a continuity of official form and order by whatever name the officers may be called."

Leaning on Harnack Professor Wells thinks the idea of an authoritative Canon of Scripture was forced on the Church in the second century, by the conflicts with Marcion and the Gnostics, who were the first to appeal to apostolic writings as authoritative. The Canon of Scripture therefore is the creation of the Church. Unfortunately the matter is not discussed, nor is any hint given that other views are held. The attitude of the Apostolic Fathers to Scripture and to apostolic authority is not mentioned.

The book is well written, condensed of course and so unsuitable for beginners in matters which require more detailed treatment. But it is the purpose of the series to serve as introductory to wider reading. There is no index.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

Theologischer Jahresbericht unter Mitwirkung von . . . , herausgegeben von Prof. Dr. G. KRÜGER und Prof. Dr. M. SCHIAN in Giessen. Dreissigster Band enthaltend die Literatur und Totenschau des Jahres 1910, erster Theil. Des ganzen Bandes iv. Abteilung (erste Hälfte): KIRCHENGESCHICHTE bearbeitet von Preuschen, Krüger, Ficker, Hermelink, Köhler, O. Clemen, Völker, Zscharnack, Werner, Schian. Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger; New York: G. E. Stechert & Co. 1912. 8vo; pp. 320. 13 marks.

The *Jahresbricht* is invaluable however late and in whatever form it comes. This year, besides being delayed, the part devoted to Church History is published in two halves, of which only the first has reached us, and three new names appear on the title-page. The division is caused not by increase of material but by unavoidable delays; and the

new co-editors are Prof. G. Ficker of Kiel, who is responsible for part of the Middle Ages, and Prof. O. Clemen of Zwickau and Lic. Völker of Vienna, who cooperate with Prof. Köhler in the Reformation. That the interest in the history of the church continues unabated is seen from the fact that this volume when complete in its two parts will be more than three times as large as the next greatest one, namely, that on Practical Theology. To be sure, judging solely from the number of pages, the year 1910 would seem to have produced fewer works on Church History than the preceding one; but the difference is so small that it may be neglected. Almost one half of the volume before us is given to the literature of the Reformation period, thus showing where the center of interest lies. Still it is a noteworthy and excellent thing that there is no period and no larger matter that has not engaged the attention of someone. Another notable thing is the continued interest in the search for fresh material and the rewards that have crowned the patient labors in different parts of the world. Irenaeus in Armenian, a continuation of the *Brennwald Chronicle* by Stumpf, a draft of an Imperial edict against Luther dated December 29, 1520, are some of the "finds" recorded; and judging from the out-put of the presses there seems to be a steady demand for the publication of "sources" whether old or new. Those interested in the Calvin celebration will find some forty titles of books and articles which appeared too late to obtain a place in the previous volume of the *Jahresbericht*. Among these we may mention Loof's three addresses on Calvin's relations with Germany, his dependence on Luther, and the part played by Calvinism in making Protestantism a political power, and Troeltsch's *Kulturbedeutung des Calvinismus*.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

The Book of Concord; or The Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. Translated from the Original Languages with Analyses and an Exhaustive Index. Edited by HENRY EYSTER JACOBS, D.D., LL.D., S.T.D., Norton Professor of Systematic Theology in the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia. Peoples Edition, by Authority of the General Council of the Evangelical Lutheran Church of North America. Philadelphia: General Council Publication Board. 1911. Pp. 758.

This convenient volume is a collection of the Lutheran creeds to which the General Council adheres. The translations are taken from Frederick's two volume edition of 1882, except in the case of the Augsburg Confession, where the officially accepted translation has been substituted. The contents are as follows: Preface to the Christian Book of Concord; The General Creeds (Apostles, Nicene, Athanasian); The Augsburg Confession; The Apology of the Augsburg Confession; The Smalcald Articles; The Small Catechism; The Large Catechism; The Formula of Concord; Analyses and Indexes

to the book of Concord. Altogether it is a handy book of reference for English readers.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

Aspects of Islam. By DUNCAN BLACK MACDONALD, M.A., D.D. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911. Pp. xiii, 375. (Being the Hartford-Lamson Lectures for 1909.)

After reading Professor Macdonald's *Muslim Theology* and his *Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, already reviewed in these columns, the reviewer approaches this book with pleasant anticipations, assured that however the views of the author may differ from his own, they will always rest upon a sound basis of wide reading in the subject discussed and will be stimulating and suggestive. It turns out on nearer acquaintance with this book, however, that it differs considerably from the former works. For one thing, it differs in approaching Islam from the missionary's standpoint; for another, it is rather a record of personal impression's derived from a recent journey and residence in the East than the product of reading in Muslim literature. Having the young missionary in mind, for whom the lectures were intended, the writer gives first a picture of the Muslim East as it presents itself to the new arrival from Christendom; then he passes to a popular review of Mohammed, the Koran and Muslim philosophy and theology. Next he depicts modern Islam in its most truly "religious" phase, the Darwish Fraternities, with their mysticism and devotion. In the next three lectures come discussions of the attitude of Islam toward Christianity, of the Islamic propaganda and pan-Islamism, and of the history of Mohammedan education. The closing lecture rounds out the whole by returning to much the same field as that of the first lecture, with practical suggestions as to the missionary's reading.

The whole burden of the book is sympathy: a plea for an intelligent understanding of the people of Islam by every one who seeks to help them. This understanding can only come through an acquaintance with the history of Islam, both outward and inward, a just appraisal of the various movements within it to-day, that are the outgrowth of the forces that have been working within it during all its past, and a patience and breadth of heart that will adjust Western habits, tastes and judgments to Oriental standards. So long as this adjustment and sympathy are consistent with faithfulness to the unchangeable standards of truth and duty promulgated by Christianity—well and good; when they begin to spell concession and compromise they have passed the boundary of right and even of ultimate usefulness.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

An Anglo-Saxon Abbot. By S. HARVEY GEM, M.A. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark. 1912.

The Abbot whose life and work the author reviews is known in Old English history as Aelfric of Eynsham, and, also, as the "Gram-

marian" in reference to the special educational work that he did in the England of his day. He might, also, be called the Abbot of Winchester and Abingdon, two of the great monastic centres of the time. It is fitting, therefore, that Mr. Gem dedicates his book "To all readers who desire the promotion of Christian Education."

The volume opens with a brief review of Early Monasticism and Old English Literature, with special reference to the Chronicle and to the disastrous effects of the Danish Wars. After an account of Aelfric's life, the author states some of the Doctrines of the Early English Church and quotes at length from the "Homilies" of Aelfric and from his "Life of Saint Ethelwold", whom he calls "father and noble teacher."

Next to Alfred the Great this Old English Abbot was the most representative man of his time, taking up and carrying on much of the work of his great forerunner, a man as gracious in spirit as he was proficient in learning. Identified with the great monastic revival under Dunstan, he did much to reform the church of his time and point the way to better things for England. Mr. Gem has done the modern world a good service in calling attention to the life and writings of this Early English saint and scholar, and he has done wisely in making his book little else than a collection of quotations from the Abbot's works.

In Aelfric's "Translation of the Pentateuch", there is a "Preface on the Old and New Testaments" nothing less than remarkable from an old Romish monk. The volume may be heartily commended to all Christian students.

Princeton.

T. W. HUNT.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

The Person of Christ in Modern Thought. The first series of Donnellan Lectures for the Year 1911-1912. By E. DIGGES LA TOUCHE, M.A., Litt.D. London: James Clarke & Co. 1912. 8vo; pp. 419.

A thorough discussion of the doctrine of the Person of Christ in the light of modern research is just now very much needed. A discussion, that is, which, holding in firm grasp all the elements of the problem, and proceeding with full knowledge of what has been done towards its solution during two thousand years of Christian thinking, shall pass in review and give a well grounded estimate of the suggestions made during the last hundred years towards modifying or elucidating the conclusions in which the Church has acquiesced since the Council of Chalcedon. Dr. La Touche's Donnellan Lectures make a very distinct contribution to this discussion. The scope of the survey they have been enabled to give of modern discussions has no doubt been somewhat narrowed, and the mass of details they have been able to adduce and examine has been somewhat lessened by the mere fact that they are a body of lectures; for in the nature of the

case lectures must be to some extent general and discursive. But Dr. La Touche has cast his eye widely enough over the field, and has embraced in his discussion a sufficient number of the more salient details, to make his survey essentially complete; and he has prosecuted his work in a temper so generous to new points of view as to assure us that nothing of great value in recent discussion has failed of recognition. We feel ourselves, as we read, in the hands of a competent guide, and we rise from the reading of the book with a sense of satisfaction. The result to which it conducts us, it must be confessed, scarcely justifies the description of the last century which Dr. La Touche gives of it in his Preface—"the second great Christological epoch of the Christian churches" (p. 11). Vigorous and suggestive as the debates which have filled its whole extent have been, they have yet, as Dr. La Touche has very clearly shown, left things very much where they were before. After a century of active criticism and attempted reconstruction, the Catholic doctrine of the Person of Christ remains, in its integrity, the only construction which the data will permit.

What has characterized the last century as an epoch in Christological discussion is the persistent attempt, which has been made throughout its whole course, to interpret the Person of Christ in terms of humanity. Dr. La Touche is inclined to look upon this as a natural, perhaps a necessary, reaction from a one-sided emphasis on our Lord's deity, and to bid us learn from it a juster conception of our Lord's manhood. "Great as were the excellences of the old theologians of all confessions, and profound as was their thought," he remarks (pp. 214, 216), "they were virtually docetic in their emphasis upon the Lord's Deity to the practical exclusion of His Manhood . . . Now, the labours of the modern age have effectually changed all this. The immense stress laid upon the Manhood of Christ by the negative critics and the forcing of believers to face the facts which has been one of the results of the free discussion of modern times have meant that we have been constantly brought into contact with the fact of the Manhood of the Lord Jesus Christ and that its various phenomena have become part of our daily thinking." We cannot share this judgment in either of its particulars. It seems to us to do injustice to the Reformed divines to say: "It would be quite impossible to say that they paid any attention to the Manhood of Christ as the Subject of development or as a Fact of religious experience. The Christ they knew was a Christ so exclusively Divine that His Humanity was practically devoid of all reality" (p. 215 note). They rather appear to us, in well-guarded reaction from the one-sided emphasis on the deity of our Lord which characterized much of mediaeval thinking concerning Him, and in contrast at once with the insufficient reaction of the Lutheran theologians (to whom nevertheless we owe a great debt for their insistence on the Divine Majesty of Christ) and the radical reaction of the Socinians (who made our Lord as great a man as a mere man could be) to have held the

balance true and to have done justice alike to our Lord's true Godhood and to His equally true and complete Manhood. To whom, for example, has the Manhood been more profoundly "a fact of religious experience" than, say, to Jonathan Edwards, although of course, with him the deity of His Lord is not forgotten either. "We may feel the most profound reverence and self-abasement," we read in one of Edward's numerous illuminating passages (*Works*, Dwight's Ed. I. p. 482), "and yet our hearts be drawn forth, sweetly and powerfully, into an intimacy the most free, confidential and delightful. The dread so naturally inspired by His greatness is dispelled by the contemplation of His gentleness and humility, . . . and the sight of all His perfections united fills us with sweet surprise, and humble confidence, with reverential love, and delightful adoration." Naturally the Reformed divines know nothing of a merely human Christ, but a merely human Christ was never "a Fact," and, had it been a fact, could never be a "Fact of religious experience." We must not be deterred, either by the exaggeration of the Lutheran divinizing of the humanity of Christ through the actual communication to it of divine attributes, or by the current tendency to exaggerate the limitations of the humanity which God the Son assumed into personal union with Himself, from recognizing and realizing the unspeakable exaltation which was conferred upon the human nature of our Lord through its elevation into participation with the life of God. The humanity of our Lord was never an ordinary humanity: even in His infancy He was an extraordinary child (Lk. ii. 40-52) and in His manhood He was not altogether like other men,—for one thing, He was without sin. We do not ourselves indeed like this negative characterization; and we do not think Dr. La Touche well-advised in preferring to speak of our Lord's "sinlessness" rather than of His "holiness" (p. 232). Of course the holiness of His human nature was capable of growth and did grow,—nay, let us say it all, is still growing and will continue to grow for ever, for human holiness can never be all that "the absolute and tideless holiness of the Divine Being is". But our Lord's holiness even in the days of His flesh was holiness in its whole positive idea; and by it our Lord in His human nature met the demands of His own command to His followers that they should be "perfect as their heavenly Father is perfect." Nor does the attribution to Him of this Divine τελείωσις "destroy the reality of His Manhood". It only recognizes the uniqueness of His Manhood. And in this indeed, we take it, Dr. La Touche would fully accord with us, for does he not tell us that our Lord "holds Himself up as the Moral Ideal to His followers . . ." (p. 242)? He who, in His human manifestation, was our Moral Ideal, cannot be fitly characterized by the merely negative predicate of sinlessness.

The formula with which Dr. La Touche serves himself, in attempting to conceive the method of the Incarnation, is accepted by him (with an important correction) from Bishop Weston, and is summed up in the one word "Limitation,"—"limitation not abandon-

ment." "The assumption of a continuous act of Self-limitation on the part of the Word," he thinks, "meets all the demands of Scripture" (p. 389)—"a continuous act of Self-limitation" which is otherwise expressed as "an act of continuous Self-restraint", or "a continuous act of Self-sacrifice." This he sets over against the theories of depotentialization of the Kenoticists including even Bishop Weston's modification of them by the substitution of the idea of self-limitation for that of self-emptying. In this he is undoubtedly on solid ground, for nothing can be clearer from the Gospel record than that our Lord rather voluntarily refrained from employing His divine powers in His walk from day to day than was unable to employ them by reason of an initial act by which He had stripped Himself of them. We think, however, that Dr. La Touche pushes matters too far when He tells us that "the Subject of our Lord's Manhood was not the unlimited Logos" (p. 391); and that our Lord, while certainly conscious of His deity, "seems to have been only conscious of it within the limitations of manhood" (p. 386)—a statement which we find some difficulty in understanding. When pushed so far, the idea of our Lord's *continuous* Self-restraint, *continuous* Self-sacrifice is again lost, and we have in its stead a single act of what Dr. La Touche speaks of not inaptly as "Self-paralysis." We must preserve in our thought of our Lord in the days of His flesh the conception of the Infinite God confining Himself in His earthly manifestation by a voluntary self-restraint within the limits of the human life which He willed to live. He did not make the stones in His pathway bread, not because He could not but because He would not; He did not descend from the cross, not because He lacked the power to do so, but because He willed not to do so. If we would make the conception of "Self-limitation" serve its purpose as our instrument of interpretation we must in all of its applications do justice to it as positing precisely Self-limitation in contrast with Self-abandonment or Self-paralysis.

Dr. La Touche's first series of the Donnellan Lectures consists of four lectures, two of which, however,—the second and third—have been much expanded for printing, and all of which have been supplied with copious notes. The first lecture may be looked upon as a general introduction to the course, designed to establish the point of view. Its title is, "Christianity and the Modern World-view," and its effect is to substantiate the scientific character of theological inquiry. Conceivably there may be some who will not be interested by it: we exhort them to persevere, for when this lecture is over the book becomes undeniably interesting and most rewarding reading. The three remaining lectures investigate successively in the light of modern criticism, the quality of our Lord's humanity, the truth of His deity and the unity of His person. As they do this, however, by means of a broad and sympathetic review of modern discussion the two former ones of the three receive the more descriptive titles, respectively, of "The Person of Christ and the Negative Criticism of the Age," and "The Person of Christ as Revealed in History."

In the second lecture which extends to nearly two hundred pages, the start is taken from the Enlightenment and the conceptions of the human Jesus which are presented by Strauss and Baur, the older Liberalism and the later Liberalism, whether in its German, French, or English representatives, are carefully ascertained, and then criticised, with an earnest desire to accredit to them all that can be justly accredited to them, but also with great penetration and balance of judgement. The verdict passed upon the outcome of the hundred years of criticism is to the effect that with the best will in the world to present us a purely human Jesus, it has not succeeded in drawing a consistently human portrait of Jesus, so that a deep discontent with its results has sprung up, which reveals itself in its own ranks both in an upward movement (Reinhold Seeberg and the Modern Positive School) and in a downward movement (represented by P. W. Schmiedel), and, outside the limits of the Liberal School technically so-called, by a corresponding dual movement, downward (Kalthoff and the whole body of those who can do without any Jesus) and upward (the Eschatological School inclusive of Modernism). A new beginning is taken at this point and the German Eschatologists (Johannes Weiss and A. Schweitzer) and the Modernists (Leroy, Loisy) are carefully studied in the portrait they draw of Jesus, and its reality shown to be inconceivable. As the conclusion of the whole matter, the failure of the long-continued and sustained attempt which characterizes the nineteenth century to eliminate the supernatural from its conception of Jesus is pointed out, and the claim is put in that "the whole course of modern criticism has resolved itself into a negative vindication of the faith of the Gospel." "To-day, it is possible for us to vindicate the character of the Lord Jesus Christ as sinless and holy by the testimony of the negative critics; to assert, with none to challenge us, the perfect character of His moral teaching; to declare with the full approval of the leaders of the opposing forces that the strength and virtue of the faith is to be found not in teaching, nor even in example, not in doctrine nor in practice, but in the ineffable Personality of our most gracious Lord and Saviour" (p. 225).

The method of the third lecture—which is nearly a hundred pages long—takes us back to the Synoptic Gospels and invites us to survey the Self-witness and claims of our Lord as they are there reported. The conclusion that is reached is that "from the merely human point of view, our Lord's Self-consciousness differed from that of all other men in that It was sinless; that, from the historical point of view, He read His destiny in terms of the Messianic conception, which, however, He transformed and spiritualized at every point; and, finally, that from the point of view of His essential character and Being, He conceived Himself to be the ontological Son of the Most High God, as 'being of one substance with the Father'" (p. 294). In the discussion which leads up to this conclusion naturally a great many of the utterances of our Lord are brought under consideration, and among them His several Messianic titles, the Christ, the Son of David, the

Son of Man, the Son of God. The discussion of the two latter of these is especially interesting and individual. "The Son of Man" Dr. La Touche thinks was neither a Messianic title nor yet an assertion of representative manhood; it was derived from the Isaianic prophecy of the Suffering Servant, and may therefore be considered to embody a soteriological reference. In developing his view of the meaning of "the Son of Man", Dr. La Touche seems to us to speak exaggeratingly of our Lord's so-called concealment of His Messianic claims. According to the record, not only of John but of the Synoptics, our Lord announced Himself as Messiah from the very beginning of His ministry. His charging of His disciples not to make Him known (p. 266) was not a universal prohibition, but belongs to historical conditions in the developing of His ministry. When Dr. La Touche declares that had He published His Messianic claims "His career would not have lasted three weeks," he seems to us to generalise too widely. "The Son of God," on the other hand, Dr. La Touche looks upon as, primarily at any rate, only a Messianic designation; we do not think this can be made good. The conclusions arrived at from a study of our Lord's self-consciousness are supported by adducing certain subsidiary evidence, derived from Christ's self-assertion, His mighty works, and the miracles of His virgin birth and resurrection, and from the Apostolic testimony.

In the final lecture the problem of the union of the two natures in one person is attacked and the chief modern attempts to solve it are examined—the Kenotic theories, the theory of Progressive Incarnation, the Ritschlian Christology, and Dr. Sanday's subconsciousness-hypothesis which Dr. La Touche characterises as conceiving our Lord's deity as a *donum superadditum*. Here too the criticism is acute and illuminating and the construction sound. An occasional remark, no doubt, strikes us as less well-considered than the general drift of the reasoning. We cannot agree, for example, when we read: "There can be no doubt that the older Christological thought of the Nicene type" (why should it be called "Nicene"?), "tended to obscure the greatness of the Self-sacrifice involved in the Incarnation by reading it as Divine condescension instead of Divine Self-sacrifice" (p. 352), nor can we even think the opposition of the notions of "condescension" (*condescensio seu demissio Jesu Christi*, was an old phrase) and "Self-sacrifice" just. A condescension—a stooping to a lower level than our native atmosphere—is in the nature of the case a Self-sacrifice. Nor can we agree that we can take over from the Kenotists the idea that "our Lord's Self-consciousness as Incarnate differs in some sense from the Self-consciousness of the Pre-existent Word" (p. 353) if by our Lord's Self-consciousness as Incarnate be meant the Self-consciousness of the Logos and by the term "differs" is intended that it has suffered some "limitation": if anything different from this is meant, then we do not owe it to the Kenotists. That too much is said when it is said that "as far as man can tell, the means whereby the Spirit of God influences the human soul are precisely

analogous to the means whereby any other personality influences it"; "all that can be said is that the means whereby the Holy Ghost operates in the sub-conscious realm seem to be analogous to those by which any other personality can work in it—by means of impressions which have been received through the consciousness" (p. 385), Dr. La Touche himself confesses by adding in a footnote: "The fact that there is such a thing as the new birth, or change of nature, would, however, point to a special operation of the Holy Ghost, to use the old Puritan phrase, beyond consciousness." We do not quite understand what is meant when it is said that "manhood as such is not personality" (p. 387) or that "human personality is most truly human when most truly divine." (p. 388). These flies in the amber, however, do not in the least destroy the quality of the amber in which they are, here and there, imbedded.

We should note before closing that a valuable Appendix on "Consciousness and the Sub-conscious" from the pen of the Rev. Thomas Chatterton Hammond, M.A., has been added to the volume.

The printing of the volume is not immaculate. We have not been careful to collect the misprints, but we may note a few which we have chanced to mark on the margin: Page 25, line 7 from bottom; "Arbeitszeiles"; p. 141, line 7 from bottom, "our Lord Self-consciousness"; p. 153, line 14, "Geissen"; p. 193, line 4 from bottom, "allow" (for "deny"); p. 211 line 4, "Aufklarung"; p. 231, line 9, end, period (for comma); p. 285, line 16, a superfluous "the". So good a book should early go into a second edition, and perhaps the noting of these slips may help towards their correction.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Is Jesus God? An Argument by GRADUATES OF PRINCETON SEMINARY.
With Introductory Note by Prof. B. B. Warfield, D.D. New York:
American Tract Society. [1912.] 16mo; pp. 152.

This little book, written by a number of students (not "graduates" as the publishers improperly say) of Princeton Seminary, owes its origin to an attempt by members of a class engaged in the study of the doctrine of the Person of our Lord during the session of 1911-1912, to give a reasoned answer to a series of inquiries, which, taken in sequence, raise the salient questions which must be faced in a historical investigation of the evidence for the Deity of Christ. These inquiries, in their order, were: Does the Christian Church teach the Deity of Christ? Has the Christian Church always taught the Deity of Christ? Do the New Testament writers teach the Deity of Christ? Do the Evangelists represent Christ as teaching His Deity? Did Jesus teach His own Deity? Is Christ God? As will be seen, essays on these subjects, read consecutively, will constitute a systematic argument for our Lord's Deity. Such a series of brief essays is brought together in this volume. There are nine essays in all, one each on the first three questions, two each on the last three—in which the argument culminates. These nine essays are written by nine several students, but,

though of such diverse authorship they fit well into one another and together build up their argument step by step, without break. They were written as class-room exercises during the Centennial session of the Seminary and have been published in commemoration of the celebration of that Centennial. They present a specimen of the kind of work done in the class-rooms of the Seminary, and it is hoped that in their published form they may prove useful.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Inspiration and Authority of Holy Scripture. By JOHN MONRO GIBSON, M.A., LL.D. With an Introduction by Principal Forsyth, M.A., D.D. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1912. Pp. 246.

This volume is one of the "Christian Faith and Doctrine Series", edited by F. B. Meyer. Dr. Gibson divides his discussion into three parts. Part I is introductory and deals with the Canon and the method to be employed in treating of the question of Inspiration. Part II is on "The Inspiration and Authority of Revelation", and Part III is on the "Inspiration and Authority of the Record", i. e. the Bible.

Dr. Gibson very properly distinguishes between the supernatural Revelation which God has made and the written record of that Revelation in the Bible. By the "inspiration of the Revelation" he means to say that it comes from God in a supernatural manner. How far, then, or to what extent, does Dr. Gibson believe that inspiration extends to the record of Revelation or the Bible? He rejects the theory of partial inspiration, and asserts that we cannot say that some parts of the Bible are inspired and others not (pp. 167, 168). It is rather a theory of graded inspiration which Dr. Gibson affirms, some parts of the Bible being supposed to be more inspired than other parts. This view rests, with Dr. Gibson, as it does in the case of most of its advocates, upon a confusion of the inspiration of the Bible with its saving efficacy as a means of grace. Dr. Gibson asks why it is that the Christian's Bible is more "worn" and "thumbed" at the Psalms and the Gospels than at Leviticus or Esther, apparently supposing that if all parts of the Bible are equally inspired, they must all be equally profitable as a means of grace. This is simply a confusion of two quite different matters.

Moreover, the entire discussion is vitiated by Dr. Gibson's identification of the Christian Church's doctrine of Plenary Inspiration with the mechanical or dictation theory which suppresses the human element in the Bible altogether. He is right in asserting that the Scripture is through and through human, but that by no means involves Dr. Gibson's idea that it is full of errors and mistakes. In short, Dr. Gibson has totally misrepresented the Church's doctrine of Plenary Inspiration.

His own view, moreover, he leaves wholly without clear definition. One may search the entire third part of the book without being able to find out what Dr. Gibson means by the "inspiration of the record".

In addition to this defect, his method is faulty. He accuses all

who believe in the doctrine of Plenary Inspiration of imposing their own ideas upon the Bible instead of letting the Scripture speak for itself. But in reality that is precisely what he himself has done. He has examined a number of different phenomena of Scripture, most of which are quite irrelevant to the question of Inspiration, and has then given his own view of the Bible. But no account whatever is taken of those phenomena which show clearly just what Christ and His Apostles thought about the Scripture. The way they quote it and the explicit statements they make concerning its authority and inspiration are omitted entirely from the discussion.

We are compelled to differ from Principal Forsyth's opinion, expressed in his Preface to the volume, that it will be of great service in guiding the Christian layman to a better view of the Bible. It seems to us that this little volume is so full of confusion of thought and of misrepresentation—unintentional, no doubt—as to leave in hopeless confusion anyone who has not investigated the subject for himself.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

The Christian Conception of God. By WALTER F. ADENEY, M.A., D.D., Principal of Lancashire College, Manchester. New York, Chicago, Toronto, London and Edinburgh: Fleming H. Revell Co. 1912. Pp. 273.

Dr. Adeney's contribution to the "Christian Faith and Doctrine Series" is this attractively written little volume on "the Christian Conception of God". Dr. Adeney begins by showing that the Person and teaching of Christ are our chief sources of knowledge on this subject. Then, in a chapter on "Other Sources", he vindicates a place for Natural Theology, the Old Testament Revelation, and Christian experience as sources of knowledge. He next proceeds to set forth Christ's revelation of God which he conceives to be chiefly the universal Fatherhood of God. Other elements in the Christian conception of God are given by Christ, but these are found elsewhere. It is the universal Fatherhood of God which Dr. Adeney thinks is the distinctive element in Christ's revelation of God.

After setting forth Christ's teaching, and touching on the Apostolic Revelation, the author does not proceed to unfold the knowledge derived from the other sources he has mentioned. He discusses certain objections to the Biblical idea of God as he has expounded it. In one chapter he shows that the ideas of personality and infinity are not inconsistent when the idea of the infinity of God is rightly conceived. In another chapter he discusses the ideas of the immanence and transcendence of God, showing that God is both immanent and transcendent, though he gives no clear idea of what he means by the divine immanence. These chapters are followed by three which discuss respectively the doctrines of the Incarnation, The Holy Spirit, and The Trinity. The volume closes with a chapter on the completion of our knowledge of God in Christian experience, the Christian Church and Creeds.

It will be more profitable for us to mention some of the merits and defects of the book, rather than to unfold in detail its contents.

In speaking of its merits, besides the clear and popular way in which it is written, should be mentioned first its insistence on the fact that the idea of the Personality of God is not inconsistent with His infinity when the latter idea is rightly conceived, though Dr. Adeney does not seem to realize that this latter idea is a Biblical one no less than the idea of God's Personality, and would abandon it if he felt the necessity for so doing. No adequate justification of such a view is given, and the author shows no appreciation of the essential place which infinitude occupies in the Biblical idea of God. The second chief merit of Dr. Adeney's book seems to us to be his defense of the rights of Natural Theology over against the Ritschlian position.

The main weaknesses of the volume are its lack of exegetical insight and its uncertainty and want of grasp in doctrinal construction. An example of the former is the whole discussion which seeks to show that Jesus taught the universal Fatherhood of God. This is not the teaching of Christ. In our Lord's teaching both Fatherhood and Sonship are soteriological ideas belonging to the sphere of grace, and God is the Father of Christ's disciples or followers. It is the "peace makers" who shall be called the sons of God (Mt. v. 9), not all men indiscriminately. This presupposes a certain quality of character which is the product of God's grace. In this respect Jesus is reaffirming the Old Testament teaching that the sons of God are those in covenant relation with Jehovah. This is also the teaching of Christ's Apostles. In the prologue to John's Gospel, he asserts that the right to become the sons of God is a gift of Christ to those who receive Him and believe on His name, and who have been begotten anew by God (Jn. i. 12). These sons of God John expressly distinguishes from the world (1 Jn. iii. 1), and asserts that they are destined to be like Christ (1 Jn. iii. 2). And what is true of the teaching of Jesus and of John, is true of Paul. We become sons of God only by faith in Christ Jesus (Gal. iii. 26), and upon the basis of Christ's redeeming work and by adoption. Hence only those in Christ are God's sons. This sonship, moreover, is made actual only by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit in our hearts, by which alone we can cry "Abba Father" (Gal. iv. 6; Rom. viii. 15, 16). Hence Paul's definition of a son of God is one who is led by the Spirit of God (Rom. viii. 14).

This is all so evident that Dr. Adeney is forced to admit that the idea of divine sonship is limited. He makes, however, the familiar contention that while divine sonship is limited, God's Fatherhood is universal. He realizes, however, that this idea of Sonship renders necessary the supposition, not that some sons of God do not realize their sonship, but that God is the Father of some who are not His sons. It is difficult to understand how this can be. Indeed it seems quite impossible. But we are not obliged to fall back on logic and say that Fatherhood and Sonship are correlatives and necessarily imply one another. The two ideas are correlatives in the teaching of Jesus

and in the whole of Scripture. Where our Lord speaks to those not His disciples He never refers to God as their Father. And more than this, when addressing His disciples and referring to others not His disciples, by using the pronoun "your" to qualify the term "Father", Jesus implies that His disciples have a Father whom the others have not. Thus He says to His disciples, "For after all these things do the nations of the world seek: but *your* Father knoweth that ye have need of these things" (Lk. xii. 30). In addressing His disciples Jesus refers to God as "your Father" implying the same idea concerning God's Fatherhood (Mt. v. 16, 45, 48; vi. 1, 14, 15; x. 29; xviii. 14; Lk. vi. 36; Jn. xx. 17).

Moreover, in John's Gospel our Lord explicitly denies the universal Fatherhood of God when He rebukes the Jews, saying that if God were their Father they would love Him (Jesus) because He came forth from God (Jn. viii. 42). Dr. Adeney cites Mt. v. 45 as proving that Jesus taught the universal Fatherhood of God because He makes His sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sendeth rain on the righteous and the unrighteous. But this is no evidence that Jesus meant that God is the Father of both classes of men mentioned. Jesus here tells His disciples that they should love their enemies and bless them that curse them and pray for them that despitefully use them and persecute them, in order that they may be sons of *their* heavenly Father whose treatment of evil men in this respect they should imitate. Here the fact that God is the Father of Christ's disciples is cited as a reason for their imitating Him.

Dr. Adeney also cites the parable of the Prodigal Son which he supposes to teach that God is the Father of all sinners. This parable teaches nothing of the kind. It teaches God's readiness to forgive His wandering children when they repent, but the parable cannot possibly be made to teach anything as to the extent of the Fatherhood of God. It is not exegesis, but his own ideas about God which leads Dr. Adeney to assert that Jesus taught the universal Fatherhood of God.

As an example of the uncertain hand which Dr. Adeney shows in doctrinal construction, may be taken his discussion of the Person of Christ in the chapter on the Incarnation. He begins by declaring in explicit terms in favor of the doctrine of the two Natures. Thus he says (p. 165): "Further, when we think of the Incarnation we cannot represent this as the dwelling of God in a human life, in closest, most intimate union, but still leaving the human personality distinct from the divine. Jesus Christ is one historic Person, and the divine nature must belong to the personality of Him as truly as the human, if we are to think of Him as an incarnation of God." Having thus recognized that Christ was truly God and truly man in one Person, it might be supposed that the limitations in Christ's knowledge and power might have been attributed by Dr. Adeney to His human nature. But no sooner does he proceed to discuss the question of these limitations in the case of our Lord, than he lets go the doctrine of the Two Natures

altogether, and speaks as if Christ after the Incarnation had but one nature and that a finite and limited one. Having thus gotten himself into inextricable difficulties, he is obliged to adopt either the Kenotic Theory or else that of Dorner that the Incarnation was a gradual process in which there came to be "more and more of God" in Christ as he advanced in human knowledge and capacity. Either this or the Kenotic Theory is the best that Dr. Adeney can say in regard to Christ, and neither of these views can possibly be harmonized with the New Testament portrait of our Lord.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

The Origin and Antiquity of Man. By G. FREDERICK WRIGHT, D.D., LL.D., F.G.S.A. Illustrated. Oberlin, Ohio, U. S. A.: Bibliotheca Sacra Company. 1912. Pp. 347.

Dr. Wright has here collected a great mass of scientific data bearing on the question of man's origin and antiquity. Evidence of an ethnological and of a philological character is briefly discussed in the opening chapters, but the greater part of the volume is occupied with the geological evidence. In a former volume—*Man and the Glacial Period*—Dr. Wright had called attention to the importance of this epoch, of which he has for many years made a special study, and in the present volume he devotes most of the space to a "fresh presentation of the facts of the glacial epoch" since they "continue to be the center about which the most important evidence of the antiquity of man gathers."

It would be interesting to follow Dr. Wright into some detail, but we must confine ourselves to a brief statement of his conclusions.

Concerning the question of the antiquity of man the evidence is mostly geological and connected with the glacial epoch. Ethnological and philological considerations give no definite data for determining man's antiquity. One can determine approximately the dates of the oldest civilization, but can make no calculation from this as to the antiquity of the human race.

This question, according to Dr. Wright, is to be determined largely by the fact that the earliest traces of man are to be found in the glacial epoch. The supposed evidence of man's existence in the Tertiary Period is examined in Chapter X, and the conclusion is drawn that the existence of "Tertiary man" is "not proven". The instances of human bones supposed to have been found on the Italian coast in Tertiary formations have proved to be interments. Likewise cuts and breaks in animal bones of Tertiary age are now shown not to have been caused by men. The main evidence for Tertiary man, relied on by some scientists, consists in pieces of chipped flint, especially those discovered in 1877 by Mr. J. B. Rames at Puy Courney, near d'Aurillac. These were shown to be of Tertiary age, but according to Dr. Wright their artificial character, which was maintained by Quatrefages, Rutot, and Mortillet, has been disproven by Commont, Boule, and Abbé Breuil.

It is, accordingly, in the glacial period, and according to Dr. Wright,

near the close of that period, that undoubted remains of man are to be found. It will not be necessary to stop to describe the human bones and instruments or tools which have been discovered, nor to give the evidence which shows that they belong to this period. These points seem fairly well agreed upon. It is of more importance to summarize Dr. Wright's conclusion as to the general length and antiquity of the Glacial epoch. If, as he supposes, the Glacial epoch was brought on by the elevation of land known to have occurred during the latter part of the Tertiary period, and by the consequent changes in the course of oceanic currents which distribute the excessive heat, then the on-coming of the Glacial epoch would have been gradual. But when the climax of the period was reached, forces of relatively great activity were set in motion, so that the accumulation and melting of the ice then became very rapid. The beginning of this epoch is not so far distant, nor its duration so long, as is popularly supposed. From various calculations Prestwich gives 25,000 years for the "reign of ice", and Wright says that it certainly could not have been longer than twice or three times as long as this estimate. The antiquity of the beginning of this epoch can then be determined approximately by a calculation of the length of post-glacial time. This is determined by evidence drawn from the erosion of post-glacial waterfalls, from the silting up of post-glacial lakes, and from the small amount of enlargement of post-glacial water courses, together with the small extent to which the weathering of glaciated rocks has proceeded. From this evidence the conclusion is drawn that in North America post-glacial time would not be more than 7,000 years. Consequently the entire time since the beginning of the Glacial epoch would not be more than 32,000 years according to Prestwich's estimate of the length of the Glacial epoch, and the antiquity of man, according to Dr. Wright, need not be more than from 12,000 to 15,000 years.

Dr. Wright then discusses the question of biological evolution to determine whether it demands a much greater antiquity for man, concluding that it does not. His conclusion on this point had best be given in his own words. He says (p. 398): "On surveying the whole subject, it appears to be evident that little confidence can be placed in any chronological calculations based upon the rate of the physiological changes by which man has been separated into races, and by which he may have advanced from the strictly anthropoid to the truly human stage. The element of uncertainty in this class of calculations lies chiefly in our ignorance of the extent to which the possession of man's mental faculties may be a disturbing factor in the ordinary course of evolution, but partly, also, in our ignorance of the relation of changing physical environment to the rapidity of modification of physiological characteristics."

Dr. Wright proceeds to show that the Bible readily admits of as great an antiquity for man as that which he has concluded from geological data. To do this he reprints the article on "Primitive Chronology" by the late Dr. William Henry Green of Princeton Theological

Seminary, which was published in the *Bibliotheca Sacra* in April 1890. In this article Dr. Green showed that the pre-Abrahamic genealogies in Genesis are not chronological in purpose and yield no definite chronological estimate, and that the Bible admits readily of any reasonable antiquity for man.

In regard to the question of the mode of man's origin Dr. Wright is much more brief. He believes that man's body is probably the product of evolution from some form of animal ancestry, but that his soul or mind demands for its explanation the creative power of God.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

The Doctrine of Man. Outline Notes Based on Luthardt. By REVERE FRANKLIN WEIDNER, D.D., LL.D., Professor of Theology in the Chicago Lutheran Theological Seminary. Chicago. Wartburg Publishing House. 1912. Pp. 199.

This little volume is an outline of Anthropology including the doctrine of Sin, based, as Dr. Weidner says in the Preface, on Luthardt's *Kompendium der Dogmatik*, Krauth's *Conservative Reformation*, Delitzsch's *System of Biblical Psychology*, Mueller's *Christian Doctrine of Sin*, and Harless' *System of Christian Ethics*. The works of the older Lutheran Dogmaticians, such as Quenstedt, Baier, and Hollaz, are also drawn upon to a large extent, as well as the chief Lutheran Creeds.

The gravest errors in the book are the statements that the Covenant Theology "had its origin with Cocceius (1603-1669)", and that "according to this theory God immediately creates each soul of Adam's posterity with a corrupt and depraved nature" (pp. 112, 113). Such historical and doctrinal inaccuracy is the result of the fact that throughout the book the author is merely giving an outline statement of the work of others.

Princeton.

C. W. HODGE.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

In An Elephant Corral and Other Tales of West African Experiences.

By ROBERT HAMILL NASSAU, M.D., S.T.D. New York: The Neal Publishing Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 180. \$1.00 net, postage 10 cents.

No one of the books by Doctor Nassau surpasses this in popular interest. Like the others, it expresses the experiences of one who has spent forty-five years as a resident of equatorial West Africa. While not attempting as large a contribution to scientific knowledge as his earlier work on *Fetichism*, these short stories are marked by the same care in observation, accuracy of statement and vividness of description. The volume is named from one of its most exciting narratives; but the account of "Gorilla Hunting" is equally fascinating and instructive; and the most important portion of the book from a religious and

philosophic point of view is that entitled "A Psychic Mystery". It demonstrates the native belief in four entities in our one human personality. This belief is rarely referred to by authors who write upon African themes, and has not been known by many missionaries or students of the native religions. It is this belief which explains the native conception of "witch-craft", and its application to "witch-craft murder" shows the intense conviction of the native in his ability to pass out of his physical body and to actually communicate with the inhabitants of the "Spirit-world". The learned theosophist of India and the ignorant African are thus not so far apart in their fundamental philosophy.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. EDMAN.

The Holy Bible. An Improved Edition. Philadelphia: American Baptist Publication Society. 1912.

This work had its beginning as far back as the year 1864, when the American Bible Union published a revised version of the New Testament. This version was three times revised, the third edition appearing in 1891. In 1883 the Saratoga Convention of the Baptist denomination committed to the American Baptist Publication Society the work of preparing a revision of the Old Testament. This revision was completed in the year 1910, and in May 1912 the completed edition was published. The distinguishing feature of this version is found in the practice of printing the word (immerse) or (immersion) after the words "baptize" or "baptism", as a part of the text, wherever these words occur. This feature will be gratifying to all convinced "immersionists"; and will be regarded by all other readers as a serious blemish; but, however regarded, it should not blind one to the many unquestioned excellences of the version. Among the other features are three to which attention is called in the "Prefatory Note": (1) The omission of all italicized words. In nearly every other edition of the Bible the words supplied to the literal translation of the text are printed in italics which greatly deface the pages; here nearly all the supplied words are enclosed in brackets. (2) The poetic form of the Hebrew, recognized in most modern versions in Job, Psalms and Proverbs, is employed in this version in making more clear the messages of the Prophets. (3) All obsolete and obsolescent words have been avoided and only those words employed which are in current English use.

Attention might also be called to the excellent paragraphing of this Bible. The verses are distinguished merely by small numerals. It would have been well to have followed the same general plan in the chapter divisions which are needlessly prominent and often break the paragraphs most unfortunately. The admirable use of the short paragraph is seen in the Proverbs which are printed with unusual clearness. It might be noted in this connection that Psalms xlii and xliii are printed as one; that "Selah" is always translated by the word "Pause"; and that the headings of the Psalms are all translated into intelligible English, however presumptuous this may seem. There are no headings to the

chapters, or to the pages of this Bible, excepting only the chapter numbers which are printed in Roman instead of the more modern Arabic numerals. Capital letters, and punctuation marks are used most helpfully. There are no marginal references or notes, but a limited number of foot notes appear, explanatory of the text. Obviously the supremely important questions in reference to a version relate to the original texts upon which it is based, and to the exactness and felicity of the translation. No one can study this "Improved Edition" without being convinced that it is characterized by careful scholarship, dignity, and accuracy, and that it will give to the Baptist denomination a worthy and valuable version of the inspired word of God.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The World Work of the Presbyterian Church in the U. S. A. By DAVID MCCONAUGHY. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 267. 50 cents net, postage 9 cents.

In his introduction to this volume the Rev. William H. Roberts, D.D., properly describes the author as one who, "in a notable degree, has caught the spirit of the gospel of Him who died for all", and is "a lover of the souls of all men, and a workman for the redemption of the world". It is both this spirit and the many years of practical service in the organization of missionary activities that have qualified the author for this present task. It is, in brief, a course of mission study and training for church officers and workers, designed especially for members of Church Missionary Committees, Brotherhoods, Women's Missionary Societies, Young People's Societies and Councils of Religious Education in Presbyterian churches. The First Part of the book considers "The Missionary Enterprise of the Church" and passes in review "The Mission of the Presbyterian Church", "The Field and Agencies", "The Force", "The Funds and Administration", "The Methods and Achievements, Medical, Industrial, Publication, Educational, Evangelistic."

The Second Part of the book concerns "The Plan and Work of "The Church Missionary Committee", in directing and stimulating "Missionary Meetings", "Mission Study", "Giving", "Prayer", and "Personal Service". The last chapter reviews "The Men's Missionary Movement in the Presbyterian Church in the United States of America."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

On the Firing Line With the Sunday-School Missionary. By JOHN M. SOMERNDIKE. Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Board of Publication. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 169. 50 cents, postage 8 cents.

Only those who are acquainted with the facts related in this volume can understand the extent and the importance of the missionary work which is being carried on by the "Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work" of our Presbyterian Church. As is known, a large percentage of the profits of the publication department is devoted to this

work, and added to this are large contributions from Churches and Sunday-Schools, aggregating more than two hundred thousand dollars annually. The writer of this book traces the work from its inception and describes its operations in the northern prairies, the Middle West, the Rocky Mountain districts, the South and South-West, the Pacific Slope and among the negroes.

To the chapters thus outlined are added valuable "Appendixes", including "Questions for Study Classes", "Reference Literature", "Work Among Foreigners", "Young People's Work", "Statistical Tables", and "Missionary Illustrations". The aim throughout is to lay upon the hearts of the readers the burden of this work not only as a religious, but also as a patriotic duty.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Pilot Flame. By KELLEY JENNESS. Boston: Sherman, French & Co. Cloth. 12 mo; pp. 268. \$1.50 net.

This is a series of studies in religious experience. The title is taken from the little flame which, in a certain heating apparatus, is used to kindle other flames. By analogy the author suggests that "the recognition of God" is a flame which must be lighted and kept ablaze in order to enkindle all the powers of the soul. The writer is an active pastor who has long been "engaged in lighting pilot flames". He here presents a series of anonymous "cases" which have been collected and classified for the purpose of careful study, and to aid ministers in their difficult task of the "cure of souls".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Progress in Christian Culture. By SAMUEL CHARLES BLACK, D.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 209. 75 cents, postage 13 cents.

As the title indicates, this volume considers the need and suggests the methods of progress in Christian life, and the development of Christian character. Among the themes considered are Prayer, Bible Study, Sacrifice, Service, Self-Control, Remembering, Meditation, Perseverance, Temptation, Sabbath Observance, Decision. The treatment of these subjects is brief, direct, practical, suggestive.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Public Worship for Non-Liturgical Churches. By ARTHUR S. HOYT, D.D., Professor of Homiletics and Sociology in the Auburn Theological Seminary. New York: George H. Doran Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 164. 75 cents net.

This admirable little volume is an expression of the sentiment which led to the preparation of "The Book of Common Worship" by the Committee of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church. It is a sentiment which is prevailing in all the non-liturgical churches; viz., a conscious need of more dignity and beauty and harmony and devotion in the services of the churches. To secure these ends it is not necessary

to abandon "free worship" and to adopt liturgies, but rather to observe such principles and adopt such methods as are suggested by this author. The scope of his discussion is evident from the titles of his brief chapters: 1. Worship in Religion and Life. 2. The Form of Worship. 3. Doctrine and Worship. 4. Liturgical or Free Worship. 5. Public Prayer. 6. The Preparation for Public Prayer. 7. The Use of Scripture in Worship. 8. The Worship of Sacred Song. 9. The Development of Free Worship.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Kindergarten Lessons for Church Sunday Schools. Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co. Cloth. Pp. 148. 75 cents net.

This manual for the instruction of beginners was prepared for the Sunday School Convention of the Diocese of New York. It not only suggests the large possibilities of the Kindergarten in the Church, but serves as a guide to the many workers who are serving in this sphere of Christian activity.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Youngest King. BY THE REVEREND ROBERT HAMILL NASSAU, M.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 12mo; pp. 95.

The author of *Fetichism in West Africa*, who was for forty-three years a devoted missionary worker in the "Dark Continent", has given us in this beautiful Christmas story, an imaginary account of the journey of Gaspar, or Caspar, one of the Magi, from his home in Africa, to Bethlehem and the presence of the infant King. The narrative is characterized by the touches and details which could be possible only for one who had a life-long familiarity with African scenes, beliefs and customs; and the story is evidently written in an expression of deep sympathy for the natives among whom the author labored, and of love for the Master he has there served.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

If Christ Were King; or The Kingdom of Heaven on Earth. BY ALBERT E. WAFFLE, D.D. Philadelphia: The Griffith & Rowland Press. Pp. 352. \$1.25 net.

There are a large number of admirable features in this book, and many of the author's conclusions commend themselves to our judgment. Its aim is to show the regenerating effect of the Spirit of Christ as a finality in the life of the individual and in the framework and social spirit of human society. Rightly, of course, it gives the supreme place to Christ among the forces that are working for the moral and social betterment of the world. A high reverence for Christ is repeatedly indicated. Words like these may serve to illustrate this feature: "Supreme love to Christ makes labor for the advancement of his kingdom a delight, and sacrifice for his sake a joy. Love alone can enable one to deny himself, to take up his cross daily, and to follow Christ" (p. 62). Another illustration may be taken from the chapter on "Joy and Gladness": "To be supremely and steadily happy, take the opportunity which

Christ gives to devote yourself to the greatest and best cause the world has known. First learn what it is. Try to grasp the meaning of the kingdom of heaven on earth. Then live for it, sacrifice for it, cultivate enthusiasm for it, concentrate your efforts on it—" (p. 94). Words like these certainly ring true.

We cannot say that this book is marked by profound scholarship, nor does it present any strikingly original contribution to theological or sociological thought. The author seems, however, to be well acquainted with his Bible—at least the English version of it—and he marshalls his texts easily in support of his various contentions; perhaps we ought to say that he quotes from the Bible happily in most instances. His English style is clear and graceful; on the whole pleasing. If we might venture to criticise what perhaps may be styled the *temper* of the author we would suggest that there are places where he reveals a little too much of the *Boanerges* spirit; as in his denunciation of the Roman Catholic Church, and in his denunciation of the possessors of great wealth. We are also inclined to think that he gives too little attention to the redemptive feature of Christ's mission, and lays relatively too heavy an emphasis upon the ethical side of Christianity. The central feature and chief dynamic of Christianity is the Cross of Christ.

If we are not mistaken in our opinion, this work of Doctor Waffle has been inspired by his desire to give expression to a sociological dogma; in other words, to proclaim and defend the gospel of Socialism. This at all events seems to be the heart of his message in the book before us; and at this point we decidedly join issue with him. He is plainly in sympathy with the doctrine of so-called Christian Socialism, as the following typical language from the chapter on "Property" indicates: "Could there be any surer way of curing the spirit of selfishness, greed, and avarice which is prevalent, and which Christ so strongly deprecated, than to abolish private ownership by general agreement and to put all property into the possession of the people—that is, the State or nation?" (p. 153). Again: "Another auspicious sign auguring well for the future is the growth of Socialism. . . . And while Socialism has some crudities which must be refined, some deformities which will have to be amputated . . . the general movement shows that the leaven of Christianity is working in human lives and that great and admirable improvements in social conditions may be soon expected" (pp. 310, 311). We are certainly fair, therefore, in classifying Doctor Waffle as a socialist. Now it is certain, and our author admits it, that the New Testament does not clearly teach the doctrine of the state ownership of material property. The farthest that any fair-minded Christian socialist can dare to go on the platform of the New Testament is to try to arrive at his social program as a rather remote deduction from the principle of brotherly love as set forth by Christ and his apostles. In fact, therefore, the question is political or sociological, and not theological. We are simply certain to read our prepossessions into Scripture, and thus bring our Scriptural learning into contempt, if we try to present Jesus as a teacher

of Socialism. It is precisely as if we were to regard the plan of the Aldrich Committee for the reform of the banking and currency system in the United States as a question to be determined by an appeal to the Epistle to the Romans. If the issue of Socialism is ever urgent in the United States, it will have to be determined not by the teachings of Jesus, but by the law of social expediency based on the primal instincts and the native and acquired tendencies of human nature.

Now the desire of the average man to hold property as a personal possession is due to the primal instinct of acquisitiveness, which is as God-given as the instinct which leads the robin and his mate to build a nest for the exclusive use of their own brood, instead of joining in erecting a nest a hundred feet wide with compartments enough for all the birds of a hundred species that inhabit the air of a township. Socialism bears against this instinct, and hence is what Bushnell styled another social movement, "a reform against nature." To be sure there are individuals—chiefly the lame and lazy, we fear,—who would possibly be happy under the régime of Socialism,—men who are, like Thoreau or Bronson Alcott, largely lacking in this native instinct of acquisitiveness; but the lame ducks do not determine the needs of the whole flock. The wholesome ambitions of the average man would be paralyzed, and his ingenuity and enterprise seriously curbed, if the possibility of personal gain were eliminated. And it is idle to argue that public ownership should be universally extended on the ground that it has worked well in exceptional departments—as in the control of public school property, for example. We may admit that it is wise for the state to own certain classes of property; but it is a different matter to close every important field against personal ownership. We are convinced that if state Socialism were ever practised by an important section of human society life would be intolerably uninteresting under such a condition. Nor is it to the point to urge that if all the people of a state were true followers of Christ, or an overpowering majority of them were that, communism would work. To put the matter thus renders the question academic, and removes it from the sphere of practical issues. We may just as well argue against marriage on the ground that if we were all in heaven there would be no necessity for marriage or being given in marriage. The fact is we are on the earth, and not above it, and it is likely that men and women will continue to mate, as it is likely that men will continue to seek riches for themselves for a millenium or two yet—at least as long as the present dispensation lasts.

There is a good deal in this book that we like much, as we have intimated; but against its socialistic teachings we place a decidedly big interrogation point.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

Christianity and the Labor Movement. BY WILLIAM MONROE BALCH, formerly Secretary of the Methodist Federation for Social Service. Boston: Sherman, French Company. 1912. Pp. 108. \$1.00 net.

It is claimed in behalf of this little book that "it is probably the only

book, at least in the English language, devoted solely to a general survey of the labor movement in the light of Christian principles." We regard it as a sane attempt to establish a better understanding and to create a mutual sympathy between the Christian churches and the labor unions. The chapters on "What Church-Men should know about Labor Unions" and "What Wage-Earners should know about the Church" are especially admirable. The points given in the former chapter in behalf of the labor unions we venture to quote: (1) "The organization of labor has elevated the general standard of living;" (2) "The shortening of the labor-day averaging in modern times at least three hours, is chiefly to the credit of the unions;" (3) "Organized labor is one of the chief defenses of public health;" (4) "The unions afford the chief protection against the exploitation of women and children;" (5) "Unionism is a safeguard against unemployment and its social ill-consequences;" (6) "The benefit funds of the unions are among the chief benevolences of the age;" (7) "Unionism often protects employers against unscrupulous competitors;" (8) "Trade-unionism is a main factor in popular education;" (9) "The union is the greatest influence for the Americanizing of the immigrant, save only the public school;" (10) "Unionism is an influence for law and order;" (11) "Organized labor is an influence for temperance;" (12) "Organized labor is a chief influence for international peace." On the whole, we wish that every intelligent labor-union man and every influential church member in the United States might read, mark and inwardly digest this thoughtful essay. We say this in spite of the author's indorsement of a rather mild type of Socialism. The book is a nut that is full of meat.

Cranford, N. J.

GEORGE FRANCIS GREENE.

A Chinese Appeal to Christendom Concerning Christian Missions. BY LIN SHAO-YANG. New York and London: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1911. Pp. 313. \$1.50.

The publisher's announcement advises us that "Not since the publication of the *Letters from a Chinese Official* has so logical, incisive, and telling a criticism of Western thought and belief issued from the press to agitate, antagonize, and convince as this brilliant tract that comes from the pen of a Chinese official." Everybody knows that the *Letters from a Chinese Official*, to which Mr. William Jennings Bryan made such an effective reply in *Letters to a Chinese Official*, were not written by a Chinese official, but, if our memory serves us, by Mr. G. Lowes Dickinson. The reader of the volume now under consideration might, therefore, be excused if he began its perusal with a tentative suspicion that the Chinese official whose superscription it bears is not as Chinese as his pen-name. That initial suspicion will not be weakened by the author's surprising acquaintance with current theological literature of a sort, or by the fact that much of the Chinese coloring of the *Appeal* is borrowed from the columns of the *Chinese Recorder* and *China's Millions*. However, there is no need for suspicion as the author has admitted in the *London Spectator*, that he is not himself a Chinaman, al-

though he assures us that he is competent to write as though he were. Certainly his position with reference to Christian missions may well be the position of Chinese rationalists of the general type represented in the English-speaking world by the writers for the Rationalist Press. The *Appeal* is not so much, however, a critique of Christian missions, in China or elsewhere, as it is "a criticism of Western thought and belief", so far as that thought and belief continue to be Christian. Mr. Lin Shao-Yang, for we can call him by no other name, is of the opinion that the fundamental presuppositions of Christian faith have been severely shaken by modern science and historical research. For such a thorough-going rationalist he is somewhat amusingly at a loss to account for the fact that, in view of this religious unrest, our "missionary zeal should not only remain unabated, but should actually show signs of increasing activity." "A garrisoned city does not send away the flower of its troops when a powerful enemy is thundering at its gates" (p. 3). No one will be disposed to controvert this proposition. But the awkward fact remains that the flower of the Christian army is off on crusading duty. Clearly the fall of the city does not seem as imminent to its defenders as to its besieging hosts. The missionaries in China who teach a supernatural Christianity are sent out by Christians in the Western world who believe in a supernatural Christianity; and if there is a new missionary vigor abroad, it can only be because there is a reinvigorated missionary belief at home. Indeed, the Chinese coloring of Mr. Lin Shao-Yang's book is incidental. The character of the attacking forces has not been changed; they have merely put on Chinese uniforms. A recital of the captions of the chapters will sufficiently indicate the scope of the critique, which is conducted in general without too much flippancy: The religious condition of Christendom and missionary activity; the prospects of Christianity in the Far East; missionaries and their methods; missionary motives, the Chinese character, and the attitude of young China; religious tolerance in China; monasticism in China, Christian intolerance, and the conversion of aborigines; revivalist methods in China; emotional religion; the problem of evil and a personal Devil; Christian demonology; hell and the damnation of the heathen; prayer, faith, and telepathy; science and prayer; Christian ethics and social prejudices; the Sabbath; religion, magic and word-spells; churches, church-bells, and hymns; Eastern and Western civilization, metamorphic Christianity, and Bibliolatry; Western education in China and the United Universities Scheme. Chapter xiv, on Christian ethics and social prejudices, is perhaps the most valuable chapter in the book.

Princeton.

HAROLD MCA. ROBINSON.

Coming to the Communion. A Manual of Instruction for Preparatory Classes and Private Study. By CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Prof. Erdman has supplied an important desideratum and will receive the gratitude of the Church.

Christian teachers have for years felt and acknowledged the want of

a manual for preparing young people worthily to come to their first Communion, than which no pastoral duty is more vital. The lack of such a textbook has prevented many parents and pastors from performing this duty, while many others have been obliged to extemporize their own course of instruction for Communicants' classes.

It is not easy, therefore, to overestimate the service which the Professor of Practical Theology in Princeton Seminary has rendered to parents, pastors and teachers in providing them with *Coming to the Communion*.

The author's experience evidently has impressed him with the serious difficulty of writing such a manual, and has impelled him to careful study of the Word and of the labors of others pastors, and to put forth the best effort of his skill to produce a manual which is complete in its statements of truths and replete with practical suggestions to those who use it. He avoids matters not relevant to his purpose and includes only the truths essential to the one thing. Accepting Jesus Christ, Confessing Jesus Christ, The Church, The Sacraments, Christian Life, Christian Service—he sets forth all these in a style characterized by brevity, clearness and a natural winsomeness. The result of this matter and manner is a book which is not merely one of instruction, but of power, and which will not merely illumine, but awaken, win, warm and move myriads of hearts of sincere readers to come to the table of the Lord.

The author has enriched these studies with careful citations from the Scriptures, from the Church's noble forms of sound words, and from standard hymns, which are intended to be memorized. He has also added collects or short prayers as helps to devotion, also review questions to each chapter, which may be answered by quotations from the New Testament. A volume of these qualities has uses beyond the teaching of Pastors' Preparatory Classes.

As Prof. Erdman writes:

"Communicant members of the Church often desire, for this service, special preparation of mind and heart, and a brief review of the great truths which the season suggests. Baptized members, who in infancy were given to God by their parents, need to be reminded of the privilege and duty of taking their places at the table of the Lord, in public acknowledgment of their relation to him and to his Church; such should receive instruction and guidance for their first communion. Other attendants upon the church services, who are secretly trusting in Christ, or who are seeking light upon religious problems, will be aided by a definite statement as to the Church and its sacraments; and they may thus be led to a profession of faith, and to a fuller Christian life and service."

Would that "Coming to the Communion" might be made an integral part of the Lesson Course in Sabbath Schools at appropriate seasons of the year, with the pastors of the Church as teachers.

Philadelphia.

JAMES A. WORDEN.

The Afterglow of God: Sunday Evenings in a Glasgow Pulpit. By the Rev. G. H. MORRISON, M.A., Glasgow. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1912. 8vo; pp. xii, 387. \$1.35 net.

This is one of the most interesting and helpful volumes of sermons we have read in recent years. We cannot but feel that the distinguished minister of the Wellington Church of Glasgow must be achieving a large measure of success in trying to "win the attention, in honorable ways, of some at least of that vast class of people who to-day sit so lightly to the church". For "the unsearchable riches of Christ" are presented in these messages with great clearness, freshness and power. It matters little from what text the discourse takes its departure, the paths traversed invariably bring us face to face with Christ and that not seldom upon the very heights of Calvary. The sermons reveal a deep insight into biblical truth and its adaptation to every variety of human experience.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Living Messages of the Books of The Bible: Matthew to Colossians.

Living Messages of The Bible: I. Thessalonians to Revelation. By the Rev. G. CAMPBELL MORGAN, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Two volumes. 12mo; pp. 223, 226; each \$1.00 net.

These two volumes complete Dr. Morgan's work as an expositor of the "Living Messages of the Bible". Each of the New Testament books is analyzed as to its doctrinal contents, which are synthetically presented under two captions, "The Essential Message" and "The Application." "The essential message" is in each instance subdivided into "the central teaching" and "the abiding appeal", while "the application" invariably deals with two of the following objects, "the individual", "the church", "the world". Doubtless most readers will feel that this method of setting forth the specific and characteristic teachings of the several documents is somewhat arbitrary. One finds it hard to see why some verses should be chosen as constituting "the abiding appeal" of the book, while others are taken as furnishing the matter that needs special applicatory emphasis for the Christian or the church or the world of to-day. The excessive use of alliteration in the statements of the main divisions of the teaching of some of the books and the striking correspondences and contrasts in various elements that fill up the one and only framework used for the disposition of the materials seem rather artificial. Thus "the central teaching" of 2 Peter is on the "responsibilities of grace"; "(i) Resources creating Responsibility" and "(ii) Responsibilities created by Resources". Again, "the abiding appeal" of Ephesians is to "walk worthily"; "(i) according to the eternal plan, (ii) appropriating the eternal power" and "(iii) approaching the eternal purpose". "The abiding appeal" of Philippians deals with "(i) the resources, (ii) the responsibility, (iii) the rules" pertaining to our duty to "have the same mind" in us which was also in Christ Jesus. But in spite of the rigidity of the method used and in spite of the fragmentary presentation of the contents of some of the larger books, the

volumes show a fine appreciation of the main teachings of the New Testament and abound in passages that show great analytic skill and spiritual wisdom.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Great Texts of the Bible: St. John sūn-xxi. The Great Texts of the Bible: James to Jude. Edited by the Rev. JAMES HASTINGS, D.D., Editor of "The Expository Times", "The Dictionary of the Bible", "The Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels", and "The Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics". Two volumes. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1912. 8vo; vi, 458; vi, 433. Each \$3.00 net.

These are the ninth and tenth volumes in the monumental expository work on the Bible under the editorship of Dr. Hastings. Like their predecessors, these latest additions to the series are made up mainly of excerpts taken from sermons, essays, commentaries and discussions by men of various schools of thought and ecclesiastical connection. The texts thus "illuminated" are doubtless among the most important passages in the books from which they are taken, but one is puzzled in trying to account for some of the omissions. Thus the whole of the nineteenth chapter of John's Gospel is passed over in silence, while the last chapter is represented by only two passages. James furnishes only two texts, 2 Peter likewise only two, and Jude but one. Such gaps call for a considerable discount from the publisher's claim that this is "the fullest and most practical expository work of the time".

For many readers the best feature of the work will be found in the excellent bibliographical notes preceding the treatment of each text.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The New Opportunities of the Ministry. By FREDERICK LYNCH, Author of "The Enlargement of Life", "Is Life Worth Living"? "The Peace Problem", etc. With Introduction by Professor Hugh Black of Union Theological Seminary. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 128. 75 cents net.

After an introductory chapter dealing with the main reasons, as he conceives them, for the falling off during recent years in the number of the candidates for the gospel ministry, the author reviews "the older opportunities" still presented to this vocation, and then treats, in ten chapters, what he regards as relatively new fields of service that still make it possible for the right sort of pastor to be the most useful man of the age. These new fields are named "the new religious education, the new biblical scholarship, the challenges of the new paganism, the combating of the new atheism, the new social gospel, missions and the call for statesmen, the challenge of the new America, the restoration of a united church, the enlarged ethical opportunity, the new evangelism". The "newness" of some of these activities may not be apparent to some of our faithful ministers who have spent decades in the work of the pastorate along so many of these very lines of labor. But there is

a ringing challenge in these chapters that cannot but impress the thoughtful young man with the great opportunities for service that the ministry of our day affords. The appeal of the book is as forceful as it is timely.

The discussion of "the new social gospel" is not altogether satisfactory. It is not wanting, indeed, in fairness, so far as the estimate of the church's influence upon society in the past is concerned, but there are statements that need to be revised in the interests of accuracy. The following is an example: "She [the church] is going to make a thorough and complete study of the whole problem of capital and labour, the relationship of employer and employee, and is ultimately going to conceive an economic system where, by cooperation, these embittering strikes and lockouts will become things forgotten, and the very causes of poverty will be so abolished that we shall no longer have the poor with us always, and all men shall together praise God for His supplying, through these new labours of the Church, their daily bread."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Preacher: His Life and Work. Yale Lectures. By REV. J. H. JOWETT, D.D., Pastor Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church, New York, Author of "Apostolic Optimism", "The Passion for Souls", "The Silver Lining", etc. New York: Hodder & Stoughton: George H. Doran Company. 1912. 8vo; pp. 239. \$1.25 net.

In beginning the course of Lectures here published, Dr. Jowett said to the divinity students in his audience: "I stand before you, therefore, as a fellow-labourer, who has been over a certain part of the field, and my simple purpose is to dip into the pool of my experiences, to record certain practical judgments and discoveries, and to offer counsels and warnings which have been born out of my own successes and defeats." And it is the rich autobiographical and personal element in these discourses that will be their chief charm for most readers. The subjects are few and familiar: the call to be a preacher, the preacher's perils, the preacher's themes, the preacher in his study, the preacher in his pulpit, the preacher in the home, and the preacher as a man of affairs. But the blood-streak of a varied Christian and pastoral experience runs through the whole discussion, and the many suggestions and counsels given by the distinguished preacher commend themselves as sound, practical and helpful. The style is strong, pointed and graceful, always luminous and frequently brilliant.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Pew to the Pulpit or Letters From Laymen. York, Pa.: P. Anstandt & Sons, 1911. 12mo; pp. 64. 20 cents postpaid.

This pamphlet contains thirty-five anonymous letters written by laymen in response to the question submitted to them by the Lutheran (General Synod) Ministerial Association of Philadelphia, "What would

you have me say to the preachers?" Some of the answers may help a pastor here and there to estimate himself, his methods and his work somewhat more accurately, but some of the contributors might have done better had they abstained from giving such wordy evidence of the fact that they had nothing to say.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Cross: The Report of a Misgiving. By G. A. JOHNSTON ROSS, Professor of Practical Theology, Presbyterian College, Montreal. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 46. 25 cents net.

The subtitle of this essay, "The Report of a Misgiving", indicates its specific aim. Dr. Ross attempts no solution of the problem of the atonement, but contents himself with the statement of the evidence that the Church of to-day is failing to do justice to the apostolic message concerning the cross of Christ. The author's conclusion, though it evades the crux of the difficulty, is good enough so far as it goes: "The faith which magnifies the unmerited and sin-destroying grace of God is the only satisfying religion, because it is the only adequate interpretation of all the facts, is the only successful antagonist of pride, and the only religion that can form a permanent foundation for holy living and unpretentious hope."

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

All the Year Round: An Outlook Upon Its Great Days. By NEWELL DWIGHT HILLIS. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 255. \$1.20 net.

These twelve "occasional addresses" originally delivered in the course of the year's work in Plymouth Church, are now published "in the belief that every public teacher, in the interest of the children and youth of his community, should do all he can to strengthen the influence of the great anniversaries that mark the epochs of each new year." The addresses on "Abraham Lincoln: His Religious Attitude", on "George Washington: The Ideal Americanism", and the Thanksgiving Day sermon on "A National Obligation" are specially fine discourses of this type.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Home Beautiful. By J. R. MILLER, Author of "Silent Times", "Devotional Hours with the Bible", etc. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. 1912. 12mo; pp. 253. \$1.00 net.

Dr. Miller was not permitted to carry out his original plans concerning this volume. He had hoped to prepare a number of new chapters in addition to these, which are taken from several of his other books. But his associate, the Rev. John T. Faris, has been able to arrange *The Home Beautiful* in a manner that others besides himself will feel to be in accordance with the wishes of the distinguished author whose publications have brought inspiration and comfort to countless lives.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, January: ERNST TROELTSCH, Dogmatics of the "Religionsgeschichtliche Schule"; EDWARD C. MOORE, The Liberal Movement and Missions; HENRY P. SMITH, The Laying-on of Hands; SHIRLEY J. CASE, The Nature of Primitive Christianity; BENJAMIN W. BACON, The Leiden Congress for the History of Religion; ERRETT GATES, Another Case of Discipline in the Prussian Church.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, January: GEORGE F. WELLS, Christian Union in Problem and Practice; WARREN UPHAM, Origin and Antiquity of Man; A. A. BERLE, The Christian Church and Democracy; HERBERT W. MAGOUN, A Layman's View of the Critical Theory (1); O. W. FIRKINS, The Springs of Beneficence; THEODORE W. HUNT, Thought and Language; JOHN B. WHITFORD, The Vision of Amos; RANDOLPH H. MCKIM, A Critical Examination of "The Bible of 1911"; HAROLD M. WIENER, The Advent of Textual Criticism.

Church Quarterly Review, London, January: Royal Commission on Divorce; Position and Future of the Church of England; J. S. PRINGLE, Japanese Buddhism in Relation to Christianity; CLEMENT C. J. WEBB, Benjamin Webb; HERBERT KELLY, The Rise and Course of Scholasticism; L. W. KING, Israel, Greece, and Babylon; EDWIN HOLTHOUSE, Dante and Ben Sira; FOSTER CUNLIFFE, The Welsh Disestablishment Bill.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, March: W. P. DUBOSE, Constructive Treatment of Christianity; WILFRID WARD, Union Among Christians; ARCHBISHOP PLATON, A Message from the Russian Church; FRIEDRICH LOOFS, A German View of *Sola Fide*; GEORGES GOYAU, Church of France To-day; JOHN J. WYNNE, Reforms of Pius X; W. P. PATERSON, Presbyterian Reunion in Scotland; SHAILER MATHEWS, The Awakening of American Protestantism; F. J. McCONNELL, Significance of Conversion in the Thinking of To-day; WILLIAM SANDAY, Pacific and Warlike Ideals; B. W. BACON, St. Paul's Message to Religion; ARTHUR HENDERSON, Religion and Labour; ROBERT E. SPEER, An American Saint.

East & West, London, January: C. R. D. BIGGS, The Cross and the Crescent in the Balkan Peninsula; DR. FERGUSON-DAVIE, Inter-Marriage between Europeans and "natives"; W. A. RICE, Bahaiism from the Christian Standpoint; BISHOP NELIGAN, The Church and the Expansion of the Empire; G. HIBBERT-WARE, Training of Indian Clergy; LOUIS BYRDE, Chung Hua Sheng Kung Hui; J. P. HAYTHORNTHWAITHE, Elementary Education in India.

Expositor, London, January: GEORGE A. SMITH, Experience of Balaam as Symbolic of the Origins of Prophecy; JAMES DENNEY, Christianity and the Historic Christ; VERNON BARTLET, Historic Setting of the Pastoral Epistles; ALFRED E. GARVIE, Religious Aspects of the Doctrine of the Trinity as Presented in the New Testament; AGNES S. LEWIS, Dr. Vogels on the Old Syriac Gospels; H. A. A. KENNEDY, St. Paul and the Mystery Religion. 8. Sacramental Meals; E. C. SELWYN, Oracles of the Discourse at Jacob's Well.

Expository Times, Edinburgh, February: Notes of Recent Exposition; MOSES GASTER, Feast of Jereboam and the Samaritan Calendar; ADAM C. WELCH, Old Testament Eschatology; JAMES MOFFATT, The Aramaeans; WILLIAM M. RAMSAY, What were the Churches of Galatia? A. R. GORDON, Pioneers in the Study of Old Testament Poetry—Herder.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, January: HENRY S. NASH, Nature and Definition of Religion; JOSIAH ROYCE, George Fox as a Mystic; ERNEST F. SCOTT, Present Position of New Testament Theology; JOHN E. BOODIN, Reinstatement of Theology; GEORGE R. DODSON, Relation of Plato to our Age and to the Ages.

Hibbert Journal, Boston and London, January: VISCOUNT HALDANE, The Civic University; BISHOP OF CARLISLE, Marriage and Divorce; A. MITCHELL INNES, Love and the Law in the East; EDWARD THORPE, Joseph Priestley; PRINCIPAL FORSYTH, Intellectualism and Faith; GEORGE COORE, Modernism and the Catholic Consciousness; HUGH WALKER, Are the "Brains behind the Labour Revolt" all Wrong?; C. G. MONTEFIORE, Modern Judaism and the Messianic Hope; D. F. HARRIS, Consciousness as a Cause of Neural Activity; H. A. OVERSTREET, Democratic Conception of God; R. S. NOLAN, Social Service. 6. Needs of Discharged Prisoners.

Homiletic Review, New York, March: E. HERMANN, Studies of Representative British Theologians. James Denney; E. C. DARGAN, Characteristics of Preaching through the Centuries; JOSEPH HUTCHESON, Bergson's Creative Evolution; GEORGE W. GILMORE, The New Rationalistic Assault; EDWARD C. BALDWIN, Does Paul Refer to Plato's Republic?; J. E. MCFADYEN, From the Creation to the Settlement in Canaan; JOHN M. GRANT, Authorship of Epistle to Hebrews.

International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, January: R. M. MACIVER, Do Nations Grow Old?; J. LAIRD, Value and Obligation; H. B. REED, The Combination vs. The Consumer; CHARLES W. SUPER, Some Weak Points in Ancient Greek Ethics; J. DASHIELL STOOPS, The Institutional Self.

Interpreter, London, January: HASTINGS RASHDALL, The Problem of Evil; A. E. J. RAWLINSON, Religion and Temperament; CANON FOAKES-JACKSON, Social Organization of Israel; G. W. WADE, St. Paul and the Sacrifice of the Cross; T. HERBERT BINDLEY, The Pastoral Epistles; F. BERTRAM CLOGG, Zachariah: His Visions and Teachings.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin and New York, January: J. KELLEHER, The Single Tax; T. J. WALSH, Eschatological Apologetics; M. J. O'DONNELL, The Seal of Confession; HUGH POPE, Why Divorce Our Teaching of Theology from Our Teaching of the Bible? M. EATON, Reform of the Breviary; J. MACCAFFREY, Personal Character of Luther.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, January: MAX L. MARGOLIS, "Man by Man", Joshua vii. 17; BERNARD REVEL, Inquiry into the Sources of Karaite Halakah; S. POZNANSKI, Ginzberg's "Geonica"; ADOLPH BÜCHLER, Schechter's "Jewish Sectaries".

Jewish Review, London and New York, January: An International

Jewish Organisation; The Community and the State; The Chief Rabbinate; Religion and Politics; BERTRAM B. BENAS, A Jewish Renaissance; BERTHA PAPPENHEIM, The Jewish Woman in Religious Life; DR. ABRAMOWIZ, Organisations of the Jews in Poland in 16th, 17th, and 18th Centuries; M. GASTER, The Biblical Lessons: A Chapter on Biblical Archaeology.

Journal of Biblical Literature, Boston, December: CHARLES C. TORREY, Concerning Hiram ("Hiram-Abi"), the Phoenician Craftsman; GEORGE A. BARTON, Origin of Names of Angels and Demons in the Extra-Canonical Apocalyptic Literature to 100 A.D.; WILLIAM R. NEWBOLD, Descent of Christ in the Odes of Solomon; PAUL HAUPT, Hebrew סֶכֶר, Abundance.

Journal of Religious Psychology, Worcester, January: ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, New Religions among American Indians; GEORGE E. DAWSON, Suggestions Towards an Inductive Study of the Religious Consciousness; THEODORE SCHROEDER, Mathias the Prophet; ARTHUR E. WHATHAM, Modern Criticism and the Origin of the Christian Church; ARTHUR L. WEATHERLY, A Note on the Ethical Ideas of Children.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, January: C. H. TURNER, Gospel of Peter; J. A. ROBINSON, Resurrection Appearances; H. J. BARDSLEY, Testimony of Ignatius and Polycarp to the Writings of St. John; W. S. PRATT, Diction of the Psalter as a Clue to its Development; H. C. HOSKIER, Evan. 157 (Rom. Vat. Urb. 2) II; D. WILLEY, Odes and Psalms of Solomon; A. WRIGHT, *τάξιν* in Papias.

London Quarterly Review, London, January: J. ARTHUR THOMSON, The Hidden Secret of Life; SAINT NIHAL SINGH, Trend of Social Reform in India; J. A. BEET, Theology, Old and New; T. ALEXANDER SEED, Lord Wolverhampton; WILFRID J. MOULTON, Christian Certainties; E. GRIFFITH-JONES, A College Principal; T. H. S. ESCOTT, Behind the Scenes in Fleet Street; JOHN TELFORD, Life of George Tyerell.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, January: J. A. SINGMASTER, The 150th Anniversary of St. Paul's Evangelical Lutheran Church, Allentown, Pa.; M. H. VALENTINE, The New Evangelism; Layman's Symposium, Kind of Preaching that I Like; H. M. J. KLEIN, Historical Sketch of Beginnings of Franklin and Marshall College; R. C. SCHIEDT, Gotthilf Heinrich Ernst Muhlenberg; W. H. WYNN, Metapolitics and Social Reform; J. C. JACOBY, Modern Attacks on the Church; ADAM STUMP, Some Harmful Results of the Higher Criticism; EDWARD PFLEIFFER, Ground and Necessity of the Missionary Enterprise; B. F. PRINCE, Beginnings of Lutheranism in Ohio; Current Theological Thought.

Methodist Review, New York and Cincinnati, January-February: A. C. ARMSTRONG, Germany Revisited; W. A. QUAYLE, A Poet Chrysostom; ELMER E. BROWN, Absolute Truthfulness; A. J. LOCKHART, Arthur Hallam and "In Memoriam"; E. C. WILM, The Present Religious Situation; O. B. SUPER, Modernity of Rousseau; F. W. ADAMS, The Parable of the Good Will; W. H. BURGWIN, Twice-Born Men—A Personal Testimony; R. J. TREVORROW, Church Attendance and an

Efficient Ministry; A. B. CUNNINGHAM, Impression A Minister Should Make Upon His People.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, January: JOHN C. GRANBERRY, Henri Bergson and His Philosophy; S. B. CHOWN, Can Socialism be Linked With Christianity? E. R. HENDRIX, Jonathan Edwards and John Wesley; FREDERICK F. SHANNON, Henry Ward Beecher; E. D. MOUZON, The Gospel Of Reconciliation; R. T. KERLIN, Present Condition and Prospects of Greece; W. J. MCGLOTHLIN, Vital Idea in the Ministry; F. L. TOWNSEND, Why I Am Opposed to Woman's Suffrage; IVAN L. HOLT, A Résumé of the Philosophy of Evil; FRANCIS MCK. MORTON, Teaching of Jesus Concerning Family Life; GEORGE H. CLARKE, "Pippa Passes"; THOMAS CARTER, Leverage of Our Lord; CARL HOLLIDAY, Woodrow Wilson.

Monist, Chicago, January: ERNST MACH, Psychic and Organic Life; WILLIAM B. SMITH, Push? or Pull? Contrasted Views of the Nature Process; ELLEN B. TALBOT, Fichte's Conception of God; ALBERT R. CHANDLER, Tragic Effect in Sophocles Analyzed According to the Freudian Method; T. PROCTOR HALL, Scientific Theology; ARISTIDES PRATELLE, Atomistic Dynamism; B. H. BODE, Paradoxes of Pragmatism; EZRA B. CROOKS, Professor James and the Psychology of Religion; PAUL CARUS, Theonomy.

Moslem World, London, January: W. A. SHEDD, Influence of a Mohammedan Environment on the Missionary; D. B. MACDONALD, God, A Unit or a Unity; W. ST. CLAIR TYSDALE, Then and Now: Henry Martyn; ARCHDEACON WARD, A Service of Intercession; C. G. MYLREA, Lucknow as a Moslem Centre; F. H. RUXTON, The Convert's Status in Maliki Law; J. L. POTTER, Religious Liberty in Persia; D. W. CARR, Evangelization of the Bakhtiari; A. BOWEN, Bible Work Among Moslems; A. T. UPSON, A Chinese Apologetic; W. H. REED, The Possibility of Personal Work Among Moslems; GEORGE SWAN, Monogamy in Islam.

Open Court, Chicago, January: ERNST MACH, Memory. Reproduction and Association; PAUL CARUS, Evolution of the Artistic Observation; ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, Some Interesting Phases of the Contact of Races Individually and en Masse; BHAI PARMANAND, A Great Aryan Movement; BERTHOULD LAUFER, Praying Mantis in Chinese Folklore. *The Same*, February: PAUL CARUS, Albania; A. KAMPMEIER, The Pre-Christian Nasareans; PAUL CARUS, The Cicada an Emblem of Immortality in China; GÜNTHER JACOBY, Herder as Faust.

Philosophical Review, Lancaster, March: FRANK THILLY, Romanticism and Rationalism; J. E. CREIGHTON, The Copernican Revolution in Philosophy; H. M. KALLEN, Radical Empiricism and the Philosophic Tradition; Proceedings of the Twelfth Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association; WALTER B. PITKIN, The Neo-Realist and the Man in the Street.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, January: A. V. CASSELMAN, Art and Symbolism in Church Architecture; R. LEIGHTON GERHART, The Lord's Supper; P. A. DE LONG, Morality of the Early Church; PHILIP VOLLMER, Development of the Dialectical Method of Socrates;

C. N. HELLER, Matthew Arnold; RAY H. DOTTERER, Problem of the Will; A. T. G. APPLE, The New Theology, A Message to the Times; S. S. HEBBERD, The Neglected Factor in Philosophy.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, January: HENRY W. CLARK, Religious History and the Idea of Immanence; HENRY C. VEDDER, First Epistle of John, Its Literary Characteristics and Content; J. H. FARMER, The Kingdom of God; W. H. MAYNARD, Twentieth Century Preacher; BOOKER T. WASHINGTON, Fifty Years of Negro Freedom.

Union Seminary Magazine, Richmond, December-January: A. B. CURRY, The Bristol Assembly; D. J. BURRELL, Christ Our Model; R. A. WEBB, Revelation: Inspiration: The Record; W. M. ANDERSON, The Old Evangelism; B. B. WARFIELD, The Religious Life of Theological Students.

Yale Review, New Haven, January: HENRY C. EMERY, The Democrats and the Tariff; GILBERT MURRAY, The "Tradition" of Greek Literature; MAX FARRAND, Popular Election of Senators; HENRY A. BEERS, The Connecticut Wits; CHARLES F. RICHARDSON, The Morals of the Rhyming Dictionary; A. MAURICE LOW, The Modern Newspaper; BURNSIDE FOSTER, The Results of Animal Experimentation; WILBUR C. ABBOTT, The Fame of Cromwell.

Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétiennes, Paris, Janvier: PIERRE BATIFFOL, Le règlement des premiers conciles et le règlement du sénat; JACQUES ZEILLER, La question du pape Libère; GERMAIN MORIN, Pour l'authenticité de la lettre de saint Jérôme à Prædicius.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Enero-Febrero: JAVIER VALES FAILDE, La Unión Internacional para el estudio del Derecho de gentes; FRANCISCO MARIN SOLÁ, La homogeneidad de la Doctrina católica (continuación); J. CUERVO, Carranza y el Doctor Navarro; FRANCISCO TRAPIELLO, Fray Pedro de Tapia y su tiempo; LESMES ALCALDE, El elemento revelado en la Suma Teológica; LUIS G. ALONSO GETINO, Historia de los Papas del Renacimiento par Ludovico Pastor.

La Cultura Contemporanea, Roma, Dicembre: LUIGI SALVATORELLI, Quello che hanno della Chiesa; ANGELO CRESPI, Idealismo assoluto e teismo in un neo-egelianismo inglese; LUIGI SALVATORELLI, Scienza delle Religioni; G. LANZALONE-B. VARISCO, L'Assoluto.

Deutsch-Amerikanische Zeitschrift für Theologie und Kirche, Berea, März-April: KARL A. DANIEL, Das moderne Denken über die Erlösung; CARL JORDAN, Die biblische Lehre von der Inspiration der heiligen Schriften; G. GÄHR, "Die jungfräuliche Geburt Jesu".

Lehre und Wehre, St. Louis, Februar: Die Weisagungen vom Antichristen im siebten Kapitel des Propheten Daniel; Pauli Lehrstellung; Die trunkene Wissenschaft; was sie will, und warum wir wenig Respekt vor ihr haben.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Janvier-Février: PIERRE ROUSSELOT, Note historique sur le concept de Foi scientifique; LÉOPOLD CADIÈRE, Les religions de l'Annam; JEAN RIVIÈRE ET PAUL GALTIER, La mort du Christ et la justice envers le démon; ALBERT CONDAMIN, L'innocence biblique d'après Saint Bède; LOUIS DE MONDADON, Du doute

méthodique chez saint Augustin; PIERRE D'HÉROUVILLE, *Nostrorum primus Maro*.

Revue Bénédictine, Paris, Janvier: G. MORIN, Un ouvrage restitué à Julien d'Eclanum: le commentaire du Pseudo Rufin sur les prophètes Osée, Joel et Amos; A. WILMART, *Le Comès* de Murbach; P. LIEBAERT, Règlement d'avouerie en faveur de l'abbaye de St-Denys en France; U. BERLIÈRE, Les évêques auxiliaires des de Liège (suite).

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique, Louvain, Janvier: G. KURTE, Étude critique sur la vie de sainte Genevieve; E. VYKOUKAL, Les examens de clergé paroissial à l'époque carolingienne; E. LESNE, La dime des biens ecclésiastiques aux IXe et Xe siècles (suite à suivre).

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Louvain, Janvier: PHILIPPE BRIDEL, Des fictions, dans la science et dans la vie humaine; EUGÈNE CHOISY, Le cardinal Borromée; ALEXANDRE MAURER, Charles Secrétan; EMILE LOMBARD, Expérience religieuse et psychologie de la religion.

Revue de Théologie et des Questions Religieuses, Montauban, Décembre: Rapport de M. le doyen Doumergue sur l'année scolaire 1911-1912; L. MAURY, La valeur sociale du Sacrifice; CH. BRUSTON, Le poète Epiménide et l'apôtre Paul; CH. BRUSTON, Rectifications à la traduction des plus anciens cantiques chrétiens; Les antinomies de Kant et l'idéalisme néo-criticiste et néo-monadiste de M. Pilon (suite et fin); F. LEENHARDT, Le Sermon sur la montagne transposé dans notre langue et pour notre temps.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Paris, Janvier: M. D. ROLAND-GOSSELIN, L'évolution de l'intellectualisme grec de Thalès à Aristote; W. SCHMIDT, Phases principales de l'histoire de l'ethnologie; P. MANDONNET, Premiers travaux de polémique thomiste (suivre); P. M. SCHAFF, Saint Thomas et les rapports de la nature pure avec la nature déchu.

Theologische Studiën, Utrecht, XXXI Jaargang, Aflevering 1: JOH. DE GROOT, Prof. F. J. van den Ham; A. VAN DER FLIER G. J. ZN., Een belangrijke strijd op het gebied der Oud-Testamentische wetenschap (I).

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, XXXVII Band, 1 Heft: JOH. DÖLLER, Der Bann (Herem), im Alten Testament und im späteren Judentum; BERNHARD POSCHMANN, Zur Bussfrage in d. cyprianischen Zeit; ANTON LINSMEIER, Der Galileiprogess v. 1616 in naturwissenschaftlicher Beleuchtung; JOSEF HONTHEIM, Die Chronologie der Richterzeit in der Bibel und die ägyptische Chronologie.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, January: H. E. JACOBS, History of the Lutheran Church in Germany; T. E. SCHMAUK AND C. H. HIRZEL, Rudolf Eucken and Christianity; R. HUFFELD, Ritschl's Development of Lutheran Orthodoxy in the Phillipistic Controversies; T. E. SCHMAUK, The New Freedom of President Wilson; STEINLEIN-VON BOSSE, On the Doctorate of Luther; SCHALLER-VOGT, The Norwegian Lutheran Church and the Synodical Conference; HENRY B. DICKERT, The Apologetic Value of the Resurrection of Jesus; J. A. W. HAAS, A New Ethics; WILLIAM BRENNER, Why Lutheran Ministers Should Not Officiate at Secret Society Funerals.

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of Jesus is a mere continuation, in a new concrete form, of something that had been predicable of Him before.

In order to preclude confusion of thought another distinction should be drawn at the outset. It is one thing to ascribe to the Evangelist the use of one or more of these names as significant of relations and functions pertaining to Christ in the preincarnate or premundane state, and quite another thing to believe that he uses them loosely, by way of anticipation, where he speaks of the Saviour's original existence, fully conscious that in the strict sense of the terms they belong to the later stage of His life. The mere fact that one of these names and some preincarnate or originally divine attribute are joined together cannot, without more, be held to prove the inherent reference of that name to the larger or eternal aspects of Christ's Person. The use of a name is often far wider than the range of its inherent significance or of the point of view which originally determined its choice. When certain things are affirmed in connection with the Logos, it by no means follows that He is called the Logos in virtue of these things or even was the Logos when these things took place. The Evangelist's intention might simply be to affirm the things referred to of Him who afterwards and for other reasons came to be the Logos. We shall, therefore, have to put the question sharply in each separate case, whether the function affirmed is a function of the Person of Christ in general, here incidentally called Logos, or a function specifically connected with his Logos-character, a Logos-function as such, the nature of the function inducing the use of the name.

The three titles in regard to which the said difference of opinion prevails are Logos, Son of God, Only-Begotten Son (or God Only-Begotten). As more or less formal names of the Saviour they are clearly distinct from other designations which partake rather of the nature of descriptive metaphors. It is true, Zahn denies this of Logos and would consider it as a figure entirely on a line with "the life",

"the light", "the vine". Even when the Evangelist singles it out from among other metaphors applied to Christ, to use it as subject for a number of statements, this is done, Zahn thinks, with full consciousness of the metaphorical intent, so that, in order to render the writer's meaning exactly, one would have to paraphrase: In the beginning was He who may be fitly compared to the word of God, etc.¹ It is, however, doubtful whether the Gospel ever uses other conceptions such as "light" and "life", without additional qualification, entirely after the same fashion as Logos, to designate the Person of Christ in the concrete. The Prologue says: "the Logos was", but: "in Him was life", "and the life (that was in Him) was the light of men". "The life" and "the light" remain abstract conceptions, although, of course, their reality is concentrated in the personal Christ. In verses 7, 8, it is true, τὸ φῶς is used as a designation of the historic Jesus. By the side of this may be placed iii. 19-21, although here the personal interpretation is not necessary. But even so there remains a perceptible difference between such a way of speaking, where the identification of the person with the abstract idea is led up to by previous statement, and the procedure of verse 1 in the Prologue, where, wholly without preliminaries, ὁ λόγος is introduced as a fixed designation.² We have sufficient

¹ *Das Ev. des Joh.* pp. 97-106. Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland im ersten Jahrhundert* (Freiburger Theol. Stud. 1910, 2) distinguishes only between the trinitarian, ontological interpretation of the Logos-name and its metaphorical interpretation, pp. 3 ff. From the sequel of the discussion it will appear that in order to reach clearness three exegetical positions are to be distinguished: 1) the name is not, strictly speaking, a name, but a metaphor; 2) it is a real name, but a name descriptive of function only; 3) it is a name used ontologically to describe inherent mode of provenience or existence. The view of Jannaris *ZNTW*, 1901, pp. 13-26, according to which logos in the Prologue is not even a metaphorical name of Christ, but simply God's utterance at creation, may be left out of account.

² In 1 Jno. i. 1, 2 "the word of life" is understood by some exegetes abstractly "the message concerning the life", notwithstanding the obvious allusion to the Prologue in ὁ ἦν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς. Others insist upon the concrete sense of "Logos". Zahn *Das Ev. des Joh.*, p. 103 has most convincingly shown that the latter must be intended by his

warrant, therefore, for placing δ λόγος on a line with the other two designations as a formal name of Christ.

The various positions taken in regard to these names may be classified as follows. First there is the extreme view of Zahn, who would restrict all three to the manifestation of Christ in the flesh.³ Zahn, of course, finds in John the doctrine of a real preëxistence of Christ, but in his view no denomination applies to the preëxistent one as such except the simple $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma$ of i. 1'. Next comes the view which after the same manner restricts "Son" and "Only-Begotten", but allows an exception for Logos regarding this at least as a name applicable to the preincarnate, if not the premundane, Christ. Among the advocates of this view may be named Lücke,⁴ Luthard,⁵ Weiss,⁶ Beyschlag,⁷ and Harnack.⁸ One step farther go those who

explaination of the peculiar construction $\pi\epsilon\acute{\rho}\iota\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \zeta\omega\eta\varsigma$. He observes that by writing $\tau\omicron\upsilon\ \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\upsilon\ \tau\eta\varsigma\ \zeta\omega\eta\varsigma\ \dots\ \delta\pi\alpha\gamma\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\omicron\mu\epsilon\upsilon\iota$ the author would have left open the abstract interpretation: "we declare the message of life". In order to preclude this and to convey unambiguously what he had in mind from the beginning, viz., that the personal Logos is the object of the $\delta\pi\alpha\gamma\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\lambda\lambda\epsilon\iota\upsilon$, he, by manner of afterthought, changes the construction and inserts the $\pi\epsilon\acute{\rho}\iota$. When the message is "concerning the Word", then "the Word" is personal. That even the neuter pronoun δ in verse 1 has such a personal reference follows from $\epsilon\omega\rho\acute{\alpha}\kappa\alpha\mu\epsilon\upsilon$, for an abstract message cannot be seen. In verse 2 $\eta\ \zeta\omega\eta$ is also a personal designation of the Saviour, because of $\eta\gamma\ \pi\rho\acute{o}\varsigma\ \tau\omicron\upsilon\ \pi\alpha\tau\acute{\epsilon}\rho\alpha\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \epsilon\phi\alpha\upsilon\epsilon\rho\acute{\omega}\theta\eta$, and because it also is the object of "seeing". This comes nearer to the peculiar use of δ λόγος in the Prologue than anything in the Gospel.

³ *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 82, 97 ff. Nevertheless Zahn affirms p. 464 that according to x. 36 the sonship involves the $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\varsigma\ \epsilon\iota\upsilon\alpha\iota$. This would seem to carry the sonship back into the $\theta\epsilon\acute{o}\tau\eta\varsigma$. In restricting all these names to the incarnate Christ Zahn has a precursor in von Hofmann, *Schriftbeweis*² I, pp. 118 ff.

⁴ *Commentar*³ I, pp. 344, 362.

⁵ *Das Joh. Ev.* I, pp. 298 ff.

⁶ *Lehrbuch*³ par. 143, 145.

⁷ *N. T. Theol.* II, pp. 422, 425.

⁸ *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, pp. 189-231.

With this group may be classified Spitta, *Das Johannes-Evangelium* (1910), who recognizes the cosmical and even pretemporal reference of the Logos-name, but assigns i. 1-5 and i. 14 (in part) to the "Bearbeiter", to whose account is also put in the sequel of the gospel

assign "Only-Begotten", together with Logos to the pre-mundane and preincarnate Christ, but place the simple "Son" this side of the incarnation. This is given as the view of Biedermann and Schanz.⁹ Formally resembling it, but with a different distribution of the names, is the view of Belser, who, like Zahn, makes Logos a designation of the incarnate Christ, but speaks of "the eternal only-born Son of God in his historical appearance", making both the other titles refer to the Saviour in his pretemporal existence.¹⁰ Finally there are those who make the simple "Son" follow Logos and Monogenes into the class of names descriptive of the preëxistent, eternal Christ.¹¹ Among the numerous representatives of this group may be named Godet,¹²

everything in connection with the other names that couples these with the idea of preëxistence, pp. 36-53.

⁹ By Holtzmann, *Lehrb. der N. T. Theol.* II, p. 437, note 1 (omitted in the 2d ed.). This, however, seems to rest rather on an inference than on the direct affirmation of these writers. Cpr. Biedermann, *Chr. Dogm.* II, 115-120; Schanz, *Commentar*, pp. 98-99.

At first sight it would seem inevitable that all who read in i. 18 *μονογενὴς θεός* should connect the name Monogenes with the eternal, divine life of Christ. But the example of Harnack and Zahn, who both strongly advocate this reading, shows that this does not follow. *Μονογενής* and *θεός* are not by Zahn attributively combined, so that the former would qualify Christ in his deity, but are understood as describing the one subject in two aspects, on the one hand as Only-Begotten (through the incarnation), on the other hand as divine. Harnack does not even consider the deity as something ontologically carried back into the preëxistent state, but as resting on an ethico-religious basis. The sharp theological antithesis, God or man, is in his view foreign to the Evangelist.

We know of no representative of the alternative view, the association of Monogenes with the incarnation and the carrying back of the generic sonship into the eternal life of Christ. This position is quite possible in itself and quite defensible from an exegetical point of view.

¹⁰ *Theologische Quartalschrift*, 1903, pp. 483-519. Differently in his *Einleitung* (1905) p. 285 "Der Logos ist eine Person . . . und selber Gott, und als solcher ist er Schöpfer und Erhalter der Welt".

¹¹ The title "Son of Man" might have been added to the other three, since it begins more and more to be recognized as in John's Gospel significantly associated with the glory either of the preëxistent or of the postexistent state.

¹² *Commentaire*,² II, p. 79.

Meyer,¹³ Keil,¹⁴ Köstlin,¹⁵ Hilgenfeld,¹⁶ Scholten,¹⁷ Immer,¹⁸ Thoma,¹⁹ Pfleiderer,²⁰ Lipsius,²¹ Oscar Holtzmann.²² It is moreover the view which has behind it the weight of authority of the orthodox church-tradition from the time of Origen onward.²³

A glance at these several views and at the distribution of the prominent names connected with them suggests the following significant fact. The traditional exegesis of the orthodox church in tracing back these distinctive names of Christ to the state of preëxistence receives support from the foremost representatives of the extreme critical school, which in its estimate of the date, the provenience and the historical truthfulness of the Gospel stands at the farthest remove from the conservative and apologetic position in regard to such matters. And on the other hand the great modern apologetes of the Gospel who have done so much to vindicate the orthodox view of the church in regard to its Apostolic origin and trustworthiness show not seldom a tendency to part company with the church-exegesis so far as the titles under review are concerned, assigning one or two or even all three of them to the incarnate Christ and insisting in the same measure upon their non-applicability to the immanent Godhead, the opposite of which the orthodox theology has always emphatically maintained, its in-

¹³ *Gospel of John*, p. 64.

¹⁴ *Commentar*, p. 110.

¹⁵ *Lehrbegriff*, pp. 89, ff. 96, pp. 149 ff.

¹⁶ *Die Evangel.*, p. 332.

¹⁷ *Het. Ev. naar Joh.*, pp. 82 ff.

¹⁸ *Theol. d. N. T.*, p. 509.

¹⁹ *Die Genesis des Joh. Ev.*, pp. 184 ff.

²⁰ *Urchr.*² II, pp. 463 ff.

²¹ *Dogm.*³ pp. 465 ff.

²² *Das Joh. Ev.*, p. 82.

²³ In the above classification the view which makes the subject of the Prologue first attain to personal existence through the incarnation has been left out of account. According to this view that which previously existed in God unhyposstatically was already as such the Logos of God. The view, therefore, would fall under the second rubric. Cpr. Lücke, *Commentar*,³ I, p. 361; Holtzmann-Bauer, *Hand-Comm.*³ IV, 1, p. 54.

terest lying in the defense of the deity of Christ which seems so obviously bound up with the pretemporal reference of these names. The phenomenon here noted is not, of course, an isolated one; it furnishes but one striking instance of the curious alignment which in exegetical and biblico-theological matters tends to group together conservative scholars with their extreme critical antipodes and to force apart the same conservative scholars from such as are their natural allies in the great critical debate. A high exegesis is joined to a low critical view of the Gospel, and a high critical estimate of the Gospel in the case of the apologetes is accompanied by a low exegesis. But mystifying as this alignment at first sight may be, it is quite capable of rational explanation. The negative critical school, especially in its older Tübingen form, contended that the Gospel is essentially a philosophico-theological document, that it contains speculation and not, in the main, history, and that in this speculative complexion the teaching of Jesus which it pretends to record is radically distinct from and irreconcilable with the kind of teaching preserved in the Synoptics. It is therefore natural for this school of critics to find not only a solid substance of doctrine in the Gospel, but also to consider the doctrine found of the highest speculative type. Now this inevitably brings their exegetical conclusions into close touch with the church-theology, for the church has always found in the Fourth Gospel the main source for its teaching on the deep things of the Godhead. On the other hand it is but human in the apologetes of the historical character of the Gospel to endeavor to approximate its doctrinal content as much as possible to the current conception of the Synoptical teaching of Jesus, for the simple reason that thus one of the chief obstacles to its historicity can be removed. Thus it comes about that a certain predilection not only for an un-speculative, but even for an untheological and undoctinal interpretation of the statements of the Gospel can be observed in apologetic circles. The tendency becomes doubly

strong where it receives reinforcement from the widely-prevailing Ritschlian antipathy to everything that savors of the speculative and metaphysical in Christian teaching. Harnack's exegesis of the Gospel with its sharp distinction between the speculatively colored Prologue and the absolutely undoctinal body of the Gospel and its refusal to recognize the Prologue as in any sense a programme for the Gospel-teaching, making it a mere accommodation to the standpoint of the readers, clearly reveals the influence of this latter motive. But the tendency as such is not dependent on this secondary influence for its existence. It is plainly perceptible in cases where every suspicion of Ritschlian sympathies is excluded, e.g., in the case of so orthodox a writer as Zahn. For such as still set store by the great theological doctrines for which the Fourth Gospel preëminently has furnished the basis, and therefore continue to attach not merely an historical, but also a specifically theological value to its teaching, the tendency spoken of may easily seem fraught with the danger of depriving whatever success has attended the apologetic efforts on behalf of the historicity of the Gospel of much of its value. One may be inclined to feel that the historical character of the document has been saved at the expense of its theological importance. We are encouraged to maintain or regain our confidence in the actual provenience of this body of teaching from the lips of Jesus, but somehow in the apologetic process which has restored our confidence the former richness and pregnancy and distinctiveness of the teaching seem to have been lost to such an extent, that we are no longer able to reap from it any appreciable addition to our store of knowledge obtained from the Synoptical sources.

As already stated, among the doctrines thus affected the Christological truths which have always been considered characteristic of our Lord's Johannine teaching stand out prominently. Among these again the Logos-doctrine occupies an important place. It is a matter of considerable

moment, theologically speaking, whether Christ bears this name in connection with his appearance in the flesh and his soteriological activity, or whether it belongs to Him in virtue of what He is and does apart from and antecedently to his work as incarnate Saviour of the world. In attempting to register the theological consequences of the adoption of the former view, we naturally think first of the doctrine of the Trinity, specifically of the relation within the Godhead between the Father and the Son. The name Logos has long since been understood as intended to throw light on this trinitarian mystery. The point of comparison is given a psychological turn and the thought results that as the logos stands related to the person who produces it, so the Son stands related to the Father. In other words the idea of the eternal generation of the Son by the Father is found expressed in the Logos-name. The name characterizes this generation as an intellectual process.²⁴ The ontological interpretation of the Logos-name either in this specialized or in a more general form is not confined to the older and oldest exponents of the church-theology; it still finds advocates among modern exegetes both of the orthodox and of the liberal school, although, owing to the fact that the question is seldom raised in a sufficiently pointed and explicit form, it proves difficult to ascertain the opinion of most writers in regard to it.²⁵

²⁴ The idea reaches back into the patristic theologizing. Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland*, *Freib. Theol. Stud.*, 1910, II, p. 3, refers for the patristic evidence to Petavius, *De Trinitate*, II, 11, VI, 5 ff. and quotes the definition of Aquinas from the *Summa Theol.* I, 34: Verbum proprie dictum in divinis personaliter accipitur et est proprium nomen personae Filii; significat enim quandem emanationem intellectus . . . huiusmodi processio dicitur generatio. Cpr. also Schanz, *Commentar*, pp. 70, 71.

²⁵ Of conservatives we may mention Lasson, *Das ewige Wort*, p. 5; Simon, *Der Logos*, p. 5; Westcott, *the Gospel according to St. John*, p. 3 "the word Logos includes the conception of the immanent Word"; "the economic Trinity, the Trinity of revelation is shown to answer to an essential Trinity"; Lütgert, *Beiträge zur Förderung Christl. Theol.*, 1899, p. 125: "nicht um der Welt willen hat Gott einen Logos, sondern er ist in Ihm selbst, in seinem eigenen geistartigen Wesen, das sich nur in 's Wort zu fassen vermag begründet." Lütgert takes

The problem is a complicated one and for successful treatment needs sharp separation of the various elements that enter into it. The following questions should be kept distinct: 1) Does the Evangelist make ontological or purely functional statements concerning the Person whom he calls the Logos? 2) If ontological statements are made, do they concern the specific point of the provenience of the Logos from God? 3) Are the ontological statements associated with the inherent meaning of the name Logos? 4) Is there reason to believe, apart from the direct statements of the

the peculiar view that the representation of Christ as Logos stands in the service of the spiritualizing tendency of the Gospel, that it lies on the line of the contrast between word and miracle. The majority of the Catholic exegetes and dogmaticians adhere to the old tradition. So Scheeben, *Handb. der kath. Dogmatik* I, p. 843; Pohle, *Lehrbuch der Dogmatik*, I^a, p. 324; Krebs, *Freib. Theol. Stud.*, 1910, II, pp. 3 ff.; an exception among the Catholics is Belser, *Theol. Quartalschrift*, 1903, pp. 483-519, who explains the Logos-name from the work of the incarnate Christ; differently in *Einleitung*³ p. 285, where the creation and preservation of the world are associated with the name. Belser does not deny the eternal generation; the difference between him and the other Catholics is that he does not find it in the Logos-title as such. Among liberal Protestant writers of recent date the following with varying clearness incline towards considering Logos a name of being and origin as well as of function: Weizsäcker, *Das apost. Zeitalter*,³ p. 552 "im Sinn der wesentlichen Einheit mit Gott"; Holtzmann, *Lehrb. d. Neutest. Theol.* II¹, p. 392, through the Logos "rundet sich der Begriff Gottes in sich selbst ab"; Grill, *Untersuchungen über die Entsteh. des vierten Evang.* I, pp. 167, 169, 175 ff., "Er ist Logos, ist Wort in höherem Sinn, schon vor Entstehung der Welt, schon ehe er in der Welt und zu der Welt geredet hat: schon ehe Gott durch Schöpfung und Offenbarung so geredet hat, dass ein kreatürliches Gottesbewusstsein entstand, hat er ausserzeitlich und seinem eigensten Wesen entsprechend, sich bei sich selbst ausgesprochen, ist er im Logos κατ' ἐξ. sich selbst gegenständlich geworden".

On the other hand Pfeiderer, *Urchristenthum*³, II, 463, thinks that the Evangelist consciously avoided all speculation as to the origin of the Logos: "er gibt keine nähere Begründung dafür, dass oder warum es einen Logos gebe, sucht ihn auch nicht irgendwie aus dem göttlichen Wesen abzuleiten—er scheut die gefährlichen Spuren gnostischer Emanationen und Theogonien." Spitta, *Das Johannes-Ev.* pp. 50, 51, conjectures that the designation of Jesus as Logos had its origin in the superscription of the Gospel as ἀρχὴ τοῦ λόγου I. X. (Cpr. Mk. i. 1); this invited the "Bearbeiter" to preface the "Grundschrift", which contained the account of the life of Jesus, with a dogmatic introduc-

Prologue, that the writer can have attached to the Logos-name an ontological and specifically an ontogenetic significance?

The first question is the easiest to answer. That verses 1 and 2 are meant as ontological statements descriptive of the premundane relation of the Logos to God, is admitted on well-nigh every hand. The three points emphasized are the eternity, the personal God-wardness and the deity of the Logos. It is true, these three great affirmations are not made for the purely theological purpose of explaining the inner mode of the divine existence. What they predicate about the Logos is introduced because of its bearing on the functions afterwards ascribed to Him. To show the qualification of the Logos for these functions it was of supreme importance to answer the three questions: 1) When was the Logos? 2) Where was the Logos? 3) What was the Logos? Although, therefore, the writer's mind is even in these two verses already fixed upon the significance of the Logos for the world, none the less what he affirms concerns the God-ward aspect of the life of the Logos, it is ontological and not functional in its essence: it recurs to explain the function upon the mode of being. It implies that there is more to the Logos than is involved in His functional relation to the world. To put it sharply: before the world was not merely were these three things true of the Logos; they were true of Him altogether irrespective of the actual or

tion "welche auf den geheimnisvollen göttlichen Ursprung Christi zurückgreift. Damit sinkt die gepriesene Spekulation . . . allerdings sehr von ihrer Höhe herab, und das Geheimnis des mystischen Eingangs wird sehr schlicht, wenn es zu seiner Keimzelle eine prosaische Buchüberschrift hat." According to Wellhausen, *Das Ev. Joh.*, p. 123, the Johannine Logos has nothing Philonic about him: "er ist das befehlende und offenbarende Wort Gottes. Man braucht den jüdisch-biblischen Ideenkreis nicht zu verlassen um zu sehen woher er stammt; die Meinung dass den Juden solche Hypostasierungen fern lagen trifft nicht zu." As to the exegesis of i. 3, 4 Wellhausen is frankly pessimistic: "Wer i. 3, 4 verstehen muss, ist nicht zu beneiden". Schwartz (*Aporien im vierten Ev.*, Nachr. v. d. Königl. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Gött. 1907-1908, p. 548) regards the Greek element even in Philo a mere superficial varnish and recognizes only the meaning "Word".

possible existence of the world, would have been true if no world had come into being. It is not permissible to eliminate the ontological element from verses 1 and 2 by carrying into them the Philonic idea of the Logos as a world-plan or a world-potency. In that case the whole distinction between the ontological and the functional would be obliterated; to say that the Logos as world-plan or world-potency was in the beginning, and was with God, would only affirm the eternity and the eternal presence with God of the world in these two respects; it would not give the Logos ontological significance apart from the world. But this understanding of the words, while it might apply to the first of the three affirmations ("in the beginning was the Logos"), can scarcely apply to the second ("the Logos *ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν*, the Logos was in active intercourse with and in perfect communion with God" Westcott), since it is difficult to conceive of a personal, eternal, God-related being with no other *raison d'être* than the mediation of the origin and organization of the world. And most certainly such an understanding of the words is excluded by the third affirmation (*θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*). To limit the being of the Logos to his significance for the world, and yet to make this Logos partake of the divine nature, would mean to pass the line that separates theism from pantheism and to carry the principium of the world as an eternal reality back into the immanent life of God.

Since the third question concerns equally the general ontological problem just touched upon and the specific problem of ontological provenience, we must immediately raise it at this point with reference to the conclusion reached, even before we attempt to answer the second question. Is there any association between the inherent meaning of the Logos-name and the facts affirmed about the intra-divine existence of the Logos? Is there anything in the Logos-conception as such that will explain His being in the beginning, his being *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* and his being divine? Here, of course, we are face to face with the ques-

tion, whether Logos means to the Evangelist "reason" or "word" (either in the sense of τὸ λέγειν, the act, or in that of τὸ λεγόμενον the product). The preponderance of opinion seems to incline towards the latter interpretation.²⁶ It is, however, hardly necessary to press for a decision on this point at the present stage of our enquiry. At first sight, to be sure, it might seem as if the interpretation "reason" offered a better, or perhaps the only, possibility for an association of the Logos-concept with the immanent ontological life of the Godhead. "Reason" is a psychological term which calls up to the mind the inner structure of our spiritual being. "Word", on the other hand, almost inevitably suggests the presence of an outside reality to which the word is addressed. The impression thus created is frequently strengthened by applying to our problem the old philosophical distinction between the λόγος ἐνδιάθετος and the λόγος προφορικός, the former designating the process of thought on its inward side as "reason", the latter the same in its utterance ad extra as "speech".²⁷ Decisive neither of these two considerations can be called. It is not impossible to view the process or product of speaking on its internal, mental side as an integral process of the personal life and on this principle to utilize the Logos-title for a trinitarian construction. And on the other hand it is equally possible to conceive of "reason" as a function or process turned outward having a cosmical object to operate

²⁶ The arguments are stated with great clearness and skill by Zahn, *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 103-107.

²⁷ The distinction is of Stoic origin. By the Stoics it was employed in an anthropological sense, not with reference to the universal logos. It is frequently asserted that Philo carries the distinction into the Logos of God. Aall, *Gesch. der Logos-Idee in der Griech. Phil.* I, p. 197 denies this. The fact is that in the one passage where Philo introduces the distinction (*Vit. Mos.*, III, 13, II, 154 Mangey) he does not explicitly apply it to the divine Logos, but only to that in man. After distinguishing between the Logos περὶ τῶν ἀσωμάτων and the Logos περὶ τῶν ὁρατῶν, he adds: ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ δὲ ὁ μὲν ἐστὶν ἐνδιάθετος ὁ δὲ προφορικός. The idea therefore is applied to the divine Logos by way of illustration, not as adequate terminology. Cpr. Grill, *Unters. üb. d. Entsteh. des viert. Ev.* I, pp. 146-147.

upon, so that a reference to the created world would, even on this rendering, fully satisfy the terms of the comparison and render the application to the purely immanent life of God unnecessary. How possible the latter is may be seen from Philo. On the whole Philo's Logos means "reason". And yet Philo in the development of his Logos-doctrine pursues a purely cosmical interest. The internal life of God lies for him beyond the reach of all human knowledge; the conception of the Logos as the reason in God does not detract in the least from his uniform and consistent application of the idea *ad extra*. It should be remembered in this connection that ὁ λόγος even in unphilosophical language can be the objective reason in things, their intelligible aspect, and not merely the faculty of reasoning in the subjective sense.²⁸ Thus it will be also seen, that the conception of the Logos as ἐνδιάθετος does not carry with it the true immanence of the same in the ontological sense. Philo's λόγος ἐνδιάθετος as applied to God is not the faculty of reasoning in God, nor even the process of reasoning in God, but the ideal product of the divine reasoning, the κόσμος νοητός, which stands related to the λόγος προφορικός as the plan of a building to its execution. The λόγος ἐνδιάθετος is no less than the other the λόγος θεοῦ ἤδη κοσμοποιούντος.²⁹ The ontological immanence of the church-theology lies along deeper lines than this whole distinction.

Is there anything to indicate that the writer apprehended the statements in verse 1 in terms of the Logos-concept? With reference to the first statement this would seem excluded from the nature of the case, for eternity cannot be expressed in terms of the Logos as such. But in regard to the other two statements it is quite conceivable. The author might mean to affirm that as the logos is most closely identified with the person whose logos it is, so the Person of Christ in his premundane life is as closely identified with God. It is true the preposition πρὸς c. Acc. would not be the most natural form of expression for such a

²⁸ Cpr. Lücke, *Commentar über das Ev. des Joh.*, I, p. 251.

²⁹ *Opif. Mundi* 6, I, 7 (Cohn and Wendland).

thought; some other construction, like *παρά* with the Dative, would appear better suited for the purpose. Still this objection has little weight in view of the fact, that in the present case what is compared from the point of its close identification with God, is a person, and the writer could reckon with this personal element by the use of *πρός* c. Acc. instead of *παρά* c. Dat., the identification of person with person not being a mere matter of fact but a matter of purposeful direction. We shall have to say, therefore, that there is nothing strained in this interpretation: both the *πρός θεὸν εἶναι* and the *θεὸν εἶναι* admit of being conceived as implications of the logos-figure. Christ's eternal communion with God and his participation in the *θεότης* can properly be compared to the closeness of in-being of reason or speech with regard to the reasoning or speaking person.³⁰ It will further be noticed that this interpretation of the Evangelist's statements easily adapts itself to the obvious purpose which, as above stated, these statements are by the context shown to subserve. If the "being-towards-God" and the "being-God" furnish the basis for the creative and revealing function of Christ, for his Logos-activity towards the world, and if this "being-towards-God" and "being-God" are in themselves a sort of Logos-existence, then the thought results that Logos-function is grounded in Logos-nature. That the Son can be described as Logos immanently with reference to God explains how he can act in the capacity of Logos with reference to the world. Though a twofold turn is given to the figure there is a point in which the two comparisons meet: He who has the closest logos-like union with God can bring the fullest and clearest logos-like revelation of God.

While this is an exegetical possibility, and there is nothing to contraindicate it, we shall have to admit that just

³⁰ The Logos-figure so understood is a spiritual analogon to the corporeally expressed figure of i. 18 ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς, with the same peculiar construction to express the combination of rest in with direction towards. Cpr. also the comparison in 1 Cor. ii. 11.

as little is there anything in the text that positively requires it. The mere fact that the writer uses Logos as the subject of the affirmations made can scarcely be regarded as doing this. At first glance, it is true, the reader will be inclined to think, if the Logos was in the beginning, was towards God and was God, then he must have been these three things in his capacity of Logos, and thus will conclude that the Logos-name has before all else an immanent Godward reference. A moment's reflection, however, will show that such a conclusion is premature. We must here reckon with the possibility referred to in our introductory remarks, that the writer may have used the Logos-name in verses 1 and 2 by way of anticipation, so that the three great affirmations made would be predicates of the subject of the sentence but not of Him in His Logos-capacity. In order to establish the possibility of this latter view it is, of course, necessary to show, that in the given context there would be a plausible reason to introduce such an anticipation. As a matter of fact it is easy to point out such a reason. As already observed the author makes the three statements for the specific purpose of laying a basis in the eternal intra-divine life of Christ for his creative and revealing activity in time, i.e., for his subsequent Logos-function. In order to make us feel that what he affirms has this bearing upon the Logos-function, he might very appropriately name the subject of the affirmations *ὁ Λόγος* without thereby implying that He had these attributes in virtue of an immanent Logos-character in an ontological sense. To put it in simple paraphrase the peculiar form of statement may easily to his mind have had this meaning: He who was to function as the Logos was in the beginning, was towards God, was God.

We may now turn to the second of the four questions above formulated and enquire whether in our verses there is any ontological statement that concerns the specific point of the provenience of the Logos from God. It was noted above that the ontological interpretation of the words in

question has been most frequently given this specific turn. The Logos-figure implied in the name is regarded as involving two distinct elements, that of causality in general and that of intellectual causality in particular. It is a figure descriptive of the eternal generation of the Son by the Father *per modum intellectus*. So far as the opening two verses of the Prologue are concerned it is plain that no *explicit* warrant for this dogmatic construction is contained therein. The three great deliverances all presuppose the existence of the Logos as a given fact and in themselves enunciate nothing about His provenience. He was in the beginning, was towards God and was God—this they affirm but not how He came into being or came to be this. It would have been easy for the author, had the making of a statement about the provenience of the eternal Christ lain in his plan, to do this by employing in the second sentence the preposition *ἐκ* instead of *πρὸς*. In not availing himself of this opportunity he clearly shows that for the practical purpose in hand (the grounding of the revealing function of the Logos in His relation to God) not the origin of the Logos but His mode of existence was regarded by him of prime importance. And yet we should be scarcely warranted in saying, that this fact absolutely precludes us from finding any reflection upon the provenience of the Logos here or from crediting it to the writer in general. What is not explicitly affirmed in the three statements as such, might possibly be implied in the subject of the affirmations, that is in the Logos-name itself. On the supposition that the *tertium comparationis* in this name lies in the point of causation, Logos would be equivalent to "one who is engendered of God as the word or reason are produced by the speaker or thinker". If such an understanding of the term was current in the circle of the writer and the readers, the word Logos itself, without further unfolding, would be able to convey it in all its pregnancy of meaning. Paraphrased the statement would read: "The God-engendered One (= Logos) was in the beginning, and

the God-engendered One was towards God, and the God-engendered One was God". In the thought that provenience determines mode of existence there is, of course, nothing unusual. Even the Prologue itself offers material for its illustration. In both verse 14 and verse 18 the idea finds expression that Christ in virtue of his sonship carries the fulness of grace and truth in Himself and so can bring the supreme revelation of God. And in verse 18 this even assumes a form strikingly analogous to the thought discovered in verse 1 on the view under discussion. Here the *μονογενής*-relation to God and the being *εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς* are joined together, after precisely the same fashion as in verse 1 the *λόγος*-relation to God and the being *πρὸς τὸν θεόν* are joined. The only difference between these two cases is that *μονογενής* by its very form suggests the idea of provenience, whereas in *λόγος* this idea would be clothed in a more recondite figure, which for its understanding would require the help of current association. But this difference does not touch the main analogy consisting in this, that the being-with-God is significantly joined to the being-from-God.³¹

³¹ In the above statement it is assumed that *μονογενής* is for John not simply equivalent to *μόνος* "unique" either in the literal or in the metaphorical sense of "dearly beloved". In three of the four instances of its occurrence in the Gospel it stands in a context which makes the idea of *γενᾶσθαι* from God prominent. The same is true of 1 Jno. iv. 9. Besides this in Jno. i. 14, the idea of endowment through derivation is plainly present. The words *δόξαν ὡς μονογενοῦς παρὰ πατρός* are not a mere comparison "a glory as great as an only-begotten son would have", but a statement of full correspondence between the idea of the glory pertaining to the *μονογενής*-relation and its reality in Christ, as Godet well formulates it: "une gloire comme doit être celle du Fils venant d'auprès du Père". The *παρὰ* is not to be construed with the *-γενής* in *μονογενής*, for it is not the proper preposition for this; it belongs either to the implied idea of "receiving" (so Zahn) or to the implied idea of "coming" (so Godet) from the Father. The Evangelist measures the fulness of the glory of Christ by a twofold standard: 1) it is the glory of a *μονογενής*; 2) it is a glory of one who was endowed by or came from the Father, i.e. in his historic appearance. The coordination of these two standards appears more natural, if in *μονογενής* there is felt the same idea of the

The assumption that the Logos-name is used in the opening sentences of the Prologue, not by way of anticipation, but with inherent ontological significance receives some support from the extraordinary emphasis placed upon it by its repetition in the second and third clauses. The question may be legitimately put whether a simple statement, "In the beginning was the word and was towards God and was God" would not have been more in keeping with the functional conception of the name and its purely proleptic employment here, than the strongly reiterative form of speaking adopted by the Evangelist. The sequel

Son's deriving his glory from the Father which is present in the *παρὰ πατρός*. The whole statement amounts to: such a glory as the Only-Begotten has in virtue of his begetting and in virtue of his endowment or commission from the Father. Whether the *γίγνεσθαι* implied in *μονογενής* relates to the eternal generation or to the virgin-birth is, of course, immaterial to the point of the argument, which concerns only the idea of determination of being through birth. As to Jno. iii. 16, 18, here the reference of the *μονογενής* to the preëxistent state of Christ is plain: God gave, sent his *μονογενής*; He therefore was the *μονογενής* antecedently to being sent: the very greatness of the sacrifice lay in the giving of Him as *μονογενής*. The idea of a being-begotten from God which occurs in the preceding context here relates to man, not to Christ. But it is at least a debatable question, whether the statement of verse 12 "If I told you earthly things and ye believe not, how shall ye believe if I tell you heavenly things", which has given exegetes so much trouble, does not allude to a higher, absolutely heavenly generation in comparison with which even the regeneration of believers may be called an earthly thing. Finally in Jno. 1, 18 (no matter whether *μονογενής θεός* or *ὁ μονογενής υἱός* be read, and whether in the former case *μονογενής* be construed with *θεός* or a supplied *υἱός*, or whether *μονογενής* be taken as a noun, *θεός* as the attribute), the qualification to declare God, to explain which *μονογενής* serves, is far better accounted for by "only-begotten" than by "only". The reference of the words *ὁ ὢν εἰς τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρὸς* to the divine life of the Saviour deserves the preference by far over Zahn's proposal to understand them of the glorified human Saviour, the present tense of *ὢν* being explained from the standpoint of the Evangelist: "who is now again in the bosom of the Father." The latter view succeeds only very artificially in making Christ's return to the Father a ground of his ability to declare the Father during his earthly life, for to that the Aorist *ἐξηγήσατο* refers. Zahn's explanation is, that the return to the bosom of the Father has set the seal of God's approval upon Christ's work and so assures us that He has adequately declared God while on earth.

of the Prologue suggests that rhetorical motives may have had something to do with the peculiar structure of the opening verses. But this peculiar structure is not entirely dependent on the repetition of the word Logos. It is difficult to dismiss the impression that, when the Evangelist takes pains to say that it was the Logos who was towards God, and who was God, and when in the next following sentence by means of *οὗτος* he again emphasizes that it is only the Logos of whom this can be predicated, there must have been some vital connection in his mind between the name employed and the great things affirmed.

The only other statement in the Prologue which would admit of a strictly ontological interpretation connected with the inherent meaning of the Logos-name is the first clause of verse 4 "In Him (i.e., in the Logos) was life". This considered in itself could be understood of the purely immanent life possessed by Christ before the world was, and it could be associated with his Logos-character, either on the general principle of identification with God or on the more special ground of derivation from God. In view, however, of the place given to the statement immediately after verse 3, descriptive of the Logos-activity in the creation of the world, it is preferable to understand the words in question not absolutely of Christ's own divine life, but of the life-giving potency that existed in Him with reference to the world, a view also favored by the immediately following clause: "and the life (that was in Him)²² was the light of men". We move here no longer in the sphere of ontology but of function.

Our enquiry so far has yielded only the result that the Gospel-statements were found to allow of and be adjustable to an ontological application of the Logos-idea on the writer's part. Positive exegetical indications absolutely compelling this view we were not able to discover. The result may seem meagre and unsatisfactory. Its negative character, however, should not be allowed overmuch weight

²² Notice the change from the simple *ζωή* to *ἡ ζωή* in the second clause.

as an argument against the view discussed and in favor of the purely functional interpretation. For it must be remembered that the restriction of the Logos-idea to the cosmical or soteriological significance of Christ is hardly in a better position. That Logos means the utterance of the creative power of God or his revelation concentrated in the Person of Christ, the Evangelist does not tell us in so many words either; we are left to infer it from the connections in which the term is introduced. In i. 14 the sense of "revelation" may seem implied in that the Logos become flesh is made the object of a beholding on the disciples' part, one who carried the pleroma of grace and truth in Himself, the counterpart of the Old Testament Shekhina as a self-manifestation of God. But absolutely certain that these things, plainly enough affirmed in themselves, are associated with the Logos-name we cannot be here any more than in verse 1. The same applies to 1 Jno. i. 1-3. It is here obvious again that the *Λόγος τῆς ζωῆς*, also called the *Ζωή*, comes in the character of a revelation, for He is the object of "hearing", "seeing", "handling", "declaring". All the same, that these things are by the author found expressed in the Logos-name is a matter of inference rather than of direct positive statement. In regard to "the life" which is said to have been manifested, no one draws the inference that the idea of manifestation is analytically contained in that of life. The third context where the Logos-names occur in the Johannine writings is Rev. xix. 11-16. Here Zahn argues for the restriction to a functional significance in the sphere of revelation, from the contrast between the name which no one knows but the Christ Himself, verse 12, and the name wherewith He has come to be designated (*κέκληται* perf. tense), viz. "the Logos of God". This contrast would seem to assign the Logos-name to the revealed, soteriological province of the Saviour's life and mark it as inapplicable to the esoteric, unknowable side of His existence within the Godhead, which can be apprehended by Himself alone. It seems to us doubtful whether the con-

trast between the unknowable and the knowable in Christ here signalized by the distinction of these two names, coincides with the contrast between the life of Christ as related to God and his function as related to redemption. No one claims that the Logos-name in its ontological application is exhaustively descriptive of what Christ is in Himself as God with God. Even so it is a name in which the divine mode of existence has been brought near to the level of our human capacity of apprehension. Given its full trinitarian profundity of meaning, it still is not the name "which no one knows but He Himself". This being so there is no reason to infer from the representation that the Logos-title can have nothing to do with the mysteries of the immanent life of the Godhead.³³

In view of the inferential character of the conclusions obtained from our reading of the Prologue itself, the question, whether parallel representations outside of the Prologue can throw any light on the possibility or probability of an ontological or ontogenetic use of the Logos-name, acquires additional interest. This is the fourth question above formulated and we now proceed briefly to look into it. It has begun to be recognized of late that at the time of the writing of our Gospel the Logos-name had a wider currency in philosophical and religious parlance than was previously supposed. The exclusive dependence of the Prologue on Philo is no longer advocated, even where a direct connection between his Logos-speculation and the Logos-doctrine of the Evangelist is insisted upon.³⁴ It is not the purpose of this paper to enquire into the extra-biblical emergence of the Logos-idea nor to discuss to what extent, if any, it may have exerted an influence upon the

³³ Krebs, *Freiburger theol. Stud.* 1910, II, p. 115 observes that at any rate the restriction of the Logos-name to the soteriological sphere, to the exclusion of all wider cosmical significance is contraindicated by the context of Rev. xix. 11-16. If the Logos is the creative power and wisdom of God, if the world is in virtue of this his own, then it becomes easily explainable, that He who is King of Kings and Lord of Lords should also be called the Logos of God.

³⁴ Cpr. Holtzmann-Bauer, *Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 50-58.

thought of the Prologue, either positively by contributing to it formative elements, or negatively by way of soliciting protest or correction from the Evangelist. The only point that at present concerns us is whether in these parallels, earlier or contemporary, the Logos-idea or related ideas are turned to ontological account or have a purely functional, cosmical reference.³⁵ In certain instances the presence of ontological speculation cannot be denied. The hypostatical beings of the Persian religion which occur in the Gathas and bear the name of Amesha Spentas were certainly known in the first century of our era, whatever may be thought of the controversy between scholars as to their much higher antiquity, and as to the chronological possibility or non-possibility of making them the prototype of the Jewish archangels, or of making one of their number, Spenta-Armaiti, the prototype of the Jewish Chokma-hypostasis.³⁶ Among these Amesha Spentas there is one who bears a remote resemblance to the Logos-conception, viz. Vohu-Manô "the good thought". While Vohu-Manô appears as the counsellor of Mazda in regard to the creation of the world, i.e., in a functional capacity, he is also represented as the Son of Mazda. Mazda is called "la matrice de Vohu-Manô"; he lives with Vohu-Manô "in one house".³⁷

In the Babylonian-Assyrian religion Marduk appears as the possessor and dispenser of wisdom, the coequal Son of Ea, the primordial wisdom. He figures also as the Creator of the world, but it is not clear that there is a close connection between his wisdom-character and his birth from Ea on the one hand, or between his wisdom-character and his creative function on the other hand. As a wisdom-God

³⁵ The following account of the extra-biblical parallels is in part dependent on Krebs, *Der Logos als Heiland im ersten Jahrhundert* (Freib. theol. Stud. 1910) I, *Logos-Spekulation und Erlösungslehre im Heidentum des ersten Jahrhunderts*, pp. 21-75.

³⁶ In favor of the later date of the Avesta, Darmesteter, *Le Zendavesta* (Musée Guimet XXI, XXII, XXIV), and lately Lagrange, *La religion des Perses* (Revue biblique internationale, 1904). In favor of the older date Bousset, *Religion des Judenthums*,² pp. 591 ff.; Mills, *Zoroaster Philo and Israel*; Carnoy, *Religion of the Avesta*.

³⁷ In Darmesteter's translation, Yasna 21, 8; 44, 9; 47, 3.

he is immanent in the world; the whole construction rests on the basis of a pantheistic naturalism, which obliterates all distinction between what applies to the Godhead in itself and what pertains to its relation to the world. The same must be remembered when in certain Assyrian-Babylonian hymns the Word of a God appears personified. And that much of these ideas of older date survived as a living religious reality in the first century of our era is not probable.³⁸

A much closer analogy is afforded by the ancient Egyptian religion. This religion has in its doctrine of the gods certain constantly recurring features, one of these being "that a god engenders his son, or, strictly speaking, his double, through his mouth, through speaking, and that the activity and manner of working of the gods in general are accomplished by means of that powerful word".³⁹ Pre-eminently this is predicated of the God Tauth or Tot. In a text from the Ptolemaic period this god is addressed as follows: "Tauth, thou hast cast forth Schu from thy mouth,—he proceeded from the tip of thy mouth—thy lips cast him forth"⁴⁰. But the idea is much older. In an inscription of the eighth century B.C. Tot himself is called "the tongue, the image of Atum". Of Atum it is said that "from every god's body and every god's mouth" he produces his own being. "All men, all cattle, all reptiles live, in virtue of his thinking and uttering whatever he wills." Tot is the mouth "which has pronounced the name of everything" (and so created it).⁴¹ Striking as, from a formal point of view, the resemblance is of this to the ontological version of the Johannine Logos-idea, the great

³⁸ Jastrow, *The Religion of Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 96, 243, 428 ff.; 548: "Marduk . . . is commonly designated as the son of Ea . . . the sun rising out of the ocean—the domain of Ea—was a factor in this association."

³⁹ Krebs, *op. cit.*, p. 30.

⁴⁰ Reitzenstein, *Zwei religionsgeschichtliche Fragen*, pp. 53, 83; cpr. also Brugsch, *Rel. der Ägypter*, pp. 427-429 and Wiedemann, *Die Rel. der alten Ägypter*, p. 73, both cited by Krebs, p. 122.

⁴¹ Krebs, *op. cit.*, p. 31.

material difference in two respects ought not to be overlooked. In the first place the substratum of this whole representation is pantheism; the producing of another god, which is equivalent to the production of self, and the production of the content of the world are not separated. And secondly from a generation *per modum intellectus* the process thus described is far removed. It is not idealistically but quite realistically conceived, as a veritable birth or ejection from the mouth, both the engendering and the engendered deity being materialistically conceived of.

This old Egyptian theology has of late been brought into the closest proximity to and connection with the Johannine Logos-teaching through its assumed combination with the cult of Hermes as Logos, first in Egypt, and then spreading from there over the Hellenistic world, about the beginning of the Christian era. Reitzenstein in his two works entitled "*Zwei religions-geschichtliche Fragen*" (1901) and "*Poimandres*" (1904) has endeavored to establish the dependence of the Prologue on the Hermetic literature in its older form.⁴² The Stoics made Hermes the "Word" of Zeus. This Stoic Logos coalesced in Egypt with the old Egyptian Tot as early as the time of Alexander the Great. Reitzenstein thinks it can be made probable that the peculiar forms which this syncretistic Logos-theology shows in the Hermetic corpus and in some later pieces were current much earlier than the date of these writings, in fact that already in the Ptolomaeic age a Hermetic religion with Hermetic writings existed in which these peculiar views were embodied. The statements coming under consideration for our present purpose are mainly the following. In the Poiman-

⁴² Cpr. also from the same author "*Hellenistische Theologie in Ägypten*" in Ilberg's *Neues Jahrbuch für klassisches Alterthum*, 1904 (a compact summary of his views) and *Die Hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen, ihre Grundgedanken und Wirkungen*, 1910. A thoroughgoing critique of Reitzenstein's theories is given by Krebs as an appendix to his study on *Der Logos als Heiland* in the *Freib. theol. Stud.* 1910, pp. 119-172. Cpr. also Zielinski, *Hermes und die Hermetik* in *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, 1905, pp. 321-372 and 1906, pp. 25-60; *Theol. Literaturz.* 1911, col. 20-24.

dres proper, the first of the eighteen pieces belonging to the collection passing under that same name, a theogony and cosmogony in one are described. The highest divine being is the Nous, the primordial light (identical with the Poimandres who gives the revelation). Out of the Nous the *ἅγιος Λόγος* proceeds, and subsequently the Nous, Demiourgos, still later the Anthropos *αὐτῷ ἴσος, ἴδιος τόκος*. All these three emanations engage in creative activity. Particularly the Logos on first coming forth from the Ur-light separates the elements of fire and air, but remains entangled in the as yet unseparated water and earth. Afterwards when the Demiourgos Nous has created the seven spirits of the spheres, the Logos leaps upward from the lower elements and unites himself with the Demiurge, the two henceforth forming a sort of Homousia. Here accordingly we have a Logos and a Nous, both sons of the Ur-light, flashed forth from the supreme Nous and remaining in a certain relation to him as well as entering upon a close relation to each other.⁴³ In another piece of the Hermetic collection, entitled the *Τέλειος Λόγος*, the Logos likewise appears as the Son of God, and at the same time as the supernatural being produced in man in the new birth, so that here the ontological and the soteriological conceptions are combined. In what Reitzenstein calls the "Strassburg Cosmogony", the following representation of the Supreme God occurs: "Having drawn off from himself a certain portion of his

⁴³ Reitzenstein thinks the peculiar situation in the Poimandres can only be explained from dependence on the old Ptah-theology of Memphis. In an inscription of the VIIIth Century B.C. Ptah is represented as the heart (= nous) and tongue (= logos) of the gods. At the same time Horos and Tot (who together = Ptah) are represented as the heart and tongue of Atum respectively. It ought to be observed, however, that others deny every connection of the Poimandres theogony with this ancient Egyptian speculation. So Zielinski, *Arch. f. Religionswiss.*, 1906, pp. 27-29. The representation in the Poimandres is held to be composite even after the elimination of the Neo-Platonic elements, which Reitzenstein himself recognizes, by Bousset, *Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1906, p. 697, and Dibelius, *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.*, 1905, pp. 178-183. If it is composite, the above combination loses much of its ontological significance.

manifold power (= Logos-Hermes) . . . he charged him to fashion the all-beautiful world".⁴⁴ In the same work Reitzenstein also discusses an Ave-Maria text preserved on an ostrakon of the VIth century.⁴⁵ In this text the words "thou shalt conceive" are lacking. He interprets this as implying that the conception has already taken place, viz. at that very moment through the Angel's speaking unto the Virgin. Reitzenstein ventures to regard this as the original version of the nativity-story, older than the present synoptical account, and brings it into connection with Gnostic texts in which it is the Logos-Gabriel who makes the annunciation to Mary.⁴⁶ This would furnish an instance of the Logos-ontology—brought into connection with the incarnation of Jesus, in the peculiar form of the Logos himself creating *per modum verbi* in the Virgin his own human nature, and uniting Himself with the same.⁴⁷

The value of these Hermetic speculations for throwing light upon the Prologue is greatly diminished by the fact that their pre-Johannine currency or even their cotemporane-

⁴⁴ So *Zwei religionsgesch. Fragen*, p. 53. Later on in the same piece Logos is the son of Hermes, p. 56.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 113-131.

⁴⁶ On this view, as Reitzenstein suggests, the Logos-doctrine of the Prologue would not so much be a different conception substituted for the original synoptical one, but a direct development out of the older synoptical version. Attention is called to the fact that as late writers as Ephraim Syr. and John of Damascus speak of Mary having conceived through the ear, Krebs, p. 154, note 6.

⁴⁷ Hence in a sermon by Pseudo-Athanasius appeal is made in refutation of the above error to the statement of Lk. i. 38 "And the angel departed from her"; if he departed this proves that he was not the Logos-Angel abiding in her united to his own human nature.

The conception of the Logos as producing his own human nature in the Virgin is already found in Justin Martyr, Apol. I, 33. Cpr. Cramer in *Zeitsch. f. Neut. Wiss.*, 1901, p. 314. Here, however, the Logos is not identified with the speaking angel, but only with the *δύναμις Ὑψίστου* of which the angel speaks, cpr. Veil, *Justins des Philosophen und Märtyrer's Rechtfertigung*, 1894, pp. 70, 71. Cramer qualifies the representation that the preëxistent Christ begat the historical Christ, a "*haarsträubende Vorstellung*" and seeks to eliminate it from Justin by excision. But there is nothing extraordinary in it from Justin's premises.

ousness with the origin of the Gospel cannot be established. Reitzenstein dates the Poimandres-corpus from the time of Diocletian. The correctness of this dating is disputed by others. But, apart from that, the grounds on which he believes that the substance of the Hermetic ideas, as embodied in a more primitive form of the first document (the Poimandres proper), can be carried back into the first century of the Christian era or earlier are very precarious. His main reliance is the alleged dependence of the fifth vision of the Shepherd of Hermas on the vision with which the Poimandres opens. Dibelius and Krebs have shown how weak this position is, and how easily the relation between the two documents may be reversed and the Poimandres made dependent on the Shepherd.⁴⁸ As to the "Strassburg cosmogony", the papyrus on which this is preserved is from the IVth century, the ostrakon containing the peculiar Ave-Maria text is of the VIth century after Christ. Reitzenstein's efforts to bridge over the gulf between this late date and the earlier period and to make plausible the existence of a Hermetic religion with Hermetic writings as early as the Ptolemaic age are exceedingly unconvincing. If the speculations in question are of later origin they fall in line with the Gnostic teachings of a similar nature, particularly the Valentinian gnosis, and lose all significance for the illustration of the meaning of the Prologue.

It should be observed that Reitzenstein himself does not put an ontological or ontogenetic interpretation upon the Logos-name as used by John. In his view the Johannine Logos is nothing but the divine word of revelation. The dependence of the Gospel, so far as the Logos-conception is concerned, on the Hermetic belief would thus be reduced to that popular aspect of the latter which makes Hermes the Logos, the Revealer. The emanation-mythology would

⁴⁸ Dibelius in *Zeitschr. f. Kirchengesch.* 1905, pp. 175 ff.; Krebs *op. cit.*, pp. 137-142. According to Granger, *Journal of Theolog. Studies*, 1904, the word Poimandres does not even mean "shepherd", but "witness", being taken from the Coptic, in which he assumes the treatise to have been originally composed.

not have cast its reflex in the Prologue. The other respects in which according to Reitzenstein the peculiar modes of thought and formulas of expression of the Hermetic mysticism have influenced the Fourth Gospel do not concern us here.⁴⁹

From Philo, whose Logos-doctrine has been so often made the proximate source of the Johannine conception, we can see how germane ontological and ontogenetic questions were to the idea. The use made of it by Philo was not in itself favorable to the raising of such problems. In fact every precise formulation and definite solution in connection with them threatened to interfere with the main use the Logos-conception subserved in the system of the Alexandrian philosopher. If none the less we find Philo raising these questions and framing an answer to them which at least preserves the semblance of an ontology of the Logos, this is convincing evidence that the idea could scarcely be thought without this. The Philonic Logos serves to effect that converse and interaction between God and the world which the transcendence of God renders it impossible for Him to maintain directly. But this requires from the outset a certain indefiniteness and ambiguity in the conception formed of his nature, provenience and position. If the Logos were made truly divine, the difficulty of bringing him into touch with the world would be quite as great as in the case of God. On the other hand, if he were sharply separated from the divine nature the same difficulty would arise at the other end, viz. as to how the Logos could be in close touch with God; by his own distinctness from God he would only accentuate the separateness between God and the creature. Hence the Logos oscillates between God and the world; he is *δεύτερος θεός, μεθόριος, μεθόριος φύσις*, is called God *ἐν καταχρήσει* only, is neither *ἀγέννητος ὡς θεός* nor *γέννητος ὡς ὑμεῖς*, but *ἀμφοτέροις ὀμνηρεύων*.⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Cpr. Krebs, *op. cit.*, under the heading *Poimandres und Johannes*, pp. 157-172.

⁵⁰ Eusebius, *Praep. Ev.* VII, 13; II, 625 Mangey; *Quis rer. div. her.*, 42; III, 47 Cohn-Wendland; *Somn.* I, 39; III, 253 CW; II, 28; III, 289 C W.

But the uncertainty in the point of nature carries with it the same kind of indefiniteness as regards personality, for the definite and positive conception of the Logos as hypostatical would have forced the issue between his subsumption under the divine or under the created.⁵¹ Here the Platonic and Stoic strands in Philo's philosophy came to the aid of his interest in upholding the transcendence of God consistently with God's operation in the world. By conceiving the Logos as the Platonic world of ideas, not, however, as something distinct from God, but as the image of the world objective to God in God's own mind, and at the same time conceiving of him after the Stoic fashion as efficient and operative in the world, a representation was found which, in semblance at least, satisfies the requirements of the problem. The Logos in this conception is God, something in God, and yet distinct from God, something ideally objective to the mind of God. To be sure the problem is only solved in appearance, not in reality, for in the question how the Platonic ideas, which to Philo form a part of God's life, can at the same time operate upon the world as the Stoic Logos, it reëmerges in all its former acuteness. It will be perceived from the above that the Philonic Logos is in his very essence unthinkable apart from the world, in fact is the world as ideally present to the mind of God.⁵² Even those names of the Logos which at first sight might seem to give him a degree of immanent significance for God, on closer examination appear to have as their necessary correlate his significance for the world, and to be understandable from this point of view only. The Logos is *πρωτόγονος, πρεσβύτερος, πρεσβύτατος υἱός*, but he bears

⁵¹ In favor of the personality Heinze, *Lehre vom Logos*, pp. 291-294. The question is unanswered and unanswerable according to Zeller, *Die Phil. der Griechen*, III, 2^a, p. 378; Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, III^a, p. 556; Reville, *La doctrine du Logos*, pp. 26, 29; against personality: Drummond, *Philo Judaeus*, II, 223-273; Grill, *Unters. üb. d. Entsteh. des vierten Ev.* I, pp. 139-144.

⁵² Here the fundamental difference between Philo's Logos and the Logos of John can be most clearly perceived. The former creates and can create because he is not-God, John's Logos creates and can create because He is God.

these names in his capacity of *κόσμος νοητός* with an implied side-reference to the *νεώτερος υἱός*, the visible world.⁵³ Now for the Logos thus conceived there was really no need of ontological or ontogenetic definition, since the conception itself defines his position with the Godhead. Notwithstanding this we find Philo not infrequently employing terms for the purpose of such definition, as if he felt that it would be unsatisfactory to speak of a Logos without seeking to define, after some fashion, his affiliation with and provenience from God. The Logos has for his father God, for his mother Wisdom.⁵⁴ The designation of him as *εἰκὼν θεοῦ* comes still nearer to the purpose, especially since it is coupled with the predicate *ὁ ἐγγυτάτῳ* "the one nearest to God", which has reminded some exegetes of Jno. i. 1 (*ὁ λόγος ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν*).⁵⁵ And here we have something inherently expressed by the Logos-name itself; he is *εἰκὼν* because Logos, for the point of the figure in *εἰκὼν* lies in the co-spirituality of the Logos with God, and this co-spirituality belongs to him because he is the objective content of God's reason (= Logos).⁵⁶ The same applies to the equation *σκιά θεοῦ ὁ λόγος*,⁵⁷ or when the Logos is described as *ἀνθήλιος αὐγή* in distinction from God the *ἥλιος*, or when God is called *ἡ τοῦ πρεσβυτάτου λόγου πηγὴ*.⁵⁸ In all these cases the figures are but so many

⁵³ *Somn.* 1, 37; III, 251 CW; *Conf. ling.* 14; II, 241 CW; 28; II, 257 CW; *Agric.* 12; II, 106 CW; *S. q. D. s. imm.* 6; II, 63 CW.

⁵⁴ *De prof.* 20; I, 562 M: *πατὴρ μὲν θεοῦ, ὃς καὶ τῶν συμπάντων ἐστὶ πατήρ, μητὴρ δὲ σοφίας, δι' ἧς τὰ ὅλα ἦλθεν εἰς γένεσιν*. Notice the side-reference to the world even here.

⁵⁵ *De prof.* 19; I, 561 M.

⁵⁶ Here again the fact should not be lost sight of that as *εἰκὼν* the Logos already postulates the world: *λόγος δὲ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεοῦ δι' οὗ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἐδημιουργεῖτο*. Nevertheless the idea of closeness to God is undoubtedly present; Cpr. Grill, *Unters.* I, p. 107 "Mit dem Wesen des Logos als des Geistigsten ist es hienach gegeben, dass er das Abbild Gottes und als solches Gott am nächsten stehend ist. In der Vorstellung des *εἰκὼν* liegt also wesentlich das Moment der Unmittelbarkeit des Verhältnisses zu Gott, der engsten Zusammengehörigkeit mit ihm."

⁵⁷ *Leg. alleg.* III, 31; I, 134 CW.

⁵⁸ *Qu. det. pot. ins.* 22; I, 277 CW.

variations of the Logos-figure: what they affirm of the being of the Logos with God or of his provenience from God could be affirmed by means of the Logos-idea as truly, if not so graphically. And in all these cases we have a sort of ontology of the Logos, though it is kept throughout related to the world and is of a psychological, not of a strictly metaphysical, nature, Philo being prevented from indulging in the latter by the terms of his system. That the idea of the Logos required some such definition of being and provenience can be even more clearly observed when Philo comes to speak of the impartation of the Logos to the world and to man. "Every man is as to his understanding inhabited by a divine Logos being thus an impress (*ἐκμαγείον*), a detached portion (*ἀπόσπασμα*) or an effulgence (*ἀπαύγασμα*) of the blessed nature of God".⁵⁹ The most realistic cosmogonic language is not shunned when the origin of the world from the demiurge as father and Episteme as mother is described in the following terms: *ἡ* (scil. *τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ*) *συνὸν ὁ θεὸς οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος ἔσπειρε γένεσιν, ἡ δὲ παραδεξαμένη τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ σπέρματα τελεσφόροις ᾠδίσι τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν υἱὸν ἀπεκύησε τόνδε τὸν κόσμον*.⁶⁰ Though this is said of the birth of the visible world, the terms employed (the mother = Episteme = Sophia, and the title "Son") mark it as the counterpart of the birth of the higher Logos in God.

From the foregoing it appears that there was that in the idea of the Logos which invited an ontological use of the conception. That Philo was unable to proceed beyond a mere psychological or metaphorical ontology was not due to the idea in itself, but to the peculiar nature and uncertain position of his Logos-subject. The situation would become quite different when a subject was given in regard to whose

⁵⁹ *De Opif. Mundi*, 51.

⁶⁰ *De ebriet.* 31; II, 176 CW. Reitzenstein (*Poimandres*, p. 41) finds in this the influence of Egyptian mythology. Cpr. also (*ibid.*) the Platonizing representation of Plutarch (*De Is. et Osir.* 53-54) clothed in the forms of the Egyptian myth of Osiris-Isis, Horos-Typhon. Here also there are two Logoi, Osiris = *κόσμος νοητός*, Horos = *κόσμος αἰσθητός*.

essential deity and true hypostatical character in the form of eternal divine sonship there existed no doubt. Such a subject was given in the Person of Jesus Christ. It is difficult to see how, once the Logos-concept was pressed into the service of the Christian doctrine concerning Christ as God, the inference could fail to be drawn for any length of time that the name was also adapted to express the mystery of the personal relation to and provenience of the Son from the Father. A presumption is thus created that the significant use of the Logos-name as a subject for ontological predicates in the opening sentences of the Prologue has already for its background a development in this direction in early Christian teaching. This is rendered all the more probable by the observation that in the case of analogous terms, which in Philo and Sap. Sol. had shared with the Logos-name and with Wisdom the cosmical reference, we can show how in the New Testament teaching their christological application is immediately accompanied by their enlistment in the service of ontology. Thus the term *εἰκὼν θεοῦ* occurs in Philo and in Sap. Sol. as a predicate of the Logos and of Wisdom. It expresses an inherent characteristic of both. Even so, however, it remains inseparable from the idea of the kosmos. Paul applies this term to Christ not merely in respect of his human nature in an eschatological sense (Rom. viii. 29; 1 Cor. xv. 49; 2 Cor. iii. 18) but also in respect of his deity in a trinitarian sense. Christ is *ὑπάρχων εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα θεοῦ* 1 Cor. xi. 7; 2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. i. 15, *ὃς ἐστὶν εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου¹, πρωτότοκος πάσης κτίσεως*. In this last passage the *πρωτότοκος* shows that the figure of the *εἰκὼν* has already connected with it in Paul's mind the idea of provenience; Christ is the *εἰκὼν* of the invisible God not merely in respect of similarity to God, but specifically in respect of similarity due to deriva-

¹ The point of the statement is not that the visible, incarnate Christ is the image of the invisible God, but that the divine Christ, precisely because He is invisible, spiritual Himself, reproduces God in this respect. It is as *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ* that He functioned in the creation of all things.

tion; the *εἰκών* not only resembles, it is drawn off from the prototype.⁶² Even more clearly the observation can be made in regard to Heb. i. 3. Here Christ is described as ἀπαύγασμα τῆς δόξης καὶ χαρακτήρ τῆς ὑποστάσεως (τοῦ θεοῦ). The words characterize Him not as the God-man, but as to his preëxistent deity, for they are brought into connection with his mediatorial activity in creating the world and in providence.⁶³ Both terms are found in Philo of the Logos, the former also in Sap. Sol. of "Wisdom";⁶⁴ they have here a cosmical reference: the soul is stamped with the seal of God, of which seal the eternal Logos is the *χαρακτήρ*; every man is inhabited by the divine Logos, being thus an ἀπαύγασμα of the nature of God; Wisdom is an effulgence from everlasting light. There is little doubt to our mind that the writer of Hebrews, while not excluding the cosmical use of the figures, means to have them understood in an ontological sense. He does not say that the son in creating carries the *δόξα* of God into the world, and stamps the world with the *χαρακτήρ* of God, but that in his own Person He is the ἀπαύγασμα and bears the *χαρακτήρ* of God. Ἀπαύγασμα is a passive form and therefore represents the Son not so much as an active instrument but rather as the passive product of the ἀπαυγάζειν. As to ὑπόστασις (here = "substance" not = "person"), this seems scarcely capable of being communicated to the world, while of the Son in Himself it can be appropriately said that the divine substance is expressed in Him.⁶⁵ We see no reason, therefore, for abandoning the ontological interpretation which has prevailed without dissent from the time

⁶² This on the supposition that *πρωτότοκος* is not a mere figure for precedence, but looks to the origin of Christ, in other words that the *-τοκος* has its own significance.

⁶³ Notice the particle *τε* in the following clause *φέρων τε τὰ πάντα*, which derives Christ's function in providence from his being the ἀπαύγασμα and *χαρακτήρ* of God.

⁶⁴ *De Opif. Mundi*, 51; I, 51 CW; *De Plantat. Noë*, 5; II, 137 CW; *Leg. alleg.* III, 96; I, 106 M; *Sap. Sol.* VII, 26.

⁶⁵ It will be observed that on the view above favored *χαρακτήρ* must be given the passive sense of *ὁ ἐστὶ κεχαραγμένον*. The other view requires the active sense of *ὁ χαράσσει*.

of the early Greek commentators, till a comparatively recent date.⁶⁶ If it is correct, we have in this passage a striking instance of the early ontogenetic use made of terms previously employed in cosmical relations. What happened to *εἰκών*, *ἀπαύγασμα* and *χαρακτήρ* may well have happened to *λόγος*.

A few words may be devoted to the hypostatical conception of "Wisdom" in its bearing on the problem in hand. There is difference of opinion among scholars as to the precise point where poetic personification passes over into hypostasizing. Those who fix a late date for the composition of Proverbs and Job and explain the peculiar form assumed by the idea of Wisdom in these writings from the influence of Persian religion or of Greek philosophy, will naturally incline towards finding a Wisdom-hypostasis even here, whilst the advocates of an earlier date as a rule favor the theory of mere personification.⁶⁷ Difference of opinion exists also in regard to Sirach, but that in Sapiientia Solomonis Wisdom appears as a fully-developed hypostatical being is generally recognized.⁶⁸ It is not necessary to enter into this question here. Although to the writers of Job and Proverbs, or even of Sirach, Wisdom might not have come to be more than a divine attribute personified, nevertheless when later the hypostatical character of this Wisdom became an object of belief and reflection, the descriptions given of it and the predicates joined to it in the earlier period, would inevitably, in the light of this new doctrinal apperception, acquire a new significance. What had been said about Wisdom as an attribute might already, it was felt,

⁶⁶ Of late the cosmical reference of the figures has been advocated by von Soden, in Holtzmann's *Handkommentar*², III, 2, p. 19. Bruce regards it as possible. *The Ep. to the Hebrews*, pp. 37 ff.

⁶⁷ Cpr. Friedländer, *Griechische Philosophie im Alten Testament*, 1904.

⁶⁸ Heinisch, *Die Griech. Philos. im Buche der Weisheit* denies that Wisdom is in Sap. Sol. a "Mittelwesen" as in Philo, i.e. that wisdom performs a function which God could not perform, but does not deny the hypostatical character of the conception (pp. 126-136 in *Alttest. Abh.* I).

have carried intimations about Wisdom as an hypostasis and in this view could be transferred from the one to the other. And in many cases the hypostatical interpretation would undoubtedly be read back as an *explicitum* into the earlier documents, where an exegesis guided by finer historical sense would say that at most it could be only hinted at and foreshadowed. Now it is of importance to observe, that in all the sources, canonical and extra-canonical, where this figure of Wisdom emerges certain significant statements concerning its origin and mode of existence with God are made.⁶⁹ These statements would, on the supposition of the personifying nature of the description, be only so many allegorical details in the general poetic picture. Like the whole picture, however, they would immediately become invested with a new and most profound significance, where the attribute had been recognized as veiling an hypostasis. Instead of being taken as mere poetic embellishments, they would be inevitably seized upon as pointing to important ontological and ontogenetic verities. In view of this it will be worth while to gather and compare the statements referred to. In Prov. viii. 22 ff. Wisdom speaks of herself: "Jehovah formed me (other rendering "possessed me") in the beginning of His way,⁷⁰ before His works of old. I was set up (or "formed" or "anointed") from everlasting, from the beginning, before the earth was . . . before the hills was I brought forth . . . when He established the heavens I was there . . . then I was with Him as a masterworkman (other rendering "as one brought up"⁷¹), and I was daily His delight, rejoicing always before Him, rejoicing in His

⁶⁹ An exception must be made for Baruch iii. 9—iv. 4 where in the picture of Wisdom nothing of this nature occurs.

⁷⁰ Frankenberg in Nowack's *Handkommentar*, reads "als Erstling seiner Schöpfung". But חַיָּה־יְהוָה seems to point to Gen. i. 1.

⁷¹ Frankenberg rejects "masterworkman" and renders "unter seiner Obhut" on the ground that חַיָּה־יְהוָה and חַיָּה־יְהוָה, as figures of child-like deportment, are inapplicable to the high creative function. But cpr. Wellhausen, *Das Ev. Joh.* p. 123 note 1. "Chokma, die in Prov. viii. dem Schöpfer die bunten Arten der Geschöpfe vorspielt ehe er sie schafft."

habitable earth, and my delight was with the sons of men." In Job. xxviii. after the contrast between human wisdom and the divine Wisdom has been pointed out in verses 1-11 and 12-22⁷² the poet continues to describe the presence of Wisdom with God at the time of creation in the following terms: "Then did He see it and declare it; He established it, yea, and searched it out" (verse 27). Sirach employs similar language. In i. 1-10 it is said of Wisdom: she "comes from the Lord and is with Him forever . . . the days of eternity who shall number? . . . and Wisdom who shall search out? . . . Wisdom has been created before all things, and the understanding of prudence from everlasting . . . the Lord sitting upon his throne: He created her, and saw and numbered her, and poured her out upon all His works." And in xxiv. Wisdom praises herself as follows: "I came forth from the mouth of the Most High . . . I dwelt in high places . . . and in every people and nation I got a possession . . . with all these I sought rest . . . then the Creator of all things . . . said, Let thy tabernacle be in Jacob and thine inheritance in Israel. He created me from the beginning before the world; and to the end I shall not fail. In the holy tabernacle I ministered before Him and so was I established in Zion" (vss. 1-10⁷³). Perhaps the most striking statements are found in Sap. Sol. vii. 22-27. Here Solomon is introduced speaking about Wisdom: "She

⁷² Merx, *Hiob* p. XLII thinks that in Job there is an implied protest against the idea of wisdom as worked out by Proverbs. The latter preaches in the public places, while in Job wisdom is represented as hidden from the eyes of all the living. But this overlooks the distinction between human and divine wisdom. The latter is a hidden wisdom in Proverbs also (viii. 22-33) cpr. Friedländer, *Griech. Phil. im Alt. Test.* p. 122.

⁷³ Friedländer would find in this definite location of Wisdom in Israel and Zion, implying its identification with the law, a particularistic and legalistic departure from the Wisdom-teaching of Proverbs. *Op. cit.*, p. 166. This is hardly just to Sir., for according to i. 9, 10 Wisdom is in his view, no less than that of Proverbs, poured out upon God's works and found with all flesh according to his gift. Even the context of xxiv. 8 ff. does not fail to state that Wisdom has gotten a possession in every people and nation.

that is the artificer of all things taught me . . . for there is in her (other reading: "she is") a spirit quick of understanding, holy, alone in kind (*monogenes*), manifold, subtle, freely moving, clear in utterance, unpolluted, distinct, unharmed, loving what is good, keen, unhindered, beneficent, loving toward man, steadfast, sure, free from care, all-powerful, all-surveying, and penetrating through all spirits . . . Wisdom is more mobile than any motion; yea she pervadeth and penetrateth all things by reason of her pureness. For she is a breath (*ἀτμός*) of the power of God, and a clear effluence (*ἀπόρροια*) of the glory of the Almighty . . . an effulgence (*ἀπαύγασμα*) from everlasting light, and an unspotted mirror of the working of God, and an image (*εἰκόν*) of His goodness. And she, being one, hath power to do all things; and remaining in herself, reneweth all things. And from generation to generation passing into holy souls she maketh men friends of God and prophets." And in viii. 3, 4: "She glorifieth her noble birth in that it is given her to live with God, and the sovereign Lord of all loved her, for she is initiated into the knowledge of God and she chooseth out for Him His works . . . an artificer of the things that are". According to ix. 4, 10 she sits by God on his throne.⁷⁴

It would be unreasonable to expect in this wisdom-literature the precise and carefully-guarded definitions and distinctions of the later church-theology. Certain things are said of Wisdom, which it might be difficult to incorporate into the scientifically formulated doctrine of the deity of Christ and the Trinity. Instead of wondering at this we ought rather to be surprised at the extent to which on the whole the wisdom-conception fits into the subsequent revelation concerning the Person of our Lord and His place within the Godhead. To be particularly noticed, however, for our present purpose is the fact that this rich elaboration

⁷⁴ In Enoch xlii. 1, 2 Wisdom also is hypostatically conceived: not finding place among mankind, she returns to her place and takes her abode among the angels. According to 2 Enoch xxx. 8 God commanded Wisdom to create man.

which the idea of Wisdom had received at the hand of Old Testament revelation and Jewish theology, could not fail to influence the development of the Logos-doctrine. That Wisdom and the Logos were closely-allied conceptions, and that many features originally pertaining to the former were subsequently transferred to the latter admits of no doubt. Even some of the earliest descriptions invited this. The representation that Jehovah "declared" Wisdom (Job xxviii. 27), that she came forth from the mouth of the Most High (Sir. xxiv. 3) seems to make her procession from God resemble that of the Word. With this agrees the later statement of Sap. Sol. that she is a breath of the power of God (vii. 25). The circumstance that both Wisdom and the Word have a mediatorial function in creation and providence would also facilitate such an interchange of attributes and predicates. But it can also be shown *à posteriori* that Wisdom and the Logos were identified. In Sap. Sol. ix. 1 we read that God is *ὁ ποιήσας τὰ πάντα ἐν λόγῳ* to which is added *καὶ τῇ σοφίᾳ σου κατεσκεύασας ἄνθρωπον*. The Logos is characterized in xvi. 12 as *ὁ πάντα ἰώμενος*, a soteriological character elsewhere ascribed to Wisdom, x. 1, 4, 6, 9, 15; xi. 1 ff. That in Philo Wisdom and the Logos (= Reason) are practically identical has been shown above. Philo appeals to Prov. viii. 22 where he represents the Logos as the child of God and Wisdom.⁷⁵ There is reason to believe that the hypostatical Wisdom was recognized by the inspired writers of the New Testament as embodied in Christ, and that consequently in their circle also the Logos-conception of Christ could easily borrow traits from the Wisdom-Doctrine.⁷⁶ As a matter of fact the Prologue itself contains some traces of this mutual fructification which the Wisdom and the Logos-

⁷⁵ *De ebriet.* 31; II, 176 CW; Friedländer, *Der vorchristliche jüd. Gnostizismus*, p. 54; *Griech. Phil. im Alt. Test.*, p. 86.

⁷⁶ Cpr. Mt. xi. 19; Lk. vii. 35; xi. 49; 1 Cor. i. 24, 30; ii. 7, 8; 2 Cor. ii. 14; iv. 4; Col. ii. 3. Krebs, pp. 81-93 seems to assume that the whole teaching of Ephesians and Colossians with its emphasis on knowledge and wisdom rests on the background of the identification of Christ with Wisdom. This would be difficult to prove.

conception received from each other. The *ἐν ἀρχῇ* of Jno. i. 1, while pointing back to Gen. i. 1, probably also alludes to Prov. viii. 23 *πρὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐθεμελίωσέ με ἐν ἀρχῇ πρὸ τοῦ τῇν γῆν ποιῆσαι*.⁷⁷ The description of the Logos as a mediator in creation in verse 3 may well have the same double background of the creative word in Gen. i. and elsewhere in the Old Testament, and the creative Wisdom in Prov. viii. and other passages of the Wisdom-literature. The idea of a tabernacling of the Logos in verse 14 has a striking parallel in the use of the same figure with reference to Wisdom taking up its abode among Israel.⁷⁸ The close association between Logos and light in the Prologue likewise favors the view that the wisdom-teaching was one of the contributory sources to John's teaching on this subject. The occurrence of the *pleroma*-conception in the Prologue on the one hand as associated with the Logos, in Ephesians and Colossians on the other hand as associated with the Wisdom in Christ, perhaps also points to an inner connection between the two ideas.⁷⁹

In view of the foregoing it does not seem unreasonable to assume that part of the ontological and ontogenetic as-

⁷⁷ Similarly 1 Jno. i. 1 *ἀπ' ἀρχῆς* seems to point back to Sir. xxiv. 9 and Rev. iii. 14 *ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κτίσεως τοῦ θεοῦ* may have its precedent in Prov. viii. 22 *κύριος ἐκτίσεν με ἀρχὴν ὁδῶν αὐτοῦ*.

Bugge, *Das Gesetz und Christus*, *Zeitsch. f. N. T. Wiss.* 1903, pp. 89 ff. thinks that the equation of Logos with Wisdom is but one instance of the general identification of Christ with the hypostatical Thora.

⁷⁸ Sir. xxiv. 8; Bar. iii. 37.

⁷⁹ The Fourth Gospel does not make explicit use of the conception of "Wisdom". It has been suggested by Grill (*Untersuch.* I, pp. 199-201) that this is due to a conscious avoidance of the term on the part of the Evangelist occasioned by the abuse made of it in Gnostic speculation. Sophia as one of the aeons played a prominent rôle in several of the Gnostic systems. She did not belong to the higher aeons, which came first in the self-unfolding of the divine being, but received her place among the later and latest emanations, so as to actually fall out of the *pleroma* into the *hyle*. Avoidance of the explicit name Sophia for the reason stated would not, of course, hinder, but rather promote the transferring of certain Wisdom-predicates to the Logos, and is therefore not inconsistent with the view that the Prologue looks back to the earlier Wisdom-teaching in its purer form.

sociations with which the conception of Wisdom was so richly invested from the beginning came to attach to the Logos-name. Some have found in the ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν of Jno. i. 1 a direct reference to Prov. viii. 27 *συμπαρήμην αὐτῷ*.⁸⁰ But whether any weight be attached to this detail-point or not, at any rate the belief that the Logos-name from its earliest use in Christian circles carried with it a certain ontological flavor, has a high degree of plausibility.

In the next place we cast a glance at the Memra-doctrine of the Jewish Theology. If a hypostatical "Word" was known to this previously to the date of the Fourth Gospel, this would have an important bearing on the problem of the ontogenetic use of the conception in John. For the "word" is so plainly a product of the divine act of speaking, that once being hypostatized it can scarcely fail to share as a hypostasis in this dependence on God for its origin, conceived after the manner of speaking. Unfortunately it is impossible to tell how old this Jewish conception of a hypostatical Memra is. In the Targum of Onkelos there occurs frequently the phrase "Memra of Jehovah" side by side with two other phrases "Shekhinta of Jehovah" and "Jekara of Jehovah". These phrases do not, according to Dalman,⁸¹ designate hypostatical entities distinct from God, but are used as circumlocutions, where the Old Testament predicates anthropomorphisms of the Deity, in order that these may no longer appear directly combined with Jehovah. To a limited extent these same phrases seem to have come into use outside of the stated Targum-address. The next step in the development of the usage seems to have been that "Memra of Jehovah" was no longer confined to anthropomorphic contexts, but became a reverential designation of God in general.⁸² But even here it would be difficult to stop. The frequent substitution of Memra for God would naturally

⁸⁰ Cpr. Norden, *Die antike Kunstprosa*, II, p. 474.

⁸¹ *Die Worte Jesu*, I, p. 187. In later Targums is also found, instead of Memra, "Dibbera" or "Dibbura of Jehovah."

⁸² Cpr. Weber, *Jüd. Theol.*,³ p. 182. Weber does not clearly distinguish between a circumlocutory and an hypostatical Memra.

tend towards hypostasizing. In a certain passage⁸³ it is said that at the promulgation of the law the Dibbur proceeded from the mouth of God, went to every Israelite in the camp, asked him whether he was willing to receive it, and kissed every one who agreed to do so on his mouth. This can hardly be explained on the basis of personification or reverential speech about God.⁸⁴ As stated, however, we are not certain how early or late the circumlocutory use passed over into the hypostatical representation. Some would find the hypostasis as early as 4 Ezra iv. 43 where it is said that "the Word" proceeds from God, as in the Targum. But the Old Testament likewise has this as a mere personification. We cannot even be certain that the circumlocutory use has influenced the Prologue. It has been claimed that such influence is traceable in Jno. i. 14, because here the three ideas of the Memra, the Shekhinta and the Jekara occur together.⁸⁵ But it would be difficult to prove that there is anything in this verse that cannot be adequately explained from the Old Testament. The joint-occurrence of the three phrases is easily accounted for, since the Shekhina and the glory go naturally together, and the resumption of the term Logos as connected with the other two would be suggested to the Evangelist by his desire to emphasize the palpable presence and bodily manifestation of the Logos among men, since the Shekhina was the most

⁸³ Shir Rabba, I^o, quoted by Weber, p. 180.

⁸⁴ Against Dalman who would deny the real hypostasis cpr. Bousset, *Die Rel. des Judenth.* p. 398, note 2. There is force also in the words of Hackspill (*Revue biblique internationale*), 1902, p. 62: "Peut-on dire que dans toutes ces locutions la Parole ne soit autre chose qu'un acte de Dieu, une manifestation de sa volonté ad extra? Si la parole est identique à l'être divin, pourquoi fait-on dire à Dieu "Ma Parole" quand on pouvait lui faire dire simplement "Moi"? pourquoi ce soin scrupuleux à faire agir la Parole comme intermédiaire entre Dieu et les hommes. A quoi bon choisir un intermédiaire apte à prévenir toute relation directe, si cet intermédiaire est identique à l'un des deux termes extrêmes, c'est à Dieu? La fréquence du recours . . . prouve . . . que cette conception . . . avait dû prendre une consistance plus que logique dans la réflexion religieuse juive."

⁸⁵ So Dalman, *op. cit.*, p. 189.

substantial form of God's real presence with his people under the old covenant.⁸⁶ We do not pass beyond the realm of possibilities in this matter.¹

The recently recovered "Odes of Solomon" would bear a conclusive witness to the early familiarity of Jewish circles with a hypostatical "Word", if Harnack's view in regard to the original Jewish provenience of the Odes (with later Christian interpolations) could be accepted.⁸⁷ They might render the same service on the hypothesis of Rendel Harris, the re-discoverer and editor of the Odes, who assigns them to a Jewish-Christian source and thinks that the elements regarded by Harnack as interpolations are original.⁸⁸ For a Jewish-Christian Logos-conception at so early a date might point back to the still earlier existence of the same in purely Jewish circles. In the existing uncertainty as to the dating of the Odes little reliance can be placed upon them for proving an early development of the Memra-doctrine.⁸⁹ But the Odes, altogether apart from this question, possess an interest in themselves on account of their relation to the Fourth Gospel in general and of their Logos-conception to the Johannine Logos in particular. Here, however, everything again depends on the date assigned to them. The lively discussions of the past three years have shown that the problems of provenience and date are yet far from ripe for a final decision.⁹⁰ If the Odes are gnostic

⁸⁶ In Sir. xxiv. 8-12, the Sophia and the Shekhina are brought into connection.

⁸⁷ Flemming und Harnack, *Ein Jüd.-Christl. Psalmbuch aus dem ersten Jahrhundert* in *Text. u. Unt.*, 1910, III, 5, 4. Harnack puts the Jewish author between 50 B.C. and 67 A.D., the interpolator about 100.

⁸⁸ *The Odes and Psalms of Solomon*,² 1911.

⁸⁹ Clemen in *Theol. Rundschau*, 1911, pp. 18, 19, thinks that the repeated association in the Odes of the conceptions Logos-Light-Life is not to be explained from dependence of the Odes on the Fourth Gospel, but points back to certain early speculations on which both John and the Odes are equally dependent. According to Clemen the Odes are Christian; he does not say whether the speculations referred to were Jewish or early-Christian.

⁹⁰ Cpr. Harris' *Brief Summary of Criticism* prefixed to the second edition of 1911. Since then several new contributions have been made to the subject from various quarters. With Harnack side: Menzies

and date from the middle of the second century or later, this, as Harris pointedly observes, sweeps away all references to a pre-Johannine school of thought and they can no longer be expected to throw light on the antecedents of the Johannine Logos-doctrine. Still it must be remembered that even on this supposition the Odes furnish an illustration of a very early and considerably developed use of the

(*Interpr.* 1910), who thinks the Jewish origin can in certain cases be maintained without resorting to the hypothesis of interpolation; Spitta (*Zeitsch. f. d. N. T. Wiss.* 1910; *Monatsch. f. Past. Theol.* 1910), whose dissection does not coincide, however, with Harnack's; Spitta believes Paul knew the Odes; as 4 Ezra illustrates Paul's state of mind before the conversion, so the Odes his state of mind after the conversion; he does not think it likely that either the writer or the redactor of the Fourth Gospel was influenced by the Odes; the interpolater probably drew from the Gospel; Staerk (*Zeitsch. f. wiss. Theol.* 1910), who adopts Harnack's view while rejecting his main arguments for Jewish origin drawn from alleged reference to the temple in Odes 4 and 6; Diettrich (*Die Reformation* 1910), who separates between an older Jewish stratum, and a younger Christian stratum, which latter he at first regarded as orthodox-Christian, subsequently as heretical-Christian. With Harris, though not accepting his arguments from the temple-references, sides Haussleiter (*Theol. Literaturbl.* 1910); the Odes presuppose the Fourth Gospel; in favor of Christian origin (not specifically Jewish-Christian): Zahn (*Neue Kirchl. Zeitsch.*, 1910), who believes that much can be explained from the view that the author impersonated Solomon and made Solomon speak not merely for his own person, but also for Christ in a typical capacity; the date approximately between 120 and 180 A.D.; the author knew Matthew, the Fourth Gospel, the Pauline Epistles, the Apocalypse; Bernard (*Journ. of Theol. Stud.* 1910), who makes the date about 150 A.D., perhaps later, and throws out the hypothesis that the Odes are baptismal songs; baptismal allusions are also found by Lake (*Theol. Tydsch.* 1911) and Diettrich (see above); Wellhausen (*Gött. Gel. Anz.* 1910): the Odes are Christian, probably dependent on the Fourth Gospel; Connolly, (*Journ. of Theol. Stud.* 1912) the Odes are Christian; not earlier than 150 A.D.; in favor of heretical origin: Gunkel (*Zeitsch. f. d. N. T. Wiss.* 1910): the production of a gnostic sect; probably Jewish-gnostic; no dualism proper; Batiffol (*Rev. bibl. intern.* 1911) the work of a syncretist with gnostic-docetic leanings of the type opposed by Ignatius; agrees with Zahn in finding impersonation of Solomon; Preuschen (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1910) the work of Valentinus; Fries (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1911) Montanistic effusions; Krebs (*Freib. Theol. Stud.* 1910) products of gnostic piety and poetry in the second century; the parallels from gnostic writings have been collected by Stölten (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1912).

Logos-name, as well as of some other conceptions, which, together with the Logos-name, occur also in John. Whether this be dependent on John or not, in either case it is not too remote from the Johannine writings chronologically to claim for it considerable historical interest and importance. According to Harnack himself light is thrown by the Odes on the Fourth Gospel in a twofold respect. First in so far as the original Jewish document reveals a preformation of the Johannine type of piety and theology and secondly in so far as the work of the Christian interpolator bears features that are allied to the Johannine teaching. Whether or not the interpolator knew the Gospel Harnack does not venture positively to decide, although in certain instances he thinks it probable he did. But in the first respect the dependence of John is clear and pronounced; the Odes disclose to us the quarry from which the Johannine blocks were hewn. While this is unhesitatingly affirmed with reference to such conceptions as "light", "life", "truth", "knowledge", "faith", "love", "hope", "new birth", all of which the Evangelist simply borrowed from the early Jewish mystics, and back of all of which he simply placed his Christ,⁹¹ the matter is not quite so simple where the Logos-idea comes under consideration. Here Harnack fails to make a clear statement as to how he conceives of the relation between the Logos-conception reflected in the Odes and the Logos-doctrine in John. On the one hand it is emphasized repeatedly that the Logos-conception of the Odes shares with the other ideas enumerated in that there is nothing Hellenic about it.⁹² On the other hand Harnack seems still to uphold his old distinction between the body of the Fourth Gospel as practically free from Hellenic influence and the Prologue as explain-

⁹¹ The conceptions were originally un-Messianic. Harnack thinks that the Odes are "the intermediate link which enables us to connect a very important strand of late Jewish literature with the presuppositions of the piety and theology of John, without recourse to the synoptical, i.e., the historical Jesus Christ, and without the help of all Messianism", Flemming-Harnack, pp. 99, 102.

⁹² *Ein Jüd.-Christl. Psalm.*, pp. 42, 11, 119.

able only from the intrusion of the Hellenic Logos-doctrine.⁹³ For he qualifies his statement that "in the Johannine theology there is nothing truly Hellenic" by excepting the Prologue.⁹⁴ Accordingly it would seem, since the Prologue is, according to Harnack, the only portion of the Gospel into which the Logos-idea enters, that as regards the Logos-conception the same close resemblance does not exist, which is supposed to exist between the Odes and the Gospel in the use of the other characteristic ideas. In all other respects the peculiarly Johannine trains of thought are now accounted for as Jewish-mystical and non-Hellenic, the Johannine Logos-doctrine alone cannot be so accounted for, because it is Hellenic, while the Logos-conception of the Odes is not. The alleged differences between the Prologue and the Gospel thus entail a corresponding difference in the point of dependence of both on the mysticism of the Odes. Now as many have been unable to follow Harnack in this discovery of a principal difference between the Logos-Christology of the Prologue and the Christology in the remainder of the Gospel, so we believe many will fail to see that the Prologue is in a different position as regards resemblance to the Odes from the other parts of the Gospel.⁹⁵ According to Harnack himself the "mystical complex" of the Odes comes very close to Hellenic-philosophic ideas, although not being quite equivalent to "Logos" in the sense of the latter, and although originated under quite different presuppositions. With such close resemblance between the two there is some room for scepticism as to the reality of a distinction which it requires considerable refinement to make perceptible.

⁹³ *Zeitsch. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, 1892, pp. 189-231.

⁹⁴ *Ein Jüd.-Christl. Psalm*, p. 119.

⁹⁵ Cpr. Strachan in *The Exp. Times*, xxii. p. 14 who makes this very point: "He (Harnack) regards these Odes as proving that in the Johannine theology, apart from the Prologue, there is nothing essentially Hellenic. It may, however, be added that, as regards the Prologue, one is very much struck with the fact that there is scarcely a single sentence in it, where some kind of parallel might not be deduced from these Odes."

The subject of the Logos-conception in the Odes is beset with great difficulty owing to the general obscureness of the Odes and because it is well-nigh impossible to retain within fixed moulds of conceptual thought the often vague and ever-fluctuating mystical effusions of the poet. In a work like this the line of division between abstract ideas or personifications and a real hypostasis is exceedingly hard to draw. So far as we are able to ascertain the outstanding facts are as follows.⁹⁶

The first reference to "the Word" occurs in Ode VII, 9 "The Father of knowledge is the Word of knowledge." In the preceding verses 4-8 the subject spoken of is the Lord Christ as condescending to the poet in the incarnation. If the subject remains the same, then Christ as "the Word" is here called "the Father of knowledge", probably in the sense of the source of knowledge. This is favored by the content of verses 10-13 which speak of the poet's creation by him who is the Word, the Father of knowledge and also reintroduce the note of condescension. If this interpretation be adopted a new subject will appear in verse 14 "He has given him to be seen of them that are his, in order that they may recognize Him that made them", for here God is the one spoken of as giving Christ to be seen. Some interpreters, however, think that not verse 14 but verse 9 is the place where the subject changes. In that case "the Father of knowledge is the Word of knowledge" is spoken of God not of Christ.⁹⁷

⁹⁶ The best discussion of the Christology of the Odes that has come to our notice is by Batiffol in the *Rev. bibl. intern.* 1911, pp. 52-59; 161-181.

⁹⁷ Zahn says of vss. 9-13 "folgen dunkle Sätze" and seems to understand "the Father of knowledge" of God, *Neue Kirchl. Zeitsch.*, 1910, p. 688. Cpr. Ode XLI, 9 "the Father of truth" of God. Harris is not explicit in his notes, but seems to apply "the Word" to Christ. Clemen thinks there is no hypostatical conception here, *Theol. Rundschau*, 1911, p. 18. Gunkel says God is referred to *Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.*, 1910, pp. 323, 327. Batiffol, *Rev. bibl. intern.* 1911, p. 47 surmises ("je crois entendre") that the meaning is "Dieu enfante la Science en tant qu'il la parle," and refers to Sir. xvii. 6; xxiv. 3. This might do for verse 10, but in verse 11 it is not said that the Father of knowledge

In Ode VIII, 9 "Hear the word of truth and receive the knowledge of the Most High" there is nothing to suggest a hypostatical conception. The same applies to IX, 1, 2 "open your ears and I shall speak to you. Give me your souls, that I may also give you my soul, the word of the Lord, and his good pleasures, the holy thought, which He has devised concerning his Messiah." This passage, however, is interesting, because it shows how closely the poet identifies even the appellative "word" with God; it is God's very soul, because it is his inmost thought. For the understanding of his idea of the Christ-Word this is certainly suggestive. In Ode X, 1 we have again the word in the ordinary sense of speech coming from God to the Messiah or the poet.⁹⁸ It will be observed how the hypostatical conception of "the Word" by no means interferes with

speaks the Word of knowledge, but that He is the Word of knowledge. If the subject is God, the Father, and "the Word" hypostatical, I do not see what else this could be but an expression of the identification of the Father and the son as regards the source of knowledge. If "the Father of knowledge" means Christ, the statement is a simple one, which affirms that in "the Word" is the source of knowledge. A difficulty lies in verse 13 where on our view Christ would be called "the pleroma of the ages and the father of them". Still this is not in itself impossible. If Christ is the Father of knowledge because He imparts it, He can be the Father of the ages because He created them. Even the pleroma, as we know from the New Testament, has its place in Christ. Or the difficulty may perhaps be relieved by drawing verse 13^b as the subject to the following verse: "The pleroma of the ages and the Father of them has given him (= Christ) to be seen of them that are his." This is the punctuation of Labourt *Rev. bibl. intern.*, 1910, p. 489. Harnack eliminates verses 4^b-8 as a Christian interpolation, and also verses 14, 15 and 18. On this view of course the subject becomes throughout God. But in what sense God, the Father of knowledge can be called the Word of knowledge in verse 9 Harnack does not make clear. His paraphrase of the connection between verse 3 and verse 9 covers up the difficulty: "Nun wird in Vers 9 fortgefahren—allerdings im Ausdruck etwas dunkel—dass der Vater der Erkenntniss schafft, dies durch das Wort thut" (p. 34). But the verse does not say that the Father of knowledge creates through the Word: He is the Word.

⁹⁸ According to some interpreters the speaking person is first the poet, then the Christ takes his place after the same immediate fashion as happens elsewhere in the Odes.

speaking of a word addressed to Christ or concerning Christ. The appellative and the technical use stand side by side.

In Ode XII on the other hand we meet once more with the personal Logos. According to verse 3 ff. "the mouth of the Lord is the true Word, and the door of his light, and the Most High has given it to the worlds, which are the interpreters of his own beauty and the repeaters of his praise, and the confessors of his counsel, and the heralds of his thought, and the chasteners (or "those that keep pure") of his servants (or "works"). For the swiftness of the Word is inexpressible, and like its expression is its swiftness and force; and its course knows no limits. Never does it fail, but it stands sure, and it knows not descent nor the way of it. For so is its work, so also its end. For it is light and the dawning of thought; and by it the worlds talk one to the other, and in the Word there were those that were silent.⁹⁹ And from it came love and concord, and they spoke one to the other whatever was theirs; and they were penetrated by the Word; and they knew him who made them, because they were in concord; for the mouth of the Most High spoke to them; and his explication ran by means of it (i.e. the Word): for the dwelling-place of the Word is man and his truth is love. Blessed are they who by means of it have understood everything, and have known the Lord in his truth." The difference between this and Ode VII is that here the Logos, while having a similar function to there, is not definitely identified with the Christ. He creates and renders the worlds vocal so that they can praise God, produces love and concord, and light by which intelligence dawns. All this in itself might be understood on the basis of the Wisdom-theology.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁹ So Harris and Flemming. Labourt: "et ils ont existé par le Verbe ceux qui étaient silencieux."

¹⁰⁰ Batiffol, who so interprets it, refers to Sap. Sol. ix. 1 and Sir. xlii. 15; xliii. 26. *Rev. bib. internat.* 1911, p. 190. Spitta (*Monatschr. f. Pastoralth.* VII, p. 95 even denies the hypostatical character of the Word in this Ode.

Even when it is said that "the dwelling-place of the Word is man", a parallel may be found for this in Baruch iii. 37, "Afterward did she (Wisdom) appear upon earth, and was conversant with men."¹⁰¹ None the less the coincidence of all these features with the Prologue strongly suggests that the Wisdom-hypostasis and the Person of the Messiah have here grown together. That something more concrete than hypostatical Wisdom is meant seems also to follow from the form of expression in verse 3 "the mouth of the Lord is the true Word". This can hardly mean that God speaks Wisdom; it seems to imply that the true Word acts as the mouth of God; as God creates and teaches by his mouth, so He creates and teaches per Verbum; unless the figure is a mere tautology, the Word is distinct from God. No doubt less definite Old Testament representations have here been made contributory to the description of the Word.¹⁰² But this does not warrant the assumption, that we here have a stage of the development of the Logos-idea not perceptibly in advance of the Wisdom-idea at its extreme point. The Christian Logos incorporates all the more indefinite and less concrete forms of representations of its antecedents, but does not on that account partake of the unformed state of the latter.

Ode XVI, which at first seems to take the Word in an appellative sense (verse 8: "his Spirit will utter in me the glory of the Lord and his beauty . . . and the strength of his Word"), in the sequel personifies. "The Word of the Lord searches out all things both invisible and that which reveals his thought" (verse 9). "The worlds were made by his word, and by the thought of his heart" (verse 20). The association of Word and Thought as both creative mediators might seem to remind of Philo, unless in the

¹⁰¹ Harris, p. 108 thinks that "the dwelling-place of the Word is man" cannot reproduce the Johannine thought of the incarnation, because the dwelling of the Logos with man is there collective, here individual. But Cpr. Rev. iii. 20.

¹⁰² It is evident that besides the Wisdom-conception Psalm xix is borrowed from.

latter there is no more than the influence of the Wisdom-doctrine.

Ode XXIX, 9, "to make war by his word and to take victory by his power" has nothing in it to suggest the personal Logos. That this, however, does not necessarily prove the personal conception to have been absent from the poet's mind may be seen from Ode XXXIX, 8-10. Verse 8 "The Lord has bridged them (the rivers) by his word" sounds quite impersonal, and yet the poet continues: "and He walked and crossed them on foot, and his footsteps stand firm on the water". That the pronouns here do not refer to God (as Harris by not capitalizing the word in verse 8a and by capitalizing the following pronouns represents it) but refer to the Logos seems clear from the recurrence of the "footsteps" as the footsteps of the Christ in verse 10, "And the waves were lifted up on this side and on that, but the footsteps of our Lord Messiah stand firm and are not obliterated and are not defaced".

The most interesting statements of all are in Ode XLI, 8-17, "All those will be astonished that see me. For from another race am I: for the Father of Truth remembered me:¹⁰³ He who possessed me from the beginning: for his bounty¹⁰⁴ begat me, and the thought of his heart: and the Word is with us in all our way; the Saviour who makes alive and does not reject our souls: the man who was humbled and exalted by his own righteousness, the Son of the Most High appeared in the perfection of his Father; and light dawned from the Word that was beforetime in Him; the Messiah is truly one; and He was known before the foun-

¹⁰³ Haussleiter (*Theol.-Literaturz.*, 1910, col. 273) understands verse 9 of the Christian, not of Christ. The change of the speaking subject (first person plural vss. 1-7, first person sgl. 8-10, first person plur. 11-17) is strange but not any stranger than in other Odes. Labourt: "un beau dialogue spirituel entre les chrétiens et le Verbe Rédempteur." Harnack assigns to the Christian writer 1-7, 11, 12-17. That is to say the purely Jewish element is confined to verses 9, 10. As Fries observes (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.* 1911, p. 124) this would look like a Jewish interpolation in a Christian song.

¹⁰⁴ So Harris; Batiffol: "sa plénitude (= pleroma) m'a engendré."

dation of the world, that He might save our souls for ever by the truth of his name". Harris well observes that the language here has its nearest parallel in the Johannine theology. Harnack observes that even here the Logos-idea is not the Hellenic one. If this means that it differs from or remains behind the Logos-conception of the Prologue, it would be difficult to point out in what respect.¹⁰⁵

Summing up we may say that in these passages of the Odes the Logos appears mainly in a functional capacity. He is the Father of knowledge; the Word of knowledge (VII, 9); He created wisdom (VII, 10); He created men (VII, 11, 15), the worlds (XVI, 11, 20); all created speech and intelligence are derived from him (XII, 3 ff.), all love and concord in the creation (XII, 9, 10). The speech and light imparted by the Logos to the world are imparted to make the world interpret God's beauty, repeat His praise, confess His counsel, herald His thoughts (XII, 4). As the Logos is from God, so his function is unto God. The Logos searches out all things in the invisible and the visible sphere (XVI, 9).¹⁰⁶ He is the revealer of God not merely in virtue of what He brings, but of what He is or becomes. (Cpr. the emphasis in Ode VII on the condescension of the incarnation in connection with the Logos-function.) More specifically soteriological functions are ascribed to the Logos. He makes a dwelling-place with man (XII, 11), he lets Himself be put on by man (VII, 6), is gracious (VII, 7, 12) gives man of his sacrifice (VII 12),¹⁰⁷ crosses the rivers for his own that they may follow after him (XXXIX, 11), is with them in all their way, a Savior, who makes

¹⁰⁵ Harnack apparently does not deny verse 15 "and light dawned from the Word that was beforetime in Him" to the Jewish writer on account of the Logos-doctrine, but because of its concatenation with a Christian context.

¹⁰⁶ Cpr. 1 Cor. ii. 10 (of the Spirit of God); Heb. iv. 12 of the word (logos) of God.

¹⁰⁷ Nestle (Harris p. 99) suggests that the Syriac translator here mistook *οὐσία* for *θυσία* so that the true reading should be "he granted me to ask from him and to receive from his ousia ("being" or "property"?).

alive, and does not reject their souls, saves their souls for ever by the truth of his name (XLI, 11-17).¹⁰⁸

It would, however, be scarcely correct to say that in the Odes the significance of the Logos-name is confined to the function of the Christ. It has its bearing also upon his inherent nature and relation to God. The Logos occupies quite a unique position by the side of God in the author's universe. He is not an aeon like others, one in a series, as the Gnostics conceive of their Logos.¹⁰⁹ Nor does the Logos appear on the background of the dualism of the great Gnostic systems. He is both the Creator and the incarnate One.¹¹⁰ If there is a trace of gnosticism in the Christology it must lie in the docetic traits which Batiffol thinks can perhaps be discovered in Ode XVII 4^b-6 ("I received the face and fashion of a new person . . . all that have seen me were amazed: and I was regarded by them as a strange person"); XIX, 8^c (*ἐγέννησεν ὡς ἄνθρωπον* with the emphasis on the *ὡς*, not a true man; according to an emended text¹¹¹); XXII, 11 "thou hast introduced thy face (= *μορφή*) into the world";¹¹² XXVIII, 14-16 ("I did not perish, for I was not their brother, nor was my birth like theirs, and they sought for my death and did not find it; for I was older than the memorial of them, and vainly did they make attack upon me", = the impassibility of the Logos-Messiah¹¹³); XXXIII, 1 ("Grace again ran

¹⁰⁸ That this soteriology differs from that of the Fourth Gospel, and of the New Testament in general, by the absence of the elements of sin and forgiveness has been truly observed by Zahn and others. But the difference is of a material rather than of a formal nature.

¹⁰⁹ Cpr. Grill, *Unters.* I, 184 ff. Some approach to a Gnostic conception might seem to be made in Ode XII, 8, the aeons endowed with the Word become vocal. But cpr. Flemming-Harnack, p. 42; Harris, p. 108; Batiffol, p. 190. Gunkel (*Zeitsch. f. d. Neut. Wiss.*, 1910, p. 328) finds an aeon Truth in Ode XXXVIII of which it is impossible to tell whether the poet conceives as an abstraction or as an hypostasis.

¹¹⁰ Batiffol, p. 162, note 2.

¹¹¹ Harris: "She brought forth as if she were a man."

¹¹² Harris punctuates and renders quite differently: "(Thy way was without corruption) and thy place; thou didst bring thy world to corruption."

¹¹³ Harnack, p. 61 infers from this representation, that Christ cannot

and put on corruption");¹¹⁴ XXXIV, 5° ("what is below is nothing but the imagination of those that are without knowledge").¹¹⁵ Whether these observations be well-founded or not, it is certain that the divine side of the Logos-subject is magnified and emphasized by the Odes. His preëxistence is affirmed; He is older than the memorial of men, He was before them (XXVIII, 15, 17), was known before the foundation of the world (XLI, 16). Side-lights fall on His relation to God in this eternal state. God possessed him from the beginning; he was beforetime in God (XLI, 9, 15). In Ode XXXII he is even designated as "the Truth who was *self-originate*".¹¹⁶ If we could be certain that in verses 9 and 10 of Ode XLI the speaking subject is the same Logos-Christ who is spoken of in the third person in the sequel, we would here have the ontogenetic statement "his *pleroma* begat me", but as observed above (note 103), the connection is somewhat obscure.¹¹⁷ Attention should be called in this connection to the repeated association in the Odes between the "Word" and the "Thought" of God. When the same idea which finds expression in Ode IX, 1, 2 of the unhypostatical Word, viz. that it is God's very soul, his holy inmost thought, is applied in Ode XXVIII, 17, 18 to the eternal Christ ("they sought to destroy the memorial of Him who was before them: for the Thought of the Most High cannot be antici-

be thought of as the subject. This hardly follows, even where no docetism is found here. If according to the Fourth Gospel even the believer does not truly die, how much more could this be affirmed of Christ. As a matter of fact verse 16 adds the reason: "I was older than the memorial of them." They might kill him as a man, they could not kill his divine Person.

¹¹⁴ According to an amended text; Harris: "forsook corruption".

¹¹⁵ For the remarks on the above passages cpr. Batiffol, pp. 55, 58, 163, 193. Also Krebs, *Freib. Theol. Stud.* 1910, II, p. 64.

¹¹⁶ According to Harris this is the rendering of the Greek *αὐτοφύης* used in Lact. *De Div. Inst.* I, 7 of the divine nature. Cpr. further Ode VII, 12, where, according to Nestle's conjecture, the Logos gives men of his *οὐσία* ("being" or "property"?).

¹¹⁷ Spitta (*Monatsch. f. Pastoraltheol.* VII, p. 93 finds in verse 10 "Christi ewige Zeugung und Geburt" according to the presumably oldest reading in Jno. i. 13 *ὁ ἐγενήθη* (instead of the plural).

pated: and his Heart is superior to all wisdom"), this would seem to bring us very close to an ontogenetic application of the Logos-name. As thought dawns from the Logos XII, 7, so the Logos Himself seems to proceed from the thought of the Most High.

What we have found in our rapid survey of the Logos-passages in the Odes does not favor the view, that the doctrine is here in a more primitive, more unformed stage of development than that observed in the Johannine writings, particularly in the Prologue. If anything, the statements go a shade beyond the Johannine ones in theological definiteness and suggestiveness. This is of importance to know, no matter what the outcome may be of the discussions of the experts in regard to the antiquity and milieu of provenience of the Odes. For, even if the Odes, as would seem at present most likely, should be recognized as posterior to the Gospel, they remain on the dating of conservative scholars a very early witness to the ideas that were at that time associated with the Johannine Logos-doctrine, and prove that the later trinitarian use made of this doctrine by the church-theology reaches back to a point not so very far distant from the composition of the Gospel itself.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

(To be continued)

THE HYMNODY OF THE METHODIST REVIVAL*

I

ITS ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS

During the early decades of the XVIIIth century the *Hymns* and *Psalms imitated* of Watts were gradually but surely replacing the older metrical Psalms in the Non-conformist churches of England, and establishing themselves there as the norm of Congregational Praise. In the parish churches, on the other hand, the use of Hymns of any sort was sporadic and occasional, while the singing of metrical Psalms was the universal practice. In the countryside and villages the *Old Version* of Sternhold and Hopkins was still used, but in London and a few towns, the *New Version* of Tate and Brady was beginning to get a hearing. The hymns of Watts had given a new spiritual interest to Congregational Song in the chapels which the *New Version* failed to impart to that of the city churches introducing it. But in church and chapel alike the clinging to the old custom of lining out the Psalm and the dull and drawling rendering of the notes emphasized the continued indifference to the musical side of Psalmody. In London churches a disposition was manifesting itself to relegate the singing altogether to a choir made up of "charity children" or such others as were available.

Such were the conditions of Congregational Song at the beginning of the Methodist Movement within the Church of England toward the middle of the century. In connection with this Movement, the singing of Hymns gained not only a great extension but also a quite new power and import. It recovered the emotional fervor of the first singing of vernacular Psalms by the Huguenots, and repeated the spiritual triumphs of the Reformation Psalmody. In the same connection the English Hymn itself acquired a

* Being the fourth of the lectures upon "The Hymnody of the English-speaking Churches", delivered on the L. P. Stone Foundation at Princeton Theological Seminary, in February, 1910.

new development in several directions, and Hymnody was permanently enriched by a large body of available hymns, many of which remain in present use, and some of which attain the highest rank.

The leader who played the part in Methodist Hymnody which Calvin had taken in Huguenot Psalmody was, contrary perhaps to the general impression, John Wesley and not his brother Charles. He planned it, prepared the ground, introduced and fostered it, moulded and administered it, and also restrained its excesses. But Charles Wesley, by reason of the bulk and quality of his contributions to the new Hymnody, became distinctively the Poet of Methodism; and indeed contests with Watts the first place as a writer of English hymns. In the matter of dates and precedence it is convenient to remember that Charles Wesley was born at the Epworth rectory in 1707, the very year of publication of Watts' *Hymns*; his brother John three years earlier. John Wesley published his first hymn book in 1737, eighteen years after Watts had completed his *System of Praise* with the publication of *The Psalms of David imitated* in 1719. And two years later Charles printed his first hymns.

There was much in the inheritance and early training of the Wesley brothers which explains their interest in Hymnody, and which prepared them for their great work in it. There was, to begin with, in both a strong inherited bent toward poetry and the poetic expression of feeling. Samuel Wesley, the father, printed a volume of his verses (*Maggots*, 1685) before leaving Oxford, and followed it with a series of later poems of which *The Life of our Blessed Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ* (1693) is best known. Careless and too voluminous, these works are yet not wanting in imaginative and forceful expression. In the Psalm versions appended to his *The Pious Communicant rightly prepared* (1700), and elsewhere, Samuel Wesley showed himself as by no means an incapable hymn writer.¹ It was

¹ One of his hymns, "Behold the Saviour of Mankind", still has place in the Methodist hymn books of England and America. In the first

no accident that five of his children, Samuel, Jr.,² John, Charles, Emilia, and Mehetabel, exhibited in varying degrees the poetic gift, and cultivated the art of verse. We find the father in 1706 recommending his son Samuel to make "translations of the Bible into verse" in the effort to reconcile fancy and devotion; and in 1725 approving verses on the 85th Psalm by his son John, who was then contemplating an entrance into holy orders.³

It may be added that the children of Epworth rectory were trained to social singing of Psalms, and apparently of hymns, in the family circle; a somewhat unusual custom at the time, the neglect of which Samuel Wesley attributed to the general decay of piety and the uninteresting character of the Psalm versions and of their tunes.⁴ The attitude of the Epworth household toward current Church of England Psalmody was the same that Watts had taken toward Non-conformist Psalmody. Before Watts' *Hymns* appeared, Samuel Wesley wrote to his son Samuel of the "sorry Sternhold Psalms",⁵ and in a paper in the *Athenian Oracle* complains that most of the Psalm tunes are so vile that even Orpheus could not make good music of them. He describes the usual rendering of the Psalms as "the reading them at such a lame rate, tearing them limb from limb, and leaving sense, cadency, and all at the mercy of the clerk's nose".⁶ In his *Advice to a young Clergyman*, referring to efforts to improve the singing at Epworth Church, he attributes the preference of the common people for Sternhold and Hopkins' version over that of Tate and Brady to their "strange genius at understanding nonsense".⁷

impressions of the *Dunciad* (1728), Pope pilloried S. Wesley along with Watts; both names being afterwards erased, perhaps owing to protestations from without. Cf. Geo. J. Stevenson, *Memorials of the Wesley Family*, London [1876], p. 68.

² Two of his hymns are retained in the *English Methodist Hymn Book*.

³ L. Tyerman, *Life and Times of Samuel Wesley*, London, 1866, pp. 311, 392.

⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 311.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 310.

⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 311, 312.

⁷ Thos. Jackson, *Life of Charles Wesley*, London, 1841, vol. ii, p. 509.

John Wesley, in his turn, ridiculed the Psalmody of the town churches as "the miserable, scandalous doggerel of Sternhold and Hopkins"; at first droned out, two staves at a time, by "a poor humdrum wretch", and then "bawled out" "by a handful of wild, unawakened striplings" "who neither feel nor understand" what they "scream", while the congregation is "lolling at ease, or in the indecent posture of sitting, drawling out one word after another".⁸

Our particular concern with these passages is in their exhibition of the young Wesleys as already in the accustomed exercise of social Psalmody, and of John especially as deeply moved by the degraded conditions of parochial Psalmody. For it was their love of social Psalmody that ultimately made Methodist Hymnody what it was, and it was the desire to better Parochial Psalmody that furnished John Wesley with the original motive of his work in Hymnody.

The social singing of Psalms and hymns passed naturally from the Epworth rectory to the meetings of the Holy Club that Charles Wesley founded at Oxford in the spring of 1729, for the cultivation of method in study, devotion and good works,⁹ and of which John became the leader on his return to Oxford in November of the same year. He was an admiring reader of Dr. Watts¹⁰ and of course familiar with Watts' work in Hymnody; and, in view of Wesley's later dealings with them, we may infer that Watts' *Psalms and Hymns*, in connection perhaps with Tate and Brady's *New Version*, furnished the materials for the singing of the Holy Club.¹¹

⁸ S. Tyerman, *Life and Times of John Wesley*, 5th ed., London, 1880, vol. ii, pp. 282, 283.

⁹ "This gained me the harmless name of Methodist." Chas. Wesley to Chandler (28 April, 1785).

¹⁰ *The Journal of the Rev. John Wesley, A.M.*, ed. by Nehemiah Curnock, standard ed., London and New York, n. d., vol. i, p. 139, note. This edition of the famous Journal, with its decipherment of the unprinted Diaries, is indispensable to understanding the development of Wesley's mind and work in Hymnody as in other directions.

¹¹ Cf. *Journal*, vol. i, p. 243, note.

When John Wesley determined on the missionary life, and on October 14, 1735, embarked for the new colony of Georgia, he was accompanied by his brother Charles¹² and Benjamin Ingham; they being three out of thirteen Oxford "Methodists". And Wesley's account of their common life on board the "Simmons" reads much like a protracted meeting of the Holy Club. The minds of both brothers had come under the influence of Tauler, Law, and other mystical divines, but both were Anglican clergymen of the severe high church type. They aimed at a devotional and church life that was "primitive", and were scrupulous in the observance of rites and ceremonies, the weekly fasts and Eucharist, and Baptism by trine immersion; and were of a spirit too intolerant for missionary success.¹³

Wesley's kit included a considerable collection of books. Among them were some that became the sources of Wesleyan Hymnody: Tate and Brady's *New Version of the Psalms*, and apparently the *Supplement*, with its tunes; Watts' *Psalms and Hymns*; George Herbert's poems; Hickes' edition of *Devotions in the ancient way of Offices*, containing John Austin's hymns; the *Divine Dialogues with Divine Hymns* of Henry More; Dean Brevints' *Christian Sacrament and Sacrifice*; and some of the works of Norris of Bemerton. Hymns by others, including his father and brother Samuel, were among his manuscript materials.

The brothers had as fellow-voyagers twenty-six German Moravian colonists, with their new bishop, David Nitschmann. The Moravians made much of hymn singing on

¹² Though Charles went as secretary to Governor Oglethorpe, he was ordained just before starting, that he might officiate in the colonies. *Dict. of Nat. Biography*, art "Chas. Wesley"; Thos. Jackson, *Life of Charles Wesley*, London, 1841, vol. i, p. 44.

¹³ The claim of some modern Anglicans that the Wesleys were high churchmen is successful enough as to this early period of their lives (1725-1738), and within those limits freely admitted by Methodist writers. Cf. Jas. H. Rigg, *The Churchmanship of John Wesley*, rev. ed., London [1887], "chap. ii, Period of ritualistic high churchmanship". For a more carefully discriminating statement, see *Journal*, vol. i, p. 167, note.

board in all weathers, and in the stress of storm it became the characteristic expression of an unruffled faith.¹⁴ On the third day John Wesley began the study of German, "in order to converse with" the Moravians,¹⁵ and soon took part in their daily worship.¹⁶

This intercourse with the Germans marks the beginning of Moravian influence upon the spiritual life of both Wesleys, and was to have a marked effect on Wesleyan Hymnody. Its immediate effect was to make an indelible impression of the spiritual possibilities of the Hymn and of a fervid type of hymn singing far removed from the dull parochial Psalmody or congregational praise of Non-conformist chapels. The fervor and spontaneity of this Moravian song was ultimately to be reproduced in the hymn singing of Methodist meetings. A secondary effect was to turn John Wesley to the study of the German Moravian Hymnody, and to set him to the making of English translations.¹⁷ The *Journal* for October 27, 1735, has the entry, "Began *Gesang-Buch*". This has been identified¹⁸ as the first of the hymn books for the congregation at Herrnhut, published that same year by Count Zinzendorf: *Das Gesang-Buch der Gemeinde in Herrnhut*. Wesley had also access, either on shipboard or in Georgia, to the pietistic hymn books of Johann Anastasius Freylinghausen, *Geist-reiches Gesang-Buch, den Kern alter und neuen Lieder*, &c. (Halle, 1704), and its second part, *Neues Geist-reiches Gesang-Buch*, &c., appearing in 1714.¹⁹ These became the German sources of the Wesleyan Hymnody, and are of decided import.

¹⁴ *Journal*, vol. i, p. 142.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 110.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 113.

¹⁷ Cf. Sermon cxxi in *The Works of John Wesley*, ed. New York, 1831, vol. ii, p. 443.

¹⁸ *Journal*, vol. ii, p. 6.

¹⁹ The two parts, combined into one under the title of the first, by G. A. Francke, appearing at Halle in 1741, remain the best expression of the Hymnody of the Pietistic Revival, from which the Methodist Revival drew not only some of its hymns but also some of its earliest tunes.

One of the disclosures of Wesley's newly deciphered diary is the grip which hymns took upon his mind and heart, when once he had caught the fervor of Moravian Hymnody; the share of his daily life given over to hymn singing; his assiduous study of hymns, sometimes continuing through the working hours of successive days. The English Hymn, that had found so capable a tutor as Watts, had been waiting for so devoted a lover as Wesley. He at once began, and pursued with extraordinary carefulness, the selection, revision, translation and composition of hymns for the varied uses of his ministrations. He introduced hymn singing into those "companies" formed at Savannah and Frederica, which were the prototype of the Methodist "society",²⁰ and even into the Sunday church services. In the list of grievances against Wesley presented by the Grand Jury for Savannah in August, 1737, the first was his alterations of the authorized metrical Psalms, and the second his "introducing into the church and service at the Altar compositions of psalms and hymns not inspected or authorized by any proper judicature".²¹

These Psalms and hymns were at first a manuscript collection,²² and Wesley tested them by repeated readings and discussions with friends, as well as in the sick-room and in social devotions.²³ He then arranged with Lewis Timothy of Charleston to print a selection of them.²⁴

This, Wesley's first hymn book, appeared as *Collection of Psalms and Hymns*. *Charles-town, 1737*, without his name; a roughly printed little volume of 74 pages.²⁵ Of

²⁰ *Journal*, vol. i, pp. 228, 229.

²¹ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 385.

²² *Ibid.*, p. 230 n.

²³ *Ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 243, 259, 269 n.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, vol. i, pp. 257 n., 275, 347. Wesley was reading the proofs in April, 1737: p. 349.

²⁵ Long lost to sight, it was reprinted (though not in facsimile as stated) by Dr. George Osborn in 1882, from what was supposed to be the only surviving copy. For the history of this copy, see Rev. R. Green, *The Works of John and Charles Wesley: a Bibliography*, London, 1896, p. 12, and additional note in the 2nd ed., 1906, p. i. There is another copy in the Lenox Collection of the New York Public Library.

its pieces, numbered as 70, one half are from Watts, 7 from John Austin, 6 adapted from George Herbert, 2 from Addison; and the Wesleys are represented by 15:—5 of Samuel, Sr., 5 of Samuel, Jr., and 5 translated from the German by John himself. There is none by Charles Wesley,²⁶ who had returned to England. The pieces are grouped in three divisions, as "Psalms and Hymns for Sunday" (hymns of general praise); "for Wednesday or Friday" (suitable for fast days); and "for Saturday" (hymns especially addressed to God as the Creator of all things). Beyond the "primitive usage" recognized in this grouping, there is little or nothing to suggest high church views, and no provision for festivals or sacraments. The outstanding feature of the collection is indeed the submission of Wesley's churchliness to his good judgment in giving the foremost place to Dr. Watts, the dissenter.

Wesley reached England on February 1, 1738; bringing from Georgia a sense of spiritual and ministerial defeat. He came into close affiliation with London Moravians, and, under Peter Böhler's advice, he, with his brother Charles and others, formed "our little society" on May 1, 1738, at the home and book-shop of James Hutton. It afterwards removed to Fetter Lane, and, though in connection with the Church of England, became the nucleus both of organized Methodism and of organized English Moravianism.²⁷

It was no doubt for the use of this, and like societies at Bristol and Oxford,²⁸ that John Wesley printed, without editor's or publisher's name, his second hymn book: *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns. London: printed in the year 1738.*²⁹ The little book is eclectic. The threefold

²⁶ "Probably the explanation is that . . . his MSS. were not at his brother's disposal." A. E. Gregory, *The Hymn-book of the Modern Church*, London, 1904, p. 156.

²⁷ *Journal*, vol. i, p. 458.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, vol. i, p. 458.

²⁹ The only known copies are in the Didsbury College Library and the Archbishop's Library at Lambeth. There is a full description of its contents in *The Poetical Works of John and Charles Wesley*, ed. by G. Osborn [13 vols.], London, 1868 seq., vol. ii, pp. 35-42.

grouping of the hymns, intended to represent the usage of "antiquity", is retained from the 1737 book. Watts still leads, with 36 numbers out of a total of 76. The Church Psalmody is represented by 16 of Tate and Brady's versions; the Prayer Book by the *Veni Creator*; and Bishop Ken's three hymns may be included with these. Mysticism is represented by four selections from Norris of Bemerton, and Moravianism by four translations from the Herrnhut collection: English poetry by Herbert, Dryden, Addison and Roscommon.

With this little book, the earlier and preparatory stages of Wesley's work for Hymnody are brought to a close. Its contents illustrate and embody most of the influences that played upon Methodist Hymnody or became its sources; except indeed that it contained nothing of the work of Wesley's father and brothers; of Charles, notably, whose great gift waited for the deepening of his spiritual experience and the inspiration he drew from the stirring scenes of the coming revival.

II

THE METHODIST HYMNODY

While living in London, in close association with Moravians and under their influence, the Wesleys passed through those remarkable spiritual experiences which brought to both the rest and joy of faith, and determined their future careers. Charles dated his evangelical conversion as on Whitsunday (May 21) 1738; John his as on the Wednesday following (May 24).

Charles began at once to proclaim his new hope to such friends as would hear him, and to preach in the churches, as long as they would receive him. In the summer of 1739 he entered that itinerant ministry, in Whitefield's way, that during seventeen years carried him through England and Wales, and twice into Ireland. John first visited the Moravians at Herrnhut. Returning in September, 1738, he found his immediate sphere in the "Religious Societies",

more or less Moravian in complexion, which in London and elsewhere supplemented the Church services with less formal devotions. To these meetings he preached his new way of "saving-faith"; teaching them to sing the hymns he had gathered and translated. The first word in his resumed diary, under the date of September 20, 1738, is "Singing".⁸⁰ In the spring of 1739 he went to Bristol at Whitefield's entreaty, to carry on the work already begun there, and on May 12 laid the corner-stone of "The New Room," really the first Methodist Chapel. Late in the same year he founded at London his own "United Society", and on November 11 first preached in the disused King's Foundry in Moorfields, which, purchased and refitted, became the headquarters of Methodism. From this year Wesley ordinarily counted the foundation of the Methodist Societies.

In this memorable year appeared the third of the Wesleyan hymn collections, the first to bear the name of either brother, as *Hymns and sacred Poems. Published by John Wesley, M.A. Fellow of Lincoln College, Oxford; and Charles Wesley, M.A. Student of Christ-Church, Oxford.* [Colossians iii. 16]. London: printed by William Strahan; . . . MDCCXXXIX. Of this there were three editions within the year, and two subsequently.⁸¹ Its contents are in two parts, containing 64 and 75 pieces, some of them hymns for singing, and some poems for reading. No less than 42 are adaptations from George Herbert, and there are 22 of Wesley's renderings from the German. Some "Verses" were included which "were wrote upon the Scheme of the Mystick Divines", and the preface of eight pages is a renunciation and exposure of their errors.

This book reflects the spiritual experiences of the year, and is itself memorable as the first printing of hymns from Charles Wesley's pen. The second part opens with a hymn beginning, "Where shall my wond'ring Soul begin?" This is probably the hymn he commenced the day after his conversion, broken off "for fear of pride", but finished under

⁸⁰ *Journal*, vol. ii, p. 75; and see p. 71, note.

⁸¹ Green, *Bibliography*, p. 15.

the encouragement of Bray the mechanic, and sung with "great joy" when, on the Wednesday evening, John came to announce his own faith in Christ.⁸² It was thus the first hymn of the Methodist Revival. Toward the close of the volume appeared the fine group of festival hymns which afterwards helped to recommend Hymns to the Church of England.⁸³

Charles Wesley had written hymns already, but with his new experience the fountain of spiritual song opened within, which was never to fail him. Thenceforward he became distinctively the poet of the new Movement, and poured forth Psalms and hymns in a stream uninterrupted until his death. But his hymns did not come from the cloisters. In the early years of the Revival, he was as active and ardent an evangelist as John himself. "He loved the stir, the tumult, the triumph of those great outdoor gatherings, where testimony must be borne before mobs which might at any time endanger the property and even the lives of preacher and hearers . . . [He] was moved to his highest flights of praise by hard-won victories amongst his wild hearers in Cornwall, or Moorfields, at Kingswood, or Walsall."⁸⁴ The composition of the hymns was thus closely related to the progress of the Revival, which they in turn did much to foster; and the long series of books and tracts in which they appeared are an essential part of the Revival records.

The poetical publications of John and Charles Wesley, jointly or separately, cover a period of fifty-three years, and number fifty-six (excluding tune-books); and the contents of not less than thirty-six of these are exclusively original, with much original work appearing in the collective volumes. The majority of these publications appeared with-

⁸² Chas. Wesley's Diary, May 23, 24, 1738.

⁸³ "Hark how all the Welkin rings" (*Christmas-Day*); "Sons of Men, behold from far" (*Epiphany*); "'Christ the Lord is ris'n to Day'" (*Easter-Day*); "Hail the Day that sees Him rise" (*Ascension-Day*); "Granted is the Saviour's Prayer" (*Whitsunday*).

⁸⁴ Gregory, *The Hymn Book of the Modern Church*, p. 160.

out the name of author or editor; eight under John's name, three under Charles', and six under the joint names of the brothers.⁸⁵

The custom afterward grew up of ascribing to Charles Wesley's pen not only the hymns published under his name but also all those published under the joint names or anonymously, excepting only the translations and very few originals admittedly written by John. Such a conclusion never rested on solid ground, and is gradually yielding to the conviction that John's share in the hymn writing was greater than had been supposed; a conviction which the recently published notes of his diary tend to strengthen. The editors of the Wesleyan Methodist hymn book of 1875 went so far as to affix merely the letter "W" to "those hymns which first appeared in publications for which the Wesleys were jointly responsible" (including "Jesu, Lover of my soul" under this category); on the ground that "it cannot be determined with certainty to which of the two brothers a hymn should be ascribed".⁸⁶ This course proved very unwelcome to Methodists,⁸⁷ and has since been departed from. But the uncertainty remains none the less. There is some evidence that the brothers agreed not to distinguish their several contributions of the hymns published jointly.⁸⁸ It is however to be noted that this uncertainty pertains chiefly to the early publications, and that as the Revival progressed, John grew content to leave the hymn writing to his brother, and also that, in giving its permanent form to Methodist Hymnody, he admitted that "But a small part of these hymns is of my own composing".⁸⁹

⁸⁵ Of the numerous short-lists of these publications, none seems to be both accurate and complete. The best bibliography is Green's; and he contributed to Telford's *The Methodist Hymn Book illustrated* (2nd ed. rev., London, n. d. [1909], pp. 497 ff.) a convenient list of the works in which the hymns therein included first appeared.

⁸⁶ Note prefixed to "Index to the Hymns".

⁸⁷ See Telford, *The Meth. Hy. Bk. illus.*, p. 12.

⁸⁸ See David Creamer, *Methodist Hymnology*, New York, 1848, p. 18; Osborn, *The Poetical Works*, vol. viii, p. xv.

⁸⁹ John Wesley's preface to the Large Hymn Book of 1780. On the

The brothers cooperated again in a second collection of *Hymns and Sacred Poems*, 1740. Its title-page, barring the date, is identical with that of 1739, with whose later editions it was incorporated. It added to English Hymnody three famous hymns, usually ascribed to Charles Wesley: "Jesu, Lover of my soul", "O for a thousand tongues to sing", and "Christ, whose glory fills the skies". While not formally a hymn book for the societies, this, with the 1739 volume, contributed not less than 100 hymns to the permanent Methodist Hymnody. Its contents are distinctively Methodist. The preface sets forth Wesley's doctrine of Christian Perfection. There is a "Hymn for the Kingswood Colliers", one "To be sung in a Tumult", one "On admission of any person into the Society", and a group on "The Love-Feast". Wesley had taken an impassioned stand against the doctrine of Election in a sermon published as *Free Grace* in the autumn of 1739, after Whitefield had gone to America. Appended was a long hymn on "Universal Redemption". This hymn, with another on the same theme, were now included in the new book, adding to the great offense already taken by Whitefield.⁴⁰ The sermon and the hymn led to the separation of the Revival forces into two camps, the Calvinistic under Whitefield, the Arminian under Wesley, to the organization of Lady Huntindon's Connexion and of Calvinistic Methodism in Wales.⁴¹

In deep depression at the defection from the inmost circle and the consequent confusions, the Wesleys printed at Bristol early in 1741, and then in London, a tractate of eighteen hymns, as *Hymns on God's Everlasting Love*.

whole subject consult Osborn, *The Poetical Works*, vol. viii, pp. 15, 16; Telford, *Meth. Hy. Bk. illus.*, pp. 8-12; *Journal*, vol. i, p. 477, note.

⁴⁰ "My dear, dear Brethren,—Why did you throw out bone of contention? Why did you print that sermon against predestination? Why did you, in particular, my dear brother Charles, affix your hymn, and join in putting out your late hymn-book?" Letter of Whitefield, Feb. 1, 1741. Tyerman, *Life of Geo. Whitefield*, New York, 1877, vol. i, p. 465.

⁴¹ Tyerman, *Life of John Wesley*, vol. i, p. 317.

To which is added the Cry of a Reprobate, and the Horrible Decree, followed by a second tractate with the same title; the two being afterwards combined. The hymns mingle most tender appeals with scathing satire of the doctrines of the opposition, described as "hellish" and "satanic", and presented with little fairness. The hymns are on fire with excitement and indignation at what threatened to undo the prospects of the Movement. The Wesleys had the precedent of the Reformers in employing satire and invective in their Hymnody. We may nevertheless count it fortunate that their work, immensely effective as it was at the time, was not of such a character as to establish a new precedent for the Controversial Hymn.

The success of these hymn tracts, scattered broadcast, read and sung in Methodist homes and societies, is probably responsible for the long series of hymn tracts in which further Wesleyan hymns were published. Capable of being printed quickly to meet the occasion, sold for a few pence and readily bought, the hymn tract became a favorite instrument for the inspiration and instruction of the early Methodists, and for cultivating their spirit of devotion. The series of hymn tracts ran for fifty years (1741-1791), numbering not less than thirty.

A small group offers hymns for times of civil disquiet and Methodist persecution:—*Hymns for times of trouble and persecution* (1744); *Hymns for times of trouble* (n. d.), *Hymns written in the time of the tumults* (1780). Another for national occasions and passing events:—*Hymns for the public Thanksgiving-Day* (1746) *Hymns for New Year's Day*, (1750), *Hymns occasioned by the Earthquake, 1750* (2 parts), *Hymns for the Year 1756*, *Hymns on the expected Invasion* (1759), and for Thanksgiving, Nov. 29, 1759, *Hymns for the National Fast, 1782*, and two numbers of *Hymns for the Nation in 1782*. Another provided for the festivals of the old Church Year:—*Hymns for the Nativity* (1745); and *Hymns for our Lord's Resurrection, for Ascension Day, Hymns of Petition and Thanks-*

giving (Whitsunday), and *Gloria Patri* (Trinity), all of 1746. With these we may group *A Hymn at the Sacrament* (1744), two numbers of *Funeral Hymns* (1746, 1759), and *Hymns for the Watch night* (1746). For the household were *Graces before Meat* (1746), *Hymns for children* (1746, 1791), and *Preparation for Death* (1772). More general in character were a little *Collection of Hymns* (1742) for the poor, *Hymns for those that seek, and those that have, Redemption in the Blood of Jesus Christ* (1747, 10 editions), the most important of them all; and *Hymns of Intercession* (1758).

Charles Wesley (for the bulk of the work was his) was thus the poet-laureate of Methodism, with an ode for every occasion. Such a companionship of hymns through passing years was never provided before or since, and was an unique feature in the upbuilding of Methodist character. In the extension also of the Revival, these hymn tracts, widely distributed among the poor and degraded, played a considerable part.

Returning now to the date at which the series of hymn tracts began, we find that the Wesleys again cooperated in publishing a third volume of *Hymns and Sacred Poems*, 1742, whose preface and "many of the following verses" dealt with Christian Perfection. This volume contributed a hundred hymns to the permanent Methodist Hymnody. A special interest attaches to the joint publication of *Hymns on the Lord's Supper. With a preface concerning the Christian Sacrament and Sacrifice. Extracted from Doctor Brevint* (Bristol, 1745). Its 166 hymns testify to the deep reverence for the sacramental side of religion that characterized both brothers, and the demand for ten editions shows how much those views influenced the earlier Methodist worship.⁴²

⁴² In 1871 the whole book (together with John Wesley's earlier *Companion to the Altar*) was reprinted as *The Eucharistic Manuals of John and Charles Wesley*. The aim of the editor (W. E. Dutton) was to make it appear that the Wesleys held sacramental views in accord with those of the modern Catholic party.

Independently of John, Charles Wesley published by subscription in 1749 *Hymns and Sacred Poems. In two volumes. By Charles Wesley, M.A., Student of Christ-Church, Oxford* (Bristol). His friends took 1145 copies of these volumes,⁴³ which contain many acceptable hymns, and whose profits helped him to set up housekeeping at Bristol. While partly laid aside, Charles Wesley occupied himself with writing versified comments on Scripture texts, often original, sometimes following earlier commentators. These, to the great number of 2030, he published as *Short Hymns on select passages of the Holy Scriptures* (2 vols., 1763), from which nearly a hundred were taken into Methodist Hymnody. Four years later he printed *Hymns for the use of families, and on various occasions*, many of which relate to his own household and friendships, and hallow the daily life of the home.

Charles Wesley wrote hymns to the very end, and left behind him in manuscript three small quarto volumes of hymns and sacred poems, an uncompleted metrical version of the Psalms and five quarto volumes of hymns on the Gospels and Acts.⁴⁴ The Psalms were printed in *The Arminian Magazine*, and all have been printed with pious care in Dr. Osborn's edition of *The Poetical Works*. It is the great number of the short hymns on Scripture texts that accounts for the vast total of Charles Wesley's work.

Most of the books and tracts we have enumerated as those in which the Wesleyan Hymns first appeared were used to sing from in the revival services, societies, bands or classes. A number are to be regarded as hymn books. But from the first establishment of Sunday, as well as weekday, services Wesley felt the necessity of providing hymn books that should be cheap, compact, and sufficiently inclusive. The earliest of these was *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns. Published by John Wesley, M.A.* (London, 1741); sold at one shilling in binding, and containing 152 pieces. This was kept in print during the whole of Wes-

⁴³ J. Telford, *Life of Charles Wesley*, rev. ed., London, 1900, p. 248.

⁴⁴ Cf. Jackson, *Life of Charles Wesley*, vol. ii, p. 457.

ley's life, remaining in use till superseded by the *Supplement* of 1831. An abridgment of it was bound up with *The Sunday Service* of 1784, and used in congregations employing that service.⁴⁵ In 1753 he published *Hymns and Spiritual Songs, intended for the use of real Christians of all denominations*, made up entirely of selections from the *Hymns and Sacred Poems* of 1739, 1740 and 1741. This became distinctively the Methodist hymn book, remaining in common use till the appearance of "The Large Hymn Book" of 1780, and in poorer societies long afterward. A volume of *Select Hymns* was also published in 1761 with tunes, and in 1773 printed without the tunes. In Wesley's judgment the societies were thus amply supplied with hymn books; "so that it may be doubted whether any religious community in the world has a greater variety of them".⁴⁶

Yet this very variety was an inconvenience to people who could not afford to buy so many books, but wished for more of the hymns than any one volume contained. An urgent demand arose for a more inclusive collection. Wesley resisted it for years. But after the opening of the City Road Chapel in 1778, he yielded and began his preparations. The new book was announced on the cover of *The Arminian Magazine* for October, 1779, and appeared in 1780 as *A Collection of Hymns for the use of the People called Methodists*. London: printed by J. Paramore, at the Foundery: with the now famous preface, dated Oct. 20, 1779, and signed by John Wesley. It was published at three shillings, and contained 525 hymns; all taken from the brothers' previous publications, and all but ten written by members of the Wesley family. They were grouped under the heads of Christian experience, and designed to form "a little body of experimental and practical divinity".⁴⁷

This collection became at once the book of common song in Methodist congregations. After Wesley's death it was

⁴⁵ Cf. Green, *Bibliography*, nos. 30, 376, 378.

⁴⁶ Preface of 1779.

⁴⁷ Preface.

tampered with by the manager of the Methodist Publishing House, who made a succession of alterations, beginning with the 1793 edition, and culminating in that of 1797,⁴⁸ which dropped 24 hymns Wesley had chosen, and added 65 (including "Jesu, Lover of my Soul") which he had not included. The Conference of 1799 appointed a committee "to reduce the large Hymn Book to its primitive simplicity as published in the second edition",⁴⁹ which was attempted, partly then, and partly later, but never carried out in strictness. In 1831 some changes were made, and a "Supplement" added. This served until 1875, when the book was revised, and "A new Supplement" added, nearly as large as the original *Collection*. It was not until 1900, one hundred and nine years after Wesley's death, that steps were taken, even then reluctantly, for a thorough revision and remodelling of Wesley's *Collection*. The revision was made largely in the spirit of catholicity, to which even the fervor of Wesleyanism has been compelled to bow, and the new book appeared in 1904 as *The Methodist Hymn Book*.⁵⁰ For the first time the name of John Wesley disappears from the title of the hymn book, but even so nearly one half of the contents is ascribed to Charles.

As Charles Wesley wrote hymns, so John compiled hymn books, to the end of his life. *A Collection of Psalms and Hymns for the Lord's Day* (1784), has been referred to as bound up with *The Sunday Service*. In spite of the fulness of the *Collection* of 1780, it appeared, to Wesley's vexation, that societies were using hymns he had not authorized. This was largely through the agency of Robert Spence, a York bookseller. He published in 1781 *A Collection of Hymns from various Authors*, enlarged as *A Pocket Hymn Book, designed as a constant companion for the pious: collected from various Authors*. A large proportion of the hymns were taken without authority or acknowledgment

⁴⁸ For the editions, see Green, *Bibliography*, No. 348.

⁴⁹ Wesley had, however, made "corrections" for the 3rd ed., 1782.

⁵⁰ For an interesting account of the method of revision, see Telford, *The Meth. Hy. Bk. illus.*, pp. 12-14.

from various Wesley publications. Apparently to offset it, and also to include some good hymns omitted from the 1780 *Collection*, but widely called for,⁵¹ Wesley published in 1785 *A Pocket Hymn Book, for the use of Christians of all denominations*. It was not reprinted, but under the advice of Conference Wesley reprinted the Spence book (with the same title as that of 1785), expunging 37 hymns as dull and prosaic, or "grievous doggerel". Spence submitted to Wesley's authority,⁵² but his little book afterward became a favorite in America.

In extreme old age, Wesley published his last collection, *Hymns for Children* (1790), chosen from his brother's *Hymns for Children and others of riper years* (1763). These hymns show that the Wesleys were minded to carry on the Children's Hymnody Watts had begun, but many are beyond a child's comprehension. In an interesting little preface Wesley contrasts Watts' method of writing down to the child's level with his brother's efforts to lift up the child to his own:—his brother's hymns are "in such plain and easy language as even children may understand; but when they do understand them they will be children no longer".

III

THE METHODIST SINGING

Wesley gave the same forethought and attention to the musical as to the literary side of Methodist Song, keeping its direction in his own hands. His equipment for this undertaking was his sound musical feeling, a very limited technical knowledge, and an unusual practical sense. Perceiving the importance of the Hymn Tune to the purpose he had in view, he provided a body of "authorized" hymn tunes, and expected that none other should be sung by his followers. His cardinal principle was that the tunes should invite the participation of all the people; and, next,

⁵¹ Preface.

⁵² Tyerman, *John Wesley*, vol. iii, p. 539.

should keep within the limits of sobriety and reverence. The tunes were to express the words, avoiding "vain repetitions" to fill out the music. Florid and fuguing tunes he likened to "Lancashire hornpipes".⁵³

Wesley prepared four Methodist tune books, and perhaps consented to the use of two more. As early as 1742 he printed *A Collection of Tunes, set to music, as they are commonly sung at the Foundery*.⁵⁴ The hymns set are those of the three volumes of *Hymns and Sacred Poems*. Its price of six pence was intended to make it available to the poor; and in printing the melody alone he appealed to the unskillful. The book was so full of musical errors as to defeat its own end, but is interesting as showing the tunes first used at the Foundery. There are only three of the *Old Version* Psalm tunes. Very few of these remained in actual use, and these were inevitably associated with the dull, drawling parochial Psalmody. The tunes of the *Supplement to the New Version* were freely drawn upon; six German melodies, which Wesley had sung with the Moravians, were taken from Freylinghausen's *Gesang-Buch*; and some eleven tunes were apparently new.⁵⁵

The conversion in 1746 of Mrs. Rich, wife of the proprietor of Covent Garden Theater put Charles Wesley in touch with the London musical circle in which J. F. Lampe, Handel and others moved.⁵⁶ Handel set three of Charles' hymns to music. Lampe published a musical setting of twenty-four as *Hymns on the great Festivals, and other occasions* (London, 1746; 4to). Handel's tunes were not printed: Lampe's were generally admired, and their use was "allowed" in Methodist services. The store of Methodist tunes was increased by the adaptation of popular melodies and by local tunes which Wesley came upon in his travels.⁵⁷

⁵³ *Minutes of Conference*, 1768.

⁵⁴ A reprint was bound up with that of the Charleston collection of 1737.

⁵⁵ Cf. J. T. Lightwood, *Hymn Tunes and their story*, London, n. d., pp. 121-125.

⁵⁶ Telford, *Charles Wesley*, pp. 150-154, 230-234.

⁵⁷ Lightwood, *op. cit.*, p. 128.

Some of these tunes, with others, were gathered together by Thomas Butts, a companion of the Wesleys, in his *Harmonia Sacra* (c. 1753). Wesley commended this book, but objected to its more florid tunes, which he thought irreverent, and its old Psalm tunes, which he thought dull. Wesley's own *Sacred Melody*, published in 1761, to bind up with the *Select Hymns* of that year, is little more than an amended reproduction of Butts' book, omitting the objectionable tunes. The 102 tunes of *Sacred Melody* represent all those in use with Wesley's approval.⁵⁸ A class of tunes of a more florid type, and characterized by much repetition of the words and breaking up of the lines, came into such wide popularity later that they were known in time as "The Old Methodist Tunes." As a matter of fact these tunes represented the taste of the later eighteenth century in general and not of the Methodists in particular as distinguished either from Churchmen or Dissenters.⁵⁹

In speaking of the actual Methodist tunes Wesley says in the preface to his *Sacred Melody* of 1761 that he had been engaged for twenty years endeavoring to persuade musicians to follow his directions in setting down the tunes, but in vain. He has at last prevailed, and the tunes are here "pricked *true*, exactly as I desire all our congregations may sing them". In this book appeared Wesley's "Directions for Singing", to be observed carefully in order that "this part of Divine worship may be the more acceptable to God, as well as more profitable" to singer and hearer. These seven rules became canonical, and are, briefly: "Learn *these* tunes before any others; sing them exactly as printed; sing all of them; sing lustily; sing modestly; sing in time; above all sing spiritually, with an eye to God in every word". They exhibit the practical mind and indomitable will of Wesley covering the minutest details of Methodist

⁵⁸ "All the tunes in *common use* among us." Wesley's preface. For a good characterization of the contents of *Sacred Melody*, see "Early Methodist Psalmody" in *A new History of Methodism*, ed. by J. W. Townsend *et al.*, London, 1909, vol. ii, appendix C, pp. 558-560.

⁵⁹ Cf. Lightwood, *op. cit.*, chaps. v and viii.

song. And both Wesley's Journal and the minutes of the Annual Conferences show how closely the observance of these rules was looked after, and any breach of them in spirit or letter detected.

Behind these regulations there was a marked spontaneity in the early Methodist Singing. It was the utterance of simple and unlettered hearts in whom the Wesleyan evangel had awakened a great happiness. They sang because their overcharged feelings could not keep from singing. The new hymns both fed and expressed the new feelings; and the thrill of spiritual passion leaped from heart to heart of a great concourse singing together "Blow ye the trumpet, blow", "O for a thousand tongues to sing", or "Soldiers of Christ, arise".

This Methodist song in its spiritual spontaneity, its fervor and its gladness, fulfilled to a remarkable degree the Apostolic ideal of Christian Song; and the injunctions of Wesley inevitably recall the figure of St. Paul, striving not to stimulate so much as to regulate the "tongues", and dealing prudently with their excesses and infelicities. The Methodist excesses at the first were simply the noise of too much physical exuberance and the confusions inevitable to singers musically ignorant. Wesley instructed his preachers to interrupt the noisy hymn, and interpolate questions to the congregation:—"Now do you know what you said last? Did it suit your case? Did you sing it as to God, with the spirit and understanding also"?⁶⁰ The ignorant, he insisted, should be taught to sing by note and acceptably.⁶¹ On their behalf he himself published two tractates: *A short Introduction to Music*, and *The Grounds of vocal Music*. Refined, scholarly, of Anglican training and with churchly sympathies, neither of the Wesleys conceived or abetted congregational song that was vulgar in its literary contents or flippant in music or indecorous in expression. They cultivated a Hymnody that should be reverently and decently ordered without any sacrifice of its heartiness.

⁶⁰ *Minutes of Conference*, 1746.

⁶¹ *Minutes*, 1765.

As time went on the excesses of exuberance naturally lessened, and were followed by the creeping in of formality. Wesley thought slow singing in itself tended to formality, doubtless having in mind the droning of the Psalms in parish churches of the time.⁶² But a new danger arose with the formation of a body of "Singers" to lead the worship of the chapels. The singing originally had required little leadership. Until the hymns were familiar or the people could read, the lines were read out, and the tune started by the preacher or any one available. As hymn and tune grew familiar, they sounded forth impulsively. But with church organization came the choir; and, with the choir, first the more intricate tune, then the anthem, and finally the organ. The Minutes of 1768 protest against the florid tunes. Those of 1787 prohibit the introduction of anthems, as not properly joint worship. In 1796 an exception was allowed on special occasions. On such occasions, it appears from the Minutes of 1800, even "theatrical" singers had been introduced into the chapels to sing elaborate solos and choruses. A few years later Richard Watson printed a pamphlet on *Singing Men and Women*, rebuking them as a class for unduly magnifying their office.⁶³

The question of instrumental music perhaps hardly arose during Wesley's life. In the open air meetings the great volume of sound would have drowned out any accompaniment, as it often drowned out the voices of those sent to break up the meetings. And in none of the chapels were the circumstances of the people such as to make likely any proposal to install an organ. The bass-viol seems to have been first introduced, as a support to the leader's voice. The clarionet and other instruments followed, as was the custom in the parish churches also. The Minutes of 1796 prohibit organs until proposed by the Conference. The Minutes of 1808 show that some had already been introduced, but consent is refused to the erection of any more. The introduction of an organ in Brunswick Chapel, Leeds,

⁶² *Minutes*, 1768.

⁶³ Curwen, *Worship Music*, 1st series, p. 57.

produced bitter controversy and a secession of "Protestant Methodists", whose protest was against instrumental music. Daniel Isaac's *Vocal Melody, or, Singing the only music sanctioned by divine authority, in the public worship of Christians* (York, 1827), reveals in its title the ground of this protest; although Isaac himself refused to join the seceders. In this, as in much beside, the Church Song of Methodism has since yielded to modern influences. Practically all of the 9,000 churches of Wesleyan Methodism in England to-day have their organ and choir;⁶⁴ and in 1910 a monthly periodical, *The Choir*, was established in the interests of Methodist church music. The Congregational Singing of present day Methodism has also exchanged something of its early fervor for the more tempered enthusiasm that comes with years and educational progress. But it still retains a certain characteristic flavor of its own; a certain potentiality also of regaining the old warmth and volume under the stimulus of revival preaching.

IV

THE PLACE OF THE WESLEYS IN THE HISTORY OF THE HYMN

It is evident that a place must be given to the Wesleyan Hymnody in the history of religion itself. The Wesleys inaugurated a great spiritual revival; and their hymns did as much as any human agency to kindle and replenish its fervor. They conducted the propaganda of a new theology: we scan Wesley's sermons to discover its contents, but in the hymns it was sung by multitudes; and of the two media of its dissemination, the song was probably the more effective. John Wesley led an ecclesiastical revolt, and, failing to conquer his own Church, established a new one of phenomenal proportions: the hymns prefigured the constitution of the new Church and formed the manual of its spiritual discipline. The Wesleyan Hymns are thus deeply written into the religious history of English-speak-

⁶⁴ *The Choir* for January, 1910, p. 1.

ing peoples. We might sum up the Wesleys' work in Hymnody by saying that they perceived the spiritual possibilities of Hymns and of Hymn Singing, and that they realized them, apparently to the full.

With this glimpse toward the wider bearings of their work, it remains nevertheless to estimate more precisely the place and importance of the Wesleys in the history of the English Hymn and the extension of Hymn Singing. It will be convenient to regard their work as:—

I. *A great enrichment of the stores of English Hymns.*—The work of Charles Wesley as a hymn writer attained vast proportions, including some 6,500 hymns. In distinguishing major from minor poets, it is customary to regard the mere bulk of an author's production as an evidence of power and an element of impressiveness. The same consideration doubtless applies to hymn writers. But in Charles Wesley's case his inventiveness and facility were coupled with a total inability for self-criticism. The inward impulse to give rhythmical expression to convictions and feelings hardened into a habit. And this, stimulated by the assurance of an eager welcome for anything he might publish, led him to produce a considerable body of material in no way worthy of his own powers.

But for all practical purposes the contribution of Charles Wesley to devotional poetry was confined to the limits of the selection made by his brother John for the *Methodist Collection* of 1780, and its supplements. The pamphlets and volumes in which the hymns originally appeared were allowed to go out of print, and dropped out of sight; and some part of his work remained unpublished. The Methodists were so well satisfied with their hymn book as to be incurious as regards the outlying material. Moreover, Charles Wesley had remained a consistent churchman to the end. He had controverted many of his brother's opinions, and protested against his whole course in establishing an independent Methodist Church. Loyalty to John Wesley's memory left the Methodists indisposed toward any

attempt to magnify the name or reputation of Charles. His family deemed it prudent to keep his manuscripts and family papers in careful custody, and it was not till after Miss Wesley's death in 1828 that they passed into the possession of the Wesleyan Conference.⁶⁵ No adequate biography of Charles Wesley was written until 1841. No attempt was made to collect the numerous poetical publications, or even to prepare any connected account of them, until 1848, when an American, Joseph Creamer of Baltimore, published his *Methodist Hymnology*.⁶⁶ The whole body of the Wesleyan Hymns was not collected and printed until in 1868-1872 the London Conference Office published *The Poetical Works of John and Charles Wesley* in thirteen 12mo volumes.

But while in this way the presentation of Charles Wesley's work as a whole was deferred, and his actual contribution to Hymnody narrowed down to the contents of the *Methodist Collection*, even so that contribution was unprecedentedly large. Even in the first edition the number of hymns regarded as his was about as large as in the entire "System of Praise" of Dr. Watts, and in the revision of 1875 it attained the great total of 724 hymns. The whole number of these hymns must be regarded as having come into actual use. If any escaped being sung, it was nevertheless read devotionally. After a century and a quarter the revisers of 1904 speak of "the delicate task of removing hymns from Wesley's original book",⁶⁷ and their new *Methodist Hymn Book* retains 429 hymns ascribed to Charles Wesley. His whole contribution to English Hymnody cannot therefore be estimated in figures smaller than these, and the number of his hymns in actual use to-day has been estimated as 500.^{67a}

⁶⁵ See Jackson, *Life of Charles Wesley*, preface.

⁶⁶ The *Wesleyan Hymnology* of Rev. Wm. P. Burgess (London, 1845, 2nd ed. 1846), was simply "A Companion to the Wesleyan Hymn Book", with brief remarks on the hymns, intended to promote their profitable use.

⁶⁷ Preface to the *Meth. Hy. Bk.*, p. iv.

^{67a} Gregory, *op. cit.*, p. 165.

Beside such figures the contribution of John Wesley is relatively small. His share in writing the original hymns cannot now be determined. In the *Collection* of 1780, twenty-seven numbers are admittedly his, mostly renderings from the German. These, though few, give him an unique place as a hymn writer at the head of the still small band who have transferred foreign hymns so deftly that they live and breathe naturally under English skies. A number of these versions may fairly be included among the classics of English Hymnody.

But John Wesley stands related to the whole body of the Wesleyan Hymns as their editor. The editor's function is at all times essential to the well-being of Congregational Praise, and Wesley was the first of note in the long line of English hymnal compilers. He exercised his function autocratically, but on the whole with distinguished success. Charles Wesley's hymns owe much to the strong hand of his brother, not only for the winnowing they so much needed, but for the verbal revision to which he subjected them insistently, before their first appearing and after it. His entire freedom in this respect has been regarded as inconsistent with the protest in the preface of the *Collection* against the alteration of his own or his brother's hymns by other hands. "I desire," he says, "they would not attempt to mend them; for they really are not able. None of them is able to mend either the sense or the verse."⁶⁸ There is nothing in the protest inconsistent with the practice. Wesley sincerely believed he could improve other people's hymns, whether Watts' or his brother's, and along with this self-confidence had a total lack of confidence in the ability of other "hymn-tinkers". The results in his case went far to justify the self-confidence. Unhappily the practice rather than the protest established a precedent for an editorial custom of "tinkering" hymns which afterward went to great lengths, and only too often failed to justify itself.

II. The work of the Wesleys *modified the ideal of the*

⁶⁸ Both Whitefield and Toplady were among those who in their published hymn books had already offended in this direction.

English Hymn itself, both on its spiritual and literary sides, and *established new types of hymns*.—No one can turn from the earlier hymns to the Wesleyan without being conscious of a change of atmosphere, a heightening of emotion, a novelty of theme, a new manner of expression.

(1). This change reveals itself, first, through *a new evangelistic note in the hymns*. In the quiet of his study Watts had aimed to improve the character of the Service of Praise. The Wesleys struck a new note,—the proclamation of an unlimited atonement and free gospel, with the yearning cry of the field preacher to "all that pass by". They sounded it in revival hymns, directly addressed to sinners, and glowing with the exhorter's excitement. They aimed to bring the unchurched and unsaved within the sound of the gospel, and to use song as a means of his conversion and upbuilding. And so, when the hymns were gathered into the *Methodist Collection*, the first section of the book bore the title, "Exhorting and Entreating to return to God".

The Wesleys may be said to have introduced the Evangelistic Hymn, as we use that term to-day. Their lead was more or less followed through the whole breadth of the Evangelical Revival, and by the extending line of latter-day revivalists. There will always be some to contend that evangelistic hymns should be confined to revival meetings as distinguished from the Church's stated worship, and that a rhymed appeal to sinners is not a hymn in any true sense. But the quickened sense of responsibility for evangelization which spread from the Methodist Movement into all the Churches has learned to regard such questions as largely academic. The Evangelistic Hymn has a secure place not only in the ordinary church hymnal but even in the collections of the straitest Anglicans. For this the Wesleys are responsible, even though the evangelistic hymns of Charles Wesley have not as a class come into much use beyond Methodism. Each subsequent revival has tended to develop its own Hymnody. But for the character of too much of this later Hymnody the Wesleys cannot justly

be regarded as responsible. The Evangelistic Hymn as conceived by them is simple, direct and tender; expressed in rippling measures that would catch the ear of the passer-by and assist his memory. But from triviality, and no less from vulgarity, the Wesleyan hymns are characteristically free.

(2). The work of the Wesleys, notably of Charles, greatly affected the *Hymn of Christian Experience*. At his hands this becomes the predominating theme of Hymnody. He felt an impulse to translate every new spiritual experience into song; and the spiritual needs of the converts, as disclosed in the class-meetings, broke through his natural reserve, and called upon him to bare the deepest feelings of his soul, and lay them at the feet of those who needed his sympathy and guidance. The hymns are frankly autobiographical. They portray, without any effort to tone down his own heightened emotions to the average level, his personal spiritual history:—his unrest and even agony under bondage to the law, his instantaneous conversion and the assurance of faith, the period of ecstatic joy, the ups and downs of the pilgrim progress to the "second rest", his delight in the anticipation of death.

In this way the Methodist Hymnody developed into something more than a body of Church Song. As finally gathered into the *Collection* of 1780, it constituted what John Wesley called the fullest account of Scriptural Christianity in existence. The whole area of the operations of the Spirit in the heart is there charted out with firmness and precision. The experiences are primarily the Wesleys' own. But it was a feature of their method to anticipate, and in a remarkable degree to evoke, in their converts a repetition of their own experiences. And the Hymnody did much in developing the type of piety we still describe as Methodist. Methodist though it was, Dr. Martineau, the Unitarian, wrote of it in 1869:⁹⁹—"After the Scriptures, the Wesley Hymn Book appears to me the grandest

⁹⁹ *Life and Letters of James Martineau*, New York, 1902, vol. ii, p. 99.

instrument of popular religious culture that Christendom has ever produced."

This conception of the Hymn, and this turning of the congregational praise book into a manual of spiritual discipline, were not the expression of the Wesleys' theory of worship imposed upon the Revival. They were rather the result of the Revival experiences with the poor and unlettered, the observation of the great educative power that lay in the use of hymns which the Revival itself had called forth and shaped. In the fulness and precision of its dealings with the Christian life, the Methodist *Collection* remains unique, but its new emphasis on the Hymn of Experience became a precedent, and was extended through the various channels of Hymnody that more or less directly had their source in the Revival.

The value of the precedent thus established will be variously appraised. From the liturgical point of view the Hymn of Experience seems to violate the traditions, and to create a new standard of Church Praise. Instead of a congregation uttering its corporate praise with a common voice, we have a gathering of individuals conducting their private devotions in audible unison. And when the Hymn of Experience becomes autobiographical, it gives rise to the double question, how far its writer's individual experience is fitted to be a norm of Christian experience in general, and how far putting another's experience into the mouth of a promiscuous congregation lends itself to the promotion of religious insincerity.

In applying these tests to Charles Wesley's autobiographical hymns, there is no occasion to separate the body of them from the Wesleyan Method, of which they became the effective instrument. In the case of a great majority of them, their use has been confined within the limits of Methodism. Of the remainder some, by reason of their emotional intensity and spiritual exaltation, are clearly unfitted for general and indiscriminate use.⁷⁰ Others have

⁷⁰ "They are too good for such purposes." Burgess, *op cit.*, p. 266.

awakened a response in the common heart of English-speaking Christendom; though even in the case of some of these there is no unanimity of opinion as to the fitness of such intimate strains for general worship.⁷¹

(3). The work of the Wesleys led the way toward a *churchly or Liturgical Hymnody*. The idea of celebrating the Christian festivals in verse had of course been held in common by many devotional poets: even that of a "Christian Year" which should be a poetic illustration of the Prayer Book began with Bishop Ken rather than with Keble. But in the Wesleys' time the thought of a "Hymnal Companion to the Prayer Book" was not in men's minds, and the work of Wither in that direction had been long forgotten.

The Wesleys had planned to carry on their work in the Church of their fathers, and as late as 1750 printed hymns under their names as "Presbyters of the Church of England".⁷² The group of hymn tracts for various festivals of the Christian Year contains some of the best hymns of that type in the language, and perhaps indicates the line on which the Wesleyan Hymnody would have developed apart from revival influences. Even after the Church proved inhospitable to the Wesleys' work and their hymns, the brothers remained in its ministry, churchmen at heart and to a great extent in practice.

The *Hymns on the Lord's Supper* of 1745 would seem a strange intrusion into the body of their experimental Hymnody, if we did not understand how the Church service and the Methodist meeting continued, in the mind of both brothers, to exist side by side, each complementing the other. They regarded the Lord's Supper as the crown of Christian worship, and held it in profoundest reverence. This book of 1745 is the witness of their desire that their

⁷¹ *E.g.*, of "Jesu, Lover of my soul", Canon Ellerton, the hymn writer, has said: "Most clergymen, I suppose, would hesitate before selecting it as the vehicle of the ordinary worship of a mixed congregation." H. Housman, *John Ellerton*, London, 1896, p. 237.

⁷² *Hymns on the Lord's Supper* (title pages of some editions).

followers should share their views. It is a "hymnal companion" to the Prayer Book "Order of the Administration of the Lord's Supper", by no means neglectful of the "Catholic" aspects of that service. John Wesley required of his people frequent communions in their parish churches; and, after the permanent organization of Methodism as a separate church, arranged for it a liturgical and sacramental scheme of worship, modified from the *Book of Common Prayer*, with its own Hymnody "for the Lord's Day" services. The churchly and sacramental proclivities of the Wesleys permanently impressed themselves on English Methodism, and, as embodied in its Hymnody, differentiate that Hymnody from the early Nonconformist "System of Praise", and no less from later types of Revival Hymnody, which give scant recognition to Church or sacrament. "Never at any time was there a danger of the Methodist Societies cutting themselves off from the Catholic Church by neglect of the Sacraments, or of their becoming an exclusively evangelistic organization on the plan of the Salvation Army."⁷³ There was thus nothing anomalous in the fact that the Wesleys should be the first within the bounds of the Church of England to celebrate its festival days in adequate songs and to provide a Sacramental Hymnody.

(4). The work of the Wesleys set up a *new standard in Hymnody on its literary side*. Their hymns are in line with the earlier devotional poets rather than with Watts. They controverted Watts' canon of hymn writing and laid down a new one,—a hymn should be a poem.

John Wesley's taking to Georgia a copy of Herbert's Poems, and his repeated efforts to utilize its verses in his hymn books, are significant. The brothers had been trained in the very atmosphere of sacred poetry. Samuel Wesley's preface to his *An Epistle to a friend concerning Poetry* (1700) was a vigorous, even violent, phillipic against the profligacy and "infidel principles" of current letters, espe-

⁷³ Gregory, *Hymn Book of the Modern Church*, p. 177.

cially poetry; and all the poets of the Epworth rectory aimed to rebut the prevailing notion that religion offered no fit themes to poetry. So far the standpoint of Watts and the Wesleys was one, but only so far.

Watts insisted that the Hymn must be kept outside the realm of poetry, stripped of poetic suggestiveness, and be written down to the level of the meanest capacity. Wesley maintained that the Hymn should be a religious lyric and create the impression of lyrical poetry; that the masses must be lifted up to the level of the Hymn, and made to feel the beauty and inspiration of poetry. By this standard he tried not only the work of Watts, but of his brother Charles, of a group of whose hymns he said, "Some are bad, some mean, some most excellently good".⁷⁴ And when his Methodist "System of Praise" was finally complete, he made the proud boast:⁷⁵—

"May I be permitted to add a few words with regard to the poetry? . . . In these Hymns there is no doggerel, no botches, nothing put in to patch up the rhyme, no feeble expletives. Here is nothing turgid or bombast on the one hand, or low and creeping on the other. . . . Here are (allow me to say) both the purity, the strength, and the elegance of the ENGLISH language: and at the same time the utmost simplicity and plainness, suited to every capacity. Lastly, I desire men of taste to judge (these are the only competent judges;) whether there is not in some of the following verses the true Spirit of Poetry: such as cannot be acquired by art and labour; but must be the gift of nature. By labour a man may become a tolerable imitator of SPENSER, SHAKESPEAR, or MILTON, and may heap together pretty compound epithets, as PALE-EYED, WEAK-EYED, and the like. But unless he is born a Poet, he will never attain the genuine SPIRIT OF POETRY."

In the judgment of a recent historian of English Poetry,⁷⁶ Wesley "was fully justified" in making this boast, and his brother Charles was "the most admirable *devotional* lyric poet in the English language".

Incidental to the poetic freedom with which Charles Wes-

⁷⁴ *Journal*, December 15, 1788.

⁷⁵ In preface to the *Collection* of 1780.

⁷⁶ W. J. Courthope, *A History of English Poetry*, vol. v, London, 1905, p. 343.

ley wrote was the marked metrical development he gave to the English Hymn. Tate and Brady in the new Psalmody, and Watts in the new Hymnody, had confined themselves to the simple metres of the old Psalmody. This was with a view of meeting the musical limitations of the congregations, but not without a thought for the quasi-sacredness acquired by these metres as the traditional vehicles of praise, Charles Wesley cast aside all such scruples, and wrote freely in the rhythms and measures most natural or effective; some suggested by German originals, some his own. He wrote hymns in some thirty metres, whose freshness and variety became a marked feature of the *Methodist Collection*. He rather neglected the familiar Iambic metres of the Psalm books, purposely no doubt, and excelled in his handling of trochaic metres. Some of his irregular or "peculiar" metres have less reason for being there.

The early Methodists, always under the pressure of John Wesley's schooling, seem to have had little trouble with the novel metres. But their ability to handle the less simple metres gradually lessened. By the XIXth century a considerable part of the *Collection* had, for that reason, become practically obsolete. Toward the middle of the century the matter was taken up, and some of the hymns restored into actual use. On the other hand, a variety of metres introduced by the Wesleys have now become familiar and standard measures in English Hymnody.

Upon the writing of hymns Charles Wesley's influence was less immediate and less clearly marked than that of Watts. He cannot be said to have established a school of hymn writers. His poetic inspiration and even his peculiar style discouraged imitation. Of the associates of the Wesleys who remained Methodists, Thomas Olivers⁷⁷ and John Bakewell⁷⁸ are each remembered as the author of a single hymn. In the generation immediately following the Wesleys, there were virtually no Methodist hymn writers at all. No need was felt of adding to the Wesleyan Hymns,

⁷⁷ Author of "The God of Abraham praise".

⁷⁸ Author of "Hail! Thou once-despised Jesus".

and certainly there was no hope in any Methodist mind of improving upon them. Of the Wesleys' associates who became Moravians, those who wrote hymns show the influence of Herrnhut rather than of Charles Wesley. On the Calvinistic side of the Revival there was more opportunity for hymn writers than on the Methodist. And it is one of the humors of the situation that the polemic and indignant Toplady so "evidently kindled his poetic torch at that of his contemporary, Charles Wesley". Montgomery's remark⁷⁹ that if Toplady's "Deathless principle, arise" had appeared without name, it might have been confidently set down as the production of Charles Wesley, may be extended to cover a number of Toplady's hymns. Upon hymn writers in general Charles Wesley's influence operated less by way of furnishing models for imitation than by gradually enlarging their conception of the Hymn, in its themes, its methods and its metrical structure.

V

THE WESLEYAN HYMNS IN THE CHURCH AT LARGE

We have yet to consider the part of the Wesleys in the Extension of Hymn Singing. And perhaps it needs to be emphasized that their immediate work in this direction was effected within the ranks of their own followers. It was effected by developing among them a new type of fervid song learned from the Moravians, and by establishing a great denomination of which Hymn Singing was the characteristic note.

When we come to "The revolution in Church Psalmody" which the editor of Wesley's *Journal* foresees in his work in Georgia and his hymn book of 1737,⁸⁰ we need to remember that Watts and not Wesley was the leader in that revolution. Even the familiar statement of Green that by the Wesleys "a new musical impulse was aroused in the

⁷⁹ *The Christian Psalmist*, 1825, preface, p. xxvi.

⁸⁰ *Journal*, vol. i, p. 229.

people which gradually changed the face of public devotion throughout England",⁸¹ needs to be qualified. The fervor of Methodist song was evoked by Methodist experience. It does not appear to have passed over even to the Calvinistic side of the Revival itself. The influence of the Wesleys in "changing the face of devotion" was somewhat indirect, and to a great extent it was deferred.

When we think of the contagion of Methodist fervor as inoculating the ranks of the Psalm singers outside with its love of the Wesleyan Hymns and its passion for hymn-singing, we are far away from real XVIIIth century happenings. The actual relation of the work of the Wesleys in Hymnody to the Churches outside of Methodism involves some very peculiar features. Perhaps there is no readier way of understanding it than that of pointing the contrast in this respect between their work and that of their predecessor, Dr. Watts.

To-day it is a commonplace to couple the names of Watts and Charles Wesley at the head of English Hymnody, with little disposition to ask which name is the greater. But this attitude of the modern Church toward them has been attained very gradually. It involved a complete readjustment of the claim of the two men upon the Church's favor; and this readjustment became possible only after a gradual enlargement of the Church's heart, in affecting which the Wesleys have been among the chief agents. Historically there was the sharpest contrast between the Church's reception of Watts' Psalms and Hymns on the one hand and of Charles Wesley's on the other. Two features of the original situation sufficiently explain this.

First. The contrast existed already in the actual work of the two men, judged from the point of view of availability for general use. Watts' felicity lay in his gift for locating the common level and his refusal to soar. He embodied the theology of his surroundings, and kept within the average range of spiritual experience. This self-

⁸¹ *Short History of the English People*, ed. London, 1884, p. 719.

restraint gave his work something like a universal appeal. When he had once persuaded Nonconformist Churches that they wanted Hymns, the Churches felt that his hymns were just what they wanted. His entire System of Praise, without sifting or retrenchment, commended itself alike to Independents, Presbyterians, and Baptists. Thus it could happen that in many quarters what now is called the "Hymnal" was referred to simply as "Watts".

Nothing of this kind could have happened to Charles Wesley. His work did not commend itself to current taste as poetry. To the average worshiper it would hardly suggest itself as adapted for singing. He had no experience of the use of anything like this as material of praise, and knew no tunes in these strange metres. Its theology was aggressively in the opposition, and heated by the controversial spirit. Its spiritual tone was strange and unreal to the man who had not come under Methodist training. Moreover the high spiritual levels on which Charles Wesley moved were immeasurably above the average experience or even ambition. And, at a time when the churches expected to receive their materials of praise as a unit, if not indeed from a single hand, no one of the successive collections of the Wesleys' hymns could have been a candidate for adoption in any branch of the Church, or by any company of Christians outside of Methodism. The very necessity of selecting the available hymns, imbedded in a mass of material not attractive to general taste or conviction, was tantamount to a postponement of the rightful claims of the Wesleys to a share in the Hymnody of the Church at large.

Second. There was the same contrast in the extent of the opportunity for the general diffusion of their hymns afforded by the respective circumstances and surroundings of Watts and Charles Wesley.

Watts moved on the social uplands of English Nonconformity. He was universally looked up to by dissenters, and he freely met "Bishops and other clergy" on their own

level. His position could not have been more favorable for disseminating that System of Church Praise he regarded as his great work. But while Watts advanced by the highways, seen and respected of all, the Wesleys worked behind the hedges separating them from both Church and dissent. In so far as either had any real knowledge of the Wesleys and their work, they were regarded by churchmen as schismatics and ranters, and by socially respectable dissent as sentimentalists and sensationalists. They sought to reach the masses neglected by Church and dissent alike, and by methods disapproved of by both. They forsook the conventional order, aroused intellectual contempt, awakened intense theological bitterness and incurred social ostracism, and even personal violence. It is difficult now to reproduce, even to the imagination, "the Reproach of Methodism," and to appreciate the isolation of the Methodist Movement from contemporary religious activity or stagnation.

It would be idle to deny that the Wesleyan Hymns suffered from these associations. The contagion of this fervid Methodist song could not be felt, so long as the Methodists and the Churches were not brought into contact. The real charm of the Wesleyan poetry could not be perceived, so long as men regarded it as the mere vehicle of Methodist errors, or failed to regard it at all, as unworthy of attention. There resulted an inevitable postponement of any use of the Wesleyan Hymns by the Churches outside. And even more permanently the hymns retained a Methodist taint, from which nothing but the change of feeling that time brings could wholly free them.

Whitefield's use of some of the Wesleyan Hymns at his Tabernacle helped a few of them across the wall separating Arminianism from Calvinism. But the Countess of Huntingdon Connexion and the Moravian Methodists developed their own hymn writers and their own Hymnody. One and another of the choice spirits among the Church of England clergy who caught the glow of the Revival, introduced some of the Wesleyan Hymns into their new hymn

books, and gave them their first opportunity for a wider use. Some of these hymns passed from one collection into others, and were gradually added to. They made their way on their own merits, as it is evident that many compilers knew nothing of the source of the materials they used. Even so, the Wesleyan Hymns thus used in the latter part of the XVIIIth century were few, and their use itself limited. The Independents were under the spell of the Watts tradition. In the first outstanding Baptist collection (Ash and Evans, 1760) the infusion of Wesleyan Hymns was very trifling: in that of Dr. Rippon (1787) it was larger. In the early XIXth century the inclusion of some Wesleyan Hymns became the general rule, and their number has gradually increased to its present proportions. But in such use, through the first half-century and beyond, there was a very common feature which every student of hymn books has observed; that is to say, that even where compilers have been careful to give the names of other authors, the hymns of the Wesleys were frequently printed as anonymous, or ascribed to some other author. Doddridge, Toplady, De Courcey, Cennick, Cowper and Montgomery, were among the names given as the authors of Wesleyan hymns in English and American collections of note. Of Wesleyan hymns, given without any name, or with a wrong name appended to them, Mr. Burgess⁸² found 27 in Rippon's *Selection* (18th ed.), 15 in Willcock's *Collection*, 24 in Montgomery's *Christian Psalmist*, 22 in Bickersteth's *Christian Psalmody*, and 29 in Conder's *Congregational Hymn-Book*. It is not surprising that Burgess saw in this coincidence a furtive use of Wesleyan materials, and something like a conspiracy to suppress the truth, due to Calvinistic prejudice. And yet, among the compilers Burgess arraigns, James Montgomery was influenced by no such motive, and in the pages of the very book referred to he paid tribute to Charles Wesley's genius, ranking him next to Watts. An explanation of the situation must include Montgomery as well as Rippon.

⁸² W. P. Burgess, *Wesleyan Hymnology*, 2nd ed., London, 1849, p. 9.

The explanation of the manner of Wesley's treatment lies largely, if not wholly, in the general ignorance of hymn book compilers concerning their materials. It must be remembered that Daniel Sedgwick, a shoemaker's apprentice and second-hand book dealer, not born until 1814, was the first to make a collection and systematic study of English hymn books. And only when in middle life he began to put his knowledge at the service of compilers, was there a beginning of the lifting of the dense cloud of ignorance covering the sphere of minor letters now appropriated to what we call Hymnology. This ignorance was well distributed over the whole extent of Hymnody. But it must be admitted that as regards Charles Wesley there was something like a concentration of ignorance. In the 13th number of *Notes and Queries* (Jan. 26, 1850), established as "a medium of inter-communication between literary men", etc., a correspondent asks:

"Can any of your readers inform me who was the author of the well-known Christmas-Hymn, 'Hark the Herald Angels Sing', which is so often found (of course without the slightest shadow of authority) at the end of our Prayer Books? In the collection of poems entitled *Christmas-Tyde*, published by Pickering, the initials 'J. C. W.' are appended to it; the same in Bickersteth's *Hymn Book*. In the last number of the *Christian Remembrancer*, it is incorrectly attributed to Doddridge. . . . If the author of the hymn cannot be determined, it would be interesting to know its probable date. . . ."

It may be noted that the writer in *The Christian Remembrancer* who in 1850 attributed the hymn to Doddridge was none other than John Mason Neale, a diligent student of the old Church Hymnody.

Three weeks after the appearance of the inquiry in *Notes and Queries*, came a reply (the only one) from another correspondent:

"I believe [the hymn] to be the composition of the Rev. Charles Wesley, the younger brother of the celebrated John Wesley. He was the author of many of the hymns in his brother's collection, which are distinguished for their elegance and simplicity. I am not able to find out, for certain, whether he had another name; if he had, it was probably the occasion of the initials (J. C. W.) your correspondent mentions."

The need for such an inquiry in such quarters sixty-two years after Charles Wesley's death, and the uncertainty of the only reply, fully explain the failure of the editors of hymn books to give him proper recognition. There was no conspiracy among them to suppress the facts. But there was a common ignorance concerning Charles Wesley and his work. And it may be that in his case there was an element of wilfulness in this ignorance that had its roots in theological or ecclesiastical prejudice. Whatever the motives to disassociate his name from his hymns may have been, the net result was in his favor. A number of these unfathered hymns gained a sure place in the affections of the Churches. And when they came to realize the actual extent of Charles Wesley's contribution to the common stock, the time had come when the fact could be accepted even gladly, as an evidence of the large area of Christian truth and feeling which all the Churches hold in common.

Philadelphia.

LOUIS F. BENSON.

JOHN WITHERSPOON IN SCOTLAND

AN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY EVANGELICAL

It was in 1768 that John Witherspoon left Scotland to become President of Princeton College in New Jersey, and Pastor of the Congregation there, taking with him a valuable gift of books to the Library. By strenuous exertions he placed the College upon a sound financial basis; entirely changed the system of teaching; greatly extended the number of subjects taught; and lectured energetically himself.

At the outbreak of the Revolution he sided strongly though temperately with the Americans and did much to mould the opinions of the Irish and Scotch settlers in the same way of thinking. He was a member of the Continental Congress, and of the Secret Committee "whose labours were of supreme importance in the prosecution of the war"; he vigorously advocated the Declaration of Independence and helped to frame its clauses; was a member of the board of war and of the Committee of Finance; he wrote, spoke, and preached incessantly, and many of the state papers on various burning questions such as the emission of paper money and the mode of supplying the army by commission, were by him: and to his suggestions were due some of the principal measures of the Congress.

All his life, and not merely in his American days, the peculiar quality of his intellect was frankly recognised by his contemporaries—its clearness and width of outlook: its power of gathering up the threads of debate and presenting a lucid statement of result to the confusions of discussion: its calmness and presence of mind in the face of danger: and its disregard of selfish interests in the advocacy of unpopular opinions. Witherspoon was never done preaching the dangers of decentralisation and selfish independence on the part of the various states: and generally his views on these and many other points were found sooner or later to be grounded upon shrewd commonsense and far-sighted political wisdom.

Modern American historians speak forcibly about Witherspoon's influence in the "right development" of the Revolution, and Tyler in his *Literary History* of the period goes so far as to say that he is "not undeserving of being called one of the great men of his age and of the world." He was sufficiently important to be ferociously satirized by Odell the loyalist verse-maker (whose lines might be more fitly characterized as a yell of execration than dignified by the honourable name of satire), and was burnt in effigy by the British. He was of imposing appearance, and next to Washington the man of the most dignified presence among the American leaders. He was a "brilliant conversationalist", his talk "sparkling with anecdote, epigram and repartee", "a man of extraordinary force, versatility and charm", and of genial and kindly nature. There is an immense statue of him in Philadelphia, and a note in the "Weekly Times" for May 28th 1909, announces that Mr. Bryce was "the principal speaker at the unveiling (in New York) of a statue of John Witherspoon, Theologian, and one of those who signed the Declaration of Independence."

Witherspoon was born in 1723, so that when he went to America he was forty-five years of age. In 1842 his *Ecclesiastical Characteristics* was reprinted, with a new preface by an Evangelical of the day: so that he was at that time still read and remembered. Since then he and his works, it is to be feared, have in his native country shown that "tendency to oblivion" of which he himself accuses the writings of Hutcheson: but though he does not figure conspicuously in subsequent or recent histories of the Church of Scotland (the best of which, be it noted, are not from the Evangelical standpoint), there is evidence to show that he was very well known in his own day. What then made the Trustees of Princeton pitch upon him with such hearty unanimity as a suitable Head for their College, and why was he received with so enthusiastic a welcome when he landed upon American soil? What, in short was there in his earlier

career that should foretell his later energies and the important share he was to take in his adopted country's educational and political affairs?

This has been answered after a fashion in the first chapters of Witherspoon's *Life* by his great-grandson, Mr. David Walker Woods, published in 1906. But the author does not warm to his subject until he gets upon American ground: the early part is rather impersonal and vague, and is disfigured by curious mistakes, especially on ecclesiastical and university matters: so that a few additional notes upon the Scottish years of this eminent American citizen may not come amiss.

It has often been noticed that Scotland in the Eighteenth Century in contrast to England, which abounded in memoir and letter-writing, is oddly deficient in personal material for social history—in intimate biographical detail or gossiping records; in the kind of thing in fact that best of all gives life to the personalities and events of a past age. The situation is saved, fortunately, by a few brilliant oases in the desert (be it spoken with reverence) of history, philosophy, and polite biography which disdains to notice the mere valueless and vulgar trivialities of daily life. If the biographical genius of Boswell had divided itself between Edinburgh and Ayrshire, instead of going to London it is pleasant to imagine what the result might have been to the social history of the time. John Ramsay of Ochtertyre voices what was apparently the general contemporary feeling on the subject of memoirs and biographies when he speaks of Boswell's "preposterous passion for recording private conversations"; of "James Boswell, who in those days hovered like a vulture above the dying judge [Lord Covington] in quest of anecdotes"; and when he says that "a collection of Lord Kames' table talk . . . would be a precious and interesting relic of him, were it lawful to record and publish a person's unguarded conversation". Ramsay however is happily better than his principles, and has recorded many a lively anecdote and epigram of the famous people of his day.

Such personal notes as we have of the times are mostly concerned with Edinburgh or the East of Scotland—Mill of Dunrossness stands for the far North, and Ramsay, when his manuscripts do not deal directly with the capital, has at least little relation to the West Country. So that after Witherspoon left Edinburgh there is not a great deal of biographical material to work upon. We hear of him, however, in Alexander Carlyle's *Autobiography*, in Thomas Somerville's *My Own Life and Times*, in Home's *History of the Rebellion*, in Sinclair's *Statistical Account of Scotland* (written in 1791), in Morren's *Annals of the General Assembly*, in Scott's *Fasti Ecclesiae Scoticanæ*, in the *Annual Register* of 1780, and later on, after he had become famous, in Blackwood's Magazine in 1818, and many other places.

Witherspoon's personal interests and energies during his Scottish period were rather exclusively ecclesiastical, but they did not represent the side of church politics and theological thought which attracted the most cultivated minds, lay and clerical, of the time, and are perhaps less well known on that account. The Evangelicals in fact were in a certain sense the retrograde party in the Church. They were not, like the Moderates, of the spirit of the Age—a spirit which, as they conceived it, they heartily condemned in its intellectual manifestation. They had some powerful preachers amongst their ranks, but few writers of any note, and no historians, philosophers, or men of letters. On the side of church government, on the other hand, they led the revolt. Each party really stood for a different aspect of the movement towards freedom, that principle which was the keynote of the later years of the Eighteenth Century. The one asked for liberty for the people to choose the man to have spiritual direction over them; the other practically for greater liberty to choose (within the Church) their own form of belief: to slacken at least the bonds of Calvinism as it is represented by the Westminster Confession, which to those who were within the influence of contemporary

thought, had become intolerable. The one party considered the other as opposed to all law and government in the Church: the latter retaliated by regarding the former as an enemy of law and order in the intellect and soul.

Liberty of course is not a synonym for license, but the difficulty has always been to decide where the one ends and the other begins; it was felt at the Renaissance, and the problem came up again prominently in the Eighteenth Century. The solution has generally been that each man would stop upon the top note of his own intellectual compass: and this is true more or less of the opposing parties in Church politics in Scotland in John Witherspoon's day. The Moderates chose to enforce the letter of the law in government, and to relax their vigilance in doctrine. If the Evangelicals were outwardly something less constitutional in their methods, it was easy enough for them to find corresponding flaws in the adversary's armour at other points.

John Witherspoon's earlier life and writings form a fairly complete expression of the Evangelical church politics and orthodox theology of the middle of the Century, which is after all a sufficiently important element in the temper of the time, including as it did the great majority of the commonalty throughout Scotland. "The people" do not often mould the thought of an age, and are frequently in violent opposition to new ideas; but they have to be counted with and their point of view has generally had much to say for itself. Witherspoon can scarcely be called a "typical" Evangelical however; the austerity of his creed, his opinions on such a subject of debate as the theatre, his dislike of "balls, routs, and drums," as well as his ecclesiastical politics identified him closely with that party. But he would have been considered a man of wide culture even amongst the cultivated Moderates; much more did he stand out from the rank and file of his own side. Neither was he, in the sense in which the epithets were then applied, either "wild" or "high-flying" in his style in comparison with even

the best of them. He is sometimes called the "Leader of the Popular party",—by Somerville for instance. With him, and occasionally without him, are oftenest mentioned Dr. Alexander Webster, a brilliant, vigorous, genial personality, affectionately regarded by all sections of the community, and a powerful preacher withal; John Erskine, Robertson's colleague in Greyfriar's Church, best known now perhaps from his appearance in *Guy Mannering*; Dr. Dick who is described by Henry Mackenzie in his *Life of Home* as "one of the most powerful speakers in point of eloquence and impression, that had ever appeared in that, or any other popular Assembly"; Fairbairn of Dumbarton; and Andrew Crosbie, Advocate, the reputed prototype of Councillor Pleydell and foremost for a time amongst laymen who supported the Evangelical cause; of immense learning, solemn, humorous, and invincible in debate, the only man in Edinburgh, it was said, who stood up to Dr. Johnson, when Robertson, Blair, Kames and Monboddo quailed before him.

Witherspoon's manner in speaking was said at this time to be unattractive, but his matter was admittedly full of weight, and he was obviously regarded as one of the best brains on either side. The fact that he did not live in or near Edinburgh meant that he was not nearly so much in the public eye as Webster, Erskine or Dick,—a distance of sixty miles being a substantial difficulty in the Eighteenth Century. One thinks of the Reverend Micah Balwhidder upon his memorable journey to the Assembly from Dalmailing, which was not very far distant from either of Witherspoon's West-country parishes. And that reminds one that the *Annals of the Parish* is not merely a work of art, but a vivid sketch of the time, as lively as any contemporary record could be. Galt's parish priest is an ideal type of the Evangelical Presbyterian of his day. He is however not greatly interested in books or in church problems and it is to be feared that his "high-flying" brethren would have regarded as a tampering with the leaven of unrighteousness

his shrewd device for combatting modern ideas—namely to prove from the pulpit that they were nothing but old ones under new names; that virtue and morality were free grace and righteousness in a new-fashioned garment. It was a simple, and so far as it went, a satisfactory solution. Such was not Witherspoon's method.

But, to begin at the beginning. John Witherspoon having been born in 1723 in the Parish of Yester in Haddington, where his father was parish minister, and being, as the biographical dictionaries relate, descended through his mother from John Knox, went in due course to Haddington Grammar School, and thence to Edinburgh University, where he lived in the house of a Mr. Baillie who had several other boys boarding with him. Amongst them, very fortunately, was Alexander Carlyle,¹ who has left a vivacious if not too complimentary sketch of his fellow-student. "John Witherspoon," he says, "the celebrated doctor, was also in the house. . . . The future life and character of Dr. Witherspoon are perfectly known. At the time I speak of he was a good scholar, far advanced for his age, very sensible and shrewd, but of a disagreeable temper, which was irritated by a flat voice and awkward manner, which prevented his making an impression on his companions of either sex that was at all adequate to his ability. This defect, when he was a lad, stuck to him when he grew up to manhood, and so much roused his envy and jealousy, and (*sic*) made him take a road to distinction very different from that of his more successful companions." This is curiously unlike most of the testimonies to Witherspoon's later public appearances. He was no doubt a spectator in 1736 of Wilson's execution, which led to the Porteous Riot; Carlyle gives an account of it all, saying that his tutor had taken windows in the Grassmarket, that his pupils might "see the show".

¹ Alexander Carlyle, minister of Inveresk, one of the leaders of the Moderate party; Moderator of the General Assembly 1770; called "Jupiter" from his imposing appearance; author of an interesting Autobiography.

They were both clergymen's sons, but of very different characters; the one open, frank, and generous, pretending only to what he was, and supporting his title with spirit; the other close, and suspicious, and jealous, and always aspiring at a superiority that he was not able to maintain. . . . I always considered the austerity of manners and aversion to social joy, which he affected afterwards, as the arts of hypocrisy and ambition; for he had a strong and enlightened understanding, far above enthusiasm, and a temper that did not seem liable to it."

This is frank; and puts briefly the point of view of the Moderate party towards Evangelical "enthusiasm" or fanaticism as they considered it. What Carlyle put down to hypocrisy and self-interest, his opponents would have called conversion or regeneration perhaps; but in any case it is glaring absurdity to call a man a hypocrite because he ventures to change the opinions he holds at the mature age of twenty, unless there is some further reason for thinking the change a pretence. That his understanding and temperament made it unlikely is scarcely a valid reason either; greater improbabilities happen every day. That the "intellectuals" of the time were mostly on the other side did not in the least hinder some men of exceptionally strong mental calibre and unsentimental if not unemotional temper from finding in an Evangelical faith satisfaction to their souls. Carlyle of course rarely gives an impartial estimate of men whose opinions differed from his own. He is an outspoken critic even of his own friends, much more of those who disagreed with him. It is a curious fact, however, that in 1744 Witherspoon was called to the Parish of Beith in Ayrshire, and having gone there, seems entirely to have lost touch and sympathy with these early friends. Whether his views changed before he left the east of Scotland; whether possibly Whitefield's preaching in 1741 or thereafter had influenced him as it influenced his friend Alexander Webster; or whether Carlyle was mistaken in his rather cut-and-dried estimate of his old friend's "temper"—

it is difficult to tell. Witherspoon's father was a scholarly man with a strong liking for the writings of the French Calvinists, and probably his influence may have inclined the son towards the kind of reading with which he himself was in sympathy: at all events the "Deistical Controversy" and the newer philosophical ideas from this time onwards were—so far as one can tell from what he has written—subjects to be regarded with equal distrust and dislike, to be written down when occasion offered, and treated contemptuously as the wilful pursuit of falsehood by determined infidelity. Such opinions carried him in the space of a few years very far from the standpoint of most of his college contemporaries; but his first exploit at Beith was of quite a different kind.

In 1745 the Presbytery of Irvine encouraged the various parishes within its jurisdiction to raise volunteers for the government service, and Witherspoon, who never did anything that he did not do with energy, himself raised a party of militia in Beith; there is a subscription paper of feuars and tenants extant in the *Cochrane Correspondence*, published by the Maitland Club, of the sum collected to defray the expenses. The minister himself marched at the head of the company to Glasgow, where he was excessively disappointed to receive orders to return, no further recruits being necessary; furthermore he personally declined to go back and went on with his own servant to Falkirk, where he was taken prisoner and lodged in Doune Castle. John Home was a fellow-captive, and has given a circumstantial account of the affair in the *History of the Rebellion*. The castle was in a ruinous state and the prisoners—eight of them—five volunteers from Edinburgh, two Aberdonians, and Witherspoon—were put up in a "large ghastly room" near the battlements, which were seventy feet high, and to which they had access. The volunteers made up their minds to make ropes of their blankets and get down on the west side of the Castle where there was no sentinel. "The proposal was agreed to, and being communicated to the three

prisoners who lodged in the cell with them, the two men from Aberdeen agreed to join the volunteers in their attempt to escape. Mr. Witherspoon said he would go to the battlements and see what happened, that if they succeeded, he would probably follow their example." This does not sound very heroic; but perhaps the edge of the remark was sharpened by sundry references to Mr. Home in the works of Mr. Witherspoon which appeared before the *History of the Rebellion* was written. If so, a little tartness can be excused, even if it was not quite just. As a matter of fact it does not appear whether Mr. Witherspoon followed their example or not. One account—not Home's—says that Witherspoon "made his escape with great peril" and that "his nervous system suffered a severe shock"; another says he was not released until after Culloden, by which time the confinement had permanently impaired his health.

In the years that followed Witherspoon steadily rose in public estimation as a preacher of unusual force. His methods and the substance of what he taught remained without great change with the years. His theological writings other than sermons, the *Essay on the Connection between the Doctrine of Justification by the imputed Righteousness of Christ and Holiness of Life* and the *Essay on Regeneration* are really sermons rather than controversy, and may be taken together with his preaching as expounding the fundamental ideas that inspired it. His view of ministerial duty was serious and exacting. He regarded strong personal religion as the first necessity, and thereafter the faithful preaching of a gospel which is shortly summed up in the doctrine of free grace. He condemns the preaching of "cold reasonings on the nature and beauty of virtue". All ministers, he says, have subscribed the Confession, and are guilty of perjury if they do not preach original sin, free grace, regeneration and the rest. He puts the case strongly for a studious ministry—studious in the liberal arts, not merely in theology—prob-

ably especially because the Moderates accused the Orthodox party of caring too little for these things; and probably also as a hint to the less broad-minded Evangelicals who were apt to speak in disparagement of all human learning. The depravity of human nature through the fall of Adam, the misery of mankind, justification, regeneration, and sanctification are the constant themes. The doctrine of Justification "by the imputed righteousness of Christ" was sometimes impugned by the Moderates—as leading to laxity in practice—and it was this opposition that led Witherspoon to write in 1756 his *Essay on the subject*, which has been called (in the *Dictionary of National Biography*) "the ablest exposition of Calvinism in any language," proving that it leads directly to holiness of life; probably an additional stimulus was supplied by the publication in 1755 of Hervey's popular *Theron and Aspasio*, in support of the same thesis. The Pope of Rome is Antichrist, the Mass an abomination. The unregenerate are consumed in eternal torment. Human reason is of no use by itself. "The dignity of human nature, and the beauty of moral virtue" are only tolerable theories if used as a help to grace—to recovering the original glory of mankind. Those who live longest and are most in public life, without any exception, have the hardest thoughts of men in general, and the worst opinion of human nature. We ought to admire the wisdom and power of God in setting bounds to the violence of men, and adore His holiness in the awful visitations He makes upon the wicked—judgments of war, famine, and pestilence, earthquakes, thunder and lightning and tempest are all just punishments for sin. The doctrine of election is evidently to Witherspoon unexplainable, and he does not dwell upon it. All he can say is that "secret things belong only to God;" and man must not presume to enquire too curiously into the Divine counsels.

His style as a preacher was simple, practical, and straightforward, and he hated ostentation and display in the pulpit. The following peroration is a brief example of his manner:

"The triumph of sinners is but very short. In a little time all earthly relations shall be dissolved. Then high and low, magistrates and subjects, ministers and people, shall stand before the judgment-seat of Christ. He shall render to every one according to his deeds. There the great and noble shall find no partial favour; there the poor and mean shall not escape observation; and there the lying slanderer shall be put to eternal silence."

Witherspoon himself read with considerable catholicity of spirit; the Drama only seems to have made no appeal to him, though he speaks as if he knew Molière. He was interested in Reid's philosophical speculations and introduced his teaching into Princeton later on; but the rationalistic school roused his strongest opposition, and he never omits to level a blow at Hume and Shaftesbury who were the particular objects of his wrath, the more especially that the works of the latter, as Ramsay of Ochtertyre says, "were in those days extravagantly admired by some of the clergy who wished to be thought polite philosophers." Witherspoon knew the writings of Mandeville and Samuel Butler; of Addison, Pope, Swift, Young, Bishop Burnet; he read French constantly and was intimately acquainted with Pascal and the Port Royalists. The *Esprit des Lois* also was a favourite book. At Princeton the teaching staff never numbered more than five whilst he was there, and the President himself was responsible for the lectures on Hebrew, advanced Greek and Latin, Divinity, Moral Philosophy, and Eloquence, showing a range of study which, if not necessarily very deep, was at least wide and varied. Perhaps his was the kind of intellect that naturally distrusts free philosophical inquiry. His faculties were active and practical rather than speculative,—or at least that side of his nature was more developed; and he only really came to his own when he got to America, where he had ample scope for his organizing, energetic, sound-headed wisdom.

He saw that the effect of contemporary freedom of thought, or at least the coincident fact, was that the upper

classes in Scotland were drifting away from the Church. The Moderate party saw it too, and tried to combat it in their own way,—by making terms with the change, and bringing themselves as far as they could into line with it. Witherspoon was a preacher with a real enthusiasm for saving souls, and he feared with a sincere dread the effect that the new ideas might have when they sifted down to the people, who still in the mass kept to the old paths. In one way the Evangelical view had a hint of utilitarianism about it: its adherents in fact thought that the existing state of things was the only one which could keep men's evil passions in check—and they were afraid of any change.

Witherspoon's writings were mainly sermons, and he generally tried in them to avoid the subjects most hotly in dispute; so that it is not easy to know how he argued on many points that he must have known about. Probably he simply ignored them, regarding their discussion as both foolish and impious. "Oh, the ingratitude of those wretches among us," he says, "who call themselves free-thinkers, who have been taught by revelation only to form rational and consistent notions of the first cause and creator of all things, and yet reject revelation entirely, and pretend to found them upon human reason!"

His liveliest and earliest published piece of work however, which should be better known than it is, was quite other than a sermon. During the years that succeeded the Secession in 1740 the relations between the two parties in the Presbyterian Church in Scotland gradually grew more and more strained through a succession of forced settlements and attendant protestations. To put the case baldly, the old law of the Church enjoined that the people should choose their ministers. The law of the land vested that right in the patron. Hence an irreconcilable division, each side regarding the other as a breaker of law. The collision came in 1752 over the Inverkeithing Case, in regard, as Morren's *Annals* has it, to the question "How far are the members of inferior judicatories bound to give effect to the

sentences of superior courts, in opposition to the dictates of their own private judgment and conscience?"

The Commission of Assembly ordered the Presbytery of Dunfermline to induct a certain minister to Inverkeithing. The Presbytery declined, and at the next meeting of the Commission presented their reasons; whereupon the Commission refrained from censure. A certain number of ministers, amongst whom were William Robertson,² John Home,³ and Hugh Blair⁴ drew up their *Reasons of Dissent* from this finding of Commission, and gave them in at the next Assembly. The Commission then appointed eight others, the best known being Principal Wishart, to draw up *Answers to the Reasons of Dissent*. These two documents were and are regarded as the manifestos of the two parties. The *Reasons of Dissent* was probably written quickly; but the hand of Robertson is evident, and the arguments are all carefully tabulated and clearly arranged. The *Answers* are less pointed, and more circumlocutory; the views they represent are not so well put nor so logically marshalled. Possibly Witherspoon (he had nothing to do with it) might have improved it; he could write with great simplicity and clearness when he had a mind.

In the beginning of 1753 there appeared an anonymous pamphlet supposed to have been written by Dr. Hyndman of the West Kirk, bringing certain accusations against the Evangelical party, with special reference to Dr. Webster—as having exerted undue influence by underhand means in the Inverkeithing business. This aroused Witherspoon, who was a friend of Webster's, and in the following September appeared, also anonymously, *Ecclesiastical Characteristics; or the Arcana of Church Policy: being an humble attempt to open the mystery of Moderation, wherein is*

² William Robertson became Principal of Edinburgh University in 1762; published his *History of Scotland* in 1759, *History of Charles V* in 1769, and *History of America* in 1777.

³ John Home, Minister of Athelstaneford, author of the tragedies *Agis* and *Douglas*, and a *History of the Rebellion of 1745*.

⁴ Hugh Blair, Professor of Rhetoric in Edinburgh University, published *Lectures* and *Sermons*.

shown a plain and easy way of attaining to the character of a moderate man as at present in repute in the Church of Scotland. This lengthy title describes sufficiently the scope and almost the style of the pamphlet. The immediate suggestion of the name was doubtless due to Shaftesbury, who, as has been seen, was a good deal in the writer's mind; but in choosing this particular vehicle for his satire, Witherspoon was only adding his contribution to the portentous heap of "Characters" which since the beginning of the Seventeenth Century had been accumulating upon all kinds of subjects—personal, moral, ecclesiastical, and political. "Maxims" also, with explanatory notes, were a favourite device at the time, especially in France—Witherspoon knew La Rochefoucauld, and doubtless Madame de Sablé and the rest of the Set, and of course intimately the *Letters to a Provincial* which are composed on a similar plan.

The form and the attitude of the *Ecclesiastical Characteristics* owe something obviously to Pascal—in fact the author said as much in his *Serious Apology* ten years later; and there are such likenesses as could be paralleled from almost any two works whose object was as in this case distantly similar. Witherspoon like Pascal accuses his victims of neglecting the Bible in preaching, of quoting "heathen writers" and modern substitutes instead, of calumniating their opponents because they knew them to be better and more zealous men than themselves. He too, has his own version of the doctrine of *opinions probables*. These points are most likely more than mere chance. But however that may be, a much closer parallel is to be found in the *Reasons of Dissent*. It is directly parodied again and again, and especially of course in its loftiest passages—in which, be it said, the somewhat youthful magniloquence and dogmatism of Robertson's style gave irresistible provocation to as keen-witted an opponent as Witherspoon, whose high Calvinism did not destroy his sense of humour—which however was all too often firmly repressed. Having made up his mind on this occasion that irony was a legitimate weapon, he for once

gave his wit full swing, with a success that must have been galling to his opponents, and in any case necessitated five editions of his little book in ten years.

Two corresponding passages may be given, which will at once exemplify his style and the nearness of the parallel. The *Reasons of Dissent* had an extended argument advocating submission to authority. Part of it runs as follows: "We think it very consistent with conscience, for inferiors to disapprove in their own mind of a judgment given by a superior court, and yet to put that judgment in execution, as the deed of their superiors, for conscience' sake; seeing we humbly conceive it is, or ought to be a matter of conscience with every member of the Church, to support the authority of that Church to which he belongs." Witherspoon's version is: "In case of necessity, an action which nobody would chuse perhaps to take the weight of upon them, may yet be done without anybody's being called to account for it in the other world. If the doer of an action were to be the judge of its lawfulness, he might be damned perhaps for doing it, in case it were found to be wrong; but upon this principle of implicit obedience to his superiors, there is no repelling his defence: it was not his province to judge whether it was lawful or unlawful; and the Assembly or Commission who gave the order, being bodies politic, are by that time all dissolved, and appear only in the capacity of individuals."

The *Reasons of Dissent* continues further on: "We cannot help being surprised, that any of our brethren should have been at a loss to conceive this plain and obvious principle, that it is essential to the very idea of a supreme judicature that its decisions be absolute and final. Such a supreme judicature by our constitution is the General Assembly of the Church; and therefore, if the decisions of the General Assembly may be disputed and disobeyed by inferior courts with impunity, we apprehend the Presbyterian Constitution to be entirely overturned. There is no occasion for this church to meet in its General Assemblies

any more; our government is at an end; it totters from the very basis; and we are exposed to the contempt and scorn of the world, as a church without union, order, or discipline, destitute of strength to support its own constitution, falling into ruins by the abuse of liberty." *Ecclesiastical Characteristics* says: "The third principle upon which our conduct is founded is of such undoubted verity, that the bare mentioning of it is sufficient to convince all the world how little it stands in need of any proof; accordingly no moderate man views it in any other light than as an axiom, or self-evident truth; namely, that if any excuse for disobedience were once admitted, or any indulgence granted to these tender-conscienced inferiors there would be an end of all government in an instant, neither commands nor obedience could proceed one step further, but every individual instrument of power, in that fatal society, astonished at the monstrous phenomenon, would stare at one another; all the wheels of the political machine would stop at once; nay would split into a thousand pieces; every revelation and connection of their parts would be instantly dissolved, and the beautiful whole would rush into a wild anarchy of chaos and confusion . . . for my own part I am so entirely influenced by it, that if the most faithful, diligent, and useful servant, should, in the humblest manner represent to me, that he had a scruple about executing any of my orders, and beg to be excused, suppose from shaving me on Sunday morning, and I should unfortunately be so far off my guard as for once to indulge him, I would immediately dissolve my whole family and nevermore think of lodging with a living soul under the same unhappy roof."

Witherspoon has been said to have imitated Swift in writing *Ecclesiastical Characteristics*—and he frankly explains that the *Tale of a Tub* suggested his dedication to the "Shade of a Departed" Minister. To say that the *Characteristics* is an original piece of work is not necessarily to deny this. Style and matter are both Witherspoon's own, but undoubtedly the former owes much to Swift. Cun-

ningham in his *Church History* called it "almost worthy of Pascal". The author would have been the last to compare himself with either; his style lacks the fine-wrought ironic courtesy that gives peculiar strength to the two-edged sword of Pascal's wrath; nor has it the resistless sweep of Swift's biting periods; but it has something of both, and especially of the latter. Witherspoon had (without the deadly grimness and ferocity) in large measure the same kind of gift for working up to an ironic climax by short telling mock-heroic phrases following one another in swift succession; for brevity and simplicity of wording: for producing a solemnly circumstantial effect in sarcastic illustration. I suspect that Mr. Collin's *Discourse of Freethinking* prompted some of the shafts in *Ecclesiastical Characteristics*. The "Athenian Creed" must be quoted. It contains a summary of the beliefs necessary to a moderate man:

"I believe in the beauty and comely proportions of Dame Nature, and in almighty Fate, her only parent and guardian; for it hath been most graciously obliged (blessed be its name) to make us all very good."

"I believe that the universe is a huge machine, wound up from everlasting by necessity, and consisting of an infinite number of links and chains, each in a progressive motion towards the zenith of perfection and meridian of glory; that I myself am a little glorious piece of clockwork, a wheel within a wheel, or rather a pendulum in this grand machine, swinging hither and thither by the different impulses of fate and destiny, that my soul (if I have any) is an imperceptible bundle of exceeding minute corpuscles, much smaller than the finest Holland sand; and that certain persons in a very eminent station, are nothing else but a huge collection of necessary agents, who can do nothing at all."

"I believe that there is no ill in the universe, nor any such thing as virtue absolutely considered; that those things vulgarly called sins, are only errors in the judgment, and foils to set off the beauty of nature, or patches to adorn her

face, that the whole race of intelligent beings, even the devils themselves (if there are any) shall finally be happy; so that Judas Iscariot is by this time a glorified saint, and it is good for him that he hath been born."

"In fine, I believe in the divinity of L. S. (Lord Shaftesbury), the saintship of Marcus Antoninus, the perspicuity and sublimity of A-e (Aristotle) and the perpetual duration of Mr. H- n's (Hutcheson's) works, notwithstanding their present tendency to oblivion. Amen."

This could never have been written by an Evangelical thinker of the type of Samuel Rutherford or Thomas Boston. One cannot help feeling with Alexander Carlyle that Witherspoon was intended by nature for the other side, but had somehow got among the orthodox,—not for a moment that it was self-interest or hypocrisy that sent him there. The man was obviously sincere; but his was not the most emotional or tender kind of Evangelicalism. He makes his points with unerring certainty, and not one of them misses the mark. Irony and parody have license to exaggerate; but almost all the maxims could be exemplified straight away even from Carlyle's *Autobiography*—a singularly direct and naïve document—alone. Mr. Henry Grey Graham, who holds no brief for the Evangelical party, says that the young moderate ministers "in ability were fit to fill a pulpit; in indiscretion they were fit to empty a church."

Witherspoon could not refrain from a passing blow at John Home (long before *Douglas*) in speaking of the books that a moderate man ought to read. "As to poetry, it will be sufficient to read 'The Pleasures of the Imagination' and 'The Tragedy of Agis,' if it be published, because in it dramatic poetry is carried to the summit of perfection; and it is believed by the author's friends, that there never will be a tragedy published after it, unless by somebody that is delirious." This is shrewd literary criticism, (though it is discounted to some extent by the fact that Witherspoon had almost certainly not read *Agis*) and a fair enough hit

at "the author's friends"—who by their ecstatic appreciation of Home's talent went near to making him ridiculous. The *Douglas* affair was still to come, however.

Meantime *Ecclesiastical Characteristics* aroused considerable excitement; the Moderate party evidently felt it keenly; and naturally enough, their references to it in writing are few and dry. The Evangelicals were delighted with the audacity and vigour of the assault. The authorship presently leaked out, but it was not formally acknowledged till 1763, when Witherspoon published a *Serious Apology for the Ecclesiastical Characteristics*, in which he put his case in plain and sober language. His principal concern in the Church struggles was that he thought the cause of religion was suffering severely, and was likely to suffer, by a persistence in the same policy. He regarded this policy as the chief cause of what he considered unnecessary secessions. He had the strongest sense of the importance of unity among Presbyterians and thought his opponents were attacking the difficulty of a non-churchgoing aristocracy in the wrong way. His view was that although the license of the Church ought to be the hall-mark of a certain standard of religion in a man, that in point of fact this was not always the case; that Presbyteries were not absolutely infallible, and that in any case different persons suited different spheres of action; and that the safest way of avoiding bribery, discontent, and decline of religion generally, was popular election. With regard to the fact that the law of the country thought otherwise, he does not actually instigate to open defiance. The Assembly might insist less on this side of the question, do what it could to mitigate the irritation, until by constant appeal they should prevail upon Parliament to repeal the law. This was, I imagine, the line he would have advocated. On the other hand, the Moderate party had taken patronage under its wing, so to speak, fearing that constant rebellion and disaffection were making towards the destruction of all ecclesiastical authority.

In 1756 the *Essay on Justification* referred to in connec-

tion with his preaching, was published, and in the same year Witherspoon became minister at Paisley, where he was to remain till his departure for America twelve years later; in the interval he declined invitations to go to Dublin and to Rotterdam. Some violent footnotes were added to the published *Essay* which had not been inserted in the original text. Witherspoon's method of dealing with Hume may be illustrated from them. "There is one late writer, David Hume, Esq., who, it must be confessed, hath excelled all that went before him in an extraordinary account of the nature of virtue. I have taken no notice above of his principles, if they may be called so, because I think both him and them worthy of the highest contempt: and would have disdained to have made mention of his name, but that it affords me an opportunity of expressing my sense of the wrong measures taken by many worthy and able men, who, in sermons and other discourses, give grave and serious answers to his writings. . . . And, as to mankind in general, if they were at that pass as to need a refutation of such nonsense, as well as impiety, it would be in vain to reason with them at all." Thereafter he becomes, which is unusual, personally insulting. The method of argument is not unlike that of Warburton, who by the way approved of *Ecclesiastical Characteristics*; he took much the same attitude towards everyone who differed from him, once saying of Hume that "he merely runs his usual philosophic course from knavery to nonsense".

Witherspoon's remarks are an odd commentary upon his own criticisms of those who called their opponents knaves and fools. It must be said, however, that he only shared in what was a perfectly common feeling at the time in regard to the "new philosophy" amongst many highly educated laymen as well as clerics, and those not of the Evangelical party; a horror of repulsion towards infidelity and towards the speculations which induced it. Witherspoon proposed to himself a speedy and much fuller discussion of the "philosophical principles which have of late been pub-

lished among us". Perhaps if this was to be the style of the "discussion" it was as well that he postponed it indefinitely. Other things intervened to take up his attention, amongst them the famous *Douglas* episode in 1757, which is too well known to need recapitulation here.

The performance of the tragedy of *Douglas*, by John Home, Minister of Athelstaneford and Witherspoon's quondam fellow-prisoner in Doune Castle, and the consequent action in regard to it by the Edinburgh Presbytery, drew forth a shower of pamphlets, mostly supporting Home and his friends. A full account of the affair is of course given (in the *Autobiography*) by Carlyle who was a prime offender, and who wrote a good many squibs himself in defence of the play and its author.

The most carefully worked-out argument from the other point of view was probably Witherspoon's *Serious Inquiry into the Nature and Effects of the Stage*,—published in the same year, after the performance, but before the publication of *Douglas*, and therefore before he had had an opportunity to read it; that however was a small matter and lay outside his sphere of argument. The impropriety of a Presbyterian clergyman being concerned in the production or representation of a play, he considered so extremely obvious as to require no notice further than a curt and somewhat contemptuous statement. Otherwise the tone of the remonstrance is uniformly grave, sober and moderate; it is an indictment, not so much of Home in particular, as of the stage in general.

English clerical opinion of course was almost equally hostile to the writing of plays by clergymen. John Brown, called "Estimate" Brown, wrote tragedies between 1754 and 1756, and the conspicuous churchmen like Warburton and Hurd were all against him. And in France Madame de Sablé, the Port Royalists, Bossuet, Bourdaloue and *tous les gens sévères* were unanimous in writing and speaking *contre la comédie*.

Witherspoon's pamphlet was probably written in some

haste; it bears the marks of it here and there in occasional repetition, and a good deal of round-about phraseology; but sometimes one is reminded of the pointed epigrams of *Ecclesiastical Characteristics*. As regards the arguments, there is nothing very new about them; it would have been rather difficult to be original upon the abuses of the stage even in 1757, and Witherspoon, though he says he wishes to avoid what his predecessors have said, is necessarily obliged to follow more or less closely in their steps. His paper is quite short so that many of the debated points are only hinted at, but in the main it is Prynne's method that he adopts and not Jeremy Collier's. He would abolish the Drama and not merely reform it. He wonders whether he would have done better to have treated the subject "in the way of wit and humour" but decides that the matter is too serious to be jested about, considering "the declining state of religion in Scotland", "the prevalence of national sins", and "the danger of desolating judgments". He refrains entirely from quotation, and some of his remarks suggest that he had not studied even Shakespeare, though that is scarcely credible. But to judge from what is known of his general reading in one way and another, parts of the *Serious Inquiry* are very like a piece of special pleading, not worked up with sufficient conclusiveness to support the real justification the author had for strictures upon certain conditions of the contemporary theatre. Most of the arguments are to be found, generally in stronger language, in *Histrion Mastix*. It is scarcely necessary to quote. That the theatre is unlawful because it "agitates the passions too violently and interests too deeply" is a curious negation of the time-honoured Aristotelian theory. That great poets may refine taste, but do not improve morals or religion, and that human art is very rarely useful in this way, is a maxim that is still to be heard from Presbyterian pulpits; perhaps it is the reason that even now it is sometimes considered necessary to apologize for the great arts, and to prove them to be "useful" or at least "a good thing."

In any case Witherspoon was in general agreement with the religious society of his time; and the action of Presbytery, Synod, and Assembly, in the matter of *Douglas*, although very far from being excessively severe, showed decisively where the weight of popular opinion lay. Blair and Robertson, however, defended Carlyle during the process against him, and the whole affair evidently did little harm to his reputation. The proceedings in the Church Courts are given rather fully in the *Scots Magazine*, and in the reports of the speeches in the Assembly of 1757. Thomas Somerville notes in his Autobiography that the rebukes levelled at Home and his friends instead of stopping theatrical performances, rather served to make them "more frequented and more respectable"; and that as the clergy presently ceased to inveigh against them, "the scandal of attending the playhouse was soon entirely done away". The tide had turned, and there was no stopping it.

In 1765 Witherspoon published another pamphlet upon the Church question, called the *History of a Corporation of Servants discovered a few years ago in the Interior parts of South America*; but it was of no great moment and had little success.

From 1744 to 1758 the author worked actively in the various Church Courts. He was Moderator of the Synod of Glasgow and Ayr, and he made his mark in the Assembly, where much good speaking, lay and clerical, was heard during those years. The Moderate Party only came into power in 1752 but thereafter they held the reins of government—though numerically the Popular side, according to Somerville, frequently almost equalled them in the Assembly. But they were less united, more inclined to stand each by his individual views; whereas the Moderates recognised that their strength lay in union, and made this one of the cardinal points of their policy. Witherspoon had seized upon this as a mark for his satire in *Ecclesiastical Characteristics*, but he was much too wise not to see the value of the doctrine in practice, and endeavoured vigor-

ously to inspire his Party with a desire for common action. Once, a story goes which has been repeated by Mr. Woods in his *Life*, the Evangelicals made a great effort and secured a majority in some motion. "Dr. Robertson, leader of the Moderates, for whom Witherspoon had the greatest personal respect, congratulated the latter, saying—'You have your men better disciplined than formerly'. 'Yes', replied Witherspoon, 'you have taught us to beat you with your own weapons.' "

In 1762 an unpleasant episode occurred which must have been a source of great annoyance and anxiety to him, though it was caused really by his own outspokenness. Some young men of his congregation had disgracefully travestied the Sacrament, on the day before it was to take place. Witherspoon preached a sermon which was intended as a solemn rebuke, and at the request of some of his people published it, with a prefatory note, in which he incautiously spoke of the offenders by name. A case for libel was the result, and as Witherspoon was not considered to have had sufficient legal proof for his accusation, it went against him, and he was heavily fined. Much sympathy was felt for him in the matter, however, and the friends who had urged the publication of the offending document, generously stepped in and paid the full amount. His reputation in no way suffered over it but the affair showed that the eighteenth century clergy were perhaps not quite so omnipotent in matters of discipline as is commonly supposed.

When the first invitation to Princeton came in 1766, Witherspoon declined it, partly because he felt he had not sufficient knowledge of the conditions of Presbyterianism in America—he had heard rumours of dissension—and partly because he did not wish to leave a place where he was "so much respected and so very happy". The following year a Trustee of the College was sent to Paisley, for the second time, to find that he had reconsidered his decision. The Board "received the intelligence with peculiar satisfaction" and proceeded immediately to a re-election.

A wealthy kinsman offered to make the President-elect his heir if he would remain in Scotland, but he had made up his mind, and on the 20th of May, 1768, he and his family sailed for Philadelphia. He received an almost royal welcome from the moment he landed, and immediately on his installation began with energy the work of improving the status of the College financially and academically. His subsequent career has been sketched in the beginning of this paper, and is fully elucidated in Mr. Wood's *Life* of his great-grandfather. His after connection with Scotland was limited to an unfortunate visit which he paid in 1785, sent by the Trustees to try to interest people in Scotland in their College, and to collect funds. Many Scotsmen had sympathised with the American side in the War, to be sure, but it was a great deal too soon for such a mission to be anything but a total failure, and a most depressing business for the unlucky emissary, who had moreover been called fool, traitor, and knave in the Scotch newspapers once and again during the struggle. The total result of the expedition was £5 sterling after the expenses had been paid.

An occasional critical note on Witherspoon's writings in various English divines of his own and the next generation indicate that he was held in esteem without the bounds of Presbyterianism. Warburton and Sherlock spoke of *Ecclesiastical Characteristics* with appreciation, and Edward Bickersteth was interested through it to compare religious conditions in England and Scotland, finding them much alike. He spoke of Witherspoon's works as "eloquent, perspicuous, evangelical, and practical." William Wilberforce recommended the treatise on *Regeneration*, and admired the sermons. Newton of Olney was enthusiastic about the former and the *Serious Inquiry*; and Rowland Hill's remark that "If any one wishes to know the whole history and mystery of Scottish moderation, he will find it admirably delineated by the pen of Dr. Witherspoon" served as a motto to the reprint of the *Characteristics* in 1842, when the Ten Years' Conflict was nearing an end.

Lochwinnoch, Scotland.

MARY LOVE.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

An Interpretation of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy. By W. TUDOR JONES, Ph.D. (Jena). New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons; London: Williams and Norgate. 1912. Pp. 250. (Crown Theological Library.)

Eucken and Bergson: Their Significance for Christian Thought. By E. HERMANN. Boston: The Pilgrim Press; London: James Clarke & Co. 1912. Pp. 224.

Since the death of William James, the brightest luminaries in the philosophical heavens have been Rudolf Eucken, of Jena, and Henri Bergson, of Paris. Eucken has been teaching for almost forty years in the town where Hegel was writing his *Phenomenology of Spirit* while Napoleon was winning his famous victory upon the adjoining heights. A steadily increasing stream of foreign students has been attracted to his lecture-room, but it is only since his reception of the Nobel Prize in 1908 that he has enjoyed a truly international reputation. His principal works have now been translated into some half dozen languages, and he has lectured in England, in 1911, and in America, in 1912-13. His philosophy is said to be quite the fashion even in Japan; and his star and that of Bergson, also a recent lecturer at Columbia University, are now decidedly in the ascendant; and around them both has been gathered a considerable body of literature.

Dr. Jones, whom we believe to be a Unitarian clergyman, gives an interpretation of Eucken's philosophy from the standpoint of a thoroughly sympathetic and convinced disciple. With other pupils of Eucken, coming from Iceland to New Zealand, and from Japan to Britain and America, he has found in the master's teaching "something of a spiritual anchorage in the midst of the tempestuous sea of time", and all alike, he says, "cherish an affection for their old teacher—an affection which is one of their dearest possessions". Mr. Hermann (or is it Mrs. Hermann?), from the viewpoint of the "modern positive theology", writes in a more critical spirit, but with abundant appreciation of the value of Eucken's work. He says: "Eucken stands before us to-day as perhaps the greatest thinker of our age and the protagonist of a new idealism which satisfies our demand for moral reality as no idealistic philosophy has ever done."

Among the philosophical precursors who have influenced his thinking, Eucken mentions Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Plotinus, Kant and Hegel. To his own system he has given the name of "Activism", but

this is not to be confounded with pragmatism, nor with the view that man's life consists in the abundance of the committees upon which he serves. Eucken says, indeed, that "the more exclusively life transforms itself into external work, the more it ceases to be an inner personal experience, and the more alien we become to ourselves". The term "Activism" implies rather that there must be an activity of the soul itself upon its material and social environment before the insights of philosophy, and the achievements of art, and the experiences of religion can be attained. The conviction that man is not merely the product of nature but in his spiritual life is independent and supreme is not the result of a revelation to a passive recipient. It is an achievement, a venture of faith, a self-assertion of the soul in the face of hostile forces which would confine it within the trivial and the phenomenal. The kingdom of the spirit must suffer violence, and the fight of faith must be fought. Eucken stands as the protagonist of the rights of personality and moral freedom, and for this reason has drawn about him a body of enthusiastic disciples who are ready to follow him in his revolt against selfish materialism, conventional morality, and a naturalistic philosophy which denies the rights of the spiritual in man. He speaks with something of a prophet's voice to an age whose veneer of civilization scarcely disguises its selfishness and greed. It is religion, he says, which "shows the dark abyss in our nature, but also shows illumined peaks; it opens out infinite tasks, and brings ever to an awakening a new life in its movement against the ordinary self. It does not render our existence lighter, but it makes it richer, more eventful, and greater; it enables man to experience cosmic problems within his own soul in order to struggle for a new world, and, indeed, in order to gain such a genuine world as its own proper life." (*The Truth of Religion*, p. 243.)

In enforcing his own message Eucken carries on a critique against other systems such as Naturalism, Pragmatism and Absolutism. Against Naturalism he holds that the life of man in its ideal constructions such as science, art, morality, and religion, cannot be explained from below but only from the Higher above him; not by the past but by the over-individual norms which beacon him forward. As an exponent of "the monistic trinity", the Good, the Beautiful and the True, many will consider Eucken more convincing than his famous colleague, Haeckel, the founder of the *Monistenbund*. Against Pragmatism, Eucken argues for the "independent character of reality over against our experience of it". He believes that our deepest nature can be called into action only by the recognition of an Ought, which has an existence and value of its own, regardless of the opinions of any group of individuals or of the whole human race. Against Absolutism he pleads for the demands of life over against those of logic, and insists that the highest knowledge can be reached only by an act of heroic choice, of moral decision. By such an act of moral decision in the midst of the antagonisms and contradictions

of life, we are linking ourselves to an Ultimate reality. In such a decision man not only asserts the reality of a spiritual world, but in his weakness he is conscious of receiving help from it. In the recognition of the Ought and the struggle of the will to follow, there is thus gained the knowledge of a spiritual world ("Universal Religion"), but this develops into an experience of the One as Absolute Spiritual Life. "There originates a mutual intercourse of the soul and God as between an I and a Thou." This stage is called by Eucken "Characteristic Religion". The argument for immortality is thus expressed: "The Infinite Power and Love that has grounded a new spontaneous nature in man, over against a dark and hostile world, will conserve such a new nature and its spiritual nucleus, and shelter it against all perils and assaults, so that life as the bearer of life eternal can never be wholly lost in the stream of time." (*The Truth of Religion*, p. 431.)

While Mr. Hermann notices the absence of any allusion to prayer in Eucken's writings about religion, and thinks that his preference for the term "Godhead" instead of "God" may indicate a loose hold upon the doctrine of Personality, yet it is evident that Eucken's philosophy has been largely formed under the influence of Christian sentiments and motives. His system has been called "a philosophical restatement of the teaching of Jesus", and in the Christian principle of Love he finds a redemptive power for the individual and society. Eucken makes the not unfamiliar distinction between the kernel or spiritual substance of Christianity and its existential form. All religions contain within themselves a spiritual nucleus in the fact that "they manifest and represent a Divine Life", but this nucleus lies deeper in Christianity than in other religions. It is "the religion of religions". Its spiritual substance lies in its aspect of "world-denial and world-renewal", or, as otherwise stated, in its principle of love to God and man and even love to one's enemies as presenting a new element for the redemption of the individual and the race. "This", in Dr. Jones' exposition, "is the Eternal element in the Christian religion. It is found, it is true, in other religions; but why should we look for it elsewhere when it blossomed with such divine glory in the life of the Founder?" The existence-form of Christianity, which is not essential, changes from age to age. But what answer has Eucken to the question, What think ye of Christ? Dr. Jones, we fear, speaks rather loosely when he says: "There is no longer any meaning in asking whether the Founder was a 'mere man' or a God. He was an intermediate reality between the two" (p. 198). Eucken himself says differently: "Between man and God there is no intermediate form of being for us, for we cannot sink back into the old cult of heroes." He goes far toward attributing to the person of Jesus a cosmical significance when in *The Truth of Religion* (p. 360), speaking of the simple and humble life in Galilee, he says: "And yet this life had an energy of spirit which filled it to the brim; it had a standard which has transformed human existence to its very root. . . . That life of

Jesus establishes evermore a tribunal over the world; and the majesty of such an effective bar of judgment supersedes all the development of external authority." What manner of man is this, the reader may exclaim, whose life in a remote corner of the world has so transformed human existence, and set up a judgment seat before whose majesty all must bow! In his *Können wir noch Christen sein?* (p. 37), Eucken speaks with greater clearness upon the question of the person of Christ. We can accept Him as the unconditional Lord and Master, he says, only upon the supposition of His essential Divinity. But, however great the figure of Jesus may be, "its greatness is confined to the realm of humanity". He cannot be the object of faith and divine honor, nor can He be an intermediate being. "If Jesus, therefore, is not God, if Christ is not the second Person in the Trinity, then He is man; not a man like any average man among ourselves, but still a man. We can therefore honor Him as a leader, a hero, a martyr; but we cannot directly bind ourselves to Him, or root ourselves in Him; we cannot submit to Him unconditionally. Still less can we make Him the center of a cult. To do so from our point of view would be nothing else than an intolerable deification of a human being." This is a clear and outspoken utterance, but it raises the query, which is not new, whether the crown of Divinity can be taken away without removing also the crown of leadership. We can accept Him as leader and His life can be our majestic judgment bar only on condition of the absolute sanity and truth of His teaching. But to remove from the sayings of Jesus everything that would imply a claim to divine attributes and honors, requires a criticism of his recorded sayings so drastic as to remove many characteristic and well-authenticated sayings. Even when this process is complete there remains the fact that he was put to death. "We have a law, and by that law he ought to be put to death, because he made himself the Son of God." Mr. Hermann thinks that Eucken's view implies that Jesus was "the unfortunate occasion and starting-point for a departure from pure monotheism and truly spiritual religion", and he suggests that unless the apostolic conception was due to some other source than the impression of the Galilean Jesus, "one would have to add to the tragic features of the life the fatal quality of creating wrong impressions". Mr. Hermann makes the further point that men will continue to experience redemption in the Pauline sense, and that this experience of redemption is the fountain of doctrine. "If it can be explained as a departure from pure spiritual religion, then the Christ goes, and with Him go the great believers from Paul through the Fathers and Reformers to the present day—the men who not only experienced redemption, but traced it directly to the Crucified."

The philosophic outlook of Bergson is toward science rather than toward religion. That his philosophy, however, has an intimate bearing upon the problems of religion Mr. Hermann shows in an interesting discussion which we cannot here follow in detail. No reader of *L'Évolution Créatrice* will be surprised at the extravagant praise of the author's style, "the most wonderful vehicle through which philo-

sophic thought has ever found speech". Creative evolution is not evolution at all if by evolution is meant the unfolding of what was implicitly present from the first. It is rather "the continuous creation of what is essentially new", or epigenesis. Bergson is therefore opposed to a mechanical evolution which reduces thought and emotion to an epiphenomenon, an insignificant by-product of the movements of the world-machine. But Bergson is also opposed—also if not equally—to finalistic evolution, in which progress is represented as the unfolding of a preconceived plan. The important thing with Bergson is not the pristine elements and their combinations, nor a timeless absolute, stretched in smiling repose above the strife of time, nor yet an eternal purpose fulfilling itself through the ages. The important thing with Bergson, "the modern Heraclitus", as he has been called, is time itself—real duration, not merely the notches on the stick. (Mr. Arnold Bennett is a Bergsonian when, in his tract on "How to Live on Twenty-four Hours a Day", he speaks of time as "the inexplicable raw material of all existence".) The important thing with Bergson is the current of existence (*élan vital*) forcing its way, against an antagonist current, into vegetable life, animal life, consciousness, civilization, and perhaps into immortality. "We have no repugnance in supposing that consciousness will pursue its path beyond this earthly life." Human conduct, in his view, is freed alike from the necessity of a mechanism and the fixity of a plan; each moment is "an original moment in a no less original history". The orthodox evolutionist will of course say that creative evolution is evolution without anything to be evolved, and the orthodox theologian will say that it is creation without a Creator; but it is plain that the Bergson *rapprochement* between creationism and evolutionism must be reckoned with in future by both parties.

Dr. Jones promises that the theoretical foundation of Eucken's system will be strengthened by a forthcoming *Erkenntnislehre*, while Mr. Hermann holds out the hope that the Paris thinker will give us soon an authoritative exposition of the religious implications of his philosophy. The volumes before us afford an easy and pleasant introduction to the two most influential and significant thinkers of the day, and many of the readers thus introduced will doubtless be led to cultivate a first-hand acquaintance with the works of the masters.

Lincoln University, Pa.

WM. HALLOCK JOHNSON.

Rudolph Eucken's Message to Our Age—An Appreciation and A Criticism. By HENRY C. SHELDON, Professor in Boston University. 8vo; pp. 55. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 1913. 35 cents net.

According to Professor Sheldon, Professor Eucken aims "to uncover with utmost distinctness the great deficiencies of the age" and to "direct to the remedy which is alone adequate". The deficiencies he finds to be "a strong decline of inward culture" and "a paralyzing doubt". The remedy, he judges, is not in "naturalism", nor in "innocent idealism",

nor yet in "culture or advancing civilization", nor in socialism, nor even in Voltaire's "gospel of work". On the contrary, Eucken's "prescription is the vital recognition of a supreme spiritual life, at once above the world and in the world, and the serious thoroughgoing response of the individual to the nature and requirements of that life". "In Eucken's exposition of the supreme spiritual life it is easy to detect a kinship with the trend of the great idealistic philosophies." Professor Troeltsch is correct in the assertion that "in Eucken we have a combination of Plato, Fichte and Hegel". Thus "the transcendent independent spiritual life" postulated by Eucken is akin to "the eternal ideas of Plato which serve as the rational and formative principle in the world." "Fichte's stress upon the moral order as immanent in reality and upon the subordination of nature to the personal agent has a noticeable, if not a complete, counterpart in Eucken's teaching." "In Hegel's evolving thought as constitutive of the universe there is somewhat of a parallel to the supreme spiritual life which leads on the development of the world." The later philosopher, however, stands in contrast with the great idealist of the preceding century "in stressing the transcendence as well as the immanence of the fundamental life principle". "In choosing 'life' rather than 'idea' or 'thought' to give expression to the basal reality, the present day philosopher was doubtless worried," Professor Sheldon thinks, "by the breadth of significance belonging to the first of these terms, as covering more than the purely intellectual, and as carrying suggestion of dynamic efficiency". He regards it as but the philosophical statement of what we mean by "God". "That Eucken uses the impersonal term prevailingly", does not import, he judges, "that he was ill-affected toward the conception of the divine personality, but rather that he had a lively apprehension that the personality of God may be construed in a too anthropomorphic fashion". Religion is "a practical means of connection with this transcendent reality". As Eucken says, "it has opened out an intimate relationship with an infinite and absolute life, and has given our life an originality over against all attempts to classify it with the *causal nexus*".

"As respects the historical religions," Professor Eucken refuses to identify any one of them in its actual form with the absolute religion. That Christianity is superior to them all, he claims on these grounds: the character and worth of its personal center and founder Christ, his emphasis on love, the transforming power of Christianity, and its natural and close "connection with an invisible world".

And yet Eucken insists that even Christianity imperatively demands "the reconstruction of its existential form". "He does not accept even the essential features of the Catholic Christology." He regards Christ as divine only in the sense in which all men are so; he takes up "a negative attitude toward the Trinity". In both respects, therefore, he "collides with the trend of the New Testament as a whole". He disparages also and radically "the catholic conception of Christ's mediation". He underestimates the theistic proof. "If he does not

challenge outright the physical miracle", he rates it, even the resurrection, as "no essential in the Christian religion". In these respects, and with ample and conclusive statement of reasons, Professor Sheldon declines, as do we, to follow the great philosopher of Jena. We heartily thank the former, however, for his appreciation and criticism of him. It could not be either more sympathetic or more just; and it is by far the most luminous presentation of Eucken's profound and in some ways very valuable philosophy of religion that has come to the reviewer's notice.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Man a Machine. By JULIEN OFFRAY DE LA METTRIE. French-English. Including Frederick the Great's "Eulogy" on La Mettrie and Extracts from La Mettrie's *The Natural History of the Soul*. Philosophical and Historical Notes by GERTRUDE CARMAN BUSSEY, M.A., Wellesley College. 8vo; pp. 216. Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1912.

This handsome and elaborate volume is a credit to compiler, editor and publisher alike. It leaves nothing to be desired by those who have still time and interest for the work of one of the greatest of the French Materialists.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

GENERAL THEOLOGY

Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics. Edited by JAMES HASTINGS, M.A., D.D., Fellow of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Member of the Council of the Palestine Exploration Fund, Editor of "Dictionary of the Bible", and "Dictionary of Christ and the Gospels". With the assistance of JOHN A. SELBIE, M.A., D.D., and other Scholars, Volume V.: *Dravidians-Fichte*. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons; Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1912. Royal 8vo; pp. xvi, 908.

The fifth volume of Dr. Hastings' *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics* maintains the high standard of scholarly presentation set by the previous volumes; and continues like them faithfully to reflect the singularly varied points of view on fundamental points which characterize present-day thought. We shall have to refer to the notices of previous volumes in this REVIEW for an account of the general scope, manner and character of the work. We shall confine ourselves here to a few scattered remarks on some of the contents of this particular volume.

The volume seems to contain a rather more varied body of articles than some at least of its predecessors, and to be less disproportionate in the space accorded to the several topics treated. It also, of course, includes some of those long series of articles on closely related subjects: for these are a feature—and a valuable feature—of the work.

For example, the topic "Ethics" falls within the limits of this volume, and of course it is accorded, in its various divisions, large space—more than a hundred pages (pp. 408-522)—to which certain other outlying articles (such as "Education, Moral") are to be added.

The central article in this series, "Ethics", by J. H. Muirhead, is to us a hard-saying, yielding no authoritative morality. For ourselves, we subscribe to the doctrine that the perception of the good is an ultimate datum beyond which we cannot go,—as G. E. Moore expresses it (*Principia Ethica*, p. 7), "Good is a simple notion just as yellow is a simple notion"; and the categorical imperative is to us all that Kant conceived it, with its full implication of a supersensible source. Professor Muirhead's attempt to ground our ethical life in the shifting sand of our developing personality cannot but seem to us therefore ineffective.

The succeeding expository articles on "Ethics and Morality" in the various ethnic groups are, as is usual with such articles in this *Encyclopaedia*, detailed and full of information. Perhaps the discussion of Christian Ethics by Donald Mackenzie is scarcely in its right place among them, but we are glad to get it and rest our spirits in it as in an oasis. It is well-conceived and is devoutly written; although it is perhaps—for the space it covers—needlessly incomplete. With the right emphasis on the rooting of Christian conduct in the creative operations of the Holy Spirit it nevertheless is a bit uncertain in its handling of the really *creative* nature of these operations and of the relations of the operations of the creative Spirit and the free activities of the human will,—released, incited and led by the Spirit to the doing of good. Perhaps also there is apparent a general weakness in definition throughout, as, for example, when the Christian *summum bonum* is expounded as "Eternal Life and the Kingdom of God", without any attempt to reduce the two ideas to unity. For our part, we should be satisfied here with the old definition: "to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever". The general point of view of the article will be apparent from the following paragraph which closes the historical section with which it opens. "Till recently there was a general tendency even among non-Christians to regard the moral teaching of Jesus as perfect, as far as individual life was concerned, though defective on its social and political side. Lately that has been denied from without and within (Nietzsche and the *Interims-ethic* school), on different grounds. Christian moralists are coming to see that the Christian life is bound up with the Christian revelation, and that the ideas of philosophical Ethics or historical theories must not be used so as to crush out the distinctive vitality of the Christian life of faith. Recognition of spiritual facts is more valuable than systematic completeness, and defective views of Christ's Person are found to revenge themselves on Christian morals."

In the center of this article (p. 472) a remark is let fall which evidences the realization by the author of the danger in which we are in our modern emphasis on "social service"—the Christian duty of

which, needless to say, he fully recognizes—of losing sight of deeper things. "The Christian ideal," says he, "is open to all. We must not forget this truth in our ardor for economic improvement and our advocacy of a living wage. The man clothed in purple and fine linen and faring sumptuously every day may be unaware of what eternal life is, while he who has not where to lay his head may have it. Even though 'friends, leisure, and means' were for ever possessed, the Christian life might still be lacking. Thus the Christian ideal conflicts with all ideals summed up in earthly pleasures, pursuits and interests with no outlook beyond." As illustrating the sanity of much of the writing in this *Encyclopaedia* we may note in passing that another writer (Louis H. Gray), writing on another subject, almost goes out of his way to warn us against the rash,—shall we not say the wicked?—legislation now becoming so popular, which proposes inflicting mutilation on innocent people in the presumed interests of the community—legislation which, he truly remarks, may approve itself to "purely secular views of the State, and to such medical men and sociologists as consider only the physical side of humanity", but which may well bid those who consider the dignity of human nature and the rights of man pause (Vasectomy: pp. 583-4). "Euthanasia" on the other hand is treated with regrettable indefiniteness (by H. J. Rose): "Eugenics" is not dealt with at all except by a cross reference to the articles "Marriage, Sociology" which have not yet appeared.

The secular spirit which rules the ethical discussions in general finds expression in the articles "Education (Moral)" and "Ethical Movement", both written by Gustav Spiller, who is the General Secretary of the International Union of Ethical Societies, known perhaps best on this side of the sea from its leadership by Felix Adler. The "trend in modern times" we read in the former of these articles, "is to appeal to human motives in conduct and . . . an Ethics which is primarily otherworldly is on that account out of place in education". And yet it is no doubt undeniable that Christianity is the greatest ethical force which has ever entered the world—as a glance even into von Dobschütz's *Christian Life in the Primitive Church* ought to convince the most unreligious! In Spiller's view, however, Bible Ethics are not adapted to modern times; and the use of them in moral education would be equivalent to training men and women for the life of from two to four thousand years ago, not for our higher and fuller life of to-day, demanding quite another ethical outlook. All this is matched in the article on "Evolution (Ethical)" which is really an article on Evolutionary Ethics, by Edward Clodd. "There never has been" we read in it, "probably there never will be, a uniform, unalterable standard of right and wrong, applicable through all time for all ages" (p. 626). Everything is in a flux, and morals—the product of the changing social conditions—of course flow on with the ever changing stream. It ought to be said in passing that this article is made particularly disagreeable by an unpleasant habit it indulges in of constantly quoting the Bible—with a kind of smirk—to support most un-Biblical positions.

We may speak rapidly of a few other articles. There is what seems to us a rather thin article on "Essence". An interestingly written article on "Ego" comes in the end much to James Ward's opinion, that the ego is a perdurable but not unchanging subject. There is an intensely disagreeable article by E. D. Starbuck called "Female Principle", which seems to have no excuse for itself, either in information communicated, or ability of treatment. W. F. Cobb writes not very illuminatingly on "Faith Healing", defining it as cures produced by the joint action of the faith of the sufferer and the power of a supernatural being, and representing our Lord as having practised it in this sense. There is an odd little article on the "Eastern Church", by an Oriental Archbishop, who has the grace however to acknowledge the failure of the Eastern Church in the duty of preaching and its excessive devotion to forms. Three closely related articles, of very diverse character, are James Moffat's article on "Essenes", which presents us rather with the materials for forming an opinion of our own about them than with his own conclusions, W. Beveridge's article on "Ebionism" which is carefully worked out but lacks something in crispness, and W. Brandt's highly speculative ("constructive" no doubt he would call it) article on "Elkesaites," which would abolish all the mysteries with which our ignorance clothes the history of this sect. James Orr has a good short article on "Enhyposstasis"; W. Inge not a very valuable one on "Ecstasy"; and W. Adams Brown a carefully written article on "Expiation and Atonement (Christian)", which, however, scarcely satisfies and is chiefly notable for the studied care with which it repudiates the authority of the Christian Scriptures in the matter, representing them indeed as thoroughly inconsistent with themselves, and repeatedly intimating that later thinkers have gone wrong because misled by this or that Biblical teaching. S. R. Driver's article on "Expiation and Atonement (Hebrew)" consists chiefly of a renewed study of the meaning of *Kipper*. A. S. Martin gives us a very confused article on "Election". The Scriptural exposition in it is so full of paradoxes that it reads as if it were written not to be understood. At the end he declares that Pelagianism has been "finally refuted", and immediately cheerfully adopts the fundamental Pelagian formula that ability and obligation are coextensive, supporting himself with a citation from W. E. Henley's "bumptious" verses: "I am the master of my fate; I am the captain of my soul",—which, of course, he just is not. A thoughtful article on "Experience (Religious)" is signed by H. Maldwyn Hughes, whom we take to be a Wesleyan. We quote a paragraph from it to put a good taste in our mouth as we close: "The New Testament does not regard the Incarnation as a mere illustration of union between God and man, but as the ground of its realization. It is not simply the revelation of the eternal affinity between the two, but the initiation of a new spiritual process, whereby that affinity is consciously realized by man—a process based not on imitation, but on fellowship in a hidden life, mediated to us by Jesus

Christ. 'The law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus' liberates us from "the law of sin and death", endows us with a moral dynamic, begets in us 'the mind of the spirit' which is life and peace, and leads us into the realization of an affinity with God, which is so close that we are called His Sons (Rom. viii. 1-17)" (p. 633).

We have of course mentioned only a few of the more than two hundred articles, written by more than one hundred and sixty writers, which are included in this rich and closely packed volume. Those we have mentioned have not been selected on any principle. We have simply turned over the pages of the book, read the articles which attracted our attention, and reported what we found in them. Perhaps what we have found is however a fair sample of the whole.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Interpretation of Religious Experience. The Gifford Lectures Delivered in The University of Glasgow in the years 1910-12. By JOHN WATSON, LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's University, Kingston, Canada. Part First. Historical, 8vo; pp. xiv, 375. Part Second. Constructive. 8vo; pp. x, 342. Glasgow: James Maclehose and Sons Publishers to the University. 1912. \$6.00 net.

This profound and elaborate work is written from the standpoint of the Hegelian philosophy. It does not, however, accept Hegelianism as it is often expounded. Thus the author rejects indignantly the view of Lotze, that the philosophy of Hegel is simply pan-logism. Nor will he admit with many that its fundamental principle is an abstract and indeterminate Absolute. Nor will he allow that it denies all freedom to man, and regards him as but the passive organ of an underlying Something-not-ourselves. With the Absolutism of Dr. Bradley he sympathizes, but does not entirely agree. What seems to him most valuable in Hegel and also most distinctive of him is his "insistence upon the essentially concrete character of the Absolute, as summing up and manifesting but never abolishing, all that we mean by self-conscious reason". Perhaps, this indicates sufficiently Dr. Watson's philosophical position.

In religion we suppose that he is classed as a Christian. His Christianity, however, is not that of the New Testament and of the Creeds. There is scarcely an important article of "the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints" that he does not deny. Thus, "the coarse juridical notion of a punishment imposed upon the human race because of the sin of the first man is due to the false interpretation of minds familiar with Roman Law, who did not distinguish between sin and crime" (vol. I, p. 120). "Creation out of nothing is contradictory of the idea of an infinite being" (vol. II, p. 134). "Man in his ideal nature is identical in nature with God" (vol.

II, p. 244). "Christ after the flesh, the historic person, has passed away, but the Christ of the spirit remains forever, for he is one with that ever-growing life of humanity which consists in the progressive conquest of evil by the living power of goodness" (vol. II p. 289). The atonement and the judgment to come are misrepresented and denied (vol. II, p. 295 and p. 311).

The purpose of these two volumes whose standpoint has thus been indicated "is to determine whether, and how far, a reconstruction of religious ideas may be necessary in view of the long process of development through which the human spirit has passed. . . . This will cover the ground dealt with in the first course of lectures; while the second course will endeavor to give such an interpretation of religious ideas as may seem to be required by the greater complexity and comprehensiveness of modern thought".

"After touching upon Greek religion and primitive Christianity, Dr. Watson reviews the history of Christian thought from Origen to Aquinas. He gives a separate lecture to Dante, discusses Eckhart, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hume and Kant, and gives marked prominence to the work of Hegel. The second part of the work is constructive. The chief themes discussed by the lecturer lie on the border line between philosophy and religion, such as Realism, Naturalism, Personal and Absolute Idealism, The Religious Consciousness, The Problem of Evil, Atonement and Immortality. But the distinction between the historical and the constructive portion is mainly formal. In discussing the history, Dr. Watson is constructive, and in constructing his doctrine he is largely historical. The two parts together form a valuable contribution to the philosophy of religion."

For Dr. Watson the first element in religion is belief, the second, worship, the third ritual; for "religion implies not only a belief in powers that are able and willing to help man, but some form of worship through which his reverence is expressed", and, in the lowest as well as in the highest religion, there is involved also "a conformation of the life to what is believed to be the will of the divine being". That is, "religion is a life as well as a creed and a ritual" (II, p. 4). This view accepts the connection of religion and morality, a position strenuously denied by certain modern thinkers; but, as the author observes, "the facts seem to show that religion in all its forms inevitably carries with it an influence upon the whole conduct of those who believe in it". Of the three elements of religion, belief "presents a double aspect",—the faith and its systematic form. Although "a systematic theology is not the indispensable condition of religion, it by no means follows that there can be a religion which excludes all definite ideas". "The origin of religion is not to be sought in fear, but always in a lower or higher degree of reverence" (I, p. 3).

The result to which Dr. Watson comes after his historical review of the development of theology and the influence of philosophy on this development, combined with such interpretation of religious ideas as is required by the greater complexity and comprehensiveness of

modern thought, is this: "The conclusion, therefore, of our whole investigation is, that man as a spiritual or self-conscious being, is capable of experiencing God, who is the absolutely spiritual or self-conscious being, and that the influence of God upon man is not external or mechanical but spiritual, and, so far from being destructive of freedom, is the condition without which freedom is inconceivable". He admits that "one of the difficulties felt in adopting this idealistic interpretation of experience is, that it seems to be inconsistent with the growing experience of the race" (II, p. 326). Of theology he says that "its supreme principle is the rational unity of all things" (II, p. 325). Of religion itself he remarks: "It is the spirit which must more and more subdue all things to itself, informing science and art, and realizing itself in the higher organization of the family, the civic community, the state, and, ultimately, the world, and gradually filling the mind and heart of every individual with the love of God and the enthusiasm of humanity" (II, pp. 327, 328). As to the future of religion, his opinion is, that "Nothing but a philosophical reconstruction of belief, which shall reconcile reason and religion, can lift us in these days of unrest and unbelief, above the fatal division of the heart and the head; and even this reconciliation is only for a few. How the great body of the people is to find its way out of its present unhappy state of division can only be determined by the onward march of humanity" (I. p. 301).

On the great work thus most inadequately summarized two general criticisms must be made:

1. The religion which its interpretation of religious experience calls for is not Christianity. True, its terminology is. We constantly meet the old familiar names, but their meaning is explained, or explained away, according to an underlying and contrary philosophical system. Thus "evil is necessary for the development of good". "The doctrine of the incarnation is to be understood as implying the indissoluble unity of God and man, as an expression of the essential nature of both". So the words atonement, regeneration, and others common in Christian theology are retained, but are interpreted in Hegelian fashion. That is, the identity called for of the new religion with the old is one of terms, of sound, merely. This ought to be made clear, but is constantly veiled. It is not the development of Christianity according to its own inherent principle that Dr. Watson demands. It is the substitution for it of his own conception of the Hegelian philosophy. Certainly that can not be Christianity which has no place for sin as consisting in "any want of conformity unto or transgression of the law of God"; which cannot admit of the incarnation as resulting in the eternal union of God and man, two distinct natures in one person; which cannot tolerate the idea of atonement by the vicarious sacrifice of the Son of God.

2. Nor is the philosophy which he would substitute for Christianity in any sense a substitute. It breaks down at two points, to go no further: (a) Its attempt to relinquish the appeal to external authority

entirely and to rebuild Christian doctrine on the basis of reason alone is and must be futile. In religion, in all its varieties and manifestations, the ultimate appeal has always been to what was conceived to be a "Thus saith the Lord"; that is, to an authority regarded as other than and so external to ourselves. Reason has been used, and ought to be used, to confirm this authority, but it has not constituted it. It is just here that we touch the most essential difference between religion and philosophy, and it is an irreducible one. Neither religion nor philosophy may be substituted the one for the other. Dr. Watson's failure to see this is his initial error. (b) Philosophy may for a time continue satisfied with an impersonal Absolute, but religion can never be. This is true even in those systems of religion, as the pantheistic, in which the personality of God is theoretically denied. The proof of this is that such religions tend toward polytheism. As one has well said, "Religion cannot breathe in the exhausted receiver of a system in which the relations between man and God are not those of an I and a Thou". Hence, "a writer whose fundamental idea of Deity is that of the philosophical Absolute will be found continually sacrificing the elements of his thought which make for religion in favor of those which he values as a philosopher". This is the fundamental mistake in Dr. Watson's interpretation of religious experience.

It does not follow, however, from anything that has been said that the elaborate lectures under review are useless. "On the contrary, they are full of suggestive thought." As another has remarked, "They correspond in the philosophy of religion to Green's *Prolegomena to Ethics*, a book that is of very high value to many who are not disciples of the Hegelian School. These lectures well deserve to be read and studied side by side with those of E. Caird, which in some respects they resemble."

Specially valuable are they for their criticism of modern tendencies of thought. Thus, Naturalism is refuted in a masterly fashion. "The fundamentally sceptical conclusion of Pragmatism, that truth is merely that which in our human experience is found to 'work'," is adequately exposed. "Nothing," we are shown, "can really be found to 'work' except that which is in conformity with the nature of things". The essentially atheistic character of Pluralism is brought out. Nietzsche's gospel of the "overman" is shown to involve confusion of self-development with self-assertion. Bergson's theory of "creative evolution" and its emphasis of the infinite richness and prodigality of the principle of life is appreciatively yet critically discussed. For all this and much else Dr. Watson has put us under a lasting obligation.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Positive Evolution of Religion, Its Moral and Social Reaction.

By FREDERIC HARRISON, D.C.L. 8vo; pp. xx, 267. G. P. Putnam's Sons: New York. 1913. \$2.00.

"This book contains the substance of a series of public discourses given by the author at different times at Newton Hall." "The first

four essays have never been published; the succeeding essays appeared in the *Positivist Review*, June, 1911 to June, 1912." "Together they resume Dr. Harrison's final thoughts on the general problem of religion." This gives to them a unique importance; for he has long been recognized as the able leader of the Positivist Society; and being now in his eighty-second year, it can scarcely be expected that we shall hear from him again. Moreover, this final pronouncement is his best. Age would seem to have invigorated his intellect as well as strengthened his convictions. Such, at least, is the judgment of the writer as he compares the impression made on him by this book with his memory of that made on him by Dr. Harrison's *The Creed of a Layman*, published in 1907. In a word, we have before us Positivism's strongest as well as most authoritative presentation of itself.

This presentation takes the form of a systematic apology. Positivism is first defended against "Orthodox Criticism" and "Deistical Criticism". It is then compared with "Nature Worship", with "Polytheism", with "Catholicism", with the "Anglican Establishment", with "Orthodox Dissent", with "Neo-Christianity", with "Theism"; and the attempt is made to exhibit the defects of these in contrast with it. The elements and the excellencies of the "Religion of Humanity" are next set forth, and the book closes with an estimate of the significance of the "Jubilee of Auguste Comte".

Taken all in all, it is a remarkable discussion that we have before us. The author's clearness and purity of style, his accuracy and comprehensiveness of knowledge, his keenness of criticism, his justness of appreciation, his strength of conviction, have not often been equalled. Barring its utter failure to appreciate the uniqueness of Christ and of Christianity, the reviewer would have great difficulty in recalling an appraisal of religious leaders and religious movements at all comparable with this. If anything could make "the Religion of Humanity" the religion of all men, it should be these "final thoughts of Dr. Harrison on the general problems of religion".

On the writer of this notice the impression made by these "thoughts" has been threefold:

1. The life of Christianity is its supernatural element. Give up this, and all is given up. "Eliminate the miracle and there is nothing stupendous or very tragic in it, that a young Jewish zealot was condemned to death in a popular tumult" (p. 197). "The moral sublimity of Christ's life and death depended on—flowed from—his being the Second Person of the Trinity. Destroy that, and the moral sublimity is reduced to very ordinary human proportions" (p. 198). In a word, "Christianity without the Supernatural is nonsense" (p. 202).

2. The Supernatural element in Christianity depends on its historical character. "The rejection as historical of the miraculous in the New Testament and of special revelation means, that Jesus, the son of Mary and Joseph, a young carpenter of Galilee, was an en-

thusiast who propounded a sort of moral reformation among the Jews, but either thought that he was, or permitted his followers to say that he was, the son of God; that after preaching for some years, and allowing the ignorant mob around him to think that he made miraculous cures and raised people from the dead, he was executed as a leader of sedition by the Romans and was duly buried by them; and that his followers stole his body and declared that he had risen into heaven. That is what the Incarnation, the Miracles, the Atonement Sacrifice, Resurrection and Ascension come to—on rational interpretation! Deny the historicity of the New Testament, and nothing else is possible" (p. 194).

3. "The Religion of Humanity", which is just another name for positive science, is only the religion of a handful; and it can never become the religion of more. Dr. Harrison's presentation of it, because it is the strongest possible, is also its most effective refutation. Not only does man not want it; made as he is, he cannot receive it. In closing the reviewer ventures to quote from his notice of *The Creed of a Layman*: "No God but collective humanity; no hereafter but an immortality of influence and, if we have been great, of remembrance,—how can any bring themselves to accept so dismal a faith? how can any find it reasonable to bow down to an aggregation whose members are most of them dead? We venture to predict that Mr. Harrison's clear and frank presentation of positivism will do more to exalt the glorious gospel of the living God than will many of the apologies for it. The strongest argument for life is to bring on a corpse.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Why does not God intervene? and other Questions. By FRANK BALLARD, D.D., M.A., B.Sc. (Lond.), F.R.M.S., etc., Author of "The Miracles of Unbelief", "Haeckel's Monism False", "Theomorphism True", "The True God", "Christian Essentials", "Does it matter What a Man Believes?" "New Theology", "'Guilty'—A Reply to 'Not Guilty'", "The People's Religious Difficulties", "'Eddyism'—A Delusion and A Snare", "Determinism—False and True", etc. 8vo; pp. xii, 348. Second Edition. Hodder and Stoughton: New York and London. 1912.

This is a collection of ten papers apologetic in form, if not in all cases in subject. The titles are: "Why does not God intervene?", "Does the Mystery of Pain contradict the Love of God?" "What is there in God to fear?" "What is it to be saved?" "How does the Bible stand To-day?" "Are the Churches helping the Modern Appreciation of the Bible?" "Is there Any Hereafter?" "What is the Christian Doctrine of Immortality?" "What are Christian Churches worth to the Modern World?" "What is the Revival most needed in Christendom?"

The first considerable book by Dr. Ballard, "The Miracles of Unbelief", was reviewed by the writer of this notice in "The Presby-

terian and Reformed Review" for Oct., 1901. At that time he wrote of it, "This unpretentious volume is by all odds the best apology for the Christian religion that has appeared for many a day." This judgment he is glad to reaffirm, but it is a source of deep regret to him that he can not extend it to the volume under discussion.

This is not because Dr. Ballard has weakened with the passing of the years. His style is as clear, as attractive, as incisive, as ever. His convictions are as positive, and as fully expressed. His references to modern apologetic literature are as numerous and as illuminating. His condemnation of the indifference of the church toward unbelief is as vigorous and as just. No, it is clear that he has not aged; but it is as clear that he has grown in the wrong direction. The tendencies which even in the earlier book caused him to omit from his bibliography Dr. Orr's "The Christian View of God and the World", to grant to biological evolution a place to which we still believe it not to be entitled, and to reject the verbal inspiration of the Bible as prejudicial to the truth of our religion as well as unnecessary and foreign to it—those tendencies have developed into an aggressive championship of Arminianism, of destructive criticism and of overweening subjectivism. Our author's aim and passion seems to be to modify Christianity along these lines rather than to refute its adversaries.

Thus, the reason why God does not intervene to prevent sin is that he cannot do so without violating the freedom with which he has endowed man and so denying himself: "in God there is nothing to fear but love" (p. 75), his justice being only benevolence guided by wisdom: "the last vision which the Gospel of Jesus gives us of the persistently impenitent is that of the waiting, yearning helplessness of love divine" (p. 92): "from such a theological monstrosity as predestination the nineteenth century has set men free for evermore" (p. 109): "no man ever was, or will be, in the Christian sense 'saved' at any one moment: Christian salvation is not a birth, but a life" (p. 111): "repentance and trust, love and obedience, are moral qualities which God cannot make for men, or put in them, if he would" (p. 115): "salvation leads on naturally and necessarily to Christian Socialism" (p. 121): the Bible "contains the Word of God", it cannot truthfully be called "the Word of God": "the Scriptures, though not infallible, are none the less inspired"; and "it is by a criticism that exposes their fallibility that they are delivered from all their difficulties": there may or may not be a probation beyond the grave, but there is no "judgment day": the reason for the lamentable and not to have been expected inefficiency of Christianity is that it has been "cribbed, cabined, and confined by swaddling bands of ecclesiasticism, Augustinian theology, and popular conventions" (p. 322): "what calls for largest emphasis is the human part in the cooperation with the divine" (p. 331): "the helplessness of God in face of persistent moral evil is a truth which is not more undeniable in fact than far reaching in its import" (p. 330): the reviewer cannot turn up or recall a single

reference throughout the whole book to the person and work of the Holy Spirit: it is the same as to the necessity and efficacy of the atoning blood of Christ: in short, the purpose of the volume would almost seem to be the reconstruction of Christianity with the Supernatural left out.

Of course, the declared and, doubtless, the real aim of the writer has been to strip our religion of what the world objects to in it that thus he may the better defend it against the world. The result, however, has been twofold:

1. The Christianity which remains, the Christianity whose God is "helpless in face of persistent moral evil", is not the Christianity to be defended, is not even a Christianity worth defending.

2. Neither is it a Christianity that can be defended. How God, though able to prevent evil, should still permit it to the glory of his grace and justice may be above reason; but that he should be God and still be unable to control evil and to determine those made in his own image to resist it, without violating their freedom—this is contrary to reason. In a word, the author's mediating and compromising apologetic must be useless at any time, but specially at a crisis like the present. The vigorous language of Henry B. Smith, the ablest apologist of the last generation, was never so applicable as now: "One thing is certain—that Infidel Science will rout everything except thorough-going Christian Orthodoxy. All the flabby theories, and the molluscous formations, and the intermediate purgatories of speculation will go by the board. The fight will be between a stiff thorough-going Orthodoxy, and a stiff thorough-going Infidelity. It will be, e.g., Augustine or Comte, Athanasius or Hegel, Luther or Schopenhauer, J. S. Mill or John Calvin. Arianism gets the fire from both sides; so does Arminianism: so does Universalism" (*Apologetics*, p. 194).

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Religion and Life. By THOMAS CUMING HALL, Professor of Christian Ethics, Union Theological Seminary, New York. 8vo; pp. xiv, 161. New York: Eaton and Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings and Graham. 1913. Price .75 net.

This attractive little book is not written to defend "the several items of a system of Christian faith, but simply to clear the way for an inquiry. The writer wishes to show the importance and dignity of the religious claim, and to demand for it the attention its past history and present power deserves". He would not raise questions as to the necessity, the probability, or the fact, of supernatural revelation, but he would settle the questions which these inquiries presuppose and which in these days may not be simply assumed. That is, he would set forth the nature, and he would establish the reality of religion; and his purpose in thus grounding "the fundamental things of a religious intelligence" is "to strengthen intelligent faith and lead to a vital union with God's purpose as revealed in the person and work of Christ Jesus our Lord".

In carrying out this plan our author raises and answers such questions as, What is Religion? What was its primitive character? How did it relate itself to Life? What are its relations to and its achievements in modern life? Thus he vindicates its importance and especially at the present day; and he does this in untechnical language and as clearly as the very narrow limits which he has imposed on himself will permit. This extreme condensation is, however, compensated for by a presentation at the end of each chapter of the literature bearing on it. These presentations are probably the most valuable feature of the volume. In short, Dr. Hall has given us a brief and simple and, in the main, excellent introduction to the study of the great presupposition of our faith as of every faith.

At one point, however, we must take issue with him expressly. The unique claim of the Church of Christ does not rest, as our author would seem to imply (p. 145), on providential appointment; for everything is providential: but on supernatural constitution by the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. And in the same connection, the distinction between sacred and secular still binds even the "Christian Protestant". Because all life belongs to God, and is in that high sense religious, it does not follow that the first day of the week, though devoted to him in the sphere of worship, is not sacred, or that the other days, since devoted to him in the sphere of our work for him in this world, are not secular. The religious embraces both, but destroys the distinction of neither.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The System of the Vedānta, According to Bādarāyana's Brahma-Sūtras and Sankara's Commentary thereon set forth as a Compendium of the Dogmatics of Brahmanism from the Standpoint of Sankara. By DR. PAUL DEUSSEN, Professor of Philosophy, Kiel University. Authorized Translation by Charles Johnston, Bengal Civil Service, Retired. 8vo; pp. xiii, 513. Chicago, U. S. A.: The Open Court Publishing Company. 1912.

This elaborate presentation of the "Dogmatics of Brahmanism" consists of an introduction and five parts. The Introduction, after some "Literary Notes", discusses "The Aim of the Vedānta", "Who is called to the Study of the Vedānta?" "The Qualifications of those called to the Study of the Vedānta", "The Source of the Vedānta", "Exoteric and Esoteric Vedānta Doctrine". Part One sets forth "Theology or the Doctrine of Brahman". Part Two presents "Cosmology or the Doctrine of the World". Part Three discusses "Psychology or the Doctrine of the Soul". Part Four gives "Sansāra or the Doctrine of the Transmigration of the Soul". Part Five treats of "Moksha or the Teaching of Liberation". An Appendix follows which contains a short and helpful survey of the Vedānta System, an Index of all quotations in Sankara's Commentary on the Brahma-sūtras, an Index of the proper names in Sankara's Commentary and the Terms of the Vedānta.

The author, the translator and the publisher of this work are, each and all, to be congratulated. They have brought the Vedānta Philosophy within the reach of all English-speaking people, and they have made a contribution to the understanding of it of unique importance.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Development of Religion and Thought in Ancient Egypt. Lectures delivered on the Morse Foundation at Union Theological Seminary. By JAMES HENRY BREASTED, PH.D., Professor of Egyptology and Oriental History in the Univ. of Chicago. New York: Chas. Scribner's Sons. 1912. Pp. xviii, 379. \$1.50.

It would be hard to overestimate the difficulties which stand in the way of the writing of an in any sense adequate treatment of the religion of the ancient Egyptians. Erman, in his *Aegyptische Religion* (Berlin, 1904), made the significant admission that the investigations of Egyptologists had up to that time accomplished little more than the "erste Orientierung auf dem verworrenen Gebiete"; and he affirmed that "many a decade's hard work will be needed before we can really see clearly", and that anyone who at present attempts to give a representation of the Egyptian religion must "draw on his imagination more frequently than is admissible". It will be well to bear these cautious words of the acknowledged leader of German Egyptologists in mind when reading the present volume. For although it shows everywhere evidence of Professor Breasted's profound acquaintance with things Egyptian, it at the same time makes the difficulty of the subject discussed all the more apparent. Thus, early in the discussion, we are confronted with the intricate problem of the relation in which the Osirian and the Solar faiths stand to one another. Starting his investigation with the "Pyramid-Texts" as the earliest available documents, Professor Breasted tells us that they have been subjected to an "Osirian editing by the hand of the earliest redactor in literary history" (p. viii). That this contention will meet with opposition is practically certain. Only recently Petrie and Budge have argued for the antiquity and it would seem even for the priority of the Osirian element. Petrie tells us: "The Osiride portions of the *Book of the Dead* are certainly very early and precede the solar portions, though both views were already mingled in the pyramid texts. We cannot doubt that the Osiris worship reaches back to the prehistoric age" (*The Religion of Ancient Egypt*, London, 1908, p. 37). And although Dr. Budge in his *Osiris* (London, 1911) has introduced into the discussion a great deal of material bearing on the beliefs and customs of African tribes, the relevancy of which may well be questioned on more than one ground, his two volumes are hardly to be disposed of in a footnote (cf. p. 251). Professor Breasted admits that the Osirian faith is very ancient—he identifies Osiris with the Nile and thinks that the cult arose in the Delta in prehistoric times—and at an early time became the faith of the mass of the people. The Solar faith,

on the other hand, he regards as, at first, the religion of the court and state priesthoods (p. 142) "whose glorious celestial realm" was reserved exclusively for kings and possibly nobles" (p. xiii). But since the "Pyramid-Texts" which were found in royal tombs of the fifth and sixth dynasties are already pronouncedly Osirian, it is clear that even on his own theory Osirianism must have exerted great influence even in court circles at this early date. And the attempt to explain this Osirian element as the work of a redactor seems very precarious, especially since there is so very much in the complicated mythology of the Egyptian religion which is still obscure and incomprehensible. The fact that Professor Breasted is obliged to introduce the redactor at the very outset and to set him to work restoring these texts which form "the oldest body of literature surviving from the ancient world" is hardly calculated to inspire the reader with confidence in the certainty of the conclusions arrived at, more especially since this question is a very important one and one which is fundamental in the whole discussion.

Among a number of interesting features which we find in this volume are the discussion of the obelisk and of the *Ka*. Professor Breasted is of the opinion that the obelisk and the pyramid are the same in origin, the former being "simply a pyramid upon a lofty base which has indeed become the shaft" (p. 70). The nature of the *Ka* has, according to Professor Breasted, been "fundamentally misunderstood. He was a kind of superior genius intended to guide the fortunes of the individual in the *hereafter*, or it was in the world of the *hereafter* that he chiefly if not exclusively had his abode; there he awaited the coming of his earthly companion" (p. 52).

In reading this book it is important to bear constantly in mind the fact that the author is a thoroughgoing naturalistic evolutionist and views the Egyptian religion from that standpoint. Professor Breasted's interest in the religion of ancient Egypt is largely due, as he makes clear at the very outset, to the fact that he believes that "the isolation of the lower Nile valley permitted a development never seriously arrested by permanent immigration for over three thousand years", a development which would correspond to the "unbroken series" of the zoölogist (p. 3). Development is, as the title of the book indicates, the keynote of the discussion (p. xiii); and if, as Erman affirms, the danger of drawing unduly upon the imagination, when discussing these intricate questions is almost unavoidable, the temptation to which Professor Breasted would be most exposed would be to lay too much emphasis upon this feature. We do not mean to imply that there is no development in the Egyptian religion. But we are seriously inclined to doubt whether he would be able to find such clear evidences of it, were he not from the very outset convinced that it must be there.

Finally, it is to be observed that Professor Breasted is not merely convinced that in the Egyptian religion we have an almost unbroken development, a development which, judging from his explanation of the worship of the Sun (p. 9) and the belief in immortality (p. 49),

is, as has been said, purely naturalistic, but that his second thesis is that this development is "analogous in the main points to that of the Hebrews (p. xiv)". It is hardly necessary to point out in this connection that such a contention can be advanced only by one who is in substantial agreement with the standpoint of the radical higher critic. The development of the Egyptian religion as conceived by Professor Breasted may correspond in the main with that of the Hebrews after the latter has been reconstructed by the critic and restated in the terms of naturalistic evolution. But between it and the "high supernaturalism" of the religion of the Old Testament there is an "impassable gulf". That Professor Breasted accepts the views of the most advanced of the critics is clear from occasional statements. He finds the story of Joseph dependent upon the legend of the "Two Brothers" (p. 358); he reduces messianic prophecy to a vanishing minimum (p. 212-5); he assigns the Psalms to the Maccabean period (p. 334)—this is especially noteworthy in view of the fact that he finds so remarkable a similarity between the 104th Psalm and Ikhnaton's Hymn to Aton that in his *History of the Ancient Egyptians* (p. 273 f.) he has printed seven verses of the one in parallel columns with the other, and one might think that this would incline him to question the correctness of the assumption that the Psalms belong to the period after the exile;—he evidently accepts the view that much of the early (!) history and legislation of the O. T. is a reflection backward of the life, laws, etc. of a later period (p. 365). That under these circumstances Professor Breasted should find marked similarity between the Egyptian and the Hebrew religions is not at all remarkable. But it is hard to see how he can avoid the admission that these religions differ in very important particulars. Thus, although he devotes a great deal of attention to bringing out the emphasis upon the future life in the "Pyramid-Texts", showing how the thought of and the preparation for the future life became, so to speak, the all-absorbing concern, he fails to allude to the fact that in the O. T., in contrast to this, some would even say in intentional protest against it, relatively little attention is paid to the life beyond.

As a study of the Egyptian religion this book is of great interest, but it is to be regretted that Professor Breasted has seen fit to make it to so marked an extent a special plea for natural evolution.

Princeton.

OSWALD T. ALLIS.

La Crédibilité et L'Apologétique. Par LE PÈRE A. GARDEIL, Dominicain Maître en Théologie. Deuxième Édition. Paris: Librairie Victor Lecoffre, J. Gabalda & Cie. 1912. Pp. xx + 332.

The plan of this book is as follows. Credibility is, in general, the capability of an assertion to be believed, and, in its special theological sense, the capability of revealed truths to be believed by divinely given faith. Apologetics is the doctrine, the aim of which is to lead men to the catholic faith by using all the resources which nature and reason place at its disposal. These terms thus defined, three problems are

arguments can produce certainty. It is of interest to us because here the findings of the modern school of historical criticism so-called are considered. Their problem is how to derive certainty from probable evidence. The Roman Catholic church has already discovered how to do so. Thus to the adherents of this church it may be said "*la fortune leur est venue en dormant.*"

Book III (pp. 204-314) outlines a science of Apologetics on the basis of the preceding principles. The object of Apologetics is the catholic faith in its entirety. It divides however into various parts relative to the various phases of credibility which, in their turn, depend on the various moments of the act of faith. Apologetics thus separates into Subjective, Pragmatist, Moral, Fideist. The first has to do with the subjective conditions of the moral life and shows that faith is necessary. The second asks, supposing Christianity absent from life, what then? The third inquires, what if you fail in your moral duty to believe revealed truth? The fourth treats the case of a faith which is incapable of realizing itself owing to certain obstacles.

Our author warns us that his book is written not for everybody but for the professors or students of theology who are not afraid of work. To such it may safely be commended especially to those who fulfill the last condition. The Protestant reader, if he allows for the Roman Catholic viewpoint, cannot fail to find the work interesting and suggestive in its remarks on theological method.

Lincoln University, Pa.

GEORGE JOHNSON.

Christianity and Other Faiths. An essay in Comparative Religion by the REV. W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, D.D. Late James Long Lecturer on Oriental Religions. Author of "The Religion of the Crescent", "The Noble Eightfold Path", "The Original Sources of the Qur'an", "Religio Critici", "Comparative Religion", "Mythic Christs and the True", etc. London: Robert Scott, Roxburghe House, Paternoster Row E. C. 1912. (Library of Historic Theology. Edited by the REV. WM. C. PIERCY, M.A. Dean and Chaplain of White-lands College.)

Some time ago there appeared a book by Dr. Paul Carus entitled "The Pleroma. An Essay on the Origin of Christianity." Dr. Carus expressed very ably the popular present-day theory that Christianity in large part is similar to other religions and that it owes its supposedly original teachings to more or less manifest assimilation of material from foreign sources. This book is only one evidence of the present tendency. The study of comparative religion has grown very popular of recent years. Many are arising even within the Christian church itself who seem ready to concede that the gospel is only one among very many true religions, that we possess no supernatural and exclusive revelation of truth, and that we can and should learn much from others as they can learn much from us. And so the suggestion is made that the final religion—the religion of the future—will be formed by a synthesis of all that is good in *all* religions.

It is also claimed that all faiths are revealed, that all contain saving power and are fitted to save those who believe in them. All who persist in the belief that Christianity is the only true religion are considered as narrow and misinformed. A mass of translated quotations from the Indian, Chinese, Egyptian and Persian sacred writings are spread broadcast over our land with the purpose of showing how noble are the precepts found in these lands and how baseless is our claim to exclusive possession of saving truth.

Every wide awake Christian minister or layman will certainly be confronted with this propaganda and unless he is a scholar having time and ability to do original research in a score of different directions he will feel at a disadvantage. He must meet and answer very ingenious arguments based on material which he cannot verify. That much of this material is falsely translated and presented in a very misleading form makes the situation even more difficult.

Therefore we welcome with great thankfulness and enthusiasm the admirable work of Dr. Tisdall.

In his delightfully written essay he takes up the whole problem of the relation of Christianity and other faiths and with a vast wealth of learning combined with great clearness of argument he vindicates triumphantly the claim of the gospel to be a divine revelation of saving faith. This book cannot have too wide a reading. It will prove a splendid arsenal to any minister providing him well constructed weapons to meet the attacks of the enemy. It will be invaluable to the student of Missions. It will serve to strengthen and glorify the faith of all Christians, especially of those who have been led to waver in their belief as to the reality or the sufficiency of the gospel or of the need of the sacrifice of the Divine Saviour for the sin of the world.

Cranford, N. J.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

God in Evolution. A Pragmatic Study in Theology by FRANCIS HOWE JOHNSON, Author of "What is Reality?" Longmans, Green & Co. \$1.60 net, postage 15 cents.

"Can Theology become Scientific? Are theologians willing to regard religious facts as the primal realities wherewith they are concerned, and theological theories as instruments for acquiring rationalized knowledge of these facts, not as answers to enigmas in which they can rest? Are they willing to measure the truthfulness of theological ideas by their values as aids to religious life, and by their relations to other truths which also must be preserved by men? Theologians speak of theology as a science: are they willing to advance their science by using the scientific method?" These questions were put to theologians by a writer in the *Hibbert Journal* and Mr. Johnson attempts to answer them in this book by providing a theology constructed according to the pragmatic method. By a very ingenious and interesting pathway the reader is led to see how God is revealed in the process of evolution and how a true understanding of the purpose of evolution makes a belief in God necessary. The chapter

on the Omnipotence of God at first sounds plausible, but its argument that the Universe reveals to us a God who is not all-powerful but is doing the best He can with the material at hand, would lead into exceeding difficulties. An argument curiously like this has sometimes been used by others when considering the doctrine of election. It is said that God will save all whom He can save and still satisfy Justice. But what made it necessary for the present world to have been created, in which such a dreadful situation should develop? The simple fact is that we do not know why God created man just as He did and why He has made use of the process of evolution. Here we must walk by faith. If God is not omnipotent then what is beyond Him that made things as they are? How can the Creation limit its Creator?

Mr. Johnson falls into the all too common error of trying to be so very scientific that he fails to consider the sound scientific basis for the belief in the supernatural as it appears in the Scriptures. A more scientific method for the author to have pursued would have been to have used the pragmatic method in showing the unique and wonderful influence of the Gospel of Jesus Christ and thus vindicating His authority as a Revealer of the truths on which theology is based. "God in Evolution" is a study in theology with hardly a mention of our greatest source of knowledge concerning God,—His Only Son, our Saviour.

Cranford, N. J.

GORDON M. RUSSELL.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Der Begriff Διαθήκη im Neuen Testament Von Lic. Johannes Behm Privatdozent an der Universität Erlangen. Leipzig. 1912. A Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Pp. vi, 116.

From more than one side the New Testament idea of *διαθήκη* has of late been made the subject of renewed investigation. In the volume of Theological Studies dedicated to Theodor Zahn in 1908 appeared a paper by Riggenbach on "Der Begriff *διαθήκη* im Hebräerbrief". Here not merely the usage of the Epistle to the Hebrews but also its antecedents in the Septuagint are enquired into. In the year following Norton published his dissertation entitled "A lexicographical and historical study of *Διαθήκη* from the earliest times to the end of the classical period (Chicago Historical and Linguistic Studies in Literature related to the New Testament II, 1). Norton's work, while not including the biblical literature, yet is indirectly of importance for the later development of the idea. Making use of these recent partial discussions Behm now, in the monograph before us, offers a comprehensive study of the subject in all its aspects. In his statement of the extra-biblical data he deals with both the classical literature and the material of the Koine, and in connection with the biblical problem both the Septuagint and the New Testament sides of the question are

carefully enquired into, and even the Old Testament idea receives some share of attention. Besides these three contributions a work by Lohmeyer on the same subject has been announced and may have meanwhile appeared, although it has not yet come to our notice. There is reason to hope that in result of these various efforts some new light will be shed, on what, notwithstanding its long history in exegetical and theological debate, still constitutes one of the New Testament problems.

The old controversy was whether *διαθήκη* meant "covenant" or "testament". This amounted practically to the question whether in the Septuagint and in the New Testament writings the old revelation-idea of Berith was preserved, or whether a new, differently-oriented idea, that of "testament" was substituted for the covenant-idea. To be sure the alternative "covenant" or "testament" had already been modified by the view of many that in the Old Testament itself Berith, either entirely or in part, originally or through a secondary development, has the meaning of "ordinance", "disposition". On that view the alternative became "disposition" or "testament" and in consequence lost considerable of its sharpness, for a "disposition" stands nearer by far to a "testament", which is in reality only a specific kind of disposition, than does a "covenant". Now in regard to this alternative in its twofold form, there has been shown of late a perceptibly growing inclination among scholars to favor for the Septuagint and the New Testament writings the meaning "testament". The demand that the terms of the Greek biblical documents shall be interpreted in the light of the contemporary Greek language has naturally led to this, for both in classical Greek and in the Koine "testament" seemed the well-fixed and only meaning of *διαθήκη*. Cremer in his lexicon had already taken this stand. Deissmann advocates it. Ruggenbach in the paper above named applies it at least to the Epistle to the Hebrews. Franz Dibelius adopts it for his interpretation of the words of institution of the Supper (*Das Abendmahl*, 1911).

Behm's treatise marks a certain check to this recent tendency in favor of "testament", for he energetically advocates that *διαθήκη* means prevailingly in the Septuagint and everywhere (with the exception of Gal. iii. 15-18 and Heb. ix. 16-17) in the New Testament "disposition", "authoritative arrangement" in general, without reflection upon any specific testamentary character. This is interesting for the reason that it would seem to open up a way of recovering the harmony and continuity between the Hebrew Old Testament usage and the Greek biblical usage (Sept. + New Test.), which seems in danger of being lost where the exclusive and specific meaning of "testament" is insisted upon. The transition from "covenant" to "testament" creates a biblico-theological problem, since the unity of revelation seems to be sacrificed, which in regard to so important an idea is a serious matter. If then this unity can not be preserved by maintaining that in the New Testament also *διαθήκη* = "covenant", the next best thing would seem to be to emphasize that in the Hebrew Scripture

already Berith is frequently "disposition" and that in the New Testament it has prevailingly this sense. This not only approximates the one to the other, as the development from "disposition" to "testamentary disposition" does, but it restores absolute identity between the two.

So far as the Septuagint and the New Testament usages are concerned Behm actually proceeds to do this. He shows that in both *διαθήκη* = "disposition" and neither "testament" (with exception of the two passages cited above) nor "covenant". But, strange to say, he does not make use of the opportunity thus afforded for showing the fundamental agreement between the Old and New Testament. On the contrary, by insisting upon it that in the Hebrew Bible Berith has always the specific connotation of "covenant", he bars this way of escape from the difficulty at the very moment it seems to open up. The result is that he simply adds to the two other forms of a discontinuous development (from "covenant" to "testament" and from "general disposition" to "testament") a third form (from "covenant" to "general disposition") and as compared with the second this third form even seems to make the break between the two usages greater. Of course we do not mean to urge this here by way of criticism or as in any sense prejudicial to the author's conclusions. His enquiry is not conducted from the point of view of harmonizing the two canons, but simply to determine objectively what the New Testament facts are. He is quite aware that his conclusions involve a certain material modification of the idea in its transition from the Old to the New Testament. *Διαθήκη* and Berith he tells us (p. 31) are anything but equivalents. Their fundamental meanings lie wide apart, and in spite of all approximation they always have remained to some extent heterogeneous. "To the Hebrew mind Berith always retained the character of a legal contract based on the principle of mutualness, the Greek mind felt in *διαθήκη* always something of the idea of a free disposition by the will of one party." Especially important and fraught with consequences was this dislocation of the idea in the religious sphere. The author defines its theological significance in the following words (speaking of the Septuagint): "Out of the 'covenants' of Jehovah with the patriarchs, with Moses and David, with the people of Israel, etc., with which the idea of legal obligation and of inviolableness is necessarily associated, now are made free arrangements, sovereign dispositions of the divine will, revealing God's demands as well as his saving purposes. The contract with its synergism gives way to the monergism of the sovereign ordinance ('selbstherrlicher Erlass') by which God prescribes his will to man, commanding or by way of promising gifts, as law or grace" (p. 32). And the author looks upon this as a progress towards a higher standpoint: the Old Testament feature, that God follows the forms of human legal procedure is an inadequate feature. He quotes with approval the words of Deissmann: "if Berith means in any sense contract . . . then *διαθήκη* is not a verbal translation, but a substitute marking a progress in the direction of a universal religion: the Scripture which con-

ceives of the relation between God and man as a divine *δαθῆκη* occupying a higher standpoint, the standpoint of Paul and Augustine, than the Scripture which represents God as engaged in the making of contracts". The Septuagint and the New Testament have transformed the conception, but they have deepened it and preserved all that is in it essential from a religious point of view. The transformed idea becomes a "witness borne by the consciousness of primitive Christianity to the majesty of the God of the Bible in the unconditionalness and monergism with which He makes his saving disposition" (p. 107).

All this is very fine and it may even seem beautifully to fit into one specific line of the part played by the covenant-idea in Reformed Theology. If *δαθῆκη* stands for the sovereignty and monergism of God in salvation, then it is an eminently Augustinian and Calvinistic idea. One thing we do not altogether like about this is, that it seems to be bought at the price of a certain depreciation of the Old Testament standpoint. That is characterized as involving a degree of synergism and of anthropomorphism derogatory to the divine majesty. Questionings arise whether there is not perhaps enshrined something else of a positive religious value in that very aspect of two-sidedness of the Old Testament Berith-conception than the anthropomorphism and synergism which the author so keenly feels as inadequacies, whether these seeming inadequacies do not on closer examination prove to be eminent merits by no means inconsistent with thought of a slightly different complexion from the monergism and sovereignty belonging to the idea from another point of view. The dipleurism of the Old Testament Berith certainly stands to the religious consciousness of the Old Covenant itself for something of positive and abiding significance, which even the New Testament development of the idea could not have stripped off without serious loss. If we are not mistaken the two elements of supreme gracious condescension and of close intimacy of life are inherent in it, inherent we mean not in the general notion of the Berith but in the covenant aspect, the dipleuric aspect of the Berith. And what looks like synergism hardly deserves this evil name, if it is remembered that the covenant rests in the Old Testament on the basis of the accomplished redemption. By emphasizing these points we do not mean to say that the majesty and the monergism are not also there in the conception. On the contrary, we would differ from the author in finding them in the Hebrew Scriptures no less than in the Greek. Notwithstanding all the emphasis placed upon the two-sidedness of the Berith, Scripture always so represents it that the Berith in its origin and in the determination of its content is not two-sided but based on the sovereignty of God. In our opinion the whole richness of the idea in a religious point of view can only be appreciated by making the sovereign and the condescending aspects of it illuminate and accentuate each other. That the sovereign majestic procedure issues in condescension and fellowship of life,—this is that religious treasure which the covenant-idea

carries in itself. That the monergism and the majesty are consciously present to the Old Testament mind appears from the many passages where *Berith* assumes the meaning of "ordinance", "disposition". We regret that the author has not been faithful to the Erlangen-tradition, as represented by Von Hofmann, in emphasizing this, as at least a prominent strand of the Old Testament usage, and are at a loss to see how he could well avoid recognizing this, since the same arguments derived from the synonymies and constructions to which he appeals on pp. 20 ff. in proof of the frequency of this meaning in LXX can with equal force be applied to the original Hebrew, for the synonyms and the constructions are there precisely the same. That the two ideas of "covenant" and "authoritative disposition" which met in the same word can have been kept separated in the religious sphere without the one coloring the other is impossible to believe. What the author therefore puts in contrast as two successive stages in the development of the idea, we would prefer to regard as two coexisting elements present in the religious idea from the outset, with varyingly distributed prominence or emphasis. The "disposition"-idea is not a product of the later period. What we would say is that the Greek period through its choice of the word *διαθήκη* to render *Berith* gave to this element a more pointed, but also a more one-sided, expression. In doing this it expressed nothing new, but it exposed people to the danger of understanding less than the Old Testament meant to convey. The question, whether the average Greek New Testament mind remained able to perceive the covenant-aspect of the idea, notwithstanding the hindering associations of the everyday usage of *διαθήκη*, is somewhat difficult to decide. The author admits that the use of *διαθήκη* as "contract, agreement" is not altogether unknown to pre- and extra-biblical Greek. And on the other hand he also has to admit that *διαθήκη* in the sense of "disposition" has not yet been found up to date outside of the biblical documents. We would not, however, lay stress on either of these two points in considering the above question, for the former use was certainly rare, and the non-occurrence of the noun in the latter sense must be, as the author observes, accidental, since the corresponding middle verb frequently has this meaning. The main point is, whether the use of the Old Testament even in the Greek would not necessarily impress the reader very vividly with the fact that the *διαθήκη*, whatever it might be in secular life, had its own specific religious associations, among others that it frequently involved an agreement between God and his people. If the Septuagint-translators felt this, why should it not have been felt by their readers. And if it could be felt by the Septuagint readers, why should not the peculiar coloring of the word have perpetuated itself in the use made of it by the New Testament speakers and writers? The author has not convinced us, that in all cases of the New Testament use the notion of "covenant" was certainly absent from the mind. That our Lord in the words instituting the supper, with their plain reference to Ex. xxiv. was entirely oblivious of the

covenantal-character written so plainly on the face of the transaction there described, we find it exceedingly hard to believe. And in other instances similar doubts arise especially in connection with the *διαθήκη* that has a *μεσίτης* in Hebrews (where Behm makes *μεσίτης* = ἄγγος without, it seems to us, sufficient warrant). The question can hardly be brought to a satisfactory solution without taking into account the possibilities of the Aramaic idiom having supplied a word either specifically expressive or at least without difficulty understandable of the covenant-idea. What possibilities in this line existed we are not competent to judge. In general it ought to be remembered that to prove the possibility of understanding *διαθήκη* in a given case as "disposition" is not without more equivalent to proving that it can not have had to the original writers or readers the sense or the associations of covenant.

In regard to Gal. iii. 15, 17 we should have liked to have more weight attributed to Ramsay's suggestion, that here not the ordinary Roman conception of a "testament", but a Graeco-Syrian conception of the same, according to which a *διαθήκη* made under certain circumstances accompanying adoption was from the outset unalterable. How the Apostle's argument about the unalterableness of the *διαθήκη* given to Abraham, after once it was made, can apply to the Roman-law testament, which so long as the author lives remains subject to alteration, we are not able to see. To our surprise the author, while dismissing Ramsey's suggestion in a note, does not himself face the difficulty or offer any other solution.

We wish to say—and that not perfunctorily but sincerely—that the strictures made are not indicative of a lack of appreciation on our part of the high quality and unusual instructiveness of the author's work. The present treatise has the same merits even to a stronger degree that distinguished the author's previous contribution on the "*Handauflegung im Neuen Testament*" noticed by us in a previous number of this REVIEW. No New Testament scholar will peruse either without substantial profit.

Princeton.

GERHARDUS VOS.

Die Geisteskultur von Tarsos im augusteischen Zeitalter. Mit Berücksichtigung der paulinischen Schriften (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur des Alten und Neuen Testaments. Neue Folge. 2. Heft). Von LIC. HANS BÖHLIG, Gymnasial-Oberlehrer in Dresden. Mit Abbildungen im Text. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1913. Pp. 178.

Every biography of Paul must begin with Tarsus. And it must begin with a puzzling problem. What kind of influence did Tarsus exert upon the greatest of her citizens? With a view to the solution of this problem, Böhlig has entered upon a systematic study of the religious and philosophical culture of Tarsus at the time when Paul was one of the inhabitants.

In the first division of the study, which is devoted to the popular

religion of Tarsus, the most interesting figure is Sandan, the chief representative of the "active gods" as distinguished from the "exalted gods". (For the distinction, Böhlig refers in an interesting way to Acts xiv.) According to Böhlig, he is closely related to or identical with the Hittite divinity Teschup. Originally, Böhlig believes, he was a vegetation god, and is essentially the same as the god which in Syria was called Adonis, in Phrygia Attis, in Egypt Osiris, and in Babylon Tammuz. When Greek culture made itself felt in Tarsus, Sandan was identified more or less closely with Hercules. Hercules, however, was originally quite distinct, and the union between the two was never really completed. The dying and subsequent exaltation of Sandan, Böhlig believes, stands in striking analogy to the Pauline conception of the death and exaltation of Christ. But in the present monograph Böhlig does not try to develop the significance of the parallel (compare p. 168, where apparently the Pauline Christology is derived not from the pagan conception, but from the Jewish idea of the Messiah plus the Damascus vision). Böhlig believes, however, that Paul's frequent application of the term *κύριος* to Christ may well have been induced by the religious uses to which the word was put in Tarsus.

Considerable attention is devoted, of course, to the mystery cults. Here the sources are confessedly even more meagre than they are for the popular religion. But Böhlig is pretty confident that not only other mysteries but also the mysteries of Mithras were prevalent in Cilicia in the first century. What is more, he is confident that the mysteries exerted a profound influence upon the religion of Paul. The Pauline idea of union with Christ and the Pauline doctrine of the Spirit are to be explained not by Palestinian Judaism, but by Syrio-Hellenistic mysticism, tempered, it is true, and prevented from being non-ethical by the religious genius of Paul working on the basis of his Jewish inheritance.

Paul's conception of the cosmos is built, Böhlig believes, on Aryan rather than Semitic lines. The Aryan conception is built upon the numbers three and nine, the Semitic upon seven and twelve. And Paul has three heavens, not seven. The Aryan number three can be discovered in almost numberless places in Paul if one will only search. And Böhlig has searched. He has pressed into service "Jews, Gentiles and elect", "not many wise according to the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble", "but ye were washed, but ye were sanctified, but ye were justified", to say nothing of the benediction in Second Corinthians and "faith, hope, love"!

A special section is devoted to the Mithras cult. Through it, Böhlig believes, a number of important Persian ideas found their way into the religion of Paul—for example, the peculiar idea of "glory" and the peculiar contrast between light and darkness or truth and falsehood.

The section on the Stoic philosophy of Tarsus, with a description of the university, is illuminating. Among the philosophers, Atheno-

dorus, who lived just before the time of Paul, is the most prominent figure. As for the influence of the Stoic philosophy upon Paul, Böhlig believes that it is sometimes exaggerated. Paul's idea of the conscience, it is true, exhibits a striking parallel to Stoicism, though in Paul the idea has been greatly enriched. And Paul's doctrines of the natural knowledge of God and of natural morality are probably influenced to some degree by Stoicism. But in general where the content as distinguished from the terminology of Paul's religion coincides with Stoicism, the contact is to be explained by a common influence of Syrio-Hellenistic mysticism. Oriental mysticism, not Greek philosophy, is the important factor in the religion of Paul.

In the instructive section on the Judaism of Tarsus, Böhlig emphasizes the difference between the Judaism of the dispersion and the Judaism of Palestine, and brings Paul into connection with the former rather than with the latter. "The Jewish ideas of Paul were derived not from Jerusalem, but from Tarsus and from the dispersion in general. Paul's connection with the disciples of Gamaliel was only an episode in his life" (p. 166). Much of the influence which Stoicism and oriental religion exerted upon Paul was not direct, Böhlig believes, but was probably mediated by Tarsan Judaism. For the Jewish schools of Tarsus were influenced, no doubt, by the Hellenistic culture of the day. Böhlig's employment of Paul's doctrine of the law as a proof that he belongs not with Palestinian Judaism but with the more liberal Judaism of the dispersion is open to special criticism. The liberal attitude assumed by the Christian Paul towards the ceremonial law is most emphatically not to be explained as due even in part to the exigencies of Jewish missionary activity. Such a view loses sight of some of the most outstanding facts in Paul's religious experience. Paul's very emancipation from the law is to be explained as starting from the strictest conceivable conception of the law. And in minimizing Paul's connection with Palestinian Judaism, Böhlig has perhaps done scant justice not only to the book of Acts, but also to Paul's own testimony in Galatians, Second Corinthians and Philipians. It is indeed a fact of enormous importance that Paul was born in Tarsus, not Jerusalem. As a Jew of the dispersion he was specially fitted for the Gentile mission. What Böhlig says in this connection about Paul's speech at Athens, for example, is worthy of careful consideration. But the difference between Paul's actual education at Tarsus and Jerusalem and the education which he would have received if he had been born in Palestine, though important, must not be exaggerated.

In view of the rather radical position which Böhlig assumes with regard to Paul's connection with pagan religion, his attitude towards the book of Acts is especially interesting. He is inclined to hold a high view of its historical value. Thus on page 159 (footnote 1) he defends with considerable vigor the report which Acts makes of Paul's speech at Athens. And this is only one instance among many. So that it is not surprising that Böhlig speaks (p. 158) with approval

of the tendency in recent criticism towards a higher estimate of Acts.

In its most characteristic theses with regard to the religion of Paul, Böhlig's monograph is decidedly unconvincing. But it brings important and interesting information about the world in which Paul lived.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

Les Actes de Paul et ses Lettres apocryphes (Les Apocryphes du Nouveau Testament publiés sous la Direction de J. Bousquet et E. Amann). Introduction, Textes, Traduction et Commentaire. Par LÉON VOUAUX, Agrégé de l'Université, Professeur au Collège de la Malgrange. Paris: Librairie Letouzey et Ané. 1913. Pp. vii, 384.

This is a critical text of the Acts of Paul with Appendices treating of the Epistle to the Laodiceans, the Epistle to the Alexandrians, and the Correspondence of Seneca and Paul. The text is accompanied by a critical digest of readings and authorities on the left page, the right containing conveniently the translation and commentary. The Introduction discusses the contents of the Acts; the text and versions; the patristic testimony from the third to the tenth century; the character and doctrinal contents; the primitive condition of the text and its integrity; the author, place and date of composition; its points of contact with the New Testament and its historical value; the legend of Thekla; the influence of the Acts, and concludes with a bibliography. The author thinks the Acts in its original form was Catholic and not Gnostic (vs. Lipsius), heretical traits appearing in the later Latin versions. In character it is distinctly romantic not historical, although Thekla like Paul was a real person. It was written about the years 160-170 in Asia Minor, probably at Pisidian Antioch and by a priest [according to Tertullian, a presbyter]. M. Vouaux says (p. 132): "We conclude briefly. The *Acta Pauli* is simply a pious romance of two real persons, one of whom, St. Thekla, is known only from this source. It would be an illusion to seek in it authentic narratives. Did the priest of Asia who composed this work desire it to pass as history? So it would seem if we may judge from his deposition [according to Tertullian], for there would have been no need to proceed thus if, having only in view the edification of believers, he had given it out as his own production. In any event he attained his end in the following centuries only for the details of the life and martyrdom of Thekla. To us who can not accept even these he has rendered a service of which he scarcely thought; he has thrown light upon the spirit of certain Christian communities of the second century but little known and plunged almost completely into the shadow by the scarcity of authentic documents."

Princeton.

WILLIAM P. ARMSTRONG.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Glaube und Unglaube in der Weltgeschichte. Ein Kommentar zu Augustins *De Civitate Dei*. Mit einem Exkurs: *Fruitio Dei*, ein Beitrag zur Geschichte der Theologie und der Mystik. Von HEINRICH SCHOLZ, Lizentiat und Privatdozent der Theologie an der Universität Berlin. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1911. 8vo; pp. viii, 244.

A Study of Augustine's Versions of Genesis. A Dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Literature in Candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy (Department of Latin). By JOHN S. MCINTOSH. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. 1912. 8vo; pp. x, 130.

We wish to say a few words only of each of these excellent dissertations, both of which have originated in academic tasks, and both of which—though in unequal degrees—advance our knowledge of Augustine, the greatest man, Adolf Harnack tells us, that, between Paul the Apostle and Luther the Reformer, God has given to His church. A few words are all that need to be said of Dr. McIntosh's useful attempt to reconstruct the text of Augustine's *Genesis*; and Lizentiat Scholz's *Study of the City of God* requires so much to be said of it to do it justice, that it is best to pass it by in the meantime with only a general intimation of its aim and contents.

It is a pleasure to know that Dr. McIntosh's dissertation is only an earnest of what is to come. He has planned to make a complete study of Augustine's *Genesis*, in its origin, relations, and linguistic character, and he promises that we shall ultimately have the complete work. What he gives us now is the reconstructed text, with its variants, and a study of its Latinity with a view to determining the source of its peculiarities. The reconstruction of the text seems to us to be admirably done. Of course it is right to give the preference to readings from long over those from short quotations; but we do not so clearly see why readings in conformity with the LXX should be preferred to those that diverge from it; and we regret that all the instances of the recurrence of readings have not been recorded. The conclusion which Dr. McIntosh draws from a study of the variations in Augustine's citations is that he used more than one codex, but that these codices were recensions of a single original version, and not representatives of independent translations. This goes to support the view that the Old Latin Version was in essence a single version, though made the object of much reworking. From his careful study of the Latinity of Augustine's *Genesis* Dr. McIntosh reaches the conclusion that it is incorrect to speak of it as "colloquial": "the language throughout is determined by the Greek originals and the popular element from the nature of things is confined in great part to the admixture of words and word-formations common in Vulgar Latin, but found also in much of the literature of this period" (p. 123-4). Dr. McIntosh has not attained to that clearness and precision of style

which is an ornament to the philologist; and his book is badly printed. Misprints, fortunately few in the Latin text, occur far too frequently elsewhere; proper names suffer severely (the Latin form "Remis" p. 1, surely should be modernized, "Reims"; "Hausleiter" p. 2 should be "Haussleiter"; "Reinken", p. 6, should be Reinkens; "McClean", p. 70, should be McLean; "Koffmann", p. 14, should be Koffmane), and there are other disturbing slips (e.g., p. 11, line 16, "volume", should be volumes; p. 121, line 6 from bottom, "Grecism" should be "Grecisms"). We trust both matters will be looked to in the completer study to follow.

Lic. Scholz's is a very important contribution to the better understanding of the thought of Augustine. The title-page advises us that it is "a commentary on the *De Civitate Dei*". It also advises us of the view taken of that great book. It is not, Lic. Scholz thinks, as it is ordinarily spoken of, the first sketch of a universal philosophy of history, but above everything an apology for Christianity—"the last and greatest apology of the ancient church"—which only utilizes the philosophy of history as an instrument of apologetics. "The work of the *City of God* is a universal argument for the truth of Christianity, marshalled with all the resources of the spirit and power, presented under the battle-figure of a giant-struggle (*Gigantomachie*) of faith and unbelief in the world-history" (p. iv): "a philosophy of the forces and activities of faith and unbelief in the world of visible and invisible things" (p. 193). Though he calls his work a "commentary", it does not pursue the method of glossological comment, but takes the form of a systematic study of the presuppositions, fundamental notions, contents, and thematic development of the work with which it deals. "The twenty-two Books of the *City of God*," we read at the end of all, "are the valedictory of a decaying and the prolegomena to a new civilization. The new civilization was Christianity. For it Augustine had striven, to it he had handed on the foundations upon which it could rise on high, higher than he himself had any premonition of. Augustine thought well of his sketch; the echo which his ideas found could teach him that he had not written in vain. But it is the greatness of humility which speaks in his self-judgment; this work so rich in spirit and power closes with a simple confession to the God who made him what he is,—'to Him to whom earth and heaven lift their hands'." (p. 195).

There is attached to the book at the end an appendix, originally begun as a footnote but expanded into a little treatise, on the "Fruitio Dei", which is described as a "contribution to the history of theology and mysticism" (pp. 197-235). "The exposition of this important, momentous, epoch-making idea", Lic. Scholz remarks, "has never so far as I know been connectedly undertaken. . . . The following treatment is only a first sketch of the matter." It is nevertheless full of details and most suggestive. At one point, however, it is defective. Justice is done to Calvin's emphasis upon the conception (p. 226), but the place it takes in Reformed thought in general is somewhat skimmed.

It is not the Westminster catechisms alone which place the "enjoyment of God" by the side of the "glorifying" of Him, in the declaration of "the chief end of man" (see this REVIEW, Oct., 1908, pp. 565 seq.), and, were it through its catechetics only, the Reformed churches have taught generation after generation not merely to live for God's glory but to find all their joy in life and death, in this life and the next, only in Him.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Elchasai. Ein Religionsstifter und sein Werk. Beiträge zur jüdischen christlichen und allgemeinen Religionsgeschichte, von WILHELM BRANDT. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1912. Pp. vi, 182. M. 7.50, geb. M. 8.50.

The Elkesaites have usually been regarded as a Jewish Christian sect, which has sometimes been held more or less responsible for the Gnostic doctrines of the Ebionites of Epiphanius. According to Brandt, however, the sect was originally not Jewish Christian at all, but simply Jewish. Elkesai, the founder, flourished about 100 A.D. The attempts to discredit the tradition of an early origin of the sect are emphatically to be rejected. For the prophecy with regard to the third year of Trajan, which is attributed to Elkesai, is an unfulfilled prophecy, and could not, therefore, have been invented at a later time. The Elkesai book was compiled soon after Elkesai's death from brief notes for which the founder himself was responsible. Elkesai started from Judaism, but claimed to be the bearer of a new revelation, of which the most characteristic feature was a peculiar form of baptism. The origin of the Elkesaite baptism is obscure. At any rate, the movement begun by Elkesai was no mere Jewish sect, but a separate religion, though its separateness found complete outward expression only at a time considerably after the death of the founder. At first, the movement spread among Aramaic-speaking Jews and Jewish Christians. But soon it made its way also among bilingual Syrians—whether heathen, Christian or Jewish—and by them the Elkesai book was translated, with modifications, from Aramaic into Greek. So active was the propaganda that in the early part of the third century an attempt was made, under the leadership of a certain Alcibiades, to extend it among the Catholic Christians of the West. To this end the book was modified so as to give at least a vague impression of Christian Christology. These Christian elements, therefore, had no place in the original work of Elkesai, and never formed a really fundamental part of the tenets of the movement, but were added merely in the interests of a propaganda among Christians. Elkesai himself, in order to win over the Jewish Christians, had contented himself with a representation of the Son of God and the Holy Spirit as giant figures which had appeared to him in a vision. The propaganda in the West resulted in complete failure, but in the East the religion of Elkesai persisted long, and although it did not

become important in the general history of religion, is interesting because "it alone affords an answer to the inevitable question as to what became of the descendants of the original Christian communities in Palestine".

The monograph, of which the above is a brief summary, is a bold attempt at reconstruction of an exceedingly obscure chapter in the history of religion. Whether the attempt is successful must be determined by subsequent investigation. For the fundamental contention of Brandt, that Elkesai was not Jewish Christian but Jewish, a passage in Epiphanius, *haer.* xix. 3, seems to afford the most direct support. In that passage, Epiphanius seems to say that he can find in the Elkesai book no direct identification of the "Christ", who is called "the great King" with Jesus. Although perhaps that does not necessarily mean that there was in the book (in the form known to Epiphanius) no direct recognition of Jesus at all, yet the passage is worthy of the most careful attention. But unless Elkesai was a professing Christian it seems difficult to explain the astonishingly rapid spread of his doctrines among Aramaic-speaking Jewish Christians. According to Brandt (p. 62), "the Jewish Christians east of the Jordan had become all of them followers of Elkesai". Despite what Brandt says (*loc. cit.*) in explanation, this wholesale apostasy to a non-Christian religion remains very extraordinary.

It seems doubtful whether the problems of Jewish Christianity will ever be finally solved. Two new solutions of some of the most puzzling of the problems have just been proposed. One is offered in the monograph now under review, the other appears in Schmidtke's important work on the Jewish Christian gospels, which was summarized in the *PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW*, vol. x, 1912, pp. 574-580. Both solutions are widely different from those that had attained a considerable measure of acceptance before, and where they overlap they display by no means perfect agreement with each other. At any rate both Brandt and Schmidtke deserve careful attention from subsequent investigators.

For Brandt's monograph, compare the review by Harnack, in *Theologische Literaturzeitung*, 1912, columns 683-685, and also Brandt's article on "Elkesaites" in the *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*.

Princeton.

J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

Arthur T. Pierson, a Biography by His Son, DELAVAN LEONARD PIERSON. Fleming H. Revell, New York City. 8vo; illustrated, cloth, pp. 333. \$1.50 net.

Only those who have carefully read this notable biography can form a just estimate of the character of Dr. Pierson, or can determine his rightful place in the history of the modern church. His abilities were so versatile, his lines of service so varied, his spheres of activity so widely separated, that only such a comprehensive survey as

is afforded by this book can suggest the greatness of his achievements. Even many who in other years may have thought that they knew him best will be surprised at the revelation of an inner life, the true character of which was unknown. To attempt such a survey, and to reveal such a life was a difficult task for a son who would naturally be tempted either to undue constraint or to exaggeration. That the endeavor has been remarkably successful is attested by the large number of readers who already have found in this volume not only a tribute of affection, but a careful recital of facts, and an inspiring portrayal of a truly noble character.

We are shown the faithful pastor and teacher as he ministers to his church in Binghamton, Waterford, Detroit, Indianapolis and Philadelphia; we hear the exponent of higher Christian life and experience as he speaks at Niagara, Northfield, Mild-May, and Keswick; we listen to the brilliant preacher who for two years successfully continues the work of Charles H. Spurgeon in the great Metropolitan Tabernacle, London; we wonder at the diligence of the busy writer, editor, author; we follow the ardent advocate of missions on his long tours through Scotland, Ireland, England, and America. We conclude the whole survey with a new and deep impression, first, of Dr. Pierson's passionate love for Bible study and exposition, and his absolute confidence in the Scriptures as the infallible and inspired word of God; secondly, of his self-denying generosity and his real joy in giving to the support of Christian work; thirdly, of his continued consciousness of the presence of God, and his conviction of the reality and power of prayer; fourthly, of his constant effort to attain truer holiness and more complete victory over sin; fifthly, of his patient and heroic industry and the persevering cultivation of natural talents; sixthly, of his breadth of sympathy and his delight in the personal and helpful ministries which resulted in such wide usefulness; seventh, of his consuming eagerness to hasten the evangelization of the world. We appreciate how justly he has been called "A Spiritual Warrior Mighty in the Scriptures, A Leader in the Modern Missionary Crusade".

Princeton.

C. R. ERDMAN.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

Foundations. A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought. By Seven Oxford Men—B. H. STREETER, R. BROOK, W. H. MOBERLY, R. G. PARSONS, A. E. J. RAWLINSON, H. S. TALBOT, W. TEMPLE. London: Macmillan and Co., Limited. 1913. 8vo; pp. xi, 538.

The character of this book is fairly intimated by its title. The "Seven Oxford Men" who have written it describe themselves as

young men; and, as young men, they conceive their place to be in the advance-line of progress. They feel their responsibility to the church to which they belong; they are loyal in heart to that church; but they consider that the nature of their responsibility is of a different kind from that of older men. It may be the part of older men to conserve what has been attained; to the younger men belongs the task of leading on to what is yet to be acquired; their responsibility is "the responsibility of making experiments". And the times in which we find ourselves living call loudly for experiments. They are times of transition. The Victorian age is gone; and the assumptions on which Victorian religion was built up have been dissipated. What was thought to be the bed-rock has become shifting sand. A new world has come into being, a new world which is asking questions. The repetition of old answers can serve no purpose. New answers must be framed, and these answers must be couched in the "terms of modern thought". Young men, children of the new age, cannot breathe "the atmosphere of pre-'critical' and pre-Darwinian religion". They think in other terms; they must at least attempt to express what they think in the terms of the thought-world in which they live. And, indeed, to be perfectly frank, if Christianity cannot be expressed in terms of this new thought-world, Christianity is doomed. Men of the time are under the stress of a great obligation, therefore, at least to attempt to pour the old wine of Christianity into the new bottles of modern thought.

Adventuring upon this necessary task of transfusion, our "Seven Oxford Men" present us with nine trial essays. They "do not profess to have covered the whole field". They have confined themselves to the problems which seemed to them the most fundamental, or on which they felt they had something to offer. And they speak modestly of what they offer: it is not put forward as the solution, but only as a contribution towards the solution of the problems they have approached. The nine essays which are given, after a general exposition of the modern situation calling for restatement of fundamental principles, treat in turn of "the Bible", "the Historic Christ", "the Interpretation of the Christ in the New Testament", "the Divinity of Christ", "the Atonement", "the Church", "the Principle of Authority", "God and the Absolute". Probably only a coterie of Anglican writers—among Protestants at least—would have hit upon just this series of topics, when dealing with Christian fundamentals; could have chosen to write of the Church, for example, instead of the Holy Spirit, or could have separated "the Principle of Authority" so far from "the Bible" and attached it so closely to "the Church". Certainly the "Critical" preoccupation is very prominent. And one will naturally wonder how, in this age of Psychological investigation, even so short a series of fundamental problems could be outlined without including a single topic belonging to the subjective life,—not Sin, for example, or any of the great stages or steps of the recovery of the soul from sin to holiness. The disclaimer of all pretention to

have covered the whole field must no doubt be borne in mind here; as must also the fact that the book is not altogether silent on these great subjects. If they are not made the subjects of separate essays, they come up for discussion incidentally, sometimes for rather full discussion. Sin for instance is discussed as fully as its own proper subject in the essay on "the Atonement", and the essay entitled "the Interpretation of the Christ in the New Testament" is almost a brief sketch of New Testament Theology. Meanwhile the precise series of topics selected for professed discussion is worthy of remark, as is also the order in which they are discussed. Some explanation is given in the brief introduction of the rather odd postponement of the discussion of the existence of God to the end. This amounts to saying that it was thought best to examine in the light of modern knowledge the actual sources from which Christians have derived their conception of God before the validity of the belief in God itself was brought to the question. This would seem a natural ordering of the material if a negative conclusion all along the line were aimed at; it seems to us an unnatural order since it is a positive conclusion that is aimed at.

No one will doubt that Christians of to-day must state their Christian belief in terms of modern thought. Every age has a language of its own and can speak no other. Mischief comes only when, instead of stating Christian belief in terms of modern thought, an effort is made, rather, to state modern thought in terms of Christian belief. The writers of this volume seem not to have escaped this danger. They are preoccupied with modern thought and appear to suppose that Christianity must be assimilated to it. They open their Introduction by telling us that "Christianity" as well as "its traditional theology" originated in a past of outworn conditions; and they apparently intimate as the condition of the survival of "Christianity" that "its theology" shall not be "out of harmony with science, philosophy, and scholarship". This is, of course, to lay down an impossible condition, if "Christianity" is to be supposed to have any determinate content. For "science, philosophy and scholarship" are not stable but varying entities, and nothing but a most habile chameleon could manage to keep in harmony with them from age to age. Of course what is meant is our own "science, philosophy and scholarship",—which seems to be only a naïve way of transferring the claim of infallibility from "Christianity" and "its theology" to ourselves. Nothing is more certain, however, than that a Christianity and a theology which are closely in harmony with the "science, philosophy and scholarship" of to-day will be out of harmony with the "science, philosophy and scholarship" of to-morrow. After all, is it not enough to ask that "Christianity" and "its theology" shall be in harmony with truth? And if it is to be in harmony with truth, must it not be out of harmony with all the half-truths, and quarter-truths, and no truths, which pass from time to time for truth, while truth is only in the making? A "Christianity" which is to be kept in harmony with a growing "science, philosophy

and scholarship", beating their way onward by a process of trial and correction, must be a veritable nose of wax, which may be twisted in every direction as it may serve our purpose.

The question is of course a question of standard. Is our standard Christianity? Or, is our standard our own "science, philosophy and scholarship", that is to say the congeries of notions which we have taken up as the outcome of the impact upon us of the results of modern investigation, deeply or shallowly, widely or narrowly, understandingly or misunderstandingly assimilated? If we hold Christianity to be true, we shall naturally sit loosely to the "science, philosophy and scholarship" of any passing moment, so far as it seems to traverse the truth of Christianity, and look forward to the better day when trial and correction shall be over and the unity of truth shall be vindicated by its manifested harmony. If we do not hold Christianity to be true, we shall naturally substitute for it the findings of the momentarily accepted "science, philosophy, and scholarship" as at least provisionally the most likely hypothesis. What is a standing puzzle is why we should wish to call by the name of "Christianity" these provisional findings of our "science, philosophy, and scholarship" substituted for it. If "Christianity" has no stable meaning, the name has no content: it is in the strictest sense of the word an empty name. It is a purely formal designation for whatever may chance in any age or in any company to be the sum of the conclusions presumed for the moment to be commended by "science, philosophy, and scholarship". Coteries at one in nothing save in the lack of the thing, may be at each other's throats in strife over the monopoly of the name. Would it not be better to allow that "Christianity" is a historical entity and has a definite content? And then, when we have drifted away from this historical entity with its definite content, just frankly to acknowledge that we are to that extent no longer "Christians"? That was, for example, what Strauss did. But that is not now the fashion. Men nowadays cheerfully give up the substance, but never the name of Christianity. Rudolf Eucken asks, "Can we still be Christians?" and answers with emphasis, Of course! but the "Christianity" we embrace must be a very different Christianity from that which has hitherto borne the name. So also Ernst Tröeltsch declares himself still a "Christian" (a "free Christian") though his Christianity has been so "refashioned" that it has become nothing more than an "immanent theism" the quintessential extract of the religious development of mankind, which still clings to the name of Jesus only because it needs a rallying point and a name to conjure with. We are not suggesting that the writers of our present volume have drifted away from Christianity as have Rudolf Eucken and Ernst Tröeltsch. But we are suggesting that they have in common with such writers the tendency to employ the term "Christianity" to express not a historical entity of fixed content, but just what they may themselves happen to believe. They have lost to this extent an objective standard of what Christianity is.

How completely they have lost an objective standard of what Christianity is appears at once from the first essay proper in the book,—that on “the Bible”. It is written by Mr. Richard Brook. Its central contention is that the Bible has no “authority”. It is simply the record of the religious experience of its writers. These writers were no doubt religious geniuses, and their religious experience is therefore in a sense normative. “We go to the Bible in order to deepen and correct our religious lives by the aid of the Biblical writers” (p. 66). “And so I go to the Bible, as others have gone before me, to learn from those who have heard God speak, seeking by their help to see the vision they saw, and finding in their words inspiration and power” (p. 71). In this sense we may still speak of the “authority” of the Bible. “Yet it still remains true that the ultimate appeal for each is to his own experience” (p. 59). The Bible may inspire, it cannot directly instruct: we go to it specifically for religion, not for, say, theology (p. 68). The theology of the Bible is necessarily very inadequate: our own may be—one would think, must be—better: “in some ways our theology may be more adequate than that of St. Paul” (p. 68). But not our religion. We may, nay must, kindle our flame from Paul’s, but we can interpret the implications of the fire once enkindled in our hearts better than he could. “We can learn more religion from the humblest saint”, we are told, “than from the greatest theologian” (p. 68), but this is only half of what is meant to be conveyed to us: the point is the entire separation of saintliness from theology, and the other half of the lesson we are expected to draw from the illustration is that we cannot learn theology even from the greatest saint. For religion “we may, or rather we must go to St. Paul”, for example, but we may safely neglect his theology. Theology is “the intellectual interpretation” of religion, and we must needs do our own interpreting, and we feel ourselves better equipped for the task than Paul was.

Clearly all this rests on a fatally false conception of the relation of religion and theology. “Theology” we are told crisply, “is the science of religion” (p. 38). This, however, it of course just is not. *Ex vi verbi* it is the science of God. It most decidedly is not “the reflexions upon religious experience, the attempt to interpret, to understand, and to systematize it”. That is what “the science of religion” is—quite a different thing from “theology”. What theology is, is reflection on God and on all that we know concerning God. It is not then the product of religion any more than—or indeed as much as—religion is the product of it. What it precisely is, is the product in the intellect of the same body of facts of which religion is the product in the life: religion and theology are parallel and interactive products of the same body of facts and are too intimately related to be separated (cf. p. 379). One would like to see religion defined without involving theology. Is not religion the reaction of the human spirit in the presence of God? And how is the human spirit to be in the presence of God except by intellectual

apprehension? By as much as man is an intelligent being, by that much he cannot react to objects unperceived. Perception, ripening into conception, underlies all religious reaction; and as is the perception ripening into conception, so is the religion. Otherwise we should be committed to the proposition that fetishism is as good a religion as Christianity. For precisely that in which fetishism differs from Christianity is its theology: take away the differences in the conception of deity and you take away the differences in the religious functioning. Mr. Brook is not so far from adopting this view as could be wished. "The same religious experience will be differently interpreted, not only at different times", he reasons in his endeavor to lay a basis for refusal to be governed by the "theology" of the Biblical "writers" (p. 38), "but even by different individuals at the same time. The Professor and the Blacksmith, in so far as they are religious, must have the same religious experience, but their 'theological' views, their 'thoughts' about God, are and must be widely different." Why not, instead of the Professor and the Blacksmith, say the Christian and the Fetish-worshiper: *gradus non mutant speciem*? Is it not because the Professor and the Blacksmith are surreptitiously supposed both to be Christians, that is, to have the same "theology" underlying and giving form to their religious experience? In point of fact the Professor and the Blacksmith, though both have religion, will not and cannot have the same religious experience save as they have the same theological conceptions. If one conceives of God as a stock or a stone and the other as an infinite moral person, their religious reaction and the whole complex of their religious experience, will be utterly different. Religion, in all its manifestations, waits, like all other human functioning on the operation of ideas: here too the line of action is from perception, through emotion, to volition. And nothing can be more certain than that if the theology of the Bible is discarded, the religion of the Bible is discarded with it. We shall certainly have religion: we cannot avoid that: man is a religious animal. But our religion will not be the religion of the Bible unless—among other elements of it—our religious conceptions, that is, our theology, be the religious conceptions, that is to say the theology, of the Bible. It is the gravest kind of self-deception to imagine—to bring the matter to its sharpest point—that we can discard the religious conceptions of Paul, or of Jesus, and remain of the same religion as Paul or Jesus, because forsooth we feel that we too, like them, are religious beings and function religiously. Christianity is not a distinctive interpretation of a religious experience common to all men, much less is it an indeterminate and constantly changing interpretation of a religious experience common to men; it is a distinctive religious experience begotten in men by a distinctive body of facts known only to or rightly apprehended only by Christians.

As this rejection of all external authority in religious conceptions is principal, it should extend to the authority of Christ also. There

are indications that it does so. Jesus is declared to have been not only "not formally impeccable" (though "actually sinless") but also "in no wise exempted from such intellectual limitations, or even (within the spheres of science and history) from such erroneous conceptions of fact, as were inseparable from the use of the mental categories of the age and generation among whom He came" (pp. 368). It is even allowed, though guardedly, that His ethical teaching was conditioned by the shortness of His view: "Doubtless had the Master explicitly contemplated the centuries of slow development still awaiting humanity, the actual form and phrasing of many a precept would have been different. Doubtless, too, He would have let fall a word or two on the creative moral value of institutions like the Family and the State" (p. 109). There is even a shocking paragraph in which Jesus' whole view of His work is represented as a "venture of faith", as if it were a speculative invention of His mind to explain "the facts of the world", that is to say the experiences to which He was subjected: "Because He believes in the goodness of God, Jesus Christ is sure that His death cannot mean either the end of His life or the ruin of His work. His faith leads Him to see in the apparent failure of His ministry the vindication of the teaching of Deutero-Isaiah as to the redemptive value of suffering, and therefore He sees in the Cross the salvation of mankind, and beyond the Cross the triumph of His risen life" (p. 51). "Doubtless," it is added, "this was a venture of faith, but essentially it was a venture which faith was bound to make". No compelling reasons are given why we should feel bound to make the venture with Him; why the theological interpretation of the facts of His life made after this fashion by a man of His "intellectual limitations" should be authoritative to us.

The essay on "the Divinity of Christ" (which is by Mr. William Temple) opens with a couple of sentences which, taken in themselves, announce an important truth, that, duly considered, might correct the tendencies of thought to which we have adverted—though Mr. Temple employs them for quite a contrary purpose. They are: "The central doctrine of Christianity has been made unduly difficult by the way in which believers inevitably tend to state it. It is really about God; but it is made to appear as if it were primarily a doctrine about a historic Person, who lived in the beginning of our era." In themselves these words might be taken to mean that in thinking of Christ we should always take our start from His Divine Nature and work out from that as our—as it was His—starting-point: though Mr. Temple himself takes the opposite course. In his attempt to construct a doctrine of the Person of Christ it is from the voluntarist standpoint that Mr. Temple works; and he fails precisely as voluntarists are accustomed to fail, by giving us a Christ who seems to be divine only as one can be said to be divine who is one in purpose with God. It is already ominous that he is constrained to tell us that Paul of Samosata was the first to attempt a construction

on this presupposition (p. 226). He hopes to escape the ruin wrought by Paul by refusing to distinguish between Will and Substance (p. 247): to the voluntarist "Will is the only Substance there is in a man; it is not a part of him; it is just himself as a moral (or indeed 'active') being". It may be doubted, however, whether he really escapes. It does not make Christ God to say that, while His "Will as a subjective function is, of course, not the Father's Will", yet "the content of the Wills—the Purpose—is the same" (p. 248); that "what we see Christ doing and desiring, that we thereby know the Father does and desires". This only makes Christ (so far) like God. And what shall we do with a passage like this: "He is the man whose will is united with God's. He is thus the first-fruits of Creation—the first response from the Creation to the love of the Creator. But because He is this, He is the perfect expression of the Divine in terms of human life. There are not two Gods, but in Christ we see God. Christ is identically God; the whole content of His being—His thought, feeling, purpose—is also that of God. This is the only 'substance' of a spiritual being, for it is all there is of him at all. Thus, in the language of logicians, formally (as pure subject) God and Christ are distinct; materially (that is in the content of the true consciousness) God and Christ are One and the Same. The human Affections of Christ are God's; His Love is God's; His Glory is God's." This is undoubtedly to exalt Christ: does it exalt Him as more than the greatest of the sons of men? Is it not an illusion to suppose that thus the true deity of Christ is vindicated? Let us assume whatever ontology of spiritual being we choose: let us declare that Will is the essence of spirit—if that is not a contradiction in terms. But let us not suppose that thus we abolish the distinction between distinct Subjects. That the contents of Christ's will is the "same" as the contents of God's will, His purpose the "same" as God's purpose, does not identify Him with God. If it did, then, when two men "have the same thought and the same purpose" they would be "merged into one another"; and it is not enough to say, in order to escape this, that the identity in their case "extends to a very small part of the content of consciousness, while in the case" of Christ and God, "it extends to the whole" (p. 250). We are in danger here of juggling with the ambiguities of "identical", whether as *homousios* or *homoiousios*. To justify the position taken it would seem that one must accept the postulate that all spirit is one, and individualization is the result only of differences in the "content" of that will which constitutes its being. When the "content"—the "purpose"—becomes one, the artificial (and temporary) barriers are broken down and spirit becomes confluent. Unless this pantheism is permitted to lie unacknowledged behind our thought, to speak of Christ as identical with God in content of will—in purpose—does not seem to be to speak of Him as Divine.

It is part of the "modernness" of these essays that they are very chary in acknowledging the occurrence in our Lord's life—or in the

origins of Christianity in general—of what we have been accustomed to call miracles. More than one of the writers carefully define miracles away. "The best definition of a miracle," we read (p. 167, cf. p. 138) "is that it is something which when we are confronted by it compels us to say, 'this is the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous in our eyes': it is no less marvelous if after our first sense of wonder has calmed down we are enabled to see a little further into the divinely ordered process by which the event was brought about." The Virgin-birth is not discussed (cf. p. 81). The Resurrection is elaborately explained away by Mr. B. H. Streeter (pp. 127-141) in the interests of the "objective vision hypothesis", and while it is obvious that some of his colleagues agree with him, we are glad to learn (p. 135) that not all of them do. Mr. Streeter can even say (p. 132): "I know of no living theologian who would maintain a physical *Ascension* in this crude form, yet so long as emphasis is laid on the physical character of the *Resurrection* it is not obvious how any refinement of the conception of the 'physical' really removes the difficulty." He is certainly right in thus bringing together the *Ascension* and *Resurrection*—both are physical or neither is: and we think him right in declaring that if they are in any sense physical no refinement of the conception of 'physical' will help. In the meanwhile it must be borne in mind that the totality of the testimony is to a physical resurrection. There is not only the empty tomb, which Mr. Streeter but lamely accounts for; but the whole account of the resurrection appearances, culminating in the explicit declaration of our Lord recorded in Lk. xxiv. 39 (of which Mr. Streeter makes no use), is to be reckoned with,—as well as Paul's clear exposition that our resurrection-bodies which are to be like Christ's are veritable "bodies" and are composed of "flesh" (1 Cor. xv. 39, 40).

Where the conception of the Person of Christ is so inadequate the conception of His Work is not likely to be less so. We are not surprised to find accordingly that only a "subjective" Atonement is admitted by some of the writers. This seems to be the position of Mr. Temple. In the essay on "The Atonement" which is by Mr. M. H. Moberly, however, a somewhat higher doctrine is taught,—the doctrine developed by Dr. R. C. Moberly in his well-known and powerfully reasoned *Atonement and Personality*, in which penitence is made to do the work of expiation and Christ's work is summed up in vicarious penitence, whatever that can be. Mr. Moberly accordingly speaks of "moral transformation" as if it could "constitute an atonement for sin", that is, as if, "in removing the cause of estrangement it removed, as it were automatically, the estrangement between God and man" (p. 293). He recognizes indeed that man's own penitence would be inadequate; not, he adds, "because it is *merely* penitence (i.e., *only* a change of character), but because it is *incomplete* penitence (i.e., only a *partial*, and therefore very probably a transitory change of character)" (p. 295). Thus we escape out of a purely "subjective" atonement,—which is a blessing. But all that is offered

objectively is a vicarious penitence of Christ, which is perfect and complete—not indeed in itself but in and with its effect in inducing penitence in us: “vicarious penitence is only redemptive when it succeeds in becoming more than vicarious” (p. 310). So firmly grounded is Mr. Moberly in his theory that he even permits himself to write: “if vicarious penitence is unmeaning and impossible the problem of atonement is insoluble: for penitence which is not vicarious, the unsupported penitence of the sinner himself, is never complete or whole-hearted” (p. 308)—from which we learn that not only in his view *can* penitence atone, *but only* penitence can atone! Having referred the atoning efficacy in Christ’s work thus to His “vicarious penitence”, Mr. Moberly is naturally greatly embarrassed in having Christ’s death on his hands, to which, rather, the New Testament writers—and indeed Christ Himself—as well as the historical Church refer it. After some pages of discussion he arrives at the point where, as he says, “we can dimly see how the fact of sin and the requirements of holiness made it necessary that Jesus should die” (p. 313)! The method of Mr. Moberly’s essay (a method we do not like) is to set over against each other the “liberal” and the “conservative” views and to seek an “inclusive” view as presumably better than either. It is noticeable that in stating the “conservative” view there is repeated intrusion of elements drawn not from the doctrine of Satisfaction as expounded by the great teachers of the church, but from the Grotian or Governmental Theory (pp. 288, 302, 305). The “conservative” view thus does not get a fair hearing, and is made the object of criticisms which do not touch it. As the essay draws to its close Mr. Moberly addresses himself to answering some objections which seem to lie against the whole idea involved in the Christian doctrine of the Atonement. Among them he raises this one,—that provision is made by it for only a fraction of the human race (p. 331). “How can we possibly believe in a divine scheme of salvation for the human race which ‘leaves whole continents out of its ken’?” In other words, if Christ is the Saviour of the world, must He not save the world? Mr. Moberly acknowledges that he has “no complete answer” to this objection, but he thinks he can “see the direction in which the answer is to be sought”. This answer is, in brief that we do not need to know Christ to be Christ’s, supplemented by the suggestion that Christ can do His saving of the world in the next world (p. 332)! The Scriptures, it is needless to say have a very different answer. We infer that Mr. Temple agrees in principle with his colleague here, from the circumstance that we find him endeavoring from a wrong point of view to grasp the idea of the “invisible Church”, putting into it the heathen sages also, “each in his degree”—whatever that may mean (p. 341).

It is in dithyrambic strains that Mr. Temple speaks of the Church, making use at times of forms of speech to which it is difficult to attach an exact meaning. Some particularly remarkable results are attained by his endeavor to give to language struck out originally from

a view of the Eucharist which he does not share, validity from his new point of view as to the "sacrifice of Christ". Jesus is veritably in the Eucharist as beauty is in a great picture though it is not every eye which can see Him there. "His sacrifice is perpetual": once only in the history of men has its whole nature been set forth, "but the sacrifice itself, which is His obedience and the submission of His will, is eternal". There is a devotion and a mystical ecstasy which is altogether admirable throbbing through his words, but the fire which glows in them has not been kindled at Calvary. Noble words are spoken about the communion of the saints into which we enter at the Eucharist (p. 363): our hearts are quickened by the vision which is summoned up of the saints of all ages gathered with us around the table of the Lord, participants with us in the body that was broken and the blood that was shed for us. But the underlying thought is not that of the altar. There seems to be something bizarre in suggesting that the phrase which calls the Church "the Body of Christ" is "probably taken from the Eucharist" (p. 340, cf. p. 185). Surely "This is my body" refers to Christ's literal, not figurative body—to Christ, that is, not to His disciples. They did not eat themselves in symbol! The latter part of the essay on the Church is filled with shrewd good sense, and exhibits a clear perception of the nature and value of Church unity.

In Mr. Rawlinson's essay on "the principle of Authority" a careful comparison is made between various views. It is a pity that Congregationalism is taken as the proper representative of Protestantism in the matter of Church organization and authority. It is as insular as Anglicanism itself: and has no existence outside of lands of English speech. A world-wide polity like Presbyterianism would have afforded a much truer representative type. Take for example the idea of "the invisible Church". If the twenty-fifth chapter of the Westminster Confession—or its parallel in any of the representative Reformed confessions—had been in Mr. Rawlinson's mind he could scarcely have written as he has written on pp. 394-5. 404. In the very interesting discussion of the origin of the Christian ministry which is attached to this essay the ordinary confusions into which Anglican writers of liberal tendencies fall are not escaped. When Mr. Rawlinson says that the "ministry appears to have very early assumed the form of a bishop, presbyters, and deacons to each Eucharistic assembly", he seems unaware that, though he defines the individual church in different terms from those that would be natural to a Presbyterian, he has described precisely the Presbyterian polity. When he goes on to say that "the modern diocese is virtually an expansion of the primitive congregation by means of the delegation to presbyters of functions originally episcopal", he is very lightly springing wide chasms. The bishop, the presbyter, the deacon,—and the officering of the local church—have each and every one of them suffered a sea-change which has transmuted them into something different from what they are, say, in the Pastoral Epistles—which Mr.

Rawlinson, by the way, treats with strange neglect. From a "pastor" of a congregation, the Bishop has become the ruler over many congregations. The Presbyterian has ceased to be a co-ruler with the Bishop; and shrinking from a plurality in each congregation to a singularity, has become a pastor. The Deacon from "a server of tables" has lost all connection with the local church and become an inchoate Presbyterian. The local church instead of possessing a Bishop, a college of Presbyters, and a college of Deacons, has left to it only a single Presbyterian. In other words from Presbyterian the church has become Episcopal—and that is a total transformation.

The final essay—on "God and the Absolute"—by Mr. W. H. Moberly, is the longest in the volume, and while very able is also very unsatisfying. It is in effect an attempt to interpret the doctrine of God in terms of the absolutist philosophy. It with difficulty escapes sheer pantheism, if indeed it does escape it. It is a hard saying to be told that "God Himself must be religious" (p. 512), even though this is transmuted into the declaration that, being a Trinity, He "can know God". It is a harder one to be told that "the union of God and man is necessary to the full reality of either" (cf. p. 520), or that God could not still remain God without creation, incarnation and atonement (p. 511). It is perhaps even a still harder one to be told that "the world and its history is essential to the very Life and Being of God" (cf. p. 341).

Throughout the whole volume there is apparent a spirit of readiness to weigh and appreciate points of view other than that which may be thought hereditary with its authors. What is more remarkable, this open-mindedness is manifested not merely towards what is commonly known as "liberalism" but also towards what is known in average Anglican circles as "sectarianism". For party-spirit apparently dies more hardly than Christian principle. We have known men who were cheerfully willing to give up the deity of Christ but not baptism by immersion alone; and latitudinarian Anglicanism has perhaps been more common than a truly tolerant one: even our modern "Evangelicals" are solicitous to be understood to be "good churchmen". No one would mistake the writers of this volume for anything but Anglicans. There are indications that they might even be classed as "High Anglicans": Mr. Temple for example pleads for prayers for the dead and the invocation of saints (p. 346); and remnants show themselves here and there of that smug self-felicitation on the position of Anglicanism midway between Romanism and Protestantism, which betrays so many Anglicans into the notion that the coming unity of Christendom must crystalize as Anglican. But few books have emanated of late from Anglican circles in which is manifested a greater readiness to consider the positions of writers of other communions of Christian men, or to weigh afresh the distinctive contentions of traditional Anglicanism. We take it that a remark like the following is typical of the general mental attitude of the volume. "In its strictest and most traditional form the theory of an original

Apostolic succession has perhaps broken down; but the liberalized restatement of it, which is to be found in the writings of Duchesne and Batiffol abroad and the present Bishop of Oxford at home is at least a tenable interpretation of the evidence as viewed in the light of certain antecedent presuppositions" (p. 383). We may think it still too much to say even so much as this, and question whether the view still clung to is compatible with the facts. But we recognize the openness of mind which is manifested in the position assumed. And this, we take it, is the most encouraging feature of the volume.

We have dealt with the volume not as a collection of separate essays but as a single whole, because we are asked to do so (p. viii).

There is a good Index.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Groote Godsdiensten: Serie II, No. 7. Het Christendom door Dr. H. BAVINCK, Hoogleraar aan de Vrije Universiteit te Amsterdam. Baarn: Hollandia-Drukkerij. 1912. 16mo; pp. 62.

It is no small task which Dr. Bavinck has undertaken, to tell in sixty-two small pages all that Christianity is, and that, in a series in which it is brought into comparison with other "great religions". He has fulfilled this task, however, in a most admirable manner. His method is, first, to point out what all Christians are agreed upon; and then to give an historical account of Christianity in its origins and in its progressive manifestations in the great forms of the Orthodox Eastern, the Romish, the Lutheran, Reformed Churches, with further descriptions of the forms it has taken since, in Anabaptism and Socinianism, and the New Protestantism rooted in the Enlightenment. His plan thus resolves itself into an informal sketch of the historical development of Christianity. This sketch is written with remarkable grasp of details and an equally remarkable power of synthesis. We cannot imagine how the work could be done better.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Open Sore of Christendom. By the Rev. W. J. SEXTON, M.A. Author of "Church and People". London: J. J. Bennett. 327 pp. 16°. 3s. 6d.

This book, with its needlessly unpleasant title, seeks a good end in a rather unfortunate way. We say, a good end, although this should be qualified. That it would be a desirable thing just now that the various branches of the Protestant Church should be organically one may be questioned. And the end the author has in view will seem to some far less good, when it is found that the only means of accomplishing it is the acceptance of the Historic Episcopate by all the "sects", and of supplemental ordination at the hands of a bishop of the Church of England by their ministers. Practically, the "sects" are to be merged into the Church of England and the Churches in

America, with which the former is in full communion. The Protestant world is hardly ripe for this now, if it ever will be. *The Open Sore*, as defined by the author, is this: "That we Christians, nominally members of One Body, are in practice split up into hundreds of sects. There are divisions among us. There is schism in the body. . . . In a word, CHRIST IS DIVIDED." There is, sadly enough, truth in this statement, viewing the Church as a visible organism. But surely the case is not so bad, because of this lack of organic unity, as the author goes on to say: "From the sole of her foot even unto the head there is no soundness, but wounds and bruises and putrifying sores." Were the Church in such a case, the unpleasant title of the book were scarcely adequate. The author is sincere and is kindly disposed toward his brethren of other communions, but his position is greatly weakened by such extravagance of statement, and a tendency to lay to the charge of organic disunion many patent evils that do not properly lie at that particular door. He regards the pre-Reformation unity of the Church as preferable to the present state of division. "We have been in this deplorable state for something like four centuries." In Part III, in which he treats of the origin and growth of the Open Sore, he describes the Reformation as one of its features. The spread of the Reformation through the countries of Europe was a continuation of the "sad progress" of the Open Sore. The disease was disseminated as the doctrines of the Reformation passed from land to land. In Parts III and IV the rise of the various sects on the Continent and particularly in England is described. The author is, of course, opposed to any form in independency. He admits that non-conformists are sheep, but they are wandering sheep. The sects have done much noble work, in spite of the fact that they have widened the "open sore" more and more. Speaking of the Wesleyans, he depicts the Church of England as acknowledging all their splendid achievements, conceding their right to retain identity as a religious organization, and offering "her quondam offspring a valid ordination" (p. 139). It all hinges on that. Part V (the book is divided into parts and not chapters) regards Jesus as the organizer of a visible kingdom or church. The author goes so far as to say: To be in the way of salvation is to be in a kingdom. To see what Jesus is seeking is to see him planning for and devising an organized society (p. 179). He states it hypothetically, but manifestly holds that "Christ intended as an essential to salvation a specific membership in the One Church He founded" (p. 191). The sects are not this Church. An ordained ministry is an essential of this Church. The sects have no valid ordination. What becomes of the hope of salvation of the vast multitudes who have no specific membership in the One Church, which their church is not? As a narrative Part V is most admirable and its conclusions are indisputable, that Jesus selected and trained certain men to carry on His work and endowed them for this work, and that these men in their turn appointed successors. Part VI treats of attempts at unity

and is marked by a vein of optimism. "In religious thought the objections to the idea of a Visible Church are passing. Protestant beliefs are weakening" (p. 221). In another aspect of things he shows some pessimism. "If you are going to rest on the mere residuum upon which all [religious] communities agree, you rest on nothing more than a flimsy, vague sentiment" (p. 223). That is probably where we are going to rest, although we may not rest at all. Part VII brings us to the crux of the matter, the Quadrilateral, and treats of three of its principles, leaving the fourth for later attention. Occasionally Mr. Sexton makes a rarely naive statement, as for example when, in his discussion of creeds he says: "The Westminster Confession is so colored with Calvinism that it is positively obnoxious to many Christians" (p. 235). This must be admitted. Part VIII is a defence of the Historic Episcopate. The author's conclusion as regards the ministry in the apostolic Church is moderate and fairly deducible from the records. He then gives the patristic evidence in favor of the existence of three orders from the apostles to Tertullian. It is a well arranged historic statement. The deductions he makes will not gain unqualified assent. Speaking of the power of the Church he says: "Now, if men are prepared to accept the Canon of Scripture or the Creed on the authority of the Church, why not the Episcopate?" (p. 287). And, let us add, why not seven sacraments and the confessional and penance and extreme unction and the chair of St. Peter? Those who have not been episcopally ordained will not be much appeased by the following: "No one (supposing he is desirous of having his own ordination supplemented by Episcopal ordination) need be called upon to deny that the Spirit of God blessed his ministrations, or contradict any other spiritual experience" (p. 295). It would have given more comfort had he said that no such one would be called upon to deny that he had been truly ordained. What we may call the author's ultimatum is given as follows: "We cannot forego the Historic Episcopate, but because of its primitive and presumably apostolic origin, because it was the authoritative rule of the Church, because of its long-lived continuity and vitality, because of its adaptability to different nations and peoples, because it is common to Roman, Greek and Anglican Catholics, and because some Protestants are rallying towards it, we would invite others to enjoy the authorized form of government, and to assist in the healing of the Open Sore of Christendom by accepting the Historic Episcopate" (p. 295). The invitation remains open. Says a writer in a recent number of *The Churchman* (New York organ of the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States): "Not more heavily did the sky rest down on the shoulders of Atlas than does the burden of unifying the scattered forces of Christendom rest down on the shoulders of the American Catholic Church." This last phrase connotes, of course, the Protestant Episcopal Church of the United States.

Princeton.

JOSEPH H. DULLES.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

A Half Century Among the Siamese and the Lāo. By DANIEL MCGILVARY, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co. Illustrated, 12mo; cloth, pp. 429, net \$2.00.

This autobiography is one of the significant missionary volumes of our era. The author has properly been classed with Carey and Judson and Paton and Chalmers and Mackay. He here traces for us his career from the early days in North Carolina, and in Princeton Seminary, through the years of missionary service in Bangkok and Pechaburi, to the long decades of devoted labor in Northern Siam. It was a long life of eighty-three years, and it covered the entire period of missionary work among the Lāo peoples. These representatives of the great Tai race were, until recently, comparatively independent and only nominally subject to Siam, but now form the northern provinces of that kingdom. A half century ago they were but little known. Their conditions, customs and characteristics have been described in the interesting volume of Mrs. Curtis: "The Laos of North Siam", and subsequently by J. H. Freeman, in "An Oriental Land of the Free". Until a few years ago, they were supposed to number in population some two or three million, but are now known to be representatives of the race which spreads over French Indo China, the Shan States and the southern provinces of China as well as over northern Siam. The numbers are now estimated at many millions. To these people Dr. McGilvary went alone, as the pioneer missionary, a half century ago, and established the work which has since grown to such encouraging proportions. In this autobiography he describes the experiences of those pioneer days, and continues the narrative as far as his last long itinerating journey in 1898. The recital is modest, intelligent, informing, inspiring. It suggests how much we owe to our representatives in these distant fields and how great is our obligation to carry forward the work they have begun. This volume will be enjoyed not only by those who are interested in the missions of our church, but by all who are fascinated by books of adventure, or who are concerned with the evangelization of the world. As Dr. Arthur J. Brown well says in his introductory "Appreciation" of Dr. McGilvary: "There is no more fascinating story in fiction or in that truth which is stranger than fiction, than the story of his discovery of a village of strange speech near his station at Pechaburi, Siam, his learning the language of the villagers, his long journey with his friend, Dr. Jonathan Wilson, into what was then the unknown region of northern Siam, pushing his little boat up the great river and pausing not until he had gone six hundred miles northward and arrived at the city of Chiangmai. The years that followed were years of toil and privation, of loneliness and sometimes of danger; but the missionaries persevered with splendid faith and courage until the foundations of a prosperous Mission were laid.

In all the marked development of the Lāo Mission, Dr. McGilvary

was a leader—the leader. He laid the foundations of medical work, introducing quinine and vaccination among a people scourged by malaria and smallpox, a work which has now developed into five hospitals and a leper asylum. He began educational work, which is now represented by eight boarding schools and twenty-two elementary schools, and is fast expanding into a college, a medical college, and a theological seminary. He was the evangelist who won the first converts, founded the first church, and had a prominent part in founding twenty other churches, and in developing a Lāo Christian Church of four thousand two hundred and five adult communicants. His colleague, the Rev. Dr. W. C. Dodd, says that Dr. McGilvary selected the sites for all the present stations of the Mission long before committees formally sanctioned the wisdom of his choice. He led the way into regions beyond and was the pioneer explorer into the French Lāo States, eastern Burma, and even up to the borders of China. Go where you will in northern Siam, or in many sections of the extra-Siamese Lāo States, you will find men and women to whom Dr. McGilvary first brought the Good News. He well deserves the name so frequently given him even in his life-time 'The Apostle to the Lāo'."

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Road of Life. A study of Pilgrim's Journey as far as Vanity Fair. By REV. JOHN KELMAN, D.D. New York: George H. Doran Company. 12mo; cloth, pp. 236. \$1.25 net.

As Dr. Kelman truly says: "Each generation repeats the miracle of finding strength and consolation for its altered thoughts and needs" in the immortal allegory of Bunyan. It seems, however, that each generation needs to be led toward this fountain of life. The work of Dr. Whyte, and the suggestions of Hawthorne and Stevenson have in part rendered such service for this generation, but these studies by Dr. Kelman will be even more effective in turning men anew to this perennial source of spiritual inspiration and power. This is the first of two volumes which are intended to form a commentary or textbook upon the "Pilgrim's Progress". Notes are collated from existing commentaries, and illustrative references and quotations from other literature. This material however is so arranged as to form a continuous exposition which may be read along with the original. This first volume is an admirable piece of literary and spiritual interpretation which makes the message of the great Puritan of immediate and practical application to the needs of the present day.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

India, And Daily Life in Bengal. By Z. F. GRIFFIN, B.D. Philadelphia: Baptist Publishing Society. 12mo; cloth, pp. 214. \$1.00 net.

This fascinating little volume has been issued for the benefit of

those who wish a brief and comprehensive survey of those matters which will be of interest in connection with life in India, and the circumstances which surround missionary work. The book opens with an historical outline including an account of British rule and an explanation of the present unrest in India. The author then describes in detail the highways, architecture, productions, climate and scenery of India, mentioning some of the chief characteristics and occupations of the natives, and concludes the volume with a glance at Hinduism and a brief mention of the history, character and prospects of Protestant missionary work. The treatment is of a somewhat elementary character, and is specially well adapted for Sunday School scholars, members of Christian Endeavor societies, and for mission study classes. The author writes with the vividness of an eye witness, as he has rendered fifteen years of service as a missionary in India.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Victory in Christ. By ROBERT F. HORTON, D.D. Philadelphia: The Sunday School Times Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 116. 50 cents net.

These pages form a stimulating chapter in experimental religion. They suggest the experience which results from a true identification with Christ, the need of Bible Study and prayer to support such a life, and its issue in service, in evangelism, in triumph over temptation and in abiding joy.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Presbyterian Handbook, 1913. Edited by the REV. WM. H. ROBERTS, D.D., Stated Clerk of the General Assembly. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work. Paper, pp. 103. 5 cents. In quantities \$2.00 per 100, carriage paid.

This little booklet is filled with invaluable information relative to the life and organization of the Presbyterian church. It contains facts respecting church history, statistics and work, together with the International Sunday School Lessons, Daily Bible Readings, and Weekly Prayer Meeting Topics.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Scientific Management in the Church. By SHAILER MATHEWS, D.D., Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. The University Press. 16mo; cloth, pp. 66. 50 cents.

This brief essay suggests the wisdom of applying to church work the method of scientific management which has proved so advantageous in the industrial world, and especially in the conduct of great commercial institutions. Some will not be ready to follow the author

in what he describes as his own revolutionary theories in the matter of theological education, and will still feel that the Christian minister is called to be a prophet rather than an organizer. Nevertheless there can be no question that more scientific management would tend to conserve energy and to eliminate waste in the conduct of Christian enterprises. The essay treats thoughtfully a matter of more than usual importance.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Address to Young Converts. By the REV. ARTHUR J. BROWN, D.D. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work. Paper, pp. 15. 20 cents.

This is a word of wise counsel to those who have recently confessed their faith in Christ.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Deacon and His Office. By HARRY PRINGLE FORD. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Paper, pp. 25. 10 cents, postage prepaid.

This brief compendium should do much to aid in an intelligent understanding of the duties and dignity of the diaconate. It contains first a description of "The Office", second "The laws of the Presbyterian Church relative to the Office", and thirdly, "Notes and Comments by a number of pastors and deacons". Every deacon should have a copy of this manual.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Efficiency in the Sunday School. By HENRY FREDERICK COPE, A.M., D.D. New York: George H. Doran Company. 12mo; pp. 253, cloth. \$1.00 net.

The General Secretary of the Religious Education Association has been a careful student of Sunday School organization and methods. In this book he treats the most important problems of Sunday School management, including the graded school, the curriculum, equipment, discipline, music, manual work, the adult department, the rural and the city school, and teacher training. The Sunday School is regarded seriously as an educational institution, and its ideals and possibilities and needs are carefully considered. An acquaintance with this volume will aid thoughtful officers and teachers in making their schools more truly efficient.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Home Training in Religion. By A. H. MCKINNEY, PH.D. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Paper, pp. 35. 10 cents.

This is a booklet of helpful suggestions for parents in the religious

instruction and training of children. It emphasizes the seriousness of the obligation and indicates certain possible methods, and aids in its fulfillment.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Regardant vers Noel. Sermon prêché à Saint-Pierre le 20 décembre 1908. Par LUCIEN GAUTIER. (No. 19 des Cahiers de prédication genevoise.) Genève: J. H. Jeheber, Editeur. 1912. 8vo; pp. 13.

Preaching on the Sabbath before Christmas, Professor Gautier raises the eyes of his auditors from the visible things of earth to those invisible things for which Christmas stands. He takes his text appropriately from one of those old Watchers whose eyes were fixed on the good things to come in the expected Liberation; it is the great passage, Is. viii. 23-ix. 6, with especial reference to the great central verse, Is. ix. 5: "For unto us a Child is born, unto us a Son is given; and the government shall be upon his shoulder; and his name shall be called Wonderful Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace." It is already significant that Professor Gautier should take this text for a sermon preparing for Christmas. And he seems to take it in simplicity with its reference directly to that Liberator who is Jesus Christ. We look back to Him as the prophet looked forward, he tells us: but we do not think of Him as something that is really past. "Ah, certainly not! He is not past, He is present, He belongs to our own time, as well as, and even more than, to any time that has preceded us. In proportion as the Church moves on from century to century, the presence of the Christ, the Liberator, the Prince of Peace becomes ever more indispensable. Let us keep our eyes fixed on Christmas, on the Prince of Peace whom the prophet announced of old and whose coming has been hailed through nineteen hundred years: for us He is still the Light, He is the Wonderful Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, ready always to give us all that we need."

In his closer interpretation of the verse which especially forms his text Professor Gautier is led by the conception that the four titles here given to the coming Liberator contain each a promise, and respond each to an insatiable aspiration of our being, resting on universal human need. In our insufficiency we need guidance, and the Liberator is promised as a Wonderful Counsellor. But we need more than direction; we need moral strength to do what we perceive to be right; and the Liberator is promised as Mighty God. What we need is not merely for the present but for the future; and the Liberator is promised as Everlasting Father; that is a protector who will never fail. And above all, we need peace, not merely external peace, but peace of heart and conscience: and the Liberator is promised as Prince of Peace. Interest culminates in the precise interpretation put upon the second of these designations. And we are not quite sure

just at this point how full a connotation Professor Gautier would assign to it. He seems absorbed in portraying the helpful functions of the Mighty God and leaves in some obscurity what he would say of His nature.

We give the substance of the eloquent paragraph that the reader may judge for himself: "There is another need which we feel not less imperiously,—it is the need of a power to help us in our weakness. What are we? Even those of us who, in a physical point of view, or intellectual, or social, are in possession of resources above the average: even these of us—what are we but poor and weak beings? . . . And if there is one sphere in which we feel most feeble it is that of the moral will. We see the road we should follow, we have no doubt of it, and nevertheless we remain inert, powerless, as if paralyzed. Even when no exterior obstacle stands in the way, we quickly feel weary and fall into discouragement. Why? Because we are limited, because at each step we are aware of the limits of our powers. Oh, how important it is for us then to discover that there is at our disposal a power which is not like ours, a power which is not feebleness, a power which really deserves its name, a might, the mighty God. This is why the Liberator whom the prophet calls Mighty God appears to us as able to meet this need of our soul; He will make the power from on high run across our weakness in such a fashion that when we feel weak, it is precisely then that we shall find ourselves strong. As long as we believe only in ourselves we are weak and miserable, we are on our way to shipwreck; but when we have learned to look to Him who is power and deliverance, then the divine aid is manifested to us. How splendid thus to be able to count on the wisdom and on the might of God, to be assured that light from on high will come to dissipate the darkness and that power from on high will come to transform our weakness!" There may be something lacking here; but in any case it is eloquent preaching.

For the questions which gather around the interpretation of these great Messianic designations, especially that of the Mighty God, see Dr. John D. Davis' study printed in the *Biblical and Theological Studies* by the Faculty of Princeton Seminary, published in commemoration of the hundredth anniversary of the Seminary (1912).

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Marriage, Its Ethics and Religion. By P. T. FORSYTH, M.A., D.D., Principal of Hackney College, Hampstead. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 8vo; pp. viii, 152. Net \$1.25.

This volume, which is "an expansion of a Lecture delivered in connection with the National Council of Public Morals", discusses marriage, in all its relations, from the Christian standpoint, and in view of the changed and highly complex conditions of modern life. Thus it considers marriage as "Individual, Social, and Religious".

It holds it to be "monogamous", "permanent", and in its object distinctly "ethical". It so explains and affirms the "subordination" of the wife to the husband as to find in that the true dignity of the former. It is very severe and very just in its condemnation of "Leasehold Marriage". It is equally strong in asserting the sacredness of marriage, the dignity and sincerity of true love, and the distinctly counteracting and evil effect along these lines of much of the literature of our day. The discussion closes with words both so apt and so weighty that the reviewer is constrained to quote them; and he would be glad to strengthen them, could that be. "Next to religion the questions involved in sex raise the most momentous and solemn issues for all history. Most men who come to grief, it is said, wreck either upon God or upon woman. And yet both orders of question are handled, I do not say merely with a levity of manner, but with a levity of mind, which is not only unworthy but incompetent and unfertile, and may entail great peril for the future. I trust these pages may contribute something to mitigate the violence of this anomaly, and to raise our interest to the range and dignity of matters with which society has so intimately and eternally to do." This wish of the author is sure to be gratified. The reviewer does not know of a more helpful and timely discussion than this of his.

There is but one criticism to be made, and that concerns the vexed question of divorce. To divorce our author is never able altogether to reconcile himself. He justifies it, even when granted on the Scriptural grounds of infidelity and final desertion, both of which he recognizes as equally scriptural—he justifies it only as a temporary expedient. Indeed, he "more than doubts if the exception imbedded in Christ's words about divorce (Mt. v. 32) is genuine". He insists that when our Lord spoke thus "He was not legislating". He more than hints that if he were, his legislation would not have force now; for "all the New Testament regulations were conceived under the influence of the expected and near parousia, when all existing relations should be dissolved". There is, however, no sufficient ground on which to reject the passage in Matthew containing the objectionable exception. While, moreover, in the fully realized kingdom of God, whether in heaven or on earth, the conditions met by divorce would be both impossible and inconceivable, our Lord, in his teaching concerning it, was legislating in the sense that he was laying down what ought to be, not only in view of existing temporary conditions, but also in view of the essential nature of marriage as a union constituting "one flesh", i.e., a common life. Nor is our author's remark as to the expectation of the speedy return of our Saviour more to the point. As even Harnack has observed, the end of the world is to consummate; it is not to bring in the kingdom. That is here, in our hearts; and, hence, the principles which will be established then are precisely those which ought to obtain now. The fact is that our author considers divorce from the standpoint of its relation to society rather than from the standpoint of its relation to the

marriage union. This is his one great mistake. If marriage, as our Lord teaches, results in one common life both spiritual and physical, then, only death or its equivalent can dissolve it and death or its equivalent must dissolve it. Hence, infidelity and final desertion must terminate marriage or evince that it has been terminated: as even physical death need not do, they mark the destruction of the exclusiveness of the more important element in marriage, the spiritual affection. Hence, also, only infidelity and final desertion can be just grounds of divorce: they are the only two reasons for it which in their effect on the common life of marriage are real equivalents of death.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

The Place of the Church in the Work of Social Betterment. By EDGAR P. HILL, D.D., Professor of Sacred Rhetoric and Applied Christianity in McCormick Theological Seminary; Superintendent of the Church Extension Board, Presbytery of Chicago. Philadelphia: Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work. Pamph., 8vo; pp. 29. 1913.

A brief but admirable discussion of a question of great and of pressing interest. It believes that the mission of the church is primarily spiritual; but because this is so, it holds that the church has been and should continue to be of all forces the most effective for true social betterment. Dr. Hill writes soundly, sanely, winningly. His paper should do much good. We wish that it might be read by all who are interested, as all ought to be, in "social betterment".

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

GENERAL LITERATURE

Critical Reviews relating chiefly to Scotland. By DAVID HAY FLEMING, LL.D. London, New York and Toronto: Hodder and Stoughton. 1912. 8vo; pp. xvi, 600.

It seems a bold thing to gather together a mass of occasional notices of books, published during a period of twenty-five years, and give them the permanency of re-publication in book-form. Possibly the quarter-of-a-century product of few reviewers would endure such a test. Dr. Hay Fleming's endure it. Unity is already given to the whole by the circumstance that practically all the reviews collected deal with works on Scottish history. When Dr. Hay Fleming qualifies this in his title by inserting the word "chiefly", this is only a characteristic instance of his scrupulous exactness of speech. Out of the some five scores of book-notices here republished, possibly some half-score might be said to concern books on English rather than Scottish history: and almost all of these are on subjects so

closely connected with Scottish history—Elizabeth, the Stuarts, Laud, the Percys—that they scarcely form an exception. Only the review entitled "Wesley and Methodism" (pp. 404 ff.) is wholly without direct reference to Scotland. A deeper unity is given to them by their harmony in style, manner, tone, and, we must add, purpose. For twenty-five years Dr. Hay Fleming has been printing notices of all the significant books on Scottish history, especially its ecclesiastical history, and more especially still the history of its great Reformation struggle and its *sequelae*, with a view apparently to doing what a reviewer may do to help on in the great work of getting the history of Scotland, particularly its religious history, truly understood and accurately recorded. With his unsurpassed stores of exact knowledge, and his wide-minded outlook on the progress of historical development, he has been able to set each new book, as it appeared, in its right light before the public, and to assign to it its proper sphere of influence. When these critical reviews are brought together they constitute what we can scarcely characterize as anything else than a valuable critical commentary on the historiography of Scotland for the past twenty-five years. Every one who reads the histories of Scotland and the historical studies on phases of Scottish affairs published during this period should have Dr. Hay Fleming's book at his elbow to instruct him as to the credit to be given to each, and to save him from misadventure in his "facts".

One of the notable features of Dr. Hay Fleming's reviews is the multitude of errors of fact in the books he reviews which he corrects. One might almost gain the impression, in desultorily turning over his pages, that they give chiefly a catalogue of the errors of the historians. This impression would be erroneous. Dr. Hay Fleming does far more than correct the errors of detail of the works with which he deals. He gives a balanced estimate of the value of each for the purpose for which it is written; an estimate, which, if it errs at all, errs on the side of generosity of judgment. But with his immense knowledge of the facts, he could not but correct a good many errors of detail as he went along. And these corrections of errors of detail form in the mass an exceedingly valuable contribution to our knowledge of Scottish history. He is able, of course, to point out only a few in each book,—just enough to illustrate the degree of trust which may be accorded to its representations. What a pity he could not point out them all! Some government ought to endow a man like Dr. Hay Fleming for the purpose of reading every book in his specialty and making a detailed list of all its errors. Then, indeed, we might hope, after a while, to get a history which could be trusted. And let it not be imagined that this detailed accuracy with respect to matters of fact is a small matter. We do not refer now to the difficulty of attaining it,—according to Dr. Routh's saying that such accuracy may be judged a trivial matter, but it is no trivial matter to attain it. We refer to its value. It is an illusion to think a just general view can be attained apart from strict exactness of detail. It

is the details in their sum which make up the general view: and if any considerable number of the details are wrong or any of them are considerably wrong, the general view is wrong too. No worker in any historical sphere—however narrow—but has had the experience that the exact ascertainment of a seemingly minute detail has been the hinge on which the correct estimate of all the great movements turn. We wish to express the deliberate opinion that it is only through the zeal for the fact which is so happily shown by Dr. Hay Fleming in all his historical work, and not least in this volume of wonderful *Critical Reviews*, that our knowledge of history is substantially advanced.

It is, of course, impossible to discuss the substance of a book like this. The reviewer's only, and happily very pleasant task, is merely to make its general character plain. We cannot content ourselves, however, without expressing the satisfaction we feel in Dr. Hay Fleming's convincing vindication of the personal character of a great hero like Knox, who has been the target of so many poisoned shafts; and in his sturdy defence of the Covenanters from much carping criticism. At one point he makes a valuable contribution to the history of the Westminster Confession in the Church of Scotland (pp. 309 ff.). It is too much to hope that his repeated, patient explanations will save future writers from the confusion into which few fail to fall with reference to the several Covenants. But it is sincerely to be hoped that his corrections of the slanders which have been given wide currency of the Scottish martyrs, notably George Wishart, may bear fruit. Over and over again fresh items of information as to historical events or persons of importance are incidentally communicated. Now and then an incompetent writer is fairly scourged. A good example is afforded by the characterization—let us rather say, the exposure—of Dr. James Rankin's History of the Church of Scotland up to 1688 published in that remarkable work *The Church of Scotland, Past and Present*, edited by the late Dr. Story, whose editorial duties Dr. Hay Fleming seems to suggest began by "inserting his own portrait as a frontispiece to the whole History of the Church of Scotland" and ended "with a general preface of twenty-four pages". Dr. Rankin's contribution he describes "as a superlative specimen of the slipshod, superficial and pretentious work of this so-called critical nineteenth century" (p. 25).

He who writes critical reviews of the literature of Scottish history of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries must of course often fall foul of Andrew Lang. Dr. Hay Fleming has not been able to avoid pointing out his numerous shortcomings, in lack of sympathy with the true makers of Scotland, deep-rooted prejudice against its religious leaders, and inveterate inaccuracy of statement. One might imagine that the relations between the criticised and the critic were necessarily somewhat strained. All the more welcome is the beautiful allusion to Mr. Lang in the Preface, with its record of more than twenty years of friendship, and its revelation of the mutual

appreciation of each other's qualities which governed the intercourse of these two lovers of St. Andrews and workers in Scottish history. "You have been rather the Freeman to my Froude (not that Freeman really knew where to have Froude)" wrote Mr. Lang to his friend only a little over a year ago, "but I hope there has never been an unkind thought on my side, or an unsportsmanlike criticism on yours, which is rather rare among men of letters".

We must not give the impression that Dr. Hay Fleming's criticism is always caustic or even always negative. Correction is correction; and the two meanings of the word are expressive of much. But correction is not invidious when it is done as transparently as it always is done by Dr. Hay Fleming only in the interests of truth. And all his criticism is not corrective, even in its milder sense. No appreciation could be more whole-hearted and generous than his, where appreciation is deserved. And no desert of appreciation is missed by him. Every good quality is perceived and noted, and every book is judged with careful regard to its purpose and its adaptability to fulfil that purpose. His praise is the more powerful that it is the praise of a critic who is not blind to faults. And his praise is lavishly given.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, April: AMBROSE WHITE VERNON, Can an Efficient Theology be Dependent upon Historical Facts; HUGO GRESSMANN, The Sources of Israel's Messianic Hope; A. V. WILLIAMS JACKSON, The Ancient Persian Conception of Salvation according to the Avesta, or Bible of Zoroaster; JOHN ALFRED FAULKNER, Luther and the Bigamous Marriage of Philip of Hesse; C. E. FRYER, The Numerical Decline of Dissent in England previous to the Industrial Revolution; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, The Washington Manuscript of the Gospels; JAMES WESTFALL THOMPSON, The alleged Persecution of the Christians at Lyons in 177.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, April: HENRY A. STIMSON, The Development of the Doctrine of God and Man; HERBERT W. MAGOUN, A Layman's View of the Critical Theory; ALFRED H. C. MORSE, The System of Indulgences; WILLIAM H. BATES, Judgment or Judgments; A. A. BERLE, Christianity and Therapeutics; HAROLD M. WIENER, The Recensional Criticism of the Pentateuch; GABRIEL CAMPBELL, Philosophical Aspects of Religious Experience; JAMES LINDSAY, The Rule of Faith; JACOB the SON of AARON, The Book of Enlightenment.

Church Quarterly Review, London, April: ARTHUR C. HEADLAM, Foundations; E. WORDSWORTH, St. Francis of Assisi; A. CALDECOTT, The Religious Philosophy of Rudolf Eucken; Religious Training in Secondary Schools; W. C. BISHOP, The Proposals for a New Lec-
tion-

ary; FOSTER WATSON, J. L. Vives and St. Augustine's "Civitas Dei"; F. C. MOREHOUSE, Trinity Parish, New York.

Constructive Quarterly Review, New York, June: JAMES DENNEY, Constructive Task of Protestantism; NEWMAN SMYTH, Common Idea of the Church in the Protestant Creeds; MGR. BATIFFOL, French School of Early Church History; SETH LOW, Christianity in the United States; R. A. FALCONER, Present Position of Churches in Canada; NICHOLAS N. GLUBOKOVSKY, Orthodoxy in its Essence; W. R. INGE, Transformation of the Messianic Hope in the New Testament; W. ADAMS BROWN, Problems and Possibilities of American Protestantism; LADY HENRY SOMERSET, Place of Religion in the Woman Movement; W. L. BEVAN, Baron von Hügel's Eternal Life; W. B. SELBIE, Tendencies in the English Free Churches; J. H. MOULTON, Methodism in the Catholic Unity; W. H. VAN ALLEN, Catholic Privileges; RUFUS M. JONES, A Forgotten Hero of the Reformation.

East and West, London, April: CAMPBELL N. MOODY, The Western Form of Christianity; E. R. MCNEILE, Theosophy and "The Coming of Christ"; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, New Light on Islam; BISHOP FRODSHAM, Bush Brotherhoods and Community Life; MASUJIRO HONDA, Missionary Methods in the Far East; W. H. G. ASPLAND, China and Medical Missions; J. KNOWLES, The Illiteracy of India.

Expositor, London, May: JANE T. STODDART, A Swiss Fénelon; Dr. Godet and the Emperor Frederick; JOHN SKINNER, The Divine Names in Genesis, 2. The Pericope-Hypothesis; G. BUCHANAN GRAY, The Forms of Hebrew Poetry, 1. Introductory; ROBERT MACKINTOSH, The Roots of St. Paul's Doctrine of Sin; ARTHUR CARR, The Fellowship (κοινωνία) of Acts ii. 42, and Cognate Words; VERNON BARTLETT, Two New Testament Problems; H. C. HOSKIER, The New Codex "W".

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, April: FRANCIS G. PEABODY, The Practicability of the Christian Life; EDWARD S. DROWN, What is the Supernatural?; JOHN W. BUCKHAM, Dualism or Duality; HENRY H. WALKER, Christian Experience the Key to Christian History; E. ALBERT COOK, Conservatism in Religion; JAMES B. PRATT, The Subconscious and Religion; CARL S. PATTON, Two Studies of the Gospel of Mark.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, April: JOSIAH ROYCE, The Christian Doctrine of Life; J. E. CARPENTER, The Buddhist Doctrine of Salvation; JOHN GALSWORTHY, The New Spirit in the Drama; L. P. JACKS, Does Consciousness "Evolve"? G. W. BALFOUR, Telepathy and Metaphysics; PROFESSOR SORLEY, Does Religion need a Philosophy? N. JARINTZOFF, The Life of the Russian Clergy: Incidents and Characteristics; JOHN A. HOBSON, How is Wealth to be Valued? G. W. BACON, A Century of Change in New Testament Criticism; HUBERT HANDLEY, Biblical Criticism and the Work of the Pastor; W. CECIL PRICE, Social Service, No. 7, The Boy Scout Movement.

International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, April: ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, The Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism; WALTER F. WIL-

COX, A Statistician's Idea of Progress; JOHN M. MECKLIN, The Problem of Christian Ethics; M. E. ROBINSON, The Sociological Idea; EZRA B. CROOKS, Is it Must or OUGHT?

Interpreter, London, April: EVELYN UNDERHILL, The Place of Will, Intellect and Feeling in Prayer; T. FIELD, Foundations; L. W. GRENSTED, The Significance of Jeremiah; H. H. B. AYLES, The Sacrifices of Christ; CANON FOAKES-JACKSON, Our Debt to Northern Israel; C. R. NORCOCK, The Earliest Doctrine of the Eucharist; A. SMYTHE PALMER, The First Words of the Lord Jesus (St. Luke, ii. 49), A New Interpreter; CHARLES FOXLEY, On the True Position of St. John VI; CANON JOHNS, Orientalia.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, April: F. E. GIGOT, The Virgin Birth in St. Luke's Gospel; D. BARRY, The Ethics of Insurance; G. S. HITCHCOCK, Apocalyptic; D. O'KEEFFE, Henri Bergson's Critical Philosophy; J. KELLEHER, Land Reform.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, April: HENRY MALTER, Saadia Studies; MAX RADIN, A Disputation in an Italian Novel; PHINEAS MORDELL, Origin of Letters and Numerals in Sefer Yesirah; NORMAN BENTWICH, Herford's "Pharisees"; LEON HÜHNER, Wiernik's "Jews in America".

Jewish Review, London, May: W. H. BENNETT, Permanent Contributions of Post-Exilic Jews to the Advance of Religion; MRS. M. A. SPIELMANN, Woman's Place in the Synagogue; M. E. LANGE, The Ruined Synagogues of Galilee; H. M. LAZARUS, The Gaon of Wilna; A. COHEN, The Problem of the Pentateuch: A New Phase.

Journal of Theological Studies, London, April: H. H. HOWORTH, The Decretal of Damascus; A. SOUTER, Tyconius's Text of the Apocalypse: A Partial Restoration; H. C. HOSKIER, Evan; 157 (Rome. Vat. Urb. 2). III; E. A. LOEW, The Codex Bezae; H. ST. J. THACKERAY, A Study in the Parable of the Two Kings; G. A. T. DAVIES, Tertullian and the Pliny-Trajan Correspondence (Ed. 96); C. F. BURNEY, St. Matthew xxv. 31-46, as a Hebrew Poem; C. RYDER SMITH, Some Indian Parallels to Hebrew Cult.

London Quarterly Review, London, April: W. T. DAVISON, Christian Faith and Modern Thought; FREDERIC LAWRENCE, Robert Schumann; W. H. GRIFFITH THOMAS, Some Factors in the Problem of Church Reunion; ALEXANDER BROWN, The Psychology of Revivals; EDWARD J. BRAILSFORD, Chivalry in Modern Life; ERNEST E. GENNER, The Religions of Greece and Rome; F. W. ORDE WARD, Christ and the Law of Contradiction; JOHN TELFORD, The Painter of Eternal Truths.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, April-June: H. E. JACOBS, The Via Media and the Lutheran Church; T. E. SCHMAUK, The Reunion of Christendom; T. E. SCHMAUK, Mr. Silas McBee and his Constructive Quarterly; D. H. GEISSINGER, A Symposium of Evolutionists; GEORGE DRACH, David Livingstone.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, April: LUTHER A. FOX, The Cosmological Argument; EZRA R. STAUFFER, The Need of Practical Training for the Ministry; J. F. KRUEGER, The History of the English

Catechism of the General Synod; A. E. DEITZ, The Reality of Christian Experience; LEANDER S. KEYSER, A Modern View of "Modern Thought"; W. A. LAMBERT, The Confession and the Church; C. J. KIEFFER, Luther and Hymnology; THEO. B. STORK, Bergson and his Philosophy; J. M. HANTZ, Moral Sense in Theology; L. RUSSELL ALDEN, Business Methods in Church Work.

Methodist Review, New York, May-June: F. J. McCONNELL, The Methodist System and Social Cooperation; J. H. WILLEY, The Modern Message of Dante; J. A. FAULKNER, Luther and the Divinity of Christ; J. M. DIXON, Religion and the Teaching of English Literature; LILLY RIDER GRACEY, The Huguenots; B. M. TIPPLE, Italian Nationalism; C. M. COBERN, A New Interpretation of the Book of Job; S. TREVENA JACKSON, The Morning Star of the Dark Continent; H. A. BUTTZ, John Wesley and Charter House.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, April: GROSS ALEXANDER, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Study for Easter; JOSEPH PARKER, The Making of Preachers and Sermons; H. C. HOWARD, David Livingstone: 1813-1913; HENRY W. CLARK, Mr. Bernard Shaw and his Theory of Life; H. M. DU BOSE, Our Church Name; J. L. CUNINGGIM, A Better System of Ministerial Training for the Church; DELO C. GROVER, The Higher Pragmatism; W. P. KING, Christian Faith and the New Apologetics; W. D. WEATHERFORD, A Buddhist Example of Practical Christianity.

Missionary Review of the World, New York, June: ROBERT KEER, The New Régime in Morocco; M. N. POPOFF, Bulgaria—The Youngest Kingdom; A. W. BAKER, The Color Line in South Africa; E. R. HENDRIX, Why send Missionaries to South America.

Moslem World, London, April: W. R. W. GARDNER, After the War; W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, An English Apologist; WYMAN BURY (ABDULLAH MANSUR), Islam and Civilization; S. M. ZWEMER, The Stumbling Block of the Cross; C. R. WATSON, The Moslem of Sumatra as a Type; CHARLES E. G. TISDALL, A Plea for the Malays; GEORGE SWAN, The Matbuli Incident.

Philosophical Review, Lancaster, May: FELIX KRUEGER, New Aims and Tendencies in Psychology; GEORGE P. ADAMS, Mind as Form and as Activity; GUY A. TAWNEY, Methodological Realism; JARED S. MOORE, Duration and Value.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, April: J. SPANGLER KIEFFER, An Appreciation of the Heidelberg Catechism; W. J. HINKE, The Origin of the Heidelberg Catechism; A. E. DAHLMANN, The Theology of the Heidelberg Catechism; THOMAS H. BALLIET, Religious Education and Catechetical Instruction; GEORGE W. RICHARDS, A Comparative Study of the Heidelberg, Luther's Smaller, and the Westminster Shorter Catechisms; A Symposium on the Heidelberg Catechism; WILLIAM C. SCHAEFFER, Religious Education in the Church; E. S. BROMER, Religious Education in the Home; H. M. J. KLEIN, Religious Education in School and College.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, April: S. ANGUS, Hebrew,

Greek and Roman, I.; CARL D. CASE, *Methods of Healing*; J. E. HICKS, *The Renaissance as Preparation for the Reformation*; ALVAH SABIN HOBART, *The Remedy for Aristocracy in the Church*; J. H. FARMER, *The Kingdom of God*; E. E. WOOD, *The Denominational School an Indispensable Adjunct to our Educational System*.

Bulletin d'ancienne littérature et d'archéologie chrétiennes, Paris, Avril: J. TIXERONT, *Le rite du matal*; GUSTAVE BARDY, *Les objections d'un philosophe païen, d'après l'Apocriticus de Macaire de Magnésie*; J. P. KIRSCH, *L'Aigle sur les monuments figurés de l'antiquité chrétienne*; PIERRE DE LABRIOLLE, *Tertullien, auteur du Prologue et de la Conclusion de la Passion de Perpétue et de Félicité*; PIERRE BATIFFOL, *La conversion de Constantin et la tendance au monothéisme dans la religion romaine*.

La Ciencia Tomista, Madrid, Mayo-Junio: TER MAAT (FR. PEDRO), *La Doctrina de la Predestinación según San Pablo (conclusión)*; MARIN-SOLA (FR. FRANCISCO), *La Homogeneidad de la doctrina católica*; TRAPIELLO (FRANCISCO), *Fray Pedro de Tapia su tiempo (continuación)*; ALCALDE (FR. LESMES), *El método teológico en la Suma*.

Recherches de Science Religieuse, Paris, Mars-Avril: JOSEPH HUBY, *Le texte original des Commentaires de Maldonat*; FREDERIC BOUVIER, *Religion et Magie (deuxième article)*; LOUIS DE MONDADON, *De la connaissance de soi-même à la connaissance de Dieu dans saint Augustin*; JULES MISSON, *La foi en l'apothéose chez un lettre païen du IV^e siècle après Jésus-Christ*; PAUL DUDON, *Notes et documents sur le Quétisme*; Mai-Juin: ADHEMAR D'ALES, *La discipline pénitentielle au II^e siècle en dehors d'Hermas*; LEOPOLD CADIÈRE, *Les religions de l'Annam (deuxième article)*; XAVIER ROIRON, *Les plus anciens prologues épistolaires chrétienne, I. Les Prologues de saint Paul*; JOSEPH DE GHELLINCK, *La "Somme théologique" d'Étienne Langton*; JEAN RIVIÈRE et PAUL GALTIER, *Le démon dans la théologie rédemptrice de saint Irénée*.

Revue Bénédictine, Paris, Avril: D. G. MORIN, I. *Pro Instantio*, contre l'attribution à Priscillien des opuscules du manuscrit de Wurzburg, II. *Un passage énigmatique de S. Jérôme contre la pèlerine espagnole Eucheria?*; D. J. CHAPMAN, *On the "Decretum Gelasianum de libris recipiendis et non recipiendis"*; D. D. DE BRUYNE, *Les notes liturgiques du Codex Forojuliensis*; D. J. CHAPMAN, *Barnabas and the Western Text of Acts*.

Revue d'Histoire Ecclésiastique, Louvain, Avril: J. FLAMION, *Saint Pierre à Rome (à suivre)*; CH. TERLINDEN, *Le conclave de Léon XII, d'après des documents inédits*; CH. MOELLER, *Frederic Ozanam et son œuvre historique, 23 avril 1813-8 septembre 1853*.

Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie, Lausanne, Mai: PIERRE BOVET, *Le mystère du devoir*; HUGO GRESSMANN, *Les odes de Salomon*; HENRI-L. MIEVILLE, *Philosophie de la religion, II. Höfding (fin)*; C. M., *La Bible du centenaire*.

Revue de Théologie et des Questions Religieuses, Montauban, Mars: DANIEL BENOIT, *Vinet inédit*; CH. BRUSTON, *Les dates principales de*

la vie de saint Paul, de sa conversion à sa première épître; HENRI BOIS, Adèle Kamm (suite et fin); CH. BRUSTON, *Fantasies exégétiques* et critiques.

Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, Paris, Avril: F. PALHORIES, La "formule idéale" dans la philosophie de Gioberti; W. SCHMIDT, La méthode de l'ethnologie; D. MANDONNET, Premiers travaux de polémique thomiste (2^e partie); B. ALLO, Versets 28-30 du chap. VIII ad Rom. (La question de la prédestination dans l'Ép. aux Romains); M. JACQUIN, Bulletin d'histoire des doctrines chrétiennes.

Theologische Studiën, Utrecht, Aflev. III: TH. L. W. VAN RAVESTEYN, Historie en Profetie; KLAP, M. Minucii Felicis Octavius.

Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie, Innsbruck, II: JOSEF STIGLMAYER, Zur Priorität des "Octavius" des Minucius Felix gegenüber dem "Apologeticum" Tertullians; BERNHARD POSCHMANN, Zur Bussfrage in der cyprianischen Zeit; FRANZ EHELE, Der Kampf um die Lehre des heiligen Thomas von Aquin in den ersten fünfzig Jahren nach seinem Tod.

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W. BRENTON GREENE, JR.

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THE RANGE OF THE LOGOS-NAME IN THE FOURTH GOSPEL

The four points in dispute in connection with the Logos-title are: 1) its ontological reference to the immanent life of the Godhead; 2) its functional reference to the creation of the world; 3) its functional reference to the continued supply of life and light to the world in the sphere of providence; 4) its functional reference to the revealing and redemptive work of the Old Testament dispensation. When we compare these four questions as to their exegetical status, it appears that in regard to the first and the second it is not the presence of the idea in the text that is called in question, but only the association of the Logos-name with this idea, whereas in regard to the third and fourth points the presence of the idea itself is denied by certain exegetes. That the words: "In the beginning was the Logos and towards God was the Logos, and God was the Logos" are intended to convey information touching the internal life of the preëxistent Christ as related to God is recognized by all, and the difference of opinion concerns merely the question whether the truths expressed are analytically contained in the Logos-name or not. Similarly, there is no dispute about the fact that ver. 3 (of Jno. i.) makes the preëxistent Christ the mediator of creation. The words: "All things were made through Him" admit of no other understanding.¹ What remains subject to doubt is again merely the question whether the preëxistent Christ bears the Logos-name on account of this function. In regard to the third and fourth points the situation is quite different. That the writer in vs. 4, 5, 9, 10 means to refer to a continued operation of the Logos in supplying life and light to the natural world is by no means admitted on all hands. Many exegetes here refer what used to be thus understood to the

¹ The old Socinian interpretation of even ver. 3 as describing the new spiritual creation may be discounted. *Cpr.* Lücke, *Comm. üb. d. Ev. des Joh.*² I, p. 302.

activity of the incarnate Christ in the sphere of redemption. Consequently, there here lies back of the problem whether the Logos-name connotes such a function, the more fundamental exegetical problem whether such a function existed in the mind of the writer or at least has found expression in his words. And even more common is the opinion that the alleged Old Testament activity of the preëxistent Christ found by some in vs. 11-13 has no real place in these verses, the reference here also being to the incarnate appearance and activity of the Saviour, so that with the whole idea of a function of Christ under the Old Covenant the inclusion of such a function in the Logos-title also disappears.

It follows from the foregoing, that in the second step of our inquiry, as in the first, the exegetical basis of fact may be taken for granted, and our attention concentrated upon the question whether the function affirmed of Christ is to the writer's mind a specific Logos-function. It is necessary to remember here the strong vantage-ground offered by ver. 14, in defense of the position that before the incarnation Christ not merely preëxisted, but preëxisted as Logos. The statement "the Logos became flesh" to our view absolutely requires the assumption that He of whom it is made was the Logos previously to His becoming flesh. Either in His previous mode of existence or in His previous mode of activity there must have been something that entitled Him to this designation. Zahn escapes from this conclusion only through a most artificial rendering of the clause in question. He translates: "The Logos became in this fashion, that as flesh He entered into existence."² This rendering judges

² "Der Logos ist so geworden dass er als Fleisch in 's Dasein trat." *Eint. i. d. N. T.*¹ II, p. 546. In the *Kommentar* this specific paraphrase is not found. By implication, however, the *Kommentar* gives the same view. To justify the above curious rendering Zahn compares Lk. xxii. 44: 1 Cor. i. 30; xv. 45; 2 Cor. i. 19; 1 Thess. i. 5; 1 Thess. ii. 1. None of these passages, however, can be placed on a line with Jno. i. 14. In Lk. xxii. 44 καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἰδρῶς αὐτοῦ ὡσεὶ θρόμβοι αἵματος surely does not mean that the sweat came as blood into existence, but that it was turned into blood. The thought of 1 Cor. i. 30, ὅς ἐγενήθη σοφία ἡμῖν ἀπὸ θεοῦ is not that Christ Jesus came into existence as "wisdom"

itself. From Zahn's own point of view a more simple escape from the difficulty would have lain through finding here in ver. 14, after the manner assumed by many exegetes in ver. 1, a proleptic introduction of the Logos-name. But this, while relatively preferable to the other translation, has its own difficulties. A proleptic use of the Logos-name in the very sentence which describes the origin of the Logos is after all something quite different from what is found in ver. 1, and cannot in point of plausibility be even remotely placed on a line with it. The fact, therefore, remains that on the only natural and practically universal understanding of ver. 14, a previous existence or functioning of the Saviour in a Logos-capacity is implied. This previous reality of the Logos-character must have lain either in the intra-divine life or in the cosmical activity of the preëxistent Christ. The writer of the Prologue may have been unacquainted with either the one or the other of these two ideas; he cannot have been unfamiliar with both. Those, therefore, who refuse to follow the church-theology in its trinitarian understanding of the clauses of ver. 1, are by reason of this very refusal all the more bound to find in the sequel some reference to that pre-incarnate display of the Logos-character which the opening words of ver. 14 imply. On the other hand, recognition of the ontological significance as implied in ver. 1 does not preclude further recog-

for us; the construction with *ἀπὸ* does not require such a reference to the origin of the Saviour, and would permit it only if *ἀπὸ θεοῦ* stood before *ἐγενήθη*; the meaning is simply that Jesus was made unto us all this through His mediatorial work. In 1 Cor. xv. 45 the construction, *ἐγένετο ὁ πρῶτος ἄνθρωπος Ἀδὰμ εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν, ὁ ἰσχυρὸς Ἀδὰμ εἰς πνεῦμα ζωοποιούν.* the construction (with *εἰς*) differs from that of Jno. i. 14, but, apart from this, the former half of the statement is a quotation from Genesis and owes its peculiar form to this; the second half is modelled after the first. 2 Cor. i. 19, *ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ υἱὸς . . . οὐκ ἐγένετο Ναὶ καὶ Οὐ* does not mean "came not into existence as", but "did not prove to be". Similarly 1 Thess. i. 5, *τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἡμῶν οὐκ ἐγενήθη εἰς ὑμᾶς ἐν λόγῳ μόνον* does not refer to the origination of the gospel, but to what it came to be for the Thessalonians. The same applies to 1 Thess. ii. 1, *οἴδατε τὴν εἰσοδὸν ἡμῶν τὴν πρὸς ὑμᾶς ὅτι οὐ κενὴ γέγονεν*; here *γέγονεν* is simply "proved to be".

dition of the functional significance as expressed in the sequel. The wording of ver. 14 involves the idea that the subject of the incarnation bore the Logos-name significantly before, but this may be true in two or three capacities as well as in a single one.

What reasons, then, have we to assume that the Evangelist not merely ascribes a mediatorial agency in creation to the Logos-subject, but finds in this agency a manifestation of the Logos-character? We cannot *à priori* refuse to consider the proleptic interpretation: All things were made through Him who afterwards was to appear as the Logos. The possibility of this must be reckoned with, because we have already granted the same possibility in regard to ver. 1. The very respectable body of exegetical opinion which stands back of the proleptic interpretation there, shows that it lies well within the range of the debatable. If we recognize as a possible paraphrase of ver. 1: In the beginning was He who was afterwards to appear as the Logos, etc., we are bound to bring the same open mind to the paraphrasing of ver. 3 on the same principle. From a purely exegetical point of view the two cases are precisely alike. On the other hand, a certain degree of implausibility attaches to the view which in ver. 1 takes the name proleptically, and then in ver. 3 finds it necessary to insist upon inherent appropriateness with reference to the function affirmed. One cannot help feeling that some allowance must be made for the likelihood of the author's introducing the title in both cases for the same reason. The exegesis which finds prolepsis in the former verse and excludes it from the latter, is weaker than that which treats both verses alike, either on the principle of prolepsis or otherwise. As a matter of fact, the case for prolepsis is slightly more favorable in ver. 3 than in ver. 1, because the word Logos occurs explicitly in the great opening sentences of the Prologue, whereas in ver. 3 it appears only by implication as the antecedent of the pronoun in *δι' αὐτοῦ*. To say, through Him (= the Logos) all things were made, calls less attention to

the Logos-character of the subject than to say, in the beginning was the Logos. If therefore it should appear that even in the statement which less accentuates the name Logos, the author nevertheless has clearly the inherent significance of the title before his mind, then this cannot fail to have some retroactive effect upon our understanding of the great opening sentences of the Gospel. The two questions, as to whether the Logos-character enters into the ontological mode of existence of Christ, and whether it enters into His creative activity, are to this extent interlinked.

There are weighty reasons for believing that in ver. 3 the author introduces the creative works of Christ as a Logos-function in the strictest sense of the word. The preponderance of exegetical opinion to this effect among the very class of writers who hold back in ver. 1 and refuse to entertain the ontological exegesis there, sufficiently proves how cogent these reasons are. If it were not for them, the same shrinking from the speculative, which seeks to keep the Logos-name and the trinitarian ontology apart, would also operate to keep the Logos-name and the doctrine of creation apart. But the facts speak too plainly in the latter case to allow of this.

In the first place one must reckon with the obvious allusions in vs. 1-5 to the Genesis-account of the creation. These allusions render it necessary to assume that the author finds the Logos-name reminiscent of the part played in that account by the creative speech of God.³ It is one thing to believe that the whole Logos-doctrine as presupposed and further developed in the Prologue can be without residue explained from Genesis i, and quite another thing to say that, once the creation-story stood clearly before the writer's mind, he could not possibly have represented the

³ Hölemann, *De Evangelii Johannis Introitu*, Lipsiae, 1855, has ingeniously traced the parallelism between Genesis and the Prologue, but with too much refinement of detail. Godet not merely finds correspondences in the *ἐν ἀρχῇ* of verse 1, but also associates the *ἦν πρὸς τὸν θεόν* with the plural of Gen. i. 26 ("let us make man"), the life and light of ver. 4 with the trees of life and of knowledge of good and evil, the *σκοτία* of ver. 5 with the story of the fall.

Logos as mediating in the creation of the world, without observing that this fitted in admirably with the Scripture-account according to which God called all things into being through His word. The same suggestive force of the combination that has obtruded itself upon so many exegetes can hardly have escaped the notice of the Evangelist. That the Evangelist not merely intends to ascribe to Christ a part in the creation of all things in general, but specifically means to represent Him as performing that part in the capacity of Logos, follows also from the preposition employed. The statement is not *πάντα ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο* but *πάντα δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο*. For the general thought that Christ participated in the creation of all things the former would have been the natural expression; for conveying the specific idea that His rôle was the rôle played by the divine word in Genesis, the construction with *διὰ* was the one peculiarly fitted.⁴

Weight must further be attached to the standing association everywhere else between the Logos-name and the creative function of the subject so designated. No matter where the Logos meets us, whether it be in Philo or in the Hermetic writings or in the Jewish theology, the mediation in the making of things is a specific and prominent part of His office. The constant recurrence of this feature indicates of itself that no mere accident can account for this; the name and the function belong naturally together. Whatever be the ultimate sources of the doctrine, sufficient acquaintance with and reference to the contemporaneous Logos-belief and speculations may safely be credited to the Evangelist, to render it certain that in speaking of the Logos in connection with the creation he would expect to be understood in the current sense.

Still further, the obvious progress of thought between ver. 3 and ver. 4 speaks likewise in favor of this conclusion. It is not necessary here to prejudge the question, whether ver. 4 ("In Him was life, and the life was the light of

⁴ *Cpr.* 1 Cor. viii. 6 *δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα*; Col. i. 16 *ἐν αὐτῷ* and *δι' αὐτοῦ*; Heb. i. 2 *δι' οὗ ἐποίησεν*.

men") relates to the preincarnate or to the incarnate Christ. In either case a connection will have to be assumed between the task of the Logos in creation and the presence in the same Logos of the subsequent supply of life and light for the world. Because of the fact that all things were made through Him, and in harmony with this fact, it is affirmed that in Him was life, and that this life was the light of men. By universal consent the furnishing of life and light to the world belongs to the very essence of the Logos-task. Consequently, that which forms either the basis for or the prelude to the quickening and enlightening of the world cannot have been something wholly detached from the Logos-character. If Christ gives life and light qua Logos, and if His mediatorial agency in the creation was but the beginning of this line of activity, then He must appear to the Evangelist at the former stage the same as He does in the latter, *i.e.*, as the Logos.

Finally, the obvious parallelism between the work of Christ in nature and in redemption, traced by the Prologue, renders it more than probable that it is precisely the Logos-name in which the writer finds the two members of this parallelism reduced to their higher unity. It is through the Logos that all things were made; it is also through the Logos, become flesh, that all things in redemption were accomplished. In the former case the connection between name and work can hardly be different from that in the latter. That in the latter case it is of the most intimate and organic character is recognized on every hand, most of all by the advocates of the restriction of the Logos-title to the incarnate stage of the Saviour's work. The coördinate-ness of the two activities, both of them alike coupled with the Logos-name, carries with it a high degree of probability that the inherent meaning of the name extends not simply to one but to both. Of course this agreement would be still stronger, if it were to be urged in connection with the chronologically progressive interpretation of the Prologue. If the Evangelist meant to affirm of the Logos-Person

that in succession He operated in creation, in providence, under the Old Covenant and since the incarnation, then the presumption in favor of a significance of the Logos-title equally distributed with reference to each of these four stages would grow in proportion to the care and deliberateness with which we should have to credit the Evangelist in building up this harmonious scheme of a progressive Christological function. Since, however, the chronological structure of the Prologue is subject to serious doubt, we prefer not to present the argument in this particular form.

In view of the above considerations we continue to believe that ver. 3 not merely records an important fact about Him who subsequently was to act as the Logos, but also represents this fact as an integral part of the specific Logos-task. In the creation of the world the Logos-character of the Preëxistent One finds expression. Even if we were to ascribe to the writer no conscious etymological reflection upon the way in which the Logos-name and the Logos-function hang together, this would still have to be maintained. The link between the two might be one of mere conventional association, the Logos-name calling up the thought of creating and *vice versa*, but it would work none the less with necessity. And this, even in its unconscious associational form, would be something far different from the view according to which in the mind of the writer the name Logos as applied to Jesus and His creative function were originally quite foreign to each other, the name having been given Him in the first place for a totally different, purely redemptive reason, and then afterwards, without reflection upon His name, mediation in the making of all things having been affirmed of this redemptive Logos. If this were the correct view, then the Logos-name would have inherently no more to do with the creation of the world than the name Christ or Kyrios. As Paul could say that through Christ or through the Lord all things were made, so John would have said that through the Logos all things were called into being. In both cases the two things

would be linked together after a purely external fashion. It is precisely in regard to this that we believe the use of the name Logos differs in such a connection from the name Christ or Kyrios. It is the name appropriate to the occasion.

A mere conventional association, as stated above, would be sufficient to uphold this view. But there is reason to assume that to the Evangelist the connection was a thoroughly intelligent one. The first element entering into it is undoubtedly that of the instrumentality of divine omnipotence. That God acts in general, and in particular creates by His word, is a common Old Testament expression for describing the omnipotent mode of His activity. This was the case in the first creation of all things, when God spake and by His mere speaking the effect was accomplished. Now if the Evangelist identifies the preëxistent Christ with this omnipotent creative word, his first thought will have been that through Christ the divine omnipotence asserted itself, that Christ entered into the creation as the Logos of God because God made Him the Mediator of His almighty power.

That this thought was actually present to the writer's mind follows not merely from the obvious dependence of the representation on the account in Genesis, but also from the mention of "life" in ver. 4 as the first thing present in the Logos in consequence of his Logos-relation to the world. He is the Logos because in Him is life; the connecting link that holds these two ideas together is none other than that of His being the organ of omnipotence. As in the divine word there is in general the unique potency of producing life wherever it is uttered, so in Him as the personal Word the same potency inheres.⁵

⁵ The idea is not directly expressed that the preëxistent Christ was the possessor of omnipotence, but that He acted as the instrument of omnipotence. Nevertheless the deity and the omnipotence of Christ are implied. It will be observed that the general representation: God creates through His (mere) word, and the specific turn here given it: God created through the personal Logos, seem at first sight mutually

This interpretation of the use made of the Logos-concept in ver. 3 in the light of ver. 4 holds good, no matter whether the statements of the latter verse relate to the preëxistent or to the incarnate Christ. It makes no difference whether the life spoken of was the life of nature or the life of redemption; in either case the possession of it by Christ is in accordance with and the result of His Logos-character; in either case the underlying thought of the connection is: to be the Logos of God means to be the organ for the production of life.

It is of the highest importance to mark sharply at this point that the first thing associated with the Logos-name by the writer does not lie in the sphere of knowledge but in the sphere of power; the first characteristic Logos-product is life, not light. This is all the more significant, since the sequence of the creative acts of God in the Genesis-account places the production of light before that of life, so that the reversed sequence of the Prologue: "In Him was life, and the life (that was in Him) was the light of men", obtains a pointed significance. Here it plainly appears already that the equation, Logos = Revealer, fails to do justice to the pregnancy of the title as employed by the Evangelist. Before this is thought of, the other more fundamental equation, Logos = Omnipotent Source of Life, should be called to mind. The clear recognition of this at the very root-point where the Logos-idea bifurcates is of the utmost importance for a correct understanding of the subsequent teaching of the Gospel as a whole. It places at the outset the life-giving and the illuminating aspects of Christ's activity, or, to speak soteriologically, the redemptive and revelatory functions of His work as Saviour, in their proper relation to each other. It saves the Gospel from the contradictory, the point of the former being the immediateness, that of the latter the mediateness of the transaction. The contradiction, which on Philo's premises is unresolvable, resolves itself on the premises of the Evangelist, by remembering the preceding statement *θεὸς ἦν ὁ λόγος*. The instrumental character of the Logos here does not interfere with the immediateness of the act, because in the instrument the divine creating omnipotence is personally present.

charge of intellectualism, which has so often been brought against it, and which its characterization as the Logos-Gospel seemed to justify. If Christ as Logos has a wider task than that of imparting light and knowledge, if He fulfills His Logos-nature in the production of life, then the Gospel can be truly a Logos-Gospel, without lying open to the charge of a one-sided intellectualism. The new-creation of all things in the sphere of redemption becomes, on this wider and more correct view, as truly a part of the Logos-function as the communication of supernatural knowledge.

On the other hand, starting with this wider and more adequate appreciation of what the Logos-name covers, it will be far easier to show that the Logos-concept actually underlies and shapes the teaching in the body of the Gospel, and is not due to a mere idiosyncrasy of the mental state out of which the Prologue was written. All that the Gospel teaches concerning salvation, the whole circle of ideas connected with life and regeneration and resurrection, will on this view naturally range itself with the interpretation of Christ's Person and work from the Logos-point of view. How easy it was for the Evangelist to subsume these ideas under the rubric of creative omnipotence, operating as such by means of the word, may be seen from Jno. v. 25, 28, where the resurrection is represented as taking place through the utterance of the voice of the Son of God, and where there is the same close association between the ideas of the omnipotent word and the idea of life as in the Prologue: "The hour cometh, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God; and they that hear shall live. For as the Father hath life in Himself, even so gave He to the Son also to have life in Himself."⁶

⁶ It is true that in Jno. v. 25, 28 the representation differs in so far as the Son here has and utters the word instead of being the Word. But this is not fatal to the assumption that the writer connected both representations. As in the sphere of revealing God, Christ is the Logos, and yet all He speaks, forming part of what He is, is subsumed under this Logos-character, so in the sphere of omnipotent creation, Christ may be conceived both as being the Word, and as uttering it, the latter relation being subsumable under the former.

The last words of this quotation suggest that the point just made may also have a bearing on the trinitarian aspect of the Logos-idea. Where Logos is taken as descriptive of the manner of provenience of the Son from the Father, and at the same time the significance of the Logos-concept is confined to the sphere of revelation, the inference may seem justified that the eternal generation takes place *per modum intellectus*. But when it is realized that the writer of the Gospel makes the first application of the idea not in the sphere of revelation but in that of omnipotent power, that in fact the Logos-name calls up first to his mind not the idea of light but that of creation and life, then it will be perceived that the intellectualistic construction of the doctrine and the formula coined for it are by no means inseparable from the doctrine itself. The Logos-name in its ontogenetic aspect need signify no more than that the filiation within the Deity is an act of omnipotent power. On the specific *modus* of this act it need throw no further light.⁷

The question next presenting itself is, whether subsequent to the creation, and with reference to the existing world of nature, a Logos-activity is taught in the Prologue. This also the older interpretation affirmed (Chrysostom: *ἐπ'ἀγεί περὶ τῆς προνοίας λόγον*), whereas more recent exegesis in varying forms inclines to denying it. This is done by transferring everything usually understood in vs. 4, 5, 9 and 10 of the work of the Logos in providence to His activity in the incarnate state and for redemption. In Him as the incarnate Christ was life, and this life on earth was

⁷ The line of argument pursued above would lose its force if it could be shown that the idea of "life" itself belongs for the writer to the intellectual sphere, for in that case the production of life would be equivalent to the production of light, of intelligence, and the equation Logos = Revealer would suffice for deducing life from the Logos-idea. But the dependence of ver. 4 on ver. 3 proves that "life" must have a wider significance than this, since it is the result of the creation of *all things* by the Logos, and only in man, not in all things, could life have this intellectual content. As a matter of fact it is only in ver. 4 that the writer comes to speak of man specifically and of the specific light-form that the life of the Logos assumes for man.

the light of men. It now (*i.e.*, at the time of writing) shines in the darkness, and the darkness comprehended (or, overcame) it not. The Saviour come in the flesh is the true light which lighteth every man. Through His incarnation He was in the world, and as such the world knew Him not. By this exegesis the whole idea of a Logos-function in providence is forced out of the Prologue. What remains is, on the one hand, the work of the Logos in creation (ver. 3), and on the other hand His work in the incarnate state (vs. 4 ff.); the middle term hitherto interpreted as linking these two together disappears.

It will be seen at a glance how radically this interpretation differs from the most wide-spread view as to the structure of the Prologue. According to the latter the principle of construction is a chronological one: the Evangelist takes his point of departure in eternity, then speaks of the task of the Logos in creation, joins to this a statement about His work in providence, next records His activity under the Old Covenant, and finally enunciates the great truth of His advent for the purpose of redemption. But if vs. 4 and 5 already speak of the Logos in the flesh and vs. 9 and 10 relate to the same thing, then it is plain that nothing remains of this whole chronological progression. According to Zahn, the Evangelist three times takes a new departure: "he starts first from the premundane existence of the Logos and closes with the joyful assurance, that, notwithstanding all its assaults, the dark world has not succeeded in extinguishing the light of men which has appeared in the living Logos (vs. 1-5). The second time he sets out from a point in the midst of history, *viz.*, the witness of John the Baptist to the Jesus who was already present in the world and had come to His people, and sketches in broad outlines His history with reference to the world and to Israel. The world as a whole has not known Him; the Jewish nation has not received Him, but in the congregation, neither Jewish nor Gentile, of those who confess Him the result of His being and activity in the world may be seen (vs. 6-12). A

third group of sentences (vs. 13-18) describes the appearance in the world of Him who up till now had been called the word, the life, the light, as of a human personality, in His relation both to God and to those of mankind for whom He did not come in vain."⁸ And Harnack tells us, that the movement of thought in vs. 1-14 is not from the past to the present, but from the abstract idea of the Logos to the concrete conception of the *μονογενὴς θεός*, which the Evangelist had in mind from the beginning and which he desired to substitute for the former as the only adequate expression of the true character of Christ.⁹ Like Zahn, Harnack finds in ver. 5 the first point in which the thought of the Prologue comes to rest, and his understanding of vs. 1-5 he sums up in the words: "The writer has not given us a history—for instance of how the Logos proceeded out of God, what He did before and after, etc.—but he has sought to determine a well-known yet undefined conception of a being, and has done this in such a way as to make this being appear in ever greater concreteness."¹⁰ And in regard to vs. 1-14 as a whole we read a little further: "Those who assume that the Prologue up to ver. 14 deals with the *λόγος ἄσαρκος* involve themselves in special difficulties in view of vs. 12 and 13. In point of fact these verses prove that the author did not intend to give a continuous history of the Logos, but to state who He is, and what relation the Logos who has appeared sustains to the World."¹¹ And once more: "Ver. 9 looks back to ver. 5; . . . the general proposition *τὸ φῶς ἐν τῇ σκοτίᾳ φαίνει καὶ ἡ σκοτία οὐκ αὐτὸ ἐκείνην κατέλαβεν*, has therefore received its more precise definition in the statements that He of whom John bore witness as the light, has come into the world created through Him, but with the tragic result that 'the world'

⁸ *Das Ev. des Joh.* p. 72. The summary of the content of the third group presupposes in ver. 13 *ὃς ἐγενήθη* instead of *οἱ ἐγενήθησαν* as the original reading.

⁹ *Zeitschrift f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, p. 218, note 2.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 219.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 220.

has not known Him, and that He has even been rejected by the people peculiarly His own."¹² "The ἐγένετο (of ver. 14) is not to be so understood, as if the author only now passed on from the λόγος ἄσαρκος to the λόγος ἑνσαρκος, but the historic fact which even from ver. 5 onward had as to its effects stood before the writer's mind, receives now special prominence."¹³

It must be granted that the old exegetical position has been made untenable by the admission, now almost universally made, that not only ver. 14 but vs. 11-13 also relate to the historical Christ. The words ὁ λόγος σὰρξ ἐγένετο are not introduced to mark the great incision which separates the preincarnate life of the Logos from His incarnate existence. Only on the view of Baldensperger, who believes that the coming of the Logos with its twofold result described in vs. 11-13 is the coming of Christ under the Old Covenant in the theophanies to the patriarchs and other divine manifestations, does it still remain possible to arrange everything that precedes ver. 14 according to strict chronological sequence.¹⁴ But this exegesis of the verses in question has met with little or no acceptance, and we shall have to admit that ver. 14 is at least not the final mile-post in the progressive journey of the writer's thought that it has been traditionally assumed to be. For its introduction some other motive will have to be assigned, than the desire of the Evangelist to add the grand climax to the chronological presentation of the history and work of the Logos.

Into this we need not here further inquire. It would be quite possible to move the great incision, which used to be found in ver. 14, back to ver. 11, and continue to interpret all that precedes this latter verse on the principle of chronological progression. Or, in view of the historical character of ver. 6, one might go even farther back, and make the division between the preincarnate and the incar-

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 220.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 221.

¹⁴ Baldensperger, *Der Prolog des vierten Evangeliums*, pp. 13 ff.

nate state at that point, still maintaining that the relation between vs. 1-5 on the one hand and the sequel of the Prologue on the other hand is that of chronological progression. But the main thing to insist upon is that the exegesis which finds in the Prologue a continuous Logos-activity previous to and apart from the incarnation, does not stand or fall with the belief in any particular structure of the Prologue, chronological or otherwise.

Opinions as to the structure of a discourse are bound to be more or less subjective, to a far larger degree than the interpretation of its component parts individually considered. The starting-point, therefore, in discussing a problem like the one before us should always lie in the detailed exegesis of the separate statements. What the writer positively affirms in them, not the coloring they may receive from any estimate of the drift of the discourse as a whole, should be given the decisive weight in a matter of this kind.

An instructive illustration of the importance of this rule is afforded by Harnack's treatment of the Prologue in the article already repeatedly cited. Harnack does not in this article deal directly with the range of the Logos-title. His main purpose is to ascertain the relation between the Prologue and the body of the Gospel. Nevertheless the way in which he determines the latter, plainly exerts its influence when he comes to touch upon the other point. In his view the Logos-idea is not merely immaterial to the remainder of the Gospel but even inharmonious and incommensurable therewith. The Evangelist uses it by way of accommodation to his readers, not because he feels any personal sympathy with its point of view. His use of it is inspired by the desire rather to correct than to commend it. Hence from the outset, *i.e.*, even in writing ver. 1, he is intent upon replacing it by the designation far more acceptable to him, "Only-begotten God" (ver. 18). Once the substitution has been made, he feels relieved at being able to dismiss the Logos-title and never even once alludes to it afterward in the body of the Gospel.

It goes without saying that a view like this is not exactly favorable to a generous conception of the range of the Logos-function. If the Evangelist only grudgingly employs the term at all, he will not enlarge but narrow its scope as much as possible, because any magnifying of its specific significance would run directly contrary to his desire to dismiss it. And if the title that he prefers, upon which his mind is fixed from the beginning, the "Only-begotten God", be, as Harnack assumes, a designation of the incarnate Christ pure and simple, with no metaphysical retrospect into the premundane life of God attaching to it, then it becomes all the more inevitable that its provisional and unsatisfactory substitute shall receive no wider range of application. Thus it comes about that Harnack, who in 1892 did not doubt the Alexandrian, Philonic source of the whole conception, including the association of the Logos with the creation of the world, nevertheless in regard to vs. 4 and 5 expressed himself to the effect that, in speaking of the enlightening activity of the Logos, the Evangelist has throughout in mind His human activity (to be sure, His human activity considered *sub specie aeternitatis*), and that, if John had ascribed actual and independent importance to the idea that the Logos first had functioned before His historic appearance and secondly had functioned *ἐν σαρκί*, he would probably have expressed himself differently.¹⁵

It appears then that in Harnack's case this opinion about the main reference of the Logos-name to the incarnate, historic activity of Christ is largely based on a subjective estimate of the drift of the Prologue, which, brilliant though it may be as a piece of conjectural analysis, is nothing more than that, and certainly falls far short of the cogency that belongs to exact exegetical demonstration. The analysis proposed is not the only possible one, nor by any means the most plausible one. We venture to assert that in the whole manner and tone of the Evangelist up to ver. 14 there is a suggestion of the very opposite of what

¹⁵ *Zeitschrift f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, p. 218, note 2.

Harnack imputes to him: instead of a desire to displace the Logos-idea, many readers have felt through the sentences and phrases a positive delight of the writer in the conception, and a perceptible inclination to linger on it and magnify its intrinsic value and importance. That the Evangelist did not let this positive sympathy with the idea betray him into the anachronism of putting it back into the mind and upon the lips of Jesus, affords surely no argument against its actual presence in his own mind, at least not for those who believe that he meant to record the actual words of Jesus.

As to ver. 14, where according to Harnack lies the actual turning-point of the movement in the writer's mind away from the Logos-idea and towards the idea of the Only-begotten God, here also the same observation may be made, *viz.*, that the very words exhale the writer's sense of the entire harmony between the two conceptions, instead of revealing a subtle intent to offer to his readers the one for the other. In the last analysis it is only Harnack's peculiar reading of the Christology in the body of the Gospel itself, that makes him thus skeptical about the Evangelist's sincere and positive interest in the Logos-conception, and leads him to put this odd interpretation upon the Prologue. If in the subsequent teaching of the Gospel every thought of an ontological background to the sonship and preëxistence of Jesus is so pointedly absent, as Harnack would have us believe, then it becomes natural not to find in this a purely negative phenomenon, but to explain it from the conscious aversion of the writer to that whole mode of thinking. And in that case one will be *à priori* inclined to surmise that the Prologue can introduce the Logos-idea only after a half-hearted fashion, for the purpose of disowning rather than of endorsing or commending it. But the whole estimate of the Christological teaching of the Gospel as ethico-religiously and not metaphysically oriented, on which this rests, is, to say the least, exceedingly one-sided and inadequate. To show this here is, of course, impossible, but

it has been abundantly shown by Grill, to whom we may refer the reader.¹⁶

We now turn to the concrete statements of the Evangelist in vs. 4, 5, 9, and 10, for it is in the careful scanning of these, and not through any preconceived general view as to the structure and purport of the Prologue as a whole, that the decision in the matter at issue as to the providential function of the Logos will have to be reached.

As to ver. 4 the question would be settled immediately, if δ γέγονεν, usually read as the close of ver. 3, were to be drawn into ver. 4 as the beginning of the next sentence and

¹⁶ *Unters. üb. d. Entst. d. vierten Ev.* I, pp. 31-88. From the above it should not, of course, be inferred that we fail to recognize the excellent points of Harnack's discussion in other respects. Before all things his article shows convincingly that the Christological material in the teaching of Jesus in the body of the Gospel is not obtained through deduction from the Logos-idea, as the Tübingen exegesis assumes. We feel bound to take issue with him when he proceeds beyond this to the assertion that it could not have been so deduced, for the reason that it is not only of a totally different type, but incommensurable and inharmonious with the Logos-doctrine. Our position would be a third one: the peculiar teaching in the body of the Gospel has not been deduced from the Logos-idea, and yet can as a matter of fact be deduced from it, because the Logos-idea is to the mind of the Evangelist simply the most appropriate conception, into which he has gathered up the teaching of Jesus concerning Himself in the discourses. We believe, what Harnack denies, that *so far as substance is concerned* the Logos-doctrine is present in and pervades the body of the Gospel. This applies to its ontological content, including the purely spiritual preëxistence, and to its soteriological content, taking the latter both in its Old Testament proleptic aspect and in its New Testament form. The only element in the Prologue not represented in the Johannine teaching of Jesus is His work in creation and providence, but for this a solid basis existed in earlier New Testament teaching, so that the writer of the Gospel could simply incorporate it together with the other elements in the Logos-concept.

We also agree with what Harnack says about its not being the purpose of the Prologue to lay a theological foundation for the high conception of Christ as God. But here again we do not feel shut up to a choice between this and Harnack's own view. The Prologue seeks a basis in eternity, not, to be sure, for the absolute, transcendent significance of Christ in the abstract, but specifically and concretely for the absoluteness and transcendence of His work as Redeemer and Revealer of God.

the rendering adopted: "that which was made was life in Him"; for this would imply that the created world continuously had its source of life in the Logos.¹⁷ This interpretation, however, involves the rendering of ver. 4 in such extreme unnaturalness and has been opposed on such convincing grounds, textual-critical and otherwise, by eminent modern exegetes, that we must discard the help to be obtained from it in favor of our position.¹⁸

Leaving δ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon$ to the third verse, we inquire what is the meaning of the statements, "In Him was life, and the life was the light of men. And the light shineth in the darkness, and the darkness apprehended (or, overcame) it not." The problem here centers in the peculiar use of the tenses, the imperfect $\eta\nu$ twice in ver. 14, and the present $\phi\alpha\lambda\upsilon\epsilon\iota$ in ver. 5. As to the imperfects, the most obvious interpretation would at first sight seem to be that which refers them to the same past state as that to which the threefold imperfect of ver. 1 refers, the state of eternity.¹⁹ The connection of thought then would be that ver. 4 explains the possibility of what was affirmed of the Logos in ver. 3: He could be the mediator of creation, because in Him was life, i.e. antecedently to the creation, in His eternal state. This would also explain the transition to the present tense in ver. 5 as a transition from the potential in eternity ($\eta\nu$) to the actual in time ($\phi\alpha\lambda\upsilon\epsilon\iota$).

¹⁷ The above rendering makes δ $\lambda\acute{o}\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ the antecedent of $\epsilon\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$. According to others, who adopt the same interpretation, the antecedent is δ $\gamma\acute{\epsilon}\gamma\omicron\upsilon\epsilon\upsilon$ which yields: "What was made, in it was life." On this rendering the implication remains that the Logos supplies the life of all created things, but it does not become clear, whether this is due to the original act of creation or to a subsequent continued Logos-influence. Still another construction is that proposed by Hilgenfeld, who would render: "What was made in Him, was life", on the basis of a distinction between three kinds of genesis: $\delta\epsilon$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$, $\sigma\upsilon$ $\chi\omega\rho\iota\varsigma$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$ and $\epsilon\nu$ $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\upsilon$. *Zeitschr. f. wiss. Theol.*, 1889, p. 137.

¹⁸ *Cpr.* Grill, *Untersuchungen*, I, p. 91; Harnack, *Zeitschr. f. Theol. u. Kirche*, II, p. 217, note 4; Bauer-Holtzmann in *Handcommentar*,³ IV, p. 34; Zahn, *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 50, 51. Bauer, in Lietzmann's *Handbuch z. N. T.*, II, 2, p. 10, assumes a corruption of the text.

¹⁹ So Pfeiderer, *Urchristenthum*,² II, pp. 338, 465, and Bauer-Holtzmann, p. 35.

If we had only the former half of ver. 4 to reckon with, this exegesis would unquestionably deserve the preference above all others. But there is also the second clause, and the form assumed by this forbids our adopting it. When it is said: "the life was the light of men", the existence of mankind is clearly presupposed; the past therefore must be a past within time, not in eternity.²⁰

Next Godet's proposal claims consideration. According to him the imperfects are meant to cover the period between the creation and the fall. In that ideal state, before sin entered the cosmos, there was life in the Logos, and this life was the light of men. From what applied to this past period the fifth verse would then proceed to the present state of sin, exchanging the imperfect for the present (*φαίνει*) and introducing the idea of "darkness", and of the conflict between this and the light. This view implies a distinction between the effectual operation of the life and the light spoken of in ver. 4 and the mere objective presence of the light, not subjectively appropriated, referred to in ver. 5. But this exegesis assumes an antithesis, which would require pointed expression in the text in order to be perceptible to the reader, and of the presence of which in the writer's mind there is no stylistic indication. It would have been easy by a simple adverb to mark the contrast between the past before and the present after the fall,²¹ or to make the alleged important difference between the effectual *ἦν τὸ φῶς* and the ineffectual *τὸ φῶς φαίνει* unmistakable. Apart from this, the form of ver. 4 hardly seems suited to bring out the efficacy of the Logos-operation in the state of rectitude. "In Him was life, and the life was the light of men" does not affirm anything more than that the

²⁰ This would not count against Harnack's solution, according to which ver. 4 relates to the incarnate Logos but shows Him and His activity *sub specie aeternitatis*. Why the imperfect as such should be characteristic of the latter is not explained. Harnack himself observes that "es in jenen Sphären, wie kein Oben und kein Unten, so auch kein Vorher und Nachher giebt". In ver. 1, to be sure, the imperfect is the tense of eternity, but only in comparison with the moment of creation.

²¹ A simple *νῦν* before *φαίνει* would have served the purpose.

Logos was adapted for quickening and enlightening the world. This adaptation He had at all times, and not only during man's state of rectitude.

Essentially distinct from the two preceding views is that of Zahn and others, according to whom the imperfect tenses of ver. 4 already transport us into the earthly life of Jesus. The Evangelist, after having spoken of the eternal existence of the subject called *θεός* in ver. 1, and of His share in creation, now proceeds to speak of His Logos-appearance in the flesh, and affirms that, during His historical activity on earth, He had life in Himself and as such was the light of men. The fifth verse then adds that this light, which had appeared in the historical Jesus, still continues to shine, after His earthly life has come to a close, in the darkness of this world, and that so far, that is, up to the Evangelist's time of writing, the darkness has not overpowered it.²²

The serious objection to this exegesis is that it involves too abrupt a transition from ver. 3 (creation of the world through the Logos) to ver. 4 (presence of the incarnate Logos in the world, as the source of life and light, viewed as a past fact), and again from ver. 4 to ver. 5 (operation of the exalted Logos in the world-darkness as a source of light). Some word or phrase to indicate the temporal movement would be expected. Zahn appeals to the prevailing representation in the body of the Gospel, according to which Jesus' abode in the flesh upon earth is the definite, circumscribed presence of the light in the world to be followed by its withdrawal.²³ Similarly Spitta, who observes that the discourses of the Gospel speak frequently of the illuminating function of Jesus during the days of His flesh, but never of a like influence during the state of preëxistence; whence he concludes that the words "the life was the light of men" must have reference to the incarnate life exclusively.²⁴ The answer to this is obvious: the Jesus-discourses in the body of the Gospel cannot be thus quoted as a check

²² *Das Ev. des Joh.*, pp. 55-62.

²³ *Cpr.* Jno. iii. 19.; ix. 5; xii. 35 ff., 46.

²⁴ *Das Johannes-Evangelium*, p. 38.

upon the range of application which the Evangelist may have given to such ideas as life and light in the Prologue, for the simple reason that the Prologue, while it professes to subsume the teaching of Jesus under its highest rubric, yet in accordance with early Apostolic teaching, gives this rubric a wider sweep, with reference to the cosmical activity of the preëxistent Christ, than Jesus Himself does in the discourses recorded. The Evangelist was not bound to speak of Christ as "life" and "light" with the same redemptive restriction as, according to his own report, Jesus did. The fact that he never makes Jesus employ the word Logos as a name for Himself proves the writer to have been perfectly conscious of a distinction between what Jesus said about Himself, and what he, John, says about Jesus. The latter was meant to incorporate and epitomize the former: it was not meant to remain shut up within it.

Besides this, Zahn's appeal to the representation of the light as present in and withdrawing with the incarnate Christ proves too much, since it would exclude the light from the period after the death of Christ also, whereas according to Zahn's own interpretation the *phalwei* of ver. 5 affirms that the light still shines at the time of the Evangelist's writing. If the withdrawal of the light in one form through Jesus' death does not prevent its reappearance in another form since His resurrection, then the epiphany of the light through the incarnation should not exclude its presence and influence in the cosmos previously in still a different form. The emphasis on the incarnate and redemptive phase of its manifestation can afford no instance against understanding the statements of ver. 4, in regard to both life and light, of the relation of the preëxistent Logos to the world as such.

Underlying the view criticized is the unwarranted assumption that the imperfect tense must in this case describe a state of things no longer true in the present, and that therefore the activity of the Logos in nature through providence cannot be meant, because this is never a thing of the

past, but goes on as long as the world exists. On the other hand, the historic activity of Jesus on earth is supposed to meet this condition, it being a thing past and definitely concluded. But, as already urged above, the Evangelist does not, as a matter of fact, look upon the life-giving and light-giving function of the Logos spoken of in ver. 4 as having come to an end. The light according to ver. 5 shines now, and the same continuance may be confidently affirmed of the influx of life. The preterite therefore is not a true chronological preterite on any view. Hence it may well be asked, if the chronological limits of the tense cannot be strictly drawn in case our verse be understood of the historic work of Christ, why should such strictness of limitation be imposed upon the view which finds here the cosmical function of the Logos? On the latter view, no less than on the former, it must be possible to reconcile the two representations that in the Logos *were* life and light and that these things *are* in Him.

By far the simplest exegesis, and that which best avoids all difficulties, is to make the imperfect tense refer to the point of time fixed by ver. 3 and let it describe something that was true at and since that point of time. Since, and in virtue of, the creation of all things through Him, and in direct continuity therewith, the Logos carried life in Himself and this life was henceforth the light of men. This surely is a most natural use of the imperfect, which frequently describes a state of affairs as existing in the past and introduced at some definitely marked point of time. On this view the connection between ver. 3 and ver. 4 is so close and self-explanatory, that no particle or adverb of more precise definition is required. The normal relation to the world of Him who had acted as the Mediator of creation, was such that thereafter the world and mankind were dependent for their life and light on Him. He was the Logos in providence, just as He had been the Logos in creation.

If it still be objected that the Evangelist might far better

have expressed this fact, as a fact of still continuing validity, by means of the present tense, the answer is twofold. In the first place, the writer takes his position at the point of the completed creation, and affirms what then was true without thereby denying that it still is true. And, secondly, he probably had already in mind the contrast between this providential Logos-activity and a fuller, richer activity performed by the same Logos since the incarnation, in comparison with which the former, while not *de facto* come to an end, may yet, inasmuch as it no longer stands alone but is now accompanied and modified by the latter, be considered in its original form a matter of the past.

The connection between the two clauses in ver. 4 likewise favors the view that not the incarnate, redemptive activity, but the cosmical activity of the Logos in His preëxistent state is referred to. When the light of men is derived from the Logos not directly, but mediately through the life that He supplies, this is a representation which suits the natural relation of mankind to the Logos far better than the redemptive relation. The Gospel of John everywhere makes a point of it that in the soteriological process the light of revelation comes first in order, as supplied by Christ after an objective, supernatural fashion, and not as something that emerges out of the new life of man, and passes through his subjectivity. It is the word, the truth, that quickens and cleanses and sanctifies. In this sphere it could be more truthfully said that the light is the life of men, than conversely that the life is their light. But in natural religion the case is quite different. Here the Logos-revelation is actually mediated through the subjective life which man in dependence on the Logos possesses. The life here naturally produces the light. The meaning is not that in man life assumes the form of light, which would savor of idealism, but that the life which man receives carries in itself, and of itself kindles in him, the light of the knowledge of God. The wording of the statement so exactly fits this peculiar relationship between the two factors in the natural religion

of man, that it is difficult to believe the author did not have the latter in mind when he wrote it.²⁵

If the above view be adopted—and we do not see what serious objection can be raised to it—the question next emerging is, how the transition to the present tense in ver. 5 can be explained on this basis. Two possibilities exist here. The present *φαίνει* might be understood in sharp contrast to the imperfect *ἦν*, as describing the illuminating function of the incarnate Logos in distinction from His light-giving activity in the natural world of the past. On this view, in ver. 5 the Evangelist, who took his point of departure in eternity and advanced from there to creation and providence, has now arrived at the stage of Jesus' earthly life. Where, however, the idea of straight temporal progression is thus maintained, the objection urged above against Godet's and Zahn's views retains its force, *viz.*, that some temporal adverb or particle would be required to render the writer's meaning understandable.²⁶ The second interpretation of the present *φαίνει*—the one that in our view deserves the preference—makes the Evangelist advance from the general proposition that the world when created was as such dependent on the Logos as its source of life and light, to the specific reflection, or after-reflection, that this holds true even now under the reign of darkness in the

²⁵ Wellhausen, *Das Ev. Joh.*, 1910, p. 7, thinks that the transition from the Logos as a cosmical principle (ver. 3) to the Logos as a source of revelation (ver. 4^c) is a harsh one, and that the idea of "life" is a purely mechanical contrivance introduced to effect it. The lack of coherence is so great, in his view, as to lead him to suspect that the text is composite and the hand of a redactor traceable in the looseness of its texture. The above remarks show that it is not impossible to find an organic, intelligible connection between the life that flows from the Logos and the light into which it blossoms for mankind. Moreover, in ver. 10 the same two aspects of the Logos, the cosmical and the revelatory, are also conjoined: "The world was made through Him, and the world knew Him not."

²⁶ The transition from ver. 3 to ver. 4 is so natural and close, that no explicit marking is required. That from ver. 4 to ver. 5, on the other hand, involves on the above view the overleaping of a considerable interval and the transporting of the mind into a totally new and different situation.

world. The light that functioned at the beginning functions also in a world which is positively darkened through sin. The only difference is that under these circumstances there is a conflict between it and the world.

It will be perceived that this view differs from Godet's interpretation, as above stated, not so much in the outcome, as in the manner in which the thought is approached and presented by the Evangelist. According to Godet, the discourse progresses chronologically from the creation (ver. 3) to the period of rectitude (ver. 4), and from this to the period of sin (ver. 5). According to our view, the progression of thought is not historical but logical, from the general to the special. The Evangelist first describes what was the normal relation of the Logos to the world after it had been created through Him, and then passes on to the concrete, specific statement, that this holds true even in the present peculiar state of the world as a world of darkness. The simple *καί* is quite sufficient to link these two propositions, the general and the special, together.²⁷

²⁷ Two other views found among expositors may be briefly mentioned. According to one, the present *φαίνει*, in distinction from *ἦν*, marks the progress from potency to actuality: The light was there—the light shines. According to the other, the present is a present of characteristic description; it is the nature of the light to shine in the darkness. Both views are open to the objection that they take the *σκοτία* as the necessary correlate of the light, and not as an abnormal fact, whereas the presence of darkness is in ver. 4 as little supposed to condition the function of the light, as the presence of death is there thought necessary to the quickening function of the Logos.

Of the two interpretations of *κατέλαβεν* that which takes it as "apprehended" in the noëtic sense deserves the preference. Most of the Greek commentators take it in the other sense of "laying hold upon" for the purpose of getting in one's power. But this latter signification, which the verb undoubtedly has, falls quite short of the proposed rendering "overcame it not". The "laying hold upon" is but the first step towards overpowering. Hence Origen: "did not overtake it", *cpr.* Rom. ix. 30, 31; Jno. xii. 35 *ἵνα μὴ σκοτία ὑμᾶς καταλάβῃ* does not go beyond "overtaking". It is plain that the rendering "the darkness has not overtaken it", or even "the darkness has not laid hold upon it", introduces a weakening element into the context. The prelude to the tragic note of vs. 10 and 11, which has been justly recognized in ver. 5^c, also speaks against this interpretation, while it is

That a reference to the incarnate Logos in vs. 4 and 5 brings a disrupting element into the context, is recognized, where on the basis of it the composite character of the Prologue is diagnosed. Thus Schwartz argues from the imperfect tenses that the clauses in which they occur must refer to the Christ on earth; so interpreted, however, these clauses reflect a totally different point of view from that of the preceding statements, and the lack of coherence is charged to the account of a redactor.²⁸

While not disputing the unity of this part of the Prologue, Spitta allows himself to be led into a most artificial rearrangement of the clauses of vs. 1-5, in order to explain the immediate juxtaposition of the cosmical and the redemptive aspects of the Logos-activity.²⁹ By drawing *ὁ γέγονεν* to the sequel, "was geworden ist, ist³⁰ in ihm lebendig", the way is opened up, he thinks, towards restoring the original structure of the text. It consisted of a triad of three sentences as follows:

In the beginning was the Logos—and the Logos was towards God—and the Logos was God.

All things were made through Him—and without Him was not anything made—what was made is life in Him.

And the life was the light of men—and the light shines in the darkness—and the darkness overcame it not.

This, it will be observed, recognizes the cosmical function admirably expressed by the other. Of modern expositors Zahn adopts the rendering "has not overpowered".

Whether the choice of the verb *φαίνειν* is in pointed antithesis to the *ἦν ζωή* and *ἦν φῶς* of ver. 4, as designating the purely objective, inflectual emission of light, depends on the rendering of *κατέλαβεν*. If this can mean "apprehended it not", then the absence of subjective effect will be expressed by *φαίνειν*. If on the other hand it means "overcame it not", then the energy and persistence of the light will rather be emphasized and the antithesis to ver. 4 disappears.

²⁸ *Aporien im vierten Ev. in Nachr. der Ges. der Wiss. zu Gött., 1907, 1908.* Schwartz declares the whole section, vs. 4-13, secondary, on the ground above stated, *viz.*, that in it throughout the epiphany of the Logos on earth, which does not take place until ver. 14, is already presupposed.

²⁹ *Das Johannes-Evangelium, 1910, pp. 37 ff.*

³⁰ Spitta reads *ἔστιν* instead of *ἦν* with Codex D, a reading already known to Origen. This variant, however, is found only in 4,^a not in 4,^o

of the Logos in providence.³¹ At the same time, by violently separating the two clauses of ver. 4, apportioning each to a different triad, it enables Spitta to maintain that the words "the life was the light of men" are meant of the incarnate Christ. They mark the beginning of a new train of thought; the revelatory function is no longer the reverse side of the cosmical, creative function, but something altogether detached from it. And that in the face of the fact that the ζωή of 4^a is significantly repeated in 4^b, with the addition of the article to preclude all doubt in regard to the identity of the life which all creatures possess in the Logos and the life which is light for mankind.³²

How artificial all this is needs no pointing out. The artificiality, however, proves that there is no place for the incarnate Christ in vs. 4 and 5.

Owing to its introduction of the historical figure of John the Baptist, ver. 6 is regarded by many expositors as marking the dividing-line between what relates to the preincarnate and to the incarnate Logos.³³ This argument, however, although it ought to work in both directions, is usually urged only to prove that what follows cannot possibly refer to anybody but the historical Christ, to whose appearance John bore witness. If the Evangelist consciously and pointedly uses the Baptist to pass over from the realm of

³¹ Spitta compares Rom. viii. 10; Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 2 ff.

³² On Spitta's interpretation it would seem to follow that the life supplied by the Logos in nature becomes the light of redemption to men. At least this could be avoided only by taking ἡ ζωή in ver. 4^b as a proper name of Christ; but against this the gender is decisive. Besides, Spitta has to disregard the clear indications which the repeated use of καί affords, as to the actual structure of the text as it lay in the author's mind. On his arrangement the καί is lacking before the third clause of the second triad ("What was made is life in Him"), although the next preceding clause of this triad has it, and although the corresponding third clauses in the first and third triads likewise have it. On the other hand, the καί, which on this arrangement introduces the first clause of the third triad ("and the life was the light of men") is out of place.

³³ Thus Theodore of Mopsuestia, quoted by Lücke, I, p. 314, note 2; Lücke himself, p. 314; Grill, *Unters.* I, p. 95; Heitmüller, in Weiss, *Schriften des N. T.* II, p. 722; Bauer in Lietzmann's *Hande. z. N. T.* II, *Johannes*, p. 11.

the metaphysical into that of the historical, then it may be argued with equal warrant, that nothing of the historical can enter into the representation of what precedes. Yet this is not always done.³⁴

On the other hand, there are those who make of ver. 6 a *point d'appui* for eliminating even from the preceding verses all reference to the preëxistent Logos as a source of life and light.³⁵ Appeal is made for this purpose to the fact that John's mission is described as having been *εἰς μαρτυρίαν* and that his witness was *περὶ τοῦ φωτός* to the end that all through him (= John) might believe (in the light). It is claimed that this statement makes *τὸ φῶς* equivalent to the historical Christ, since it was to the latter as present on earth that the Baptist pointed in his preaching. And "the light" of vs. 7-9 again determines the meaning of "the light" in vs. 4 and 5.

It must be acknowledged that there is a certain incongruousness between the two aspects of "the light", if previously to ver. 6 the exclusively metaphysical, cosmical sense is insisted upon, and after ver. 6 with equal rigor the exclusively redemptive reference is maintained.³⁶ But in our opinion relief should not be sought by carrying back the redemptive light into vs. 4 and 5; it should and can be obtained by finding the cosmical light, at least in part, repre-

³⁴ Bauer, *op. cit.*, who says: in ver. 6 the discourse proceeds to the period of the human existence of the Logos, says also: in vs. 4 and 5 the Prologue already has in view the human activity of the Logos. Similarly in Holtzmann-Bauer's Handcommentar, *Ev. des Joh.* pp. 36, 37.

³⁵ So Belser, in *Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1903, pp. 483-519, who thinks that vs. 4 and 5 are to be understood redemptively, and that the Logos-name in ver. 1 is used proleptically.

³⁶ Wellhausen, *Das Ev. des Joh.*, p. 8, emphasizes the inconcinnity of the metaphysical and the historical. The Baptist, he observes, cannot be properly contrasted with the super-terrestrial Logos, but only with the incarnate Logos. But the latter does not enter until ver. 14. Consequently ver. 6 presents the strange phenomenon which he characterizes in the words, that the Baptist "unversehens in die Ewigkeit hineinschneit". Wellhausen seeks relief here as elsewhere, through denying the original unity of the composition. In our view, in vs. 6-9 the Baptist carries with himself the atmosphere of the higher world in that he witnesses to the eternity of the Logos-light.

sented in vs. 7-9. It is quite true; of course, that the one to whom John bore witness was the incarnate, historical Christ, but this settles nothing as to the question what he referred to when he called this historical person τὸ φῶς. It is just as possible that the Evangelist means to make John the Baptist bear witness, among other things, to the cosmical illuminating function of the historical Christ, as that he means to make him confine his witness to the redemptive light supplied by Jesus.

That the former is the case gains in probability, if we notice how in vs. 15 and 30 the subject of the preëxistence of the Christ is introduced as constituting, to the mind of the Evangelist, the first important element in the witness that John bore concerning Him. If the reference to the ἀνὴρ in ver. 30 cannot tie down the witness to the incarnate state, then certainly the reference to the φῶς need not in vs. 6-9 be held to restrict this term to its redemptive associations.⁸⁷ In ver. 9 there is a positive indication that the Evangelist consciously distinguished between the existence of the Logos-light in a previous state and its existence in historical form within the cosmos.⁸⁸ The retroactive force of the argument drawn from the historical setting in which τὸ φῶς appears in ver. 7 cannot be allowed.

But the same considerations detract also from the prospective force of the argument. If the cosmical associations of the term φῶς are still clearly perceptible in vs. 7-9, there is no à priori warrant for excluding them from what is said about the same subject in the sequel. Undoubtedly the words ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ θεοῦ, ὄνομα αὐτῷ Ἰωάννης are a historical "Ansatz", on a line with ver. 19. They could, however, mark the time of the sequel only if the writer continued with statements of a similar historical character. This is not the case. In ver. 6 he speaks as a historian; in ver. 8 he has already resumed the tone

⁸⁷ Cpr. Clemen, *Die Entstehung des Johannes-Ev.*, 1912, p. 59.

⁸⁸ On the view that ὁ κόσμος here means the world of men, and that the entrance of the light into it means not the incarnation, but Jesus' public appearance, see below.

of the theologian. Only a careful exegesis of the words can here decide whether the Logos-subject is introduced exclusively in its incarnate aspect, or as incarnate, yet on the background of its cosmical aspect, or whether perhaps things are freshly affirmed of it that pertain to its cosmical function as such.

For deciding this question nothing is yielded by ver. 8. To be sure, the Baptist is here contrasted with τὸ φῶς and it might seem as if the cosmical light and a historical person were too incommensurable to be even compared with each other. But i, 15, 30 and iii, 31 ff. prove that the Evangelist felt differently on this point, for there the Baptist is represented as formally comparing himself with Christ from the point of view of the latter's deity and preëxistence. There is nothing, therefore, to show that it would have seemed incongruous to the Evangelist to say: John was not the cosmical light manifested on earth, but was sent to bear witness concerning that light.

In regard to ver. 9 the question is interlinked with the mooted problem of the construction of the sentence. Two main views are here opposed to each other. The one makes τὸ φῶς the subject and ἦν ἐρχόμενον the predicate: "the true light which enlightens every man, was coming into the world." The other supplies the subject from the foregoing, makes τὸ φῶς the predicate, and construes ἐρχόμενον with ἄνθρωπον of the relative clause: "the Logos was the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into the world".⁸⁹

⁸⁹ Other attempted renderings, covered by the above two in their bearing upon our problem, are: "there was the true light, which enlightens every man who comes into the world", or: "the true light enlightening every man coming into the world, was present"; this overweighs ἦν at the opening of the sentence; "there was (or He was) the true light, which, coming into the world, enlightens every man"; this draws ἐρχόμενον to the ὃ of the relative clause, but yields no suitable sense, since the illuminating effect of the incarnate Christ does not coincide with His birth or public appearance; "the true light is that which enlightens every man who comes into the world"; this yields excellent sense, but would seem to require τὸ φωτίζον instead of ὃ φωτίζει, as Blass actually proposes to read, but without authority.

The latter of these two constructions would directly bear out the contention that the Logos is a source of light in the world of nature, because it represents Him as exerting this influence at the time of every man's entrance into the world, *i.e.*, at his birth.⁴⁰ But this construction, while perfectly allowable in itself, would leave the ἦν at the beginning of the verse isolated without a proper subject, and for this reason alone will have to be abandoned in favor of the other: "the true light . . . was coming into the world", *viz.*, at the time of the Baptist's witnessing. And this has the twofold result of apparently rendering the relative clause ὁ φωτίζει πάντα ἄνθρωπον, now detached from ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον, unavailable as an argument on our side, and of apparently furnishing a direct argument against the cosmical interpretation of the light in the sequel, inasmuch as that which is here represented as coming, must from this point onward figure in the account as having come, *i.e.*, as the light of the Christ incarnate. It should be noticed, however, in regard to the first point, that the relative clause, when separated from ἐρχόμενον, while not necessitating the reference to natural revelation as it does when combined with ἐρχόμενον, nevertheless fully permits of it. In affirming that the true light was coming into the world, it was perfectly natural for the writer to observe that this is the light which enlightens every man. In other words, the purpose of the relative clause may well be to identify the redemptive light with the cosmical light.

If it be objected that such a specific reference of the φωτίζειν to natural revelation would have to be indicated in some way in order to be understood, we answer, that it is sufficiently indicated by the object πάντα ἄνθρωπον. A light of which it is said that it enlightens every man, is

⁴⁰ We do not agree with Zahn, who thinks that ἐρχόμενον joined to ἄνθρωπον is pleonastic and useless; it has excellent sense as a temporal definition. The writer might have used it for the very purpose of making it plain that he speaks of the Logos as a cosmical light. Nor can much weight be attributed to the absence of the article before ἐρχόμενον. The Greek exegetes, who follow this construction, do not seem to have missed the article, *cfr.* Lücke, p. 317.

thereby clearly enough characterized as the general light which is common to the world as such. On the other hand, this absolute universality of the *φωτίζειν* tells against the opposite interpretation, which would have us think here of the illuminating influence of the incarnate Christ, and understand the present tense as a historical present with reference to the time of writing. As a matter of fact no such universal illumination took place at that time. We have abstained from urging this objection to Zahn's exegesis of verse 4.⁴¹ The clause "was the light of men" in its pure objectivity might properly apply to the incarnate Logos on earth.⁴¹ But it becomes a totally different matter when a verb like *φωτίζειν* is used, which clearly passes beyond the sphere of objective potentiality into that of subjective effectuation. Moreover, after we have already concluded on other grounds, that in ver. 4 both the life and the light are cosmically conceived, we may allow weight to the obvious backward reference to ver. 4 in the clause of ver. 9 now under discussion, for determining the meaning of the latter verse. The present *φωτίζει* no less clearly points back to the *φαίνει* of ver. 4, than the *πάντα ἄνθρωπον* does to *τῶν ἀνθρώπων* in the same verse.⁴²

As to the other point, that the construction of *ἐρχόμενον* with *ἦν* predetermines the reference of all that is said in the sequel to the incarnate Logos, because the subject here said to have been coming, must thereafter be present,—we are inclined to think that here, as in connection with ver. 7, the argument rests on an undue pressing of the historically progressive character of the discourse, and on an insufficient recognition of the free play which the author allows his mind in approaching the subject alternately from a his-

⁴¹ *Cpr.* viii. 12, "I am the light of the world"; ix. 5, "While I am in the world, I am the light of the world".

⁴² As a rule, where the cosmical reference in the preceding and following context is recognized, the relative clause in ver. 9 is interpreted of the same thing. Keil is an exception, who takes the *φωτίζει* of redemptive illumination, and yet in his exegesis of ver. 10 upholds the presence of the Logos in the world as a cosmical principle, *Comm. üb. d. Ev. des Joh.*, p. 97.

torical and from a theological point of view. The whole issue resolves itself into this, whether in ver. 10 it is the historian or the theologian who speaks. If the historian, then the question is immediately decided in favor of the view which finds here the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world, for after the historical statement: the Logos was coming into the world, an immediately succeeding statement of similar historical import: He was in the world, can only mean that the coming into the world resulted in a presence within the world. If on the other hand it is not the historian but the theologian who speaks, then it is equally plain that the clause "He was in the world", being a free reflexion of the author, receives its chronological setting, not from the progress of events, but from the movement of the author's thought, and, provided a movement in that direction can be made psychologically intelligible, we may feel at liberty to refer the words to the presence of the Logos in the world as a principle of providence.

For this reason the mooted question as to the exact force of the periphrastic form *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* has far less to do with the exegesis of the sequel than is generally assumed. Opinion among present-day exegetes inclines to the view that the form cannot have, grammatically considered, future significance, in other words that it cannot mean, the true light was to come in the future, or, with a somewhat weaker futurizing force, was about to come. On both renderings, it is urged, *ἔρχεσθαι* receives a meaning which it cannot bear in either classical or New Testament Greek.⁴⁸ Only the former of these two renderings would materially affect the sense of what follows, since from the statement: the light was to come into the world in the future, no easy historical transition could be made to the statement: He was in the world; and consequently this stronger form of the futurizing interpretation would compel in ver. 10* the rendering: He was already in the world previously to this future coming. But in its weaker form: the light was

⁴⁸ *Cpr.* Lücke, pp. 319-324; Zahn, pp. 67, 68.

about to come, the future understanding of the verb leaves room for imposing either sense on ver. 10^a. Perhaps even so the connection slightly favors the reference of the clause *ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* to the providential presence of the Logos in the world, since between: He was about to come and: He was present, if both statements form part of one historical movement, there would be left a gap, the act itself of coming being unmentioned.

But there is no need of further considering this here, since, on the ground already stated, we follow the more recent exegesis, which takes *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* as a periphrastic preterite: the light was in the act of coming into the world at the time of the witnessing by John. And this certainly, even more clearly than the weaker futurizing interpretation, leaves us free to understand the next statement, "He was in the world", of the incarnate life on earth.⁴⁴ The question now is, whether we shall avail ourselves of this possibility, or choose the alternative, equally possible in itself, of rendering: He was (already) in the world.

This latter view yields a perfectly natural train of thought, and suggested itself quite early to exegetes.⁴⁵ Bengel in his usual pointed way has formulated it as follows: "Ne quis illud veniens in mundum ita accipiat, acsi lux antea in mundo plane non fuisset."⁴⁶ It is not a necessary concomitant of this view that the incidental qualification of ver. 9 should be considered the only purpose of ver. 10^a. Ver. 10, and within it the words we are considering, conveys an independent thought—that of the failure of the

⁴⁴ While, of course, grammatically different, yet as a matter of practical outcome the weaker futurizing and the preterite version of *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* amount to much the same thing. To say that one is in the act of coming implies, if it does not express, t'at he is about to come. Thus Lücke, who opposes the futurizing view, yet himself paraphrases: "*War im Begriff hervorzutreten*"; the future expelled from *ἦν ἐρχόμενον* reënters in "Begriff" and in "*hervorzutreten*".

⁴⁵ Theodore Mops., quoted by Lücke, p. 319, observes: *εἰπὼν τὸ, Ἐρχόμενον εἰς τ. κόσμον περὶ τοῦ δεσπότου Χριστοῦ καλῶς ἐπήγαγεν τὸ, Ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν, ὥστε δεῖξαι, ὅτι τὸ, Ἐρχόμενον πρὸς τὴν διὰ σαρκὸς εἶπεν φανέρωσιν.*

⁴⁶ *Cpr. Keil, Comment. ũ. d. Ev. d. Joh., p. 98.*

world to apprehend the Logos. Whether this thought is new or a refrain-like repetition of ver. 5 "the darkness apprehended it not", will depend on the exegesis of οὐκ ἔγνω, into which we shall look presently. In any case, the interpretation before us involves the view that the writer makes use of the incidental qualification of ver. 9, "He *was* in the world", to prepare the way for the subjoined statement: although being in the world, the world knew Him not.

The choice between the two views now before us is exceedingly difficult. The attempt has been made to decide the question by appealing to the sense of ὁ κόσμος in ver. 9°. This must have the meaning, it is thought, of the world of humanity and of public life, and cannot here bear the sense of the created universe, for at the time of John's witnessing Jesus was entering, not into the created universe through birth, but into the world of men through His public appearance. And this sense of κόσμος is then carried over into ver. 10, from which results the rendering: He was in the world (= present among men) . . . and the world (= men) knew Him not,—a mode of representation which could be naturally applied only to the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world.

One might be inclined to reply to this, that it is not inapplicable to the alternative view, for the providential activity of the Logos with reference to mankind could be fitly described as a presence of the Logos in the world. The statement, "He was in the world", would then simply extend to the Logos the specifically divine attribute of immanence of being with reference to the life of mankind.

It is very doubtful, however, whether the argument on which this restriction of the term κόσμος is based is a sound one. To tie down the Evangelist in ver. 7 to this degree of chronological preciseness seems to us to overlook the bold, broad sweep of the whole representation. Where eternity and time are put into relation to each other, as is the case here, it would be pedantic to quibble about a matter of some thirty odd years. Even though the incarnation

had taken place that many years before the preaching of the Baptist, the writer could none the less with perfect propriety say that the light was then in the act of coming into the world and include in this act of entrance into the world everything connected with the epiphany of Christ from His incarnation down to His public appearance, and could put into the word *κόσμος* a sufficiently broad meaning to cover all this. A certain indefiniteness in its meaning would be the natural thing under the circumstances. The choice of the periphrastic conjugation may have been due in part to a desire to adjust the verb to this latitude of conception. Elsewhere also in the Gospel the phrase *ἔρχεσθαι εἰς τὸν κόσμον* in Christological connections has this broad sense of transition from the higher, divine sphere into the lower, created sphere,⁴⁷ although in a single instance it may have been used with restricted reference to the public appearance of Christ.⁴⁸ And in the present case ver. 10^b ("the world was made through Him") proves how any sharp distinction between the world as the universe and the world as humanity was at this point absent from the writer's mind. It is the cosmos as including mankind and as summed up in man in which the Logos is said to have been present, and accordingly the words can be equally well understood of His presence in nature and of His historical presence among men in incarnate form.⁴⁹

By this reasoning, however, no more than the possibility of relating ver. 10 to the preëxistent Logos can be established. An actual presumption in favor of this exegesis is only obtainable from ver. 10 taken in connection with the following statement, *εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν καὶ οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ*

⁴⁷ *Cpr.* vi. 38, 51; viii. 23, 27; ix. 39; xii. 46; xiii. 1; xvi. 28.

⁴⁸ *Cpr.* xvi. 18, 38.

⁴⁹ Spitta takes occasion from this double meaning of the word cosmos to cut out from ver. 10 the first two clauses: "He was in the world and the world was made through Him." In ver. 9 he throws out everything from *τὸ ἀληθινόν* to *ἄνθρωπον*. This leaves as the original statement: *ἦν τὸ φῶς ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον καὶ ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω*, translated as follows: "Es war das Licht beim Kommen zu den Menschen, aber die Menschen erkannten ihn nicht." *Das Joh-Ev.*, pp. x, 41, 42.

παρέλαβον. As is well known, expositors are sharply divided in regard to the question, whether the terms *ἴδια* and *ἴδιοι* designate the world, and specifically mankind, as the Logos' "own" in virtue of creation, or the people of Israel, as belonging to Him in virtue of a particular redemptive relationship.⁵⁰

It should be noticed that the former of these two interpretations of ver. 11 has for its natural correlate the reference of ver. 10 to the preëxistent Logos as present and active in the natural world. If the words *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν* already affirmed the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world, the subsequent affirmation of His coming into the world (*εἰς τὰ ἴδια ἦλθεν*) would make of them a singular *hysteron proteron*. The writer cannot have first said, He was present, and then added, He came, and have meant both in the same relation. On the other hand, the view which takes *ἴδια* and *ἴδιοι* of Israel, not only permits the finding of the incarnate Logos in ver. 10 but positively creates a presumption in favor of this exegesis, because after the *ἦν ἐρχόμενον εἰς τὸν κόσμον*, one naturally expects some mention of the result of this process, the actual presence of the Logos in the world, and this the words *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν* supply. A progress in the movement of thought from the Logos-presence in nature to the Logos-advent among Israel, would leave unexpressed this indispensable intermediate conception, the advent of the Logos into the world.

With this relation existing between ver. 10 and ver. 11,

⁵⁰ Besides these two main interpretations, the views of Spitta, who thinks of Jesus' relations in the narrowest genealogical sense (*Das Ev. des Joh.*, p. 42) and of Belser, who would understand the term of the Judeans, as according to the Gospel Jesus' fellow-countrymen *par excellence*, (*Theol. Quartalschr.*, 1903, p. 491) may be mentioned. Belser interprets ver. 10 of Jesus' private life before His public appearance. It was at that time that He was in the world unknown to the world; thereupon He came to His own, the Judeans, and was rejected by them. Apart from the obscure statement, Jno. iv. 1-3, which has received the most divergent interpretations, there is no evidence that the Fourth Gospel makes Judea the home-country of Jesus.

it is obviously the proper procedure to make one's exegesis of the former depend on that of the latter. The question arises, whether there is anything in the wording of ver. 11 that renders the sense less equivocal than that of the preceding statement, and consequently enables us to remove the uncertainty in which the consideration of ver. 10 by itself has left us.

Zahn believes that the terms *ἰδία*, *ἰδίοι* furnish such a positive indication. He urges that *ἰδιος* does not express appurtenance in general, but appurtenance in distinction from the absence of it in a wider sphere, that cannot be called in the same sense a person's own. For this reason, he thinks, the cosmos could not be called the *ἰδία* of the Logos, because there is no other foreign sphere to be distinguished from it in respect to this relation. It must be granted that reflections on the existence of other worlds, not equally related to the Logos with our earth, or reflections on the sub-human cosmos, as excluded from the peculiar affinity of mankind to the Logos, can scarcely be credited to the Evangelist in the present connection. But we are inclined to call in question the premise itself of Zahn's argument. It is obvious from the usage of the word *ἰδιος* as ascertainable from any dictionary, that the side-reference to what is not *ἰδιος*, while usually present, is nevertheless, etymologically considered, a purely secondary and incidental element in the signification. "*Ἰδιος* simply designates that which appertains to a person and in virtue of this sustains a particularly close relation to him. From the nature of the case in human proprietary relationships, this always involves the existence of other objects not so owned, but it is not permissible to infer from this, that, where the application lies outside of the sphere of human proprietorship, this element must necessarily be retained. To say that the universe and mankind are in virtue of their creation through the Logos His *ἰδία* or *ἰδίοι* does not detract from or in the least do violence to the normal meaning of the word. The usage of *ἰδιος* therefore settles nothing as to the import of ver. 11.

But there are some considerations, which, to our view, incline the balance in the opposite direction. In the first place, we cannot help believing that there is a close connection between *ἴδια* and *ἴδιοι* in ver. 11 and the clause *ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο* in ver. 10. It is certainly most natural to assume that this latter clause prepares the way for and explains the characterization of those to whom the Logos came as His *ἴδιοι*. They were His own, because as part of the cosmos they had been made through Him. The production of a thing is the most primitive and prevalent source of the proprietary relation. Especially if *τὰ ἴδια* and *οἱ ἴδιοι* be given the sense of "his own home" and "his own home-relations", the force of this consideration will become apparent.⁵¹ On the other view the term *ἴδια* emerges unprepared for and unexplained.⁵²

In the second place the pointed parallelism between *ἦν* and *ἦλθεν* on the one hand, and *οὐκ ἔγνω* and *οὐ παρέλαβον* on the other hand, can be best accounted for when it is understood as a parallelism between the Logos-relation to the natural world and the Logos-relation to the world of redemption. Of the natural, cosmical relationship in its lasting, unchanging character the clause *ἦν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ* is eminently appropriate, just as of the redemptive approach as a unique historical event the verb *ἦλθεν* is strikingly

⁵¹ Cfr. Bauer in Lietzmann's *Handbuch, Johannes*, p. 13. Bauer, however, although rightly explaining *τὰ ἴδια* of the cosmos, finds the incarnate Logos already in ver. 10.

⁵² It will have been noticed that in discussing ver. 10 we did not argue from the clause *ὁ κόσμος δι' αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο* that the preceding clause *ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν* must likewise relate the Logos to the world of nature. Such an argument would not be valid, because the middle clause might be retrospective from the point of view of redemption: "He was, incarnate, in the world, and the world was made through Him, and the world knew Him not." As the preceding note shows, the close connection between ver. 10^b and *τὰ ἴδια* can be recognized, *τὰ ἴδια* understood of the world, and yet ver. 10^a understood of redemption. But in that case the peculiar sequence of *ἦν* and *ἦλθεν* is unaccounted for. This is the weak point in Bauer's exegesis. Our argument is: *τὰ ἴδια* = the world in ver. 11 because of ver. 10^b and since the *ἦν* must come before *ἦλθεν* ver. 10^a describe preincarnate relations.

descriptive. This is not saying that *ἦν* and *ἦλθεν*, each considered by itself, do not yield good sense on the other view. Our point is that the delicately shaded contrast perceptible in the use of these two words by the Evangelist is obliterated by the other exegesis. And the same applies to the difference between *οὐκ ἔγνω* and *οὐ παρέλαβον*. The issue between knowing and not-knowing naturally reminds us of the religion of nature and man's universal failure to apprehend the light supplied by the Logos.⁵³ On the other hand, the issue between receiving and not-receiving points to a definite, historical act on the part of the Logos whereby He aggressively made His appearance among those who were His own. Here again it is not denied that the *οὐκ ἔγνω* can be amply justified on the basis of what the Gospel teaches about the failure of the world to recognize the incarnate Jesus, but nevertheless the fine point of distinction between the two situations is lost, if both are made to refer to the same thing.⁵⁴

Thirdly, it will have to be remembered that the broad, universalistic outlook of the Prologue as a whole does not particularly favor the introduction of Israel at this point, co-ordinately with the natural cosmos and the Christian Church, as constituting by itself a separate sphere of Logos-activity. While such a conception is quite in keeping with the general attitude of the Gospel towards the Old Testament, and perhaps finds expression in viii. 56, yet in the presence of the highly-generalized contrast between nature and redemption which furnishes the key-note to the Prologue, its appearance here would be more or less anomalous. In the sequel, even where the author speaks in the plural, as representing the first believers who were witnesses

⁵³ Cpr. the words of Heraclitus (Sext. Emp. vii. 19, 1: *γινόμενων γὰρ πάντων κατὰ τὸν λόγον τόνδε ἀπείρουσιν ὁμοίασιν*, with their striking resemblance to the contrast in ver. 10.^b ^c

⁵⁴ The only possibility of retaining the contrast, other than the exegesis advocated above, is that suggested by Belser (cpr. note 47). Apart from its general implausible character, it labors under the disadvantage that the non-recognition of the Logos during His private life lacks the tragic, culpable aspect, here connoted by the *οὐκ ἔγνω*.

of the incarnate Logos-life, he speaks not out of the specifically Jewish, but out of the general Christian consciousness of himself and his fellows.

One other consideration must be taken into account. The view which understands ver. 10 of the presence of the incarnate Logos in the world and ver. 11 of His coming to Israel encounters a difficulty when the last clauses of both verses are to be explained as marking two successive and distinctive steps in the ill-reception of the Logos. The question may be pertinently asked, to what historical events or development the words *ὁ κόσμος αὐτὸν οὐκ ἔγνω* refer if they are to be kept separate from the statement *οἱ ἴδιοι αὐτὸν οὐ παρέλαβον*? How or where did the world reject the incarnate Christ, apart from His not being received by Israel? The clearly perceptible climax in the tragic note as between ver. 10^c and ver. 11^a requires that the two clauses shall not be related to the same thing. It will not do, therefore, to say, that in Israel's rejection of the Logos, it was the cosmos, which, acting through Israel, rejected Him. Whatever may be thought of the theory that in the Gospel the Jews thus represent the cosmos, it is plain that, as the two statements stand here, two distinct failures to appreciate the Logos, by two distinct subjects and in two distinct relations are spoken of.⁵⁵

The singular view of Baldensperger, who understands the *ἴδια* and *ἴδιοι* of the Israel of the Old Covenant, and carries the act of the coming of the Logos back to the same period, specifically to the time of the patriarchs, needs only passing mention.⁵⁶ It lies open to three fatal objections. In the first place, the aorist tense *ἦλθεν* cannot describe a repeated coming such as is assumed on the view in question, but only a single definite advent. Secondly, what Balden-

⁵⁵ The same difficulty is encountered on the exceptional view which combines reference to the incarnate Logos in ver. 10 with the exegesis of *τὰ ἴδια* of the world in ver. 11. Thus Bauer in Lietzmann's *Handbuch* ii. 2, 13 seeks to make out a "Gedankenfortschritt von Schöpfung und Geschöpf zu Heimat und Angehörigen". In reality, however, the one is but the reverse side of the other.

⁵⁶ *Der Prolog des vierten Evangeliums*, pp. 13 ff.

sperger seems to have overlooked, the description of those to whom the Logos came as His *ἴδιοι* implies a previous activity on His part in regard to them. If, when the Logos came to them, the patriarchs were already His own, then it becomes necessary to think of a still earlier Logos-work that made them such, and this it would be difficult to point out. And, in the third place, the present participle *τοῖς πιστεύουσιν* at the close of ver. 12 excludes a reference to past believers and points plainly to the writer's own time.⁵⁷

The result of our inquiry into the purport of vs. 10 and 11 yields a twofold addition to the evidence for a cosmical Logos-function already discovered. Besides giving us the direct affirmation that the Logos was in the world made through Him by nature, it presents us with the same truth, indirectly expressed, in the description of the cosmos as the Logos' own. It is evident, moreover, that the writer does not look upon the production of the world through the Logos as a past fact, of which the significance and influence ceased with the moment of creation. It is a fact resulting in a continuous relationship, for only as such could it offer a reason why the world could and should, under normal conditions, have so known and received the Logos as is implied in both ver. 10^c and ver. 11.⁵⁸ The bare fact that the Logos had a hand in the creation of the world would not of itself have made it easier for the world to know Him; this would result only if the origin of the world

⁵⁷ Zahn, who understands τὰ ἴδια of Israel, thinks that the destination of the people to belong to the Messiah, affords a sufficient ground for calling them the Logos' own. Against this is the parallel case of the cosmos, which has its relation to the Logos not in virtue of destiny alone, but as a result of its creation through Him. Therefore, in the case of Israel also, a more substantial basis would have to be found, and the only thing to be thought of in this connection would be the activity of the Logos under the Old Covenant.

Frankе, *Das Alte Testament bei Johannes*, assumes that the term ἴδια is meant by the Evangelist as an equivalent of the Old Testament עַלְמֵי as a designation of Israel. But the Sept. rendering of this is *περιούσιος*, not *ἴδιος*.

⁵⁸ Notice the adversative *καί* before both clauses in ver. 10^c and ver 11.^b

through the Logos established a perpetual relation of immanence in the world and proprietorship of the world.⁵⁹

The result of our exegesis of ver. 10, however, proves important in still another respect. It once more shows the close connection in the author's mind between the Logos as a source of omnipotent power and the Logos as a source of revelation. As in ver. 4 the Logos in virtue of His having life in Himself becomes the light of men, so here in virtue of His being in the world, and His having made the world, He appears as the One whom the world should have known and consciously appropriated. And it is chiefly in this that the doctrinal value of the teaching of this part of the Prologue consists. The question has perhaps been raised by the reader, whether a laborious inquiry of the kind here instituted is sufficiently repaid by the establishment of a principle, which elsewhere in the New Testament finds direct and undisputed expression. Why argue at length on the riddles of the Prologue, if 1 Corinthians and Colossians, and perhaps Hebrews, teach the cosmical significance and function of the preëxistent Christ in the most unequivocal language? Our answer to this is that the Prologue, if correctly interpreted by us, presents the truth involved from a peculiar angle, from which it is not considered in these other passages. The unique feature of the Prologue consists in this, that it views the cosmical function of the preëxistent Christ as a revealing function and places it in direct continuity with His revealing work in the sphere of redemption. Not that the Messiah has a share in the creation of the world or in providence, but that in mediating both He acts as the revealing Logos of God,—this is the valuable information which the Prologue supplies. It not only vindicates for nature the character of a revealing

⁵⁹ The above answers the question, left unanswered at a previous stage, to what the οὐκ ἔγνω of ver. 10^c must be referred. It is correlated with ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ ἦν and, in accordance with our understanding of these words, describes the culpable non-recognition of the Logos by men in the state of nature, not the failure of the world to recognize the incarnate Christ.

medium through which God speaks, but also links together creation and redemption as both mediated by the same Logos. Vs. 4, 5 and 10 taken together are preëminently the *sedes* for the church-doctrine of natural revelation in its relation to God's redemptive disclosure in Christ. While it is plainly taught that mankind subjectively fails to appropriate this revelation of nature, it is likewise implied that it nevertheless remains objectively valid. Moreover we receive the guarantee of the inner harmony and mutual interdependence of the two realms of truth in which the one Logos rules. Especially in our days, when a potent current of thought seeks to banish all natural theology from religion and to void the Christian mind of all antecedent rational knowledge of God, the principle just formulated assumes more than ordinary importance, and the old exegesis of the Prologue, in which it finds classical expression, becomes invested with a new apologetic interest.

Princeton.

GEERHARDUS VOS.

CONSCIENCE AND THE ATONEMENT

The fundamental subject of the Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ has scarcely ever been discussed by a theologian without some reference being made to its relation to the human conscience, and by some theologians the relationship in question has been discussed with great seriousness and at very considerable length. Thus Turretine, in his *De Satisfactione*,¹ makes, as is well known, a powerful use of the argument from conscience with an ultimate intention of showing that, on the supposition of God's purposing to forgive sins, the nature of Divine Justice renders a precedent Atonement absolutely necessary. Dr. Hugh Martin, in the same spirit, devotes a section of his valuable work on the Atonement² to showing that the benefit of the remission of sins can never be made intelligible or acceptable to the human conscience, except as issuing from the expiation of the guilt of those sins. One cannot help regretting that Dr. Martin was never able to bring to accomplishment a purpose, or at least a strong wish, to which he gave expression once and again of subjecting the question of the relation of conscience to the Atonement to a discussion as near as might be to completeness.³

Dr. J. MacLeod Campbell, whose work on the Atonement⁴ has from its publication up to the present hour been profoundly influential in English theological thought, regarded conscience as an instrument by means of which we may ascertain the true significance of Christ's obedience unto death.

¹ Francisci Turretini *De satisfactione Christi Disputationes*, Thesis I., Pars I., xxix. s.

² *The Atonement*, by Hugh Martin, D.D., p. 191 f.

³ An article entitled, *Conscience and the Blood of Sprinkling*, which Dr. Martin contributed to the *British and Foreign Evangelical Review* some ten years after the volume on the Atonement was published (i.e. April 1882) is, in the present connection, worth perusing.

⁴ Cf. *The Nature of the Atonement*, by John McLeod Campbell, D.D., p. 10 f., p. 311 f.

He used the term conscience, however, with a connotation which one cannot but regard as highly questionable. He held that the testimony of conscience was in favor of what is really the basal thought of his treatise, to wit, that the whole human race, according to the original constitution of things, stood towards the Creator in the relation of children to a Father, that this filial relation has been the determining principle of all God's dealings towards the human race, and that the purely legal element was, at any time, anything but determinative in our case. Without waiting to debate the matter, here and now, from the point of view of the nature of conscience itself, it occurs to one to say in passing that if the truth of the matter were as Dr. MacLeod Campbell would have us believe, the apostle Paul's method of dealing with sinners in order to shut them in to the faith of the Gospel would have been other than it was. To the present writer at least it seems quite evident that when the apostle Paul wished to show how inexpressibly greatly all mankind stood in need of the Gospel which he preached, he, at this stage of his presentation of the truth of the Gospel, made everything of the legal element in the natural covenant, and he did so in order that sinners might realise how intolerable the natural condition had become through sin, that thus they might wish for an interest in a gracious covenant whose most distinguishing and characteristic promise is, "I will be merciful to your unrighteousness and your sins and your iniquities will I remember no more." The natural covenant knew nothing of forgiveness; but much, very much, about death as the unavoidable penalty of sin. Now the case could scarcely have been altogether thus, if Dr. McLeod Campbell's construction of the original constitution of things were correct.

It is not the aim of this paper to discuss, with any pretensions to adequacy, either conscience, or the Atonement, or yet the relation of these most potent factors in the moral and religious spheres, the one to the other. The present discussion is not to be taken as raising, save in a very meagre sense, the general question of the relation of con-

science to the Atonement, nor even of the many difficulties, which one approaching the subject of expiation from the point of view of conscience might conceivably feel. The paper, mainly at least, deals with one difficulty or question the nature of which may at this stage be indicated thus: If it be ascertained that the common doctrine of the Reformed Creeds, in the sense of "Satisfaction" as against say the "Triumphatorial", the "Moral Influence" or the "Governmental" theory, is the right construction of the meaning of Christ's obedience unto death, how may we suppose that a conscience, painfully burdened with guilt, can rationally find rest in Christ's death as thus interpreted? Of course, preliminarily to our taking up this question in precise form, it will be necessary for us to make plain what the concept, conscience, stands to us for, and what, in one main aspect, the Atonement. And if our solution of this practical question be a good one, its goodness will manifest itself in the ease with which it self-evidently lends itself to a wider application. In this limited sense, the present discussion may be held as having a reference to the subject of the relationship in question in a more general regard.

It may be in place to say a word here concerning the sources of our knowledge. Conscience belongs to the natural sphere, and its origin, nature, and functions are proper objects of scientific study. Moral philosophers have for generations exercised themselves with this enquiry, and, although one may, or rather must, examine one's experience for oneself, it would surely be great presumption for any one to think that he has not much to learn in this matter from men who have devoted their lives to this special study. On the other hand, the Atonement belongs to the supernatural revelation of God. Its nature can be learned only from the Scriptures, which are here, of course, taken as the very Word of God. But the Scriptures speak of conscience also. It is here assumed that what the Scriptures say of conscience is not contradicted by anything that can be learned in the natural sphere. The fact that herein we have something that is common to the two spheres, the natural and the

supernatural, to which conscience and the Atonement respectively, in the main part, properly belong, points to the possibility of a rational comparison being made between the claims of conscience and the content of Christ's Atonement.

I. Conscience: In a matter of such difficulty⁵ as the human conscience, it seems most advisable to proceed from simpler to more complex views of the subject. I venture to submit the following propositions thereanent.

(a) The simplest, and therefore the broadest, although not necessarily the deepest, view one can take of conscience is, that it is a power belonging to the human soul in virtue of which we make moral distinctions, and are rendered capable of appreciating such moral distinctions. Conscience is, in a word, moral reason.⁶

(b) By virtue of this moral reason or conscience we are not only capable of apprehending an essential fundamental difference between right and wrong in dispositions and in actions, but with this apprehension we cannot avoid recognising, although it comes not to all with the like clearness, that we are under law. In other words conscience, which enables us to say of certain acts that they are right and of others that they are wrong, compels us at the same time to recognise that we are under obligation to follow after the one and to avoid the other. When conscience apprehends that envy or murder is wrong, with that apprehension comes also the knowledge that we are under obligation to avoid the

⁵Even Butler found the subject abstruse and difficult. Cf. Preface to *Sermons*.

⁶I think it of importance to hold that it is in virtue of our being creatures endowed with a conscience that we are capable of making moral distinctions at all, and that in this capability we have the most elementary, and the broadest view that can be taken of conscience. When Kant (*Metaphysics of Ethics*, Calderwood's, 3rd Ed., p. 254), says that "the consciousness of an internal tribunal in man, before which his thoughts accuse or excuse him, is what is called Conscience", he, in my humble opinion, regards the matter from a too narrowly individualistic point of view, a point of view, of course, in keeping with his Critique. It is not questioned that those activities of conscience which Kant condescends to notice are the activities which, in the estimation of every thoughtful person, lend awe to the theme.

condemned disposition or act. Similarly when conscience apprehends that it is right that a son or daughter should cherish affectionate regard towards a parent and, in case of need, should help such a parent materially, with that apprehension comes the knowledge that a son or daughter is under an obligation to act in this spirit towards a parent. The fact that in the case of many this concomitant knowledge is practically disregarded does not nullify the truth of what is now being asserted.

An analysis of conscience that does not take note of, and indeed emphasize, the fact that with the apprehension of a fundamental difference between right and wrong there comes the concomitant knowledge of an obligation to choose the right and to avoid the wrong is fatally defective.⁷ For, on the one hand, we have given us in this sense of obligation the indispensable subjective condition of our being capable of attaching any meaning to moral law in an objective sense, of our being capable indeed of sin, or of our being convicted of guilt. On the other hand, because this inward sense of obligation cannot account for itself, cannot render its own rationale, we are compelled to look beyond ourselves for the true rationale of the condition of things to which we are referring.⁸ Our sense of obligation, which, as we said, we, in virtue of conscience, apprehend, cannot be regarded as merely equivalent to an apprehension of the reasonableness, as within the finite spirit itself, of following after the right and of avoiding the wrong. The weight of it, the unshakeableness of it, the tragicalness of it, have been too realistically experienced by countless millions of our race that it should thus simply be accounted for. But a sufficient rationale of the conscionable obligation is ren-

⁷ "The observation that man is by his very nature a law to himself pursued to its just consequences, is of the utmost importance." Butler, *Sermons*, Preface. "This notion of responsibility is at all times involved, however darkly, in every act of moral self-consciousness." Kant *op. cit.*, p. 256.

⁸ This, of course, amounts to saying that ethical science is forced to borrow a fundamental premiss from theology. Cf. Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*, last ed., p. 505.

dered if, with the best Reformed divines, we identify this obligation, so far, that is, as it is correctly construed, with the law of God.⁸ The intuitions of some of the profounder moral philosophers among the heathen made them with more or less clearness of vision and firmness of grasp to lay hold upon this solution. The tortures of some of the wickedest men both in heathendom and in nominal Christendom have forced the sufferers to an acknowledgement, more or less clearly expressed, of the truth of this solution. But it is the supernatural revelation of God's word that supplies us with the fullest and clearest proof of the truth and reality of the identification here asserted. That revelation, so far as it bears on the present question, is given us partly in unambiguous utterances, the explication of which need not now occupy us, but partly also in what may be called the Biblical presuppositions, the significance of which requires closer attention. These presuppositions are in the sense that, although in the case of fallen man, there is not always clearness of vision enabling all and sundry, without fail, to pass over from law as revealed in every man's conscience to the Personal Lawgiver, or God, yet, in innocence, the law of the conscience must have been immediately understood as being a direct revelation of the will of the Creator, and thus a revelation of the Creator Himself.

⁸ Says Turretine (*Theol. Elen.* L.I.Q.3, 5): "Natural law, which has been written on the conscience of each and which (according to Romans ii. 14, 15) excuses and accuses men for well-doing or ill-doing, is to be met with in man. Nor may it be excepted: Either (1), that not the law but the work of the law is said to have been thus written; for, to the apostle these are synonymous expressions, so that he takes the expressions, "they are a law to themselves", and, "they have the work of the law written in their hearts", in one and the same sense. And the nature of the thing itself proves the truth of this, because such a work of the law is meant as that a man by the impulse thereof not only distinguishes the honourable from the base, but is urged to pursue the former and flee the latter. Or (2), that the law is said not to be innate, but written, that is, made known, as the law of Moses was made known to the Jews by revelation; for, the writing implies a natural revelation of that law in the conscience of man in contradistinction to the external revelation which was made to the Jews through a writing which was upon tables of stone."

This construction of the relation of conscience to the law of God, which in its final form we owe to the Biblical revelation, gives the rationale of that awful sense, as one may say, of responsibility to something, or rather some One other than ourselves of which no human being can quite rid himself. It gives the rationale also of that superintendency of conscience, as among our mental and moral activities, for which the moral philosophers have, as a rule, argued.⁹ True it is that the proper ultimate object even of the purely intellectual reason also is God. The fact that human beings have shown themselves capable of giving, so far, an intelligible account of the arrangements that rule the starry heavens, of thinking, as Kepler said, their thoughts with God,¹⁰ ought to be taken as intimating to us that nothing can satisfy man's soul, considered even as an intellectual being, but the very Creator of heaven and earth.^{10a} We are not, therefore, making conscience man's sole religious organ. All we maintain is that it serves with a certain emphasis as the handle whereby God binds every human being to Himself, and especially to His righteousness or justice. And in this emphasis there is given us the rationale of the superintendency of conscience as among man's intellectual and moral powers, and the rationale also of man's unshakeable sense of responsibility. In a word our search for the rationale of conscionable obligation brings us to the conclusion that the highest function of conscience is to act as guardian of the claims of God.¹¹

⁹ Cf. Butler's oft-quoted dictum (Sermon II): "Had Conscience strength, as it has right; and had it power, as it has manifest authority; it would absolutely govern the world." Professor Calderwood (*Handbook of Moral Philosophy*, p. 80) says that, "Butler has placed the fact of the supremacy of conscience on such a basis that it has been admitted with wonderful unanimity by the upholders of most conflicting theories as to the nature of conscience."

¹⁰ I have often thought that this consideration was fitted to go a long way towards commending to man the reasonableness of the doctrine of the Incarnation, when once revealed.

^{10a} Augustine (*Confessions* i.) says: "Thou hast formed us for Thyself, and our hearts are restless till they find rest in Thee."

¹¹ "Conscience," says Delitzsch, *Psychology*, 2 Eng. Ed. p. 167, "in its primitive state was precisely knowledge knowing itself in God. But, in

(c) Conscience, which we identify with that "spirit of man which is the lamp of Jehovah searching all his innermost parts" (Proverbs xx. 27),¹² is a light capable of augmentation.¹³ This, on our construction of conscience, is a thesis that, one would think, scarcely requires proof. Notwithstanding, because of some interesting questions that arise in this connection, one may endeavour to make the phenomenon manifest. If we shall speak true to the Biblical representations we must, on the subjective side, consider two principal cases here; I mean that of the regenerate and that of the natural.¹⁴ For, with regard to the former, regeneration must be held to have affected their conscience beneficially. It increases its sensitiveness. Not only so: it renders it sensitive to some objects and truths to which it was once quite irresponsive. Regeneration thus enables conscience to fulfil in a better way than before its proper and natural functions, both in discriminating between the right hand and the left, and in identifying natural obligation with the will of Jehovah. Regeneration in this connection in fact means not only the coming of spiritual life, but an augmentation of light, in the sense of vision. But over and above this augmentation, in a purely subjective sense, it stands to reason that, in an objective sense, the conscience whose eyes, so to say, have been opened should gain additional light from the revelation which God has given of Himself in the work of creation, in the promulgation, after a supernatural manner, of the moral law at Mount Sinai, and in the revelation which God has given of Himself as a Saviour both in the Old and especially in the New Testa-

consequence of the fall, it is no longer the perfectly true mirror of God's law in us. This law itself, however, subsists in man as the ineradicable dowry of his divinely constituted nature."

¹² "Conscience is God's searchlight." Toy *in loc.*

¹³ In other words, it has a content from without.

¹⁴ "The existence of conscience," says Delitzsch, *op. cit.*, p. 168, "reaches beyond the fall, and has, in its manifestation of itself, run through a changeful history: it was one thing in its original position; it is another thing in its position under sin; it becomes another thing in its position under grace, through which it becomes renewed."

ments. Nor does it cause any difficulty if we should say that the regenerated conscience makes this, to begin with objective, light its own.

The other case is that of those who are yet in the state of nature, strangers to a gracious regeneration. Now, however difficult it be in this second case to explain all the facts, there can be no question that, even in the case of the unregenerate also, natural conscience is a light that is capable of increase. Conscience may in one sense reject a light¹⁴ which in another sense it makes its own. One may conclude from the first chapter of the Epistle of Paul to the Romans that generally in the case of heathen idolaters the moral reason rejects the light which the natural creation throws upon the Being and Perfections of God. Yet, in another sense, the moral reason makes that light its own. Otherwise it is inconceivable in regard to those who "sinned without the law and perish without law" that they should in the next world suffer remorse of conscience because of their not having put that revelation of God, which the creation yields or serves, to good use. And, on the other hand, apart from such remorse, one can scarcely attach any intelligible thought to the expression, "the heathen perishing without law".¹⁵

A similar remark falls to be made with regard to the written Word, and especially here to that Word as, in a supernatural way, it repromulgates the natural covenant. When the apostle Paul in Romans ii. 13, says that "as many as have sinned under the law shall be judged by the law", "judgment" in this latter case must mean something still more terrible than "perishing" when spoken of the heathen.¹⁶

¹⁴ Light is truth, and all truth may be said to have God for its author. The truth, however, which we have here in view is, mainly, God's self-revelation in creation, in law, and in grace.

¹⁵ "The Bible," says W. G. T. Shedd (*Sermons to the Natural Man*, p. 86), "sends the ungodly and licentious pagan to hell, upon the same principle that it sends the ungodly and licentious nominal Christian."

¹⁶ "Paul argues," says Shedd (ut sup. p. 85), "that the ungodly Jew will be visited with a more severe punishment than the ungodly Gentile."

Again we say that we can attach no intelligent thought to the expression if it does not imply that in the next world such as have had such a revelation of God's will as is given us in the ten commandments, and have not put this revelation to good use, will on this very account suffer remorse. Yet it is inconceivable that that should be so, if conscience did not in some sense make this supernaturally bestowed light, which it did not improve, in some sense its own.

Because, according to the Scriptures, such as have had the light of the Gospel and have not appreciated it are the guiltiest of any, and must suffer the greatest punishment of any,¹⁷ Dr. McLeod Campbell, reasoning I suppose on presuppositions that might seem, but are not really, analogous to those made use of by me in the last two paragraphs, concludes that the law of conscience must be one with the Gospel, and that, because the Gospel in a word means sonship, therefore we must conclude that the filial relation was the determining factor in the first constitution of things. But this kind of reasoning is fallacious. It is quite true that rejecters of Christ in the Gospel are the guiltiest of any, and it is also true that unless in some sense conscience made the light of the Gospel its own even whilst rejecting it, it would be inconceivable that rejecters of Christ should suffer remorse in the next world on account of this rejection. All this may well be, without the case for a natural sonship being altogether as Dr. McLeod Campbell imagined. For, to begin with, adoption, although it may be regarded as the crown of our salvation, is by no means the whole of our salvation. And further, the Biblical view of adoption in the evangelical sense is (howsoever the question concerning a natural sonship in some sense be decided on Biblical grounds), that those, who believe in the Son of God, Jesus Christ, are received into the family of God in the sense of a sonship which is ever so much higher than the natural cov-

¹⁷ "This is the condemnation that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil." John iii. 19.

enant so much as once contemplated.¹⁸ These simple and, I should say, easily demonstrable truths, of themselves, take the ground from under Dr. McLeod Campbell's argument.

But I shall not here and now pursue this line of reasoning farther. I return to the proposition with which under this section I started: The light of conscience may be augmented. Both in the case of the regenerate and of the unregenerate the augmented light is still, in some sense, the light of conscience, although as will be readily perceived that is true in a much more profound sense of the former than of the latter.^{18a}

(d) The light of conscience, from its dimmest to its brightest manifestations on earth, may be traversed. The warnings of conscience may, so far, be unheeded. But this cannot be done with impunity. The result is a blot, a burden, it may be a burning. In proportion as the conscience is sensitive, the issue will be a discomfort, a restlessness, an upheaval in man's moral nature, in which one seems to interpenetrate oneself in the form now of criminal, now of accuser, now of extenuator, now of judge. "The procedure," as one has said, "takes the form of the conduct of a cause before a court." But throughout it all there is some consciousness, more or less distinct, that the case cannot end there, that it must be appealed to an Ultimate Court. This circumstance may, from one point of view, be construed as lending fearfulness to the situation, when one can expect only a fearful looking for of judgment, and of fiery indignation that shall devour such as have trampled upon conscience in its several degrees of enlightenment. Yet from another point of view the fact that the case goes up as by necessity from the court of conscience to an Ultimate Tribunal, contains in it the only hopeful circumstance attending

¹⁸ God has properly speaking only One Son—the Only Begotten. Those who believe upon this Son are, in the evangelical sense, *exclusively* the children of God. Cf. John i. 12, Galatians iii. 26.

^{18a} The matter may be put thus: The former receive the truth in the love of it, the latter not in the love of it.

this woeful business. If the case must go to the Ultimate Tribunal, it must be that it is with that Tribunal we have mainly to do. That, as we shall see later on, is a hopeful matter.

(e) We bring our remarks upon conscience *per se* to a close by observing that we have, in (a), (b), (c), (d), been dealing with what are universal experiences. This lends grandeur as well as awesomeness to our discussion. All have a conscience,¹⁹ all have some sense of obligation to a Higher,²⁰ all have had some augmentation of light, all have violated conscience, even if some did so in more aggravated forms than others, so that all have naturally reason to dread a flood of wrath in which not only the fountains of the great deep of the human conscience shall be broken up, but heaven's windows shall be opened as avenues for God's immediate wrath. Seeing then that conscience is an instrument, awesome in its complexity, that every conscience has been more or less defiled, and that the consuming fire of God's holy wrath is ready to seize upon the conscience that remains defiled, and the fierceness of that fire will be in proportion to the degree of defilement, it becomes a pressingly practical question, how this defilement may be cleansed, how the conscience may be purged. Now the Gospel of Jesus Christ offers cleansing, in the sense required, and consequent freedom from wrath. When the Holy Spirit (Hebrews ix. 9) discounts the efficacy of the gifts and sacrifices that were offered up under the law as being things that could not make those who exercised themselves to the utmost in those ceremonial services perfect as pertaining to the conscience, He plainly thereby claims for the sacrifice of Christ an efficacy to cleanse the conscience of the believer in Christ, be that conscience ever so much defiled.

II. We come, therefore, to discuss briefly the second

¹⁹ Cf. Kant's "Every man has, as a moral being, a conscience." *Op. cit.*, p. 217, and repeatedly.

²⁰ Consult Turretine's splendid discussion: "An dentur Athei proprie dicti." *Th. El.* L.III. Q 2.

member of the relationship in question, to wit, the Atonement—a remedy for a defiled and burdened conscience which is apt to appear to one, on first thoughts, as a professed friend showing his back to one in the time of need. For Christ in expiating guilt did not set His face towards sinful creatures. On the contrary He set His face towards God. On account of this, as Naaman with Elisha, one is apt to feel disappointed (2 Kings vii). But on a better understanding of Christ's method of relieving the guilty, one will not feel disappointed. Meantime for our present purposes, we must be at some pains to establish the fact that Christ's work in making Atonement, or in other words in expiating guilt, terminated upon God Himself. For it is this fact that raises the difficulty to which special attention is now drawn. And moreover, there is additional necessity laid upon us to establish the Godwardness of Christ's Atonement, inasmuch as not a few, in the name of theological science, have at one time or another denied it. It is a fact of common knowledge that some early Christian writers expressed themselves as if their idea was that Christ's work, in giving His life as a ransom, terminated upon Satan. That a very important result of Christ's death was the destruction of Satan—I mean in the sense of Hebrews ii. 14—is a fact to which the Scriptures bear ample evidence, and is an aspect of Christ's intention in dying which, if overwrought by some of the early Christian Fathers, is generally under-worked nowadays. When one thinks that the very first intimation of salvation through a suffering Saviour that was made to our race was enveloped in a threat addressed to our arch-enemy (Genesis iii. 15), that Christ Himself regarded the work He was engaged in as a battle deciding once for all whether the world was to be His or Satan's (John xii. 31), that in a portion of the New Testament in which more than in any other Biblical writing—I mean the Epistle to the Hebrews—the relation of the Atonement to conscience gets prominence, a main purpose of Christ's death is set forth as being the

destruction or bringing to nought of him that had the power of death, that is the devil—all this is surely ample proof that the results of Christ's death cannot be adequately dealt with, without an important section being devoted to the question of what Christ's death meant for the god of this world. But Christ did not achieve His victory over Satan, as the so-called "Triumphantorial" theory would seem to teach, through giving Himself in any sense to Satan. His victory over Satan was complete, but He achieved it through giving Himself in life and death to God.

Again, within post-Reformation times and up to the present hour there have been not a few who have taken in hand to discuss the significance of Christ's death, whose construction comes practically to this: God cannot but forgive sinners who repent of their sins, Christ's life and death have in some way, howsoever inexplicable the connection be, an influence to bring about in sinners this indispensable repentance desiderated. In this way Christ's death saves. This is the Socinian view, and the view of not a few who, although they repudiate the Socinian name, have come under Socinian influences. It is the "Moral Influence" theory of the Atonement, and, according to it, Christ's death can only in a very indirect or rather improper way be said to terminate upon God at all.

The "Governmental" theory, although it is at a less remove from the doctrine for which we contend than the "Moral Influence" theory, has this in common with it, that it makes the Atonement terminate upon God only in an indirect, or rather, I should say, in an improper sense. It would seem to be the human conscience that the Atonement, according to the "Governmental" theory, directly affects.^{20a} It is because the Atonement does this directly, that God can consistently with rectoral righteousness exercise mercy.

Abettors of the "Moral Influence" and "Governmental" theories of the Atonement claim to do more justice to con-

^{20a} That is to say, it affects the human conscience with a view to quicken it. But what of cleansing and appeasing conscience?

science than can be done on the "Satisfaction" construction, the construction which we advocate. The theories we discard appear, indeed, at first sight, to deal more immediately with conscience. But it happens in not a few cases that the seemingly longer road is really the shorter. And so it is in this case. It is only by making the first first, that we can ever have a good second. But be the interests of conscience what they may, it is, in view of the Biblical data, a demonstrably true affirmation that the Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ, or Christ's priestly act in laying down His life, terminated not upon devil or man, but upon God the Judge of all. We can here and now give only the elements of this demonstration:

(a) Sin, which, in this case, is the great trouble—that which defiles the conscience, and that which Christ's Atonement must put away—is against God. So David in confessing in the fifty-first Psalm, "Against Thee, Thee only, have I sinned", evidently meant to teach. As Perowne puts it: "Human judges can only regard wrong actions as *crimes*, God alone takes cognizance of them as *sins*." The apostle Paul regarded this question from one and the same point of view as did David. One may prove it thus: In the opening portion of the Epistle to the Romans, Paul undertakes to show that every human being stood in need of forgiveness as preached through Jesus Christ. Why? Because all men are demonstrably under God's wrath. And how demonstrably under God's wrath? Because all are guilty. Unpurged guilt spells unappeasable wrath. It is just another way of saying that sin strikes against God. If sin does so, the Atonement, which cancels it, must terminate upon God.^{20b}

(b) Not only is sin against God, but it belongs to the perfection of God's nature that no sin should go unpunished. In Deuteronomy xxxii. 35, the fact that vengeance belongeth unto God is given as a reason making it certain that the

^{20b} Wrong actions may be hurtful to one's neighbor, or to one's self; but it is in the sense in which these same actions wrong God that Christ bore them.

finally impenitent guilty person must suffer condign punishment, howsoever long that punishment may seem to delay its coming. This perfection of God is pointed to in the Epistle to the Hebrews (x. 30) as the reason why despisers of Christ in the Gospel shall in the judgment have the most intolerable portion of any. David, in Psalm v, reasons from this perfection of God to the certain ultimate overthrow of such as obstinately oppose themselves to God, and similarly the apostle Paul in 2 Thessalonians i. 8, reasoning from this perfection of God, warns the troublers of the Church of God concerning their certain fearful end.

It is quite easy, we admit, to dwell so exclusively on this aspect of the Divine character as to give an entirely wrong impression of the God of Israel. We cannot dwell too much on that aspect of the Divine character to which the Westminster Divines—see Confession of Faith II, i—were enabled to do so much justice when in setting forth the natural and essential perfections of God they declared Him to be “most loving, gracious, merciful”. But, notwithstanding, one may justly say that, in a certain sense, it makes the unavoidable wrath of God against sin all the more terrible when it is realised to be the unavoidable wrath of a Being who is naturally infinitely loving in His nature. This view of the matter puts the blame on the right party—it makes sin appear exceedingly horrible.

(c) If then sin is against God, and if further it is a perfection of the Godhead to execute vengeance on account of every sin, it is evident that Christ, if He is to save sinners from their fearful plight on account of sin as guilt, must engage His heart to draw near to Jehovah (Jeremiah xxx. 21). His work must terminate upon God. That the achievement was equal to and in keeping with the emergency, was taught the Church of God under the Old Testament dispensation in connection with the sacrifices which they were then commanded to offer up. For proof: The sin offering^{20*} was

^{20*} For a particularly fine statement of the argument as from the broader base of all the piacalar sacrifices of the law of Moses, one

the sacrifice which in a more significant sense than any other of the Mosaic sacrifices was the type of Christ's sacrificial death, and therefore is best fitted to throw light on the significance of Christ's death. It is quite a good proof of this last assertion that, in the New Testament, Christ as a sacrifice is more frequently designated sin-offering than under any other name drawn from the Mosaic appointments. Further the sin-offering itself may be studied most significantly of all as it was offered up on the tenth day of the seventh month in Israel, that is on the great day of Atonement. The signal significance of the service of the great day of Atonement is evident from the nature of the case, and also because the fact of this pre-eminent significance is a presupposition of the argument of the Epistle to the Hebrews. Now on that great day the High Priest under the law took the blood of those animals which were for sin offerings, and, bringing it into the holiest of all, sprinkled it upon the mercy seat and before the mercy seat. He sprinkled it neither upon the people nor upon the tabernacle²⁰ but upon the throne and before the throne of God Himself. Could it be shown more clearly that it is the essence of sacrifice, at least of the sin-offering, to propitiate God, to turn away His wrath, and to procure His favour?²¹

(d) The truth that the sacrifice of Calvary had God, the Judge of all, for its objective, is brought out in the New Testament in a simple way, but in a way which is in perfect keeping with what the law of Moses might have taught us. In every case in which the immediate *terminus ad quem* of Christ's priestly activities in laying down His life is indicated in the New Testament, that terminus is said to be God Himself. "He gave Himself a sacrifice to God" (Ephesians v.

may refer to Outram's, *Two Dissertations on Sacrifices*, especially Dis. i. chs. 15 and 19.

²⁰ Even if with the Jewish commentators we understand Lev. xvi. 16 in the sense that a part of the blood of the sin-offerings of the great day of Atonement was ordered to be sprinkled in the outer sanctuary the argument is not substantially affected.

²¹ That is, in the sense of Judge.

2). "He offered Himself without spot to God" (Hebrews ix. 14). In a word, the cause of Christ's death was, according to the Scripture, our sins (Romans iv. 25). But the death which He died on account of our sins amounted to a sacrifice of a sweet smelling savour, which, of course, was unto God.

Christ's death may, in a secondary sense, be said to terminate upon the believing sinner's conscience. But, in the primary sense, it terminated upon God. *And the primary sense is the whole of the Atonement.* The death of Christ, which took place nearly nineteen hundred years before we, who now live, were born, was in its own nature there and then perfect in the sense of an Atonement, and perfection does not admit of addition. "By the one offering Christ hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified" (Hebrews x. 14). In proof of its perfection God, to whom Christ offered Himself as a sacrifice of a sweet smelling savour, raised Him from the dead, and exalted Him "far above all heavens that Christ might fill all things" (Ephesians iv. 10). It is because of this perfection of Christ's work in the sense of an Atonement, that believers in the Son of God always have the forgiveness, not of some of their sins, nor even of most of their sins, but of *all* their sins. (Colossians ii. 3; 1 John i. 7).

One of the latest somewhat noteworthy contributions to the interpretation of the significance of the Atonement is, one regrets to say, in the regard now alluded to, one of the least satisfactory. I refer to Principal P. T. Forsyth's, *The Work of Christ*. Principal Forsyth professes to have sympathy with the three great ideas which have commended themselves to so many as interpretive of the significance of Christ's Cross,—destruction of Satan's power, moral influence, satisfaction; and instead of making any of them in a supreme sense the interpretive idea, he tries to combine the three in one. The result, as might be expected, is little better than a medley. It is as if, in regard to the constitution of man's moral nature, instead of, like Butler, asserting the

supremacy of conscience, and assigning to self-love and to benevolence their proper subordinate places, one were to conjoin self-love and benevolence with conscience in the superintendency.

The evil effect, however, of seeking to co-ordinate these interpretive ideas is seen at its worst when towards the end of the volume under notice, the author faces the question what it is that God has regard to in forgiving sins. "Christ", he says, (p. 224) "satisfied the heart of God by presenting in the compendious compass of His own person a Humanity presanctified by the irresistible power of His own creative and timeless work." In other words a holy penitent people is, in the last resort, substituted for Christ's satisfaction to divine justice as the immediate ground of forgiveness. Cover it up with fine phrases as Principal Forsyth may, the outcome of his discussion does not differ essentially from the old Romish view: "He merited that we might merit."²²

III. But, to return to our direct purpose. Let what has been advanced suffice as the elements of a demonstration of the thesis that Christ's work in making Atonement terminated upon God, the Judge of all. Christ seems thus by the very fact of His turning His face towards Another, even although that Other is God, to turn away from ourselves and our distressful case. Now no one is so self-centred as the one whose spirit is wounded. Naturally, therefore, none are so ready as the wounded in spirit to think that, if Christ is to expiate their guilt, He must deal primarily and directly with their own conscience. Yet such was not His method. In what is really the whole of expiation, of propitiation, of Atonement, Christ was occupied in offering Himself unto God, and thus made an end of sin, finished transgression, made reconciliation for iniquity, and brought in an everlast-

²² Principal Forsyth opens his discussions in the volume referred to promisingly, beginning, as he does, with man as God's enemy. But he very soon loses the right path, and that because he takes this enmity only in an active sense. In Romans v. enmity is primarily passive enmity. That is: such is the nature of God's righteousness that, if we remain guilty, we must be dealt with as enemies. Had Dr. Forsyth but admitted that one truth, it would, we think, have compelled him to make "satisfaction" the interpretive idea in Christ's death.

ing righteousness. And He points the burdened conscience for relief to a work that thus is seen to have terminated entirely upon Another, a work that was finished ere any now living had a being. And, after all, Christ's directions to us—and here we are offering the solution for the sake of which mainly this paper was written—are most reasonable. It is not that we think that any sinner was ever simply reasoned into a cordial acceptance of the Atonement. What we mean is that regeneration does not leave a man less reasonable than before, but on the contrary that God's efficiency is in perfect harmony with the original laws of our rational nature, whether intellectual or moral. And, therefore, in pursuance of our proof of the reasonableness of our being directed to find peace of conscience in a work that terminated upon God, consider:

(1) The main function of conscience, as was already pointed out, is to be a guardian of the interests of God. Not only so, but the functionings of conscience, whether in the sense of discerning right from wrong, or in discerning the obligation under which a creature is to choose the right and to avoid the wrong, is a revelation of God, because it is a revelation of His Will. If that is admitted, it will surely appear no unreasonable thing that conscience should identify satisfaction rendered to its Lord with satisfaction rendered to itself, in fact should reckon that satisfaction to its Lord as that whereby alone conscience, according to its proper office, could be honoured, or in which it could find rest.²⁸

(2) The Biblical view appears to be that it is just because Christ's work terminated upon God that that work can result in the cleansing of the conscience of a guilty, if believing, creature. The *locus classicus* is Hebrews ix. 13.

²⁸ "The human conscience," says Professor B. B. Warfield, "is the shadow of God's judgment; its deliverances repeat the demands of God's righteousness; its satisfaction argues the satisfaction of God's justice." The sermon from which this quotation is made—see Warfield's *The Power of God unto Salvation* (p. 79)—is altogether a most valuable contribution to a better understanding of the relationship discussed, so far, in this paper.

14. The meaning seems to be: (a) This relation or dependence of conscience for cleansing on the Atonement was adumbrated by means of types under the old dispensation: "If the blood of bulls and goats and the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean, sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh: how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through His Eternal Spirit²⁴ offered Himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" The thought of these verses, so far as, for our present purpose, they throw light on the meaning of the Old Testament sacrificial arrangements, may be brought out in this way: In ver. 13, "the blood of bulls and goats" means the blood of the sin-offerings, especially of the sin-offering of the great day of Atonement. In other words "the blood of bulls and goats" gives us the sixteenth chapter of the Book of Leviticus. In the same verse, "the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean", gives us the nineteenth chapter of the Book of Numbers, with its laws concerning the water of separation. Now the Apostle by thus bringing these two chapters into close proximity suggests that the rites of Numbers xix were dependent upon the rites of Leviticus xvi. Now the rites of Leviticus xvi were typical of Christ's sacrificial death, when He offered Himself unto God. And the rites of

²⁴"His Eternal Spirit": The right rendering is of course a matter in debate, and the argument of this paper is not really affected by the decision. But I may briefly indicate why I take "Eternal Spirit" in the sense of, "Christ's essential or divine nature", and not in the sense of, "the Third Person of the Godhead". (1) It is not denied that "Eternal Spirit" is attributable to the Holy Ghost, but He is not spoken of exactly as in Hebrews ix. 14, elsewhere in the Scriptures. (2) The expression is anarthrous, and thus suits a nature still better than a Person. (3) The terms "Eternal Spirit" are certainly attributable to Christ's essential nature, and, according to many good exegetes, have, if taken in this sense, a close analogue in Romans i. 4. (4) Especially, the passage (Hebrews ix. 14) in which the terms occur is a terse summary of the glorious views of Christ's Person and office that make up the previous part of the Epistle to the Hebrews. None of these reasons is absolutely decisive, but, taken in combination, they, in my judgment, turn the balance in favour of the above translation.

Numbers xix were typical of the cleansing of the conscience, which is a result of the offering of Christ unto God. In other words, according to the Old Testament adumbration, cleansing of conscience was dependent upon Atonement. To put it otherwise "the blood of bulls and goats" in ver. 13 has for its parallel "Christ offering Himself through His Eternal Spirit without spot unto God" in ver. 14. And "the ashes of an heifer sprinkling the unclean" in ver. 13, has for its parallel "the blood of Christ cleansing the conscience from dead works in order to serve the living God" in ver. 14. And the Apostle appears to me to say that this dependence of a cleansed conscience upon the satisfaction of divine justice ought not to be regarded as a truth quite novel, because that, properly understood, the same truth was in a shadowy way taught under the law, as one may see if one considers the dependence of the minor ceremonials on the central ceremonial of Leviticus xvi. (b) What was taught, although with less distinctness, under the Old dispensation, is set before us in a plainer and more direct way under the New: "The blood of Jesus Christ who through His Eternal Spirit offered Himself without spot to God, will purge the conscience from dead works." It is not as if he had said that the blood of Christ will effect this, although it was offered to God, but that it has this effect just because it was offered to God, for the offering of Himself is the offering of His blood. The thought of this 14th verse seems most concentrated. It is as if the Apostle would gather up the essence of all that he had said in the previous portion of his Epistle into one pregnant sentence. "His Eternal Spirit" is a phrase that appears to the present writer to give in a word what had been given *in extenso* in Chapter i concerning that Son of God, who is all that God Himself is, who is called God and unto whom the works of God are ascribed, who is even called Jehovah, the God of Israel, and unto whom the works that are proper to the God of Israel are ascribed. Similarly the phrase, "without spot", is tantamount to a declaration of the per-

fection of His humanity and refers us back to Chapter ii, where the Apostle has expatiated on this interesting theme, showing that as the Redeemer is God's Son, so is He His people's Brother, and all that His brethren ought to be. Again, when it is said that "He offered . . . to God", that is but to say that He acted the part of a Priest, a priest after the likeness of Melchizedec, a royal priest, and suggests Chapters iii, iv, v, vi, vii. Finally, in that he says "that He offered Himself", it is in order to show that Christ, His Father's Son, His people's Brother, the Priest after the similitude of Melchizedec, was Himself the sacrifice, and that, although He behoved to be a sacrifice emphatically in our nature, there is not a consideration implied in all the rich references which are here made but was an element contributory to the worth of this sacrifice. In a word, it was a sacrifice worthy of God. And because it was worthy of God, it must needs be worthy of acceptance on man's part, and man's conscience's part, the Biblical view being that God alone is independent, that man is dependent upon God and that man's conscience has a peculiar dependence upon God's justice.

(3) By emphasizing the fact that it was with God alone, as the Judge of all, Christ had to do in offering Himself a sacrifice, we remove one principal difficulty which is apt to occur in connection with the Biblical doctrine of a definite Atonement. For one can scarcely avoid putting the question: Was I, according to God's purpose, one of the people? Now that question cannot be answered at the outset, but neither need it. For the essential thing is that God, the very God against whom one has sinned, was in Him. And He was in Him not in a fractional sense,—if to meet the unreasonableness of unbelief one be permitted to use an almost unreasonable term. He was in Him in His entirety. "The fulness of the Godhead dwelt in Him bodily." It is sufficient proof that the only God, and all of God with whom we can have to do, was in Christ, that Christ was Himself God, that He drew upon all the resources of His entire Godhead in this matter, that it was through a

really eternal Spirit that He offered Himself without spot unto God. It was this God against whom we sinned, whether sinning against the light of nature, or the light of the moral law given in a supernatural manner upon Mount Sinai, or the light of the Gospel as promised in the Old Testament, yea even if we sinned against light and love, it was this God, we say, who sent Jesus Christ into the world, who was with Jesus Christ, unto whom also Jesus Christ offered Himself. This God it was that raised Him from dead, exalting Him far above all heavens that Christ might fill all things, so that in Christ God gives the all perfect revelation of Himself. The Atonement terminated upon God. It is God with whom we have to do. This God was in Christ, and in as much as that was the case, we may rest upon this God, and in resting upon Him we shall have the assurance soon that He had everlasting thoughts of love towards us, thoughts with which our eternal destruction is incompatible.^{24a}

(4) We are confirmed in the correctness of our proposition because of the circumstance that, according to the Biblical teaching, God as propitiated is the object of saving faith. The Publican, according to Luke viii. 14, sought after the face of a propitiated God; and according to Paul's teaching in Romans iv. 23-25, it is such a God that is revealed to us in the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. To trust in God as thus revealed is indefectible salvation.

(5) *Omnia exeunt in mysterium*. No one has been able to explain so simple a matter as that through images of external objects formed on the retina of the eye, we gain a knowledge of the external world. If that is so, need we wonder if the relation of a purged conscience to the satisfaction of divine justice should involve mysteries? But just as in connection with questions bearing on the connection between soul and body, between mind and matter, without our being able to answer the metaphysician's every

^{24a} Cf. also John v. 22.

question we may have not only such a knowledge as serves all practical interests, but also such a knowledge as enables us to rest in an assured conviction of the ultimate rationality of it all, so also, as regards the more mysterious question of the relation of a purged conscience to the satisfaction of divine justice, we may, without our professing to give an exhaustive account of the whole matter, appeal to experience in proof of the truth of our account, so far, of the relation of conscience and the Atonement. For, has not the whole Evangelical Church of God been witnesses to the fact that when, through the power of the Holy Spirit, men were enabled to lean upon God as revealed in the death of Christ on account of sin, and as revealed in the resurrection of Christ on account of the satisfaction which the death of Christ rendered to the justice of God, this act of leaning was answered with comforts of the Holy Ghost in their soul? This Spirit created thoughts holier and also more humbling than, previous to their falling in with God's way of salvation, they ever experienced, and this experience may well be taken as an intimation of a justifying act on the part of the Judge of all, and as corroborating evidence of the truth of our construction of related doctrines.²⁵

Our task is practically over. This paper was, in the main, written with a practical purpose, that is to say, with a view to direct every wounded conscience to the Atonement of our Lord Jesus Christ. With a view to strengthen and stimulate such consciences in this direction we have been insisting on the reasonableness of looking for peace of conscience from faith in a propitiated God. For if one may use such an expression, the controlling strand in the doctrine of Atonement is its Godwardness, and the controlling strand in conscience also is its Godwardness. This common factor gives the rationale of the dependence of a purged conscience upon the death of our Lord Jesus Christ. A wounded conscience, on this account, finds rest in the Atonement, and in it alone.

²⁵ Cf. 1 Peter iii. 21.

But the argument may, in a more general regard, be so pointed as to contribute towards a proof of the proposition that no other idea save that of satisfaction to divine justice can be regarded as properly interpretative of the Cross of Christ. For (a), one would not venture to undertake to ascertain from the outset the nature of the Atonement from the nature of the human conscience. The Atonement had not its springs or origin in the will of man, neither was man's moral nature the mould it had to conform to. Its springs or origin is the will of God, and it must be conformed to the righteousness of God. For, to use an expression of Dr. Smeaton's, the divine character has a conservative as well as a liberal aspect, God cannot give, without at the same time keeping. He cannot grant forgiveness without at the same time retaining the glory of His hatred to sin. Yet, although conscience ought not to be made the measuring rod of the Atonement, when it is discovered that that which fully answers the demands of the divine righteousness answers also the needs of a wounded conscience, the healed conscience may reasonably be emboldened to say that since in the fact of the Godwardness of the Atonement it found rest and cleansing, an Atonement in which the controlling strand is not its Godwardness would to it be no Atonement at all. Or (b), again, one may put the matter thus: In the sphere of mechanics, if two related members, both of which are very complex in structure, correspond exactly the one to the other, there is moral certainty that this answerableness of the one to the other was designed, that, in fact, given one side of this complex relation, the other side is, in a sense, already and thereby determined. In the case of a lock of extraordinary complexity, its wards will determine the cavities of the complex key which will fit it. If then Atonement, in the sense of satisfaction, meets the needs of conscience, of a wounded conscience, even as we have seen that reason, revelation and the experience of the Church of God combine in assuring us that it does, is not the problem so profound, is not the matter involved in such

complexities, that one feels morally certain that a second solution cannot be forthcoming? In other words, the only idea that will interpret, the only real, that is, actually existing, Atonement, is satisfaction to Divine Justice.

Inverness, Scotland.

JOHN R. MACKAY.

THE SOURCE OF ISRAEL'S ESCHATOLOGY*

The topic selected for this lecture has been chosen largely because the history of recent criticism on this subject can perhaps best illustrate for us, within the limits of a single hour, the principles and methods of the dominant school of critics—the Wellhausen school—and the new forces that are now at work to discredit them. Though the limitations imposed by the time at our disposal prevent attention to details, the choice of a narrower theme would stand in the way of our obtaining that general impression which can only be gotten from a rather broad outlook.

It was undoubtedly a one-sided view of the Old Testament writers, especially of the prophets, that saw in them merely or mainly predictors of future events, and in their writings little of worth save what could be interpreted as at least a foreshadowing of greater things to come. But the over-emphasis on this phase of their function has been at least counterbalanced by the insistence of scholars, since Gesenius a century ago, upon the mission of prophet and poet, historian and sage, to their own contemporaries—particularly upon the prophet's function as a preacher of righteousness to his age. At first critics tended simply to slight the predictive side of the prophets' message. Largely as it bulks in their books, it was regarded as the product of an enthusiasm of little value while they lived—in fact, an obstacle to their usefulness—and of no value to us to-day in our effort to envisage the man in his historical environment. But the Wellhausen school, with characteristic thoroughness, included this eschatology of the prophets in its programme of reconstruction, just as it included their ethics, their theology or their politics. Still, even to this school the eschatological message is not the central and organizing fact in determining the significance of the prophets: it lies on the periphery and must rather be judged in its nature

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and extent through a process of deduction from what is conceived to be more central.

That central fact of Hebrew prophecy, in the view of Wellhausen and his followers, is of course this: that the prophets of the 8th century B.C.—notably Amos, the earliest of them—were innovators in preaching an “ethical monotheism”. Taking Jehovah, this little tribal god of the Israelitish people, they made of Him such a deity as that in principle no other god could exist alongside of Him, and a deity who not only was ethically perfect Himself, but also demanded moral conduct of His worshipers. The deduction from this central feature of prophecy with respect to eschatology was made as follows: Jehovah alone is Israel’s God; Jehovah is holy and Israel must put away sin or be punished for it; Israel’s sin is great and demands an unheard-of punishment; Jehovah will come in wrath and sweep away utterly the sinful nation.

Beyond the limits of Israel this coming of Jehovah will indeed smite this nation and that and the other with disaster, yet obviously the view of a prophet like Amos is limited to his little Syrian world, the immediate environment of Israel—Damascus, Philistia, Phœnicia, Edom, Ammon, Moab. Even in Isaiah (the genuine 8th century Isaiah) it is only Assyria, Jehovah’s particular foe, that He will devour with His fire and brimstone. The prophet singled out by critics of this school as the first to preach a world-wide conflagration at Jehovah’s coming is Zephaniah, at the end of the 7th century.

With Ezekiel, a few years later, we already enter, according to this scheme, upon the new, apocalyptic stage of eschatology, which is to mark its course thereafter. That stage is characterized, not by the immediate and necessary deduction of the prophet’s eschatology from his own historical environment, but by a theoretical and bookish system, derived from growing notions of canonical authority, plus a detached and fantastic imagination that delights to paint the future in colors as lurid as the writer’s present is gray

and dull. As the earlier stage may be described as the psychological stage, so this latter may be called the literary stage of eschatology. It culminates in the literary phantasies of the apocalypses, from Daniel to Enoch, Esdras and Revelation.

But what now of the reverse side of the shield? we ask. There is, pervasively, an eschatology of weal as well as an eschatology of woe. Are not all the prophets, early as well as late, continually breaking forth into rhapsodies upon the contemplation of "the latter days", when Israel shall be saved, and all the prosperity, peace, joy and glory of paradise shall be enjoyed once more by Jehovah's people? Is it not Amos himself who tells us of the days "when the plowman shall overtake the reaper, and the treader of grapes him that soweth seed; and the mountains shall drop sweet wine, and all the hills shall melt"?

No, comes the reply; no, for it is psychologically inconceivable that a prophet with a message to his contemporaries such as Amos bore, should have so stultified himself and so nullified his own preaching, as to paint for hardened, mocking sinners whose judgment was impending, this rosy picture of peace and plenty through the favor of the very deity whom their conduct outraged and summoned to judgment. No! Every such element must go—away with it! Not only that ninth chapter of Amos, but every passage where Amos or Hosea or Micah is made to depict a future of bliss for Israel, must be an interpolation.

When, however, we reach Isaiah, we reach the genius who first devised a theory by which judgment could be tempered with mercy. In his new doctrine of "the remnant", Isaiah succeeded in conserving, as vigorously as his predecessors, the penal phase of Jehovah's appearing, yet added to it His gracious preservation of a limited portion of Israel, the "remnant" that "returns" unto Jehovah and forms the nucleus of the new Israel of a better day.

But again we discover, on closer examination, that "the bed is shorter than that a man can stretch himself on it".

This concession to Isaiah's genius proves insufficient for him to rescue by it all those glorious Messianic passages, which in the present constitution of his book look like the culmination of his eschatology. There is indeed no perfect unanimity among critics of this school in accepting or rejecting those verses in chapters vii, ix, and xi, where Messiah's salvation is celebrated in words that can never lose their power. Yet any divergence as to their genuineness is due simply to varying judgment upon the question, Can this passage, can that passage be deduced, on psychological principles, from Isaiah's premises, or can it not be? For those who answer the question in the negative there remains, of course, only the alternative of relegating the passage to a later writer, who lived after the exile had given to prophecy a new starting-point, viz., the comfort required by a nation already stricken to the uttermost by Jehovah's judgments. With this total reversal of the historical situation by the exile there could and did emerge that final efflorescence of Messianic prophecy, which constitutes one important side of Judaism, and which transmitted its theories to the apocalyptic literature and through this to the Christian Church.

This whole scheme has now, just as the last details of its application have been worked out by Nowack, Stade, Smend, Volz and others, received a blow that threatens to be a death-stroke. It comes from an unexpected quarter. Though there had not been wanting, since the first elaboration of the Wellhausen hypothesis, writers on the history of Israel's religion who opposed it strenuously, such as König, Robertson and Sellin, their arguments were discounted in advance because their angle of approach was held to be "apologetic" and therefore unworthy of serious consideration. In deference to their unanswerable logic it had indeed to be admitted, for example, that Amos was not an absolute innovator, that he had some predecessors who foreshadowed his doctrines, much as "the Reformers before the Reformation" foreshadowed the views of Luther, Zwingli and Calvin. But no serious impression was made on the lines

defended by the adherents of the hypothesis in general, and in particular upon the explanation of Israel's eschatology before the exile through psychological deduction from "ethical monotheism".

Whence then has the blow come to which I refer? I may answer in these well-chosen words of Professor Sellin: "It turned out that the help in this time of need came from a quarter from which we could scarcely have expected it: from Egypt, from Babylon, from the entire ancient orient. The old literatures there discovered and unlocked opened up entirely new perspectives, completely did away with the old points of view, gave us glimpses of an intellectual life, in which that of Palestine also shared even as early as the second millennium [B.C.], by which, too, that of Israel must be estimated, without which it can never be rightly understood. And this new surge has made a breach in the walls of that edifice apparently so firmly constructed, so that it is only a question of time now when in its place a new structure will arise."¹

Though many scholars have contributed a part in this new movement, we are now concerned particularly with those who have applied the results of archæology to the eschatology of Israel. Here I shall mention three names, as significant of what appear to be three stages in the process of application and rectification.

First, Professor Hermann Gunkel, in a series of books commencing with his *Creation and Chaos*, 1895,² has done the pioneer work, in showing how irreconcilable are the conceptions of the end of the world, paradise, "the old serpent", and other myths that Israel shared with the surrounding nations, with that scheme of eschatology which the current literature on the religion of Israel has been elaborating and defending.

Next to Gunkel stands Professor Hugo Gressmann, whose

¹ *ATliche Proph.*, p. 110.

² *Schöpfung und Chaos in Urzeit und Endzeit*. Von Hermann Gunkel. Göttingen, 1895.

work, 1905, on *The Source of the Eschatology of Israel and the Jews*³ was an exceedingly clever working-out of Gunkel's principles, applying them to the Old Testament with a clearness of logic that left the adherents of the older school of criticism without a leg to stand on. In the eight years that have elapsed since this work appeared it has found no one to answer it: at best a few voices have been lifted in criticism of this or that feature of Gressmann's positive construction. But if I mistake not, its lasting influence will rest in its negative attitude toward the older view, over against which it establishes, once and for all, the irrefutable thesis that the earliest writing prophets of Israel did not create Israel's eschatology, but adapted and used an eschatology that was prevalent in their nation from ages ago.

But around this central thesis of Gressmann there lie, in his book, several other theses, which are indeed in his own view as essential as this one to a correct history of eschatology among the Hebrews, but which in fact are not capable of demonstration, or are even demonstrably false. It is the honor of Professor Ernst Sellin to have discerned between the wheat and the chaff, pointed out in an engaging and convincing style the permanent worth of the former, and separated most of the latter which threatened to discredit the whole. Only last year, 1912, appeared Sellin's study entitled *The Age, Nature and Source of Old Testament Eschatology*.⁴ His method is simple. He divides the material into the eschatology of woe, the eschatology of weal, and the eschatology of a Saviour. In each division he first states Gressmann's view over against that of the scholars he was opposing, passes on next to buttress Gressmann's arguments with further considerations establishing the high

³ *Der Ursprung der israelitisch-jüdischen Eschatologie*. Von Hugo Gressmann. Göttingen, 1905. (Forschungen zur Religion und Literatur d. A. u. N. T. Band I, 6.)

⁴ *Der alttestamentliche Prophetismus. Drei Studien*. Von Ernst Sellin. Leipzig, 1912. The second of these three "studies" is the one referred to in the text, entitled *Alter, Wesen und Ursprung der alttestamentlichen Eschatologie*.

antiquity of these eschatological ideas in Israel, then exhibits the inadequacy of Gressmann's interpretation of the nature of those ideas—their essential character even in the popular Hebrew mind,—and ends by tracing their origin, not like Gressmann to ancient extra-Israelitish nature-myths, but to the unique experience of revelation and redemption given to the Hebrew nation at Mt. Sinai upon its deliverance from Egypt. If in the sequel we have any fault to find with Professor Sellin's book, it must be understood that in general it deserves only the warmest praise, and that wherein it errs it errs in not going far enough in the direction in which it does go.

In the remainder of the time allotted to me I shall endeavor to give succinctly a notion of the contents and origin of that body of expectations in Israel, which we group commonly under the title "eschatology", the doctrine of the last things. We shall adopt Sellin's convenient division of material.

I. The Eschatology of Woe.

When we collect and compare the various utterances of Old Testament writers upon a time of disaster that impends, we discover, first of all, that they may be roughly grouped according to the nature of the phenomena used to describe that time. These phenomena belong either (1) to the sphere of nature, or (2) to the sphere of history. I need not quote the familiar passages in psalm and prophecy that paint for us the impending earthquakes, storms, floods, fires, evil beasts, droughts or pestilences that threaten to annihilate puny and helpless man. And again the threats of coming woe through an invading army—the sword of man—are so pervasive as to require no special illustration. In the face of this obvious division into natural and historical disasters we are compelled to seek the unifying thought that underlies them all.

The school of Wellhausen finds this unity, as we have seen, by interpreting the historical disasters literally and the

natural disasters figuratively. Roughly speaking, the view is this: the prophets, stirred by Israel's need of penal retribution, discern in the political situation of their day—the advance of the Assyrian army, later of the Babylonians—Jehovah's method of punishment. He summons these resistless human forces to accomplish His purpose of final judgment upon His sinful people. No catastrophe of nature that came within the horizon of the prophets' experience was too terrible, none indeed was sufficiently cataclysmic, to serve as a figurative drapery or setting for that scene of Israel's doom.

Gressmann, on the other hand, discovers the underlying unity by taking the natural disasters literally and the historical disasters figuratively. Again, we are speaking only roughly. For it is time now to observe that Gressmann distinguishes three phases of Israel's eschatology: the mythical phase, the popular phase, and the prophetic phase. In general these may be said to be not merely logical phases, but also chronological stages. The cornerstone of Gressmann's edifice is this dictum: nature-myths never arise in historical times. In other words they arise only in primitive, mythopœic times, and all that we find in the literary period are the more or less mutilated ruins of the ancient myth-structures. In Israel long, long before the writing prophets the mythical stage had passed, and that floating eschatological material which the prophets found abroad among their contemporaries and made use of in their messages belonged to the second or popular phase of eschatology. It is of this phase that the remark above made is approximately true: the popular idea of evil to come was essentially the idea of a natural cataclysm, of some indeterminate sort, but universal, unescapable and final. The prophets then gave to this conception abroad in their day a new turn, by discerning in the Assyrian or the Babylonian, as the case might be, the actual means of introducing "the day of wrath, that awful day", and by lending the whole idea that highly ethicized significance which it exhibits in their writings.

Finally, Sellin has shown that the true unity of conception underlying this kaleidoscopic variety in depicting the future of woe, is to be found in something higher than either of the two groups of judgments and back of them both, in the conception, namely, of the sovereignty of Jehovah.

When sympathetically read, these Old Testament writers, from the earliest poetical fragments to the last of the prophets and psalmists, are seen to have deepest down in their minds the thought of their God as Israel's King. As King, He has all the functions of a king. He it is who fights their battles, both to annihilate their foes and to save themselves; and He it is who judges them according to the laws He has enacted for His realm. This is the ancient oriental idea of the king. In Israel we find this sovereignty of Jehovah—under a variety of titles and figures of speech—in literature that by all schools of criticism is accepted as among the earliest monuments of Israel's self-expression. Thus in Jacob's blessing He is the "Shepherd" of Israel. The Red Sea song closes with "Jehovah shall reign as King forever and ever". The Balaam-oracles sing of "Jehovah his God" as "with Israel", and "the shout of a King among them". The blessing of Moses reminded the tribes who recited it that "there was a King in Jeshurun", and that they were "a people saved by Jehovah, the Shield of thy help and the Sword of thy excellency". And the song of Deborah distributes, among the tribes, blessing or cursing according to whether they came or "came not to the help of Jehovah, to the help of Jehovah against the mighty".

Now the true significance of all the lurid details in those canvases of the prophets lies in this, according to Sellin: they are attempts to depict, now by one means, now by another, in the only language available to them, the language of their day and of their hearers, *Jehovah's vindication of His sovereignty in His "day"*. To call that "day of the LORD", so conspicuous in the prophets from Amos to Malachi, simply a "judgment-day", would hardly be doing full justice to the prophets' conception of it. To be sure, there are some

remarkable pictures of that day drawn on the general pattern of a judicial scene, such for example as Isaiah i, Psalm l, Hosea iv, Micah vi. But Gressmann is right in pointing out that the only judicial scene in Old Testament eschatology where the machinery of the court-room is consistently depicted is that in Daniel vii, where thrones are placed, the books are opened, and sentence is pronounced and executed. The true explanation is doubtless this, that no single figure is adequate in itself alone to convey the writer's conception of Jehovah's majesty, power, wrath and grace. It is His absolute supremacy "in that day" that overpowers the mind, renders all speech vain, and attains fitting expression only by the heaping up, or alternate selection, of all the various traits by which the divine Sovereign manifests Himself to His human subjects. Now it is a tempest from Him who "maketh winds His messengers, flames of fire His ministers" (Ps. civ), that breaks upon the head of His enemies, with the lightnings which mythopœic fancy regarded as the arrows or spear of the deity, and that sweeps them away with the flood that reproduces the deluge of ancient story. Now it is a parching wind from the desert, that ruins vegetation, dries up the bodily frame, produces wasting fever and pestilence, consumes the precious supply of water hoarded through the dry season, fans fires in the dessicated stubble, and sends the wild beasts forth in frenzy to tear or carries the armies of locusts to devour. Again it is the subterranean fires, that burst forth in sulphur or naphtha, to annihilate as with a flaming flood city and field, the whole face of the cultivated land, as when Jehovah of old "overthrew Sodom and Gomorrah". Or else He who ruleth alike "in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth" summons the hosts of Assyria or Babylon—but too well known!—or the storied squadrons of "the northerner" (Joel ii. 20), that mysterious "scourge of God", whose imaginary terrors seemed more fearful than the cruelties of any familiar foe. In any case it is *Jehovah's* army, *His* mighty arm, *His* glit-

most part the ethical qualities of the popular eschatology may have been,"—I quote Sellin—"it is impossible to deny it all ethical tone, for it was already acquainted with the thought of judgment. . . . And besides, the opposite of mythological is not ethical, but—historico-religious. And the popular eschatology of Israel ceased to be mythological the moment that all those mythical terrors were taken up out of their isolation, and combined into a complex of phenomena, ordained and directed by God, which were to accompany that great day of history when He Himself should come to set up His kingdom in all the earth; but this is as much as to say, from the moment that there existed an eschatology embodied in Israel's religion. . . . The origin of the entire eschatology of the Old Testament rests in the act of revelation at Sinai, whereby was implanted deep in the heart of the nation the seed of hope for a future similar appearance of Jehovah, for the purpose of assuming His unlimited sovereignty of the world."⁶

II. The Eschatology of Weal.

We have seen that according to the prevailing view of the present day the idea that mediates between the woe and the weal of the "day of Jehovah" is the idea of "the remnant", first conceived by Isaiah, and emphasized by the national experience of exile and partial restoration.

Gressmann is quite dissatisfied with this hypothesis. He attacks it from several different angles. For one thing, the notion of a remnant is misinterpreted by criticism, if it is supposed that it can mediate between a world-catastrophe and a restored paradise beyond. For, "the thought of a remnant", says Gressmann, "belongs essentially to the eschatology of woe. For one speaks naturally of a remnant or of the escaped only after some fearful catastrophe, that has annihilated everything *except a remnant*. . . . Those two or three berries left when the olives are gathered (Is. xxiv), the ten men left in the besieged city (Amos v), the 'two legs and part of an ear' of the lamb recovered by the shep-

⁶ Sellin, *op. cit.*, pp. 147 f.

herd from the lion's mouth (Amos iii) contain the idea of the remnant and use it to illustrate the greatness of the disaster. This is comprehensible. But in the eschatology of weal the remnant is only comprehensible as a 'technical term'. Are all the delightful and splendid things that are said of that time of weal to belong originally to a *remnant*? This would be like pouring two or three drops of oil upon the raging waves of ocean. The two facts do not harmonize. A remnant and an eschatology of weal are mutually exclusive."⁷

Gressmann proceeds to show how the prophets developed the idea of the remnant, so as to make of it a new people of Jehovah, who should enjoy the benefits of His reign. His remarks suffice at least to sustain his thesis that this idea of the remnant was evidently not the invention of the prophets, but one adopted by them from the prevalent conceptions of the people. He further proves the impossibility of Isaiah's having originated the idea, from Isaiah's having named his son *Shear-jashub*, "A-remnant-shall-return", without any explanation: "whoever heard it must have known at once what it meant." And this is confirmed by the very plain fact that Isaiah's predecessors had already used "remnant" as a "technical term"; so Amos, for example, in his fifth chapter, "the remnant of Joseph".

After this negative critique of the Wellhausen construction, Gressmann voices his own conviction that in the popular eschatology upon which the prophets thus drew, there was, properly speaking, no mediation between the two sides of the eschatological outlook. Weal and woe were both essential and primitive parts of the ancient myths that Israel inherited from prehistoric times, and, whatever mediation may have existed in that primitive conception—such a mediation, for example, as a universal resurrection after the world-catastrophe was overpast,—that link was forgotten by Israel, at any rate it was missing, and the two phases, the

⁷ Gressmann, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

dread and the hope of "that day" lived on side by side, undisturbed by any demands of logic or system.

When now we turn to Sellin, we find, as before, complete recognition, in the first place, of Gressmann's great service in exhibiting the weakness of the "psychological view" that he combats; in the second place, valuable contributions to Gressmann's arguments establishing the high antiquity of the notion in Israel of an eschatological salvation and bliss; but also, in the third place, a much needed criticism of the whole argument about the "remnant" and the mediation between destruction and salvation in the "day of the Lord". Let us examine this critique, and gather up its results.

For one thing, there existed in the language of ancient Israel a series of expressions, analogous to "remnant", that present the same phenomena of "technical terms", the edge of which has been dulled by long familiarity and use. Such is the phrase "to turn the captivity" (שוב שבות), which we find used, for instance, even of Job's restoration to health and prosperity, where there is no thought of a captivity, but only of a sudden, complete and lasting change of fortune.⁸ Such, too, are "hiding-place", "covert", and the like, as in Is. xxvi, where we read, "Come, my people, enter into thy chambers, and shut thy doors about thee (a touch reminiscent of the deluge-narrative, 'and Jehovah shut him in'); hide thyself for a little moment, until the indignation be overpast."

Again that idea of a resurrection of Jehovah's people is by no means uncommon or only late. In Hosea vi. 1-3 we apparently possess a passage that represents what was, not the prophetic, but the popular idea in the 8th century as to the manner in which Israel could participate in the joys that lay beyond Jehovah's judgments: "Jehovah hath torn, and He will heal us; He hath smitten, and He will bind us up. After two days He will revive us: on the third day He will raise us up, and we shall live before Him."


⁸ Job xlii. 10.

⁹ Cf. also Gilgamesh Epic, 11th tablet, col. ii, line 34.

But after all, the prevailing notion among the contemporaries of the prophets was clearly this, that while the future woe was for the other nations, the future bliss was for Israel. It is against this view that Amos thunders out his famous paradox (iii. 2): "You only have I known among all the families of the earth: therefore I will visit upon you all your iniquities." Unethical as the idea was in its practical effect, it was nevertheless based upon a very ancient and respectable theory of the moral superiority of Israel to the nations (*cf.*, *e.g.*, Tamar's "no such thing ought to be done in Israel" in 2 Sam. xiii. 12), though mixed with a perverted, heathenish conception of the covenant-relationship between Jehovah and Israel. But as the counterpart to the doctrine of Jehovah's use of the nations as a scourge for Israel's sins, there lived on in Israel from the pre-prophetic into the prophetic period the doctrine of Jehovah's use of Israel as a scourge for the nations. For example, in Mic. iv. 13 we read: "Arise and thresh, O daughter of Zion; for I will make thy horn iron, and I will make thy hoofs brass, and thou shalt beat in pieces many peoples."

Whoever, then, were to become the participants in this ultimate salvation and bliss, ancient Israel had no difficulty in discovering some such objects, coinciding now with a limited fragment of the nation, howsoever selected, now with all the nation, and now with an indefinite multitude who should, by attaching themselves to Israel through conquest or voluntary submission, become incorporated into the people whom Jehovah saves in His great "day".

Moreover, it is impossible to deny all ethical quality to this discrimination that Jehovah exercises on "that day", even in the popular estimation. It is true that the colors of paradise are used to paint the picture of this eschatology of weal, but it is the paradise of Israel's type, not the mere mythological paradise of the nations. That is to say, just as the paradise of the protoplasts was an ethical paradise, even in the oldest tradition into which divisive criticism distributes Genesis, so also the eschatological "paradise re-



gained" is to be characterized by ethical perfectness as well as by natural charm. After the sketch of that "age of gold" when "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid", and all the rest of that familiar idyllic picture in Isaiah xi, the prophet concludes thus: that "all the earth shall be full of the knowledge of Jehovah as the waters cover the sea"; and he gives this as his reason for predicting that "there shall be none to do evil or be corrupt in all my holy mountain".

The fundamental fault of Gressmann, here as before, lies in his failure to grasp the sovereign presence of Jehovah Himself as the central feature of that time of weal to which Israel looked forward. All of that transformation of nature, that covenanting with the beasts of the field, that slaying of leviathan, that limitless bounty of field and herd, of tree and stream, which combine to give at best but an inadequate expression to Israel's expectations of a "paradise regained",—all this has as the vital, pulsating heart of the system, the restored communion of man with God. He shall dwell among them, and Israel shall dwell safely. He shall teach them His *torah*, and judge righteously among them. He shall offer Himself in a new covenant of love to His people,—such is the burden of Hosea's love-song of Jehovah: "I will betroth thee unto Me forever; yea, I will betroth thee unto Me in righteousness, and in justice, and in lovingkindness, and in mercies. I will even betroth thee unto Me in faithfulness; and thou shalt know Jehovah" (Hos. ii). Such, too, is the climax of Zephaniah's song of salvation: "Jehovah thy God is in the midst of thee, a mighty one who will save; He will rejoice over thee with joy; He will be silent [so the margin] in His love; He will joy over thee with singing" (Zeph. iii).

It is the especial desert of Sellin to have shown in this connection, not only that this thought is the central, organizing thought in the eschatology of weal, but also that it is as old as Israel's literature, where the conception of Jehovah as the Saviour and Deliverer is associated, on the one hand,

with His universal kingship, and, on the other hand, with all the separate details of the eschatological hope.

III. The Eschatology of a Saviour.

This brings us very suitably to our final subject, the origin of the Messianic idea in Israel.

The idea of a Messiah, if limited strictly to the expectation of a future king, and explained solely on the "psychological" principles of the Wellhausian evolution-scheme, cannot have arisen before there was a king in Israel, that is, before David; nor even, apparently, before prophetism and kingship had reached their final breach with each other, that is to say, before Isaiah fell out with King Ahaz; nor even, to be quite accurate and logical, as Volz at last has shown, before the exile, with its complete overthrow of the Davidic dynasty. This progressive banishment of the Messianic expectation from the preëxilic literature of Israel is an excellent illustration of what our German cousins call *Systemzwang*,—the compulsory force of a theory, that drives on and on to a thorough-going readaptation of facts and materials to its remorseless logic.

For there are facts. And what are the facts? Not simply this, that the Davidic house is already typical, for psalmist and prophet, of the Coming King promised of that line, centuries before the exile; but also this, that such a personage, without the title "King" indeed, yet with all the attributes of sovereignty, is presupposed long before there was any king in Israel save the divine King. To say nothing, therefore, of the Messianic psalms (ii, xxi, xlv, lxxii, cx), which are simply inconceivable in the time of the Maccabees and can only belong to the old monarchical period, we have the "Shiloh" passage in Jacob's blessing, and the "scepter out of Israel" celebrated by Balaam's oracle, the context of both of which lends them not only a very early date of origin, but also a clearly eschatological setting. And among the various explanations of the "Immanuel"-child of Isaiah vii and Micah v, the most natural—to say the least—is that which sees in the allusive manner of both prophets,

especially in referring to "the virgin" or "her who travaileth", evidence that these prophets did not invent the features of this wonderful child, but took them over, as they took over the other features of their eschatology, from the accepted ideas of their day. It was in the use they made of these ideas that their individual contribution and advance lay.

What then shall we make of a figure such as this, alongside of that figure of the expected Jehovah, whose sovereignty was found by us to be the central fact in all Israel's expectations? What room is there for a Messianic King alongside of that divine King?

The marvel only grows when we discover divine attributes, divine titles, divine activities, associated with the Messiah-figure Himself? For illustration of what I mean I may cite Micah's words, "His goings forth are from of old, even from everlasting", Isaiah's ascriptions, "Mighty God, Everlasting Father", Zechariah's prediction, "His dominion shall be from sea to sea, and from the river unto the ends of the earth". Preëxistence, essential deity, universal rule. Yet, on the other hand, we cannot take refuge in the view that this is only Jehovah Himself under another guise. For Jehovah's relation to this person is clearly depicted as that of the One who will "raise Him up", or "set Him on His throne", or "bring Him forth", or supply the "strength" and majesty" in which He shall rule, or the "spirit" by which He shall judge.

Israel's divine King, and yet not Jehovah! *This*, in a nation of monotheists, and most uncompromisingly from the lips of Israel's most uncompromising monotheists! What does it mean? And why do the two expectations persist from age to age side by side: "He comes," that is, Jehovah cometh; "He comes," that is, Messiah cometh?

The only explanation of this riddle lies in a *wholly unpsychological origin* for this figure of Messiah. In this we can agree with Gunkel and Gressmann over against the prevalent criticism of the day. Where we cannot agree with them is in their positive statement of its origin,

namely, that this figure was derived from mythical material that wandered into Israel in early days without having any organic connection with Israel's religion.

The entire field of ancient oriental literature has been searched most diligently to discover traces of a coming Saviour-King among the nations. More has been read into the lavish praises and self-gratulations of Babylonian, Assyrian, Persian and Egyptian rulers than even the wildest flights of egotism or flattery could conceive. But we may safely assert, in the words of Professor Sellin (who uses spaced type to emphasize them), that "the ancient orient does not know the eschatological king". At most we may perhaps discern in the "court style" of these foreign scribes a certain analogy with what may have been the "court style" at the court of David and Solomon, of Jeroboam and Hezekiah, and may therefore have contributed elements of form to the language in which this eschatological king is celebrated. This is hypothesis, but it is not in itself improbable. Yet this deals only with form, not with substance. The substance of this Messianic doctrine, we must hold with Sellin, runs its roots back into "a tradition older than the revelation at Sinai, which was then, it is true, united most intimately with the fundamental eschatological thought (*i.e.*, that Jehovah shall be king 'in that day') that sprang up therefrom, and in the main became subordinate thereto, yet which also maintained persistently a certain independence".¹⁰

From this point, however, we must part company, in a measure, even with Professor Sellin. We do not feel, with him, that "in the moment that we begin to pursue this pre-Mosaic tradition, we are treading on the soil of hypothesis". We believe that the patriarchal period, as depicted for us in the book of Genesis, is firm historical ground. In passing from the principles of Wellhausen to those of Gressmann, Baentsch and others, criticism is just discovering that the elephant that bears up the world must have a tor-

¹⁰ Sellin, *op. cit.*, p. 175.

toise on which to stand. How long must it be before criticism awakes to the stupendous discovery that the tortoise, too, has probably something on which to stand? Just as back of Amos stands Moses, so also back of Moses stand Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, with whose God Jehovah at Sinai took pains to identify Himself; and to this family of Semites, immigrants to Canaan from the Mesopotamian lands, God had given a promise, world-wide in its outlook, gracious in its terms, unconditional in its pledge, that in their seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed. And back of Abraham, again, we believe that the same tradition of a purpose of salvation was associated with the line of Shem, in whose tents Jehovah should dwell, and that it finds its beginnings at the gate of "paradise lost", where "the seed of the woman" is to "bruise" the serpent's "head". In this chain of tradition we see, starting with the weal once possessed but forfeited, and renewed at each of those crises when Jehovah made fresh covenant with men of His choice, how the covenanted blessing of the future, the essence of the eschatological hope—or "comfort", as Lamech, the father of Noah, first calls it—how this covenanted blessing of the future attaches itself to a human "seed", until at length it is designated as of the "seed of David according to the flesh", and from that woman of "Bethlehem Ephratha", who "travaileth" in birth of Him "whose goings forth are from of old, from everlasting."

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

REVIEWS OF RECENT LITERATURE

PHILOSOPHICAL LITERATURE

The New Philosophy of Henri Bergson. By EDOUARD LE ROY. Translated from the French by Vincent Benson, M.A., Late Scholar of New College, Oxford. New York: Henry Holt and Company. London: Williams & Norgate. 1913. 8vo; pp. x, 235.

This work, though complete so far as it goes, "does not in any way claim to be a profound critical study". It aims simply to give an "introduction which will make it easier to read and understand Mr. Bergson's works, and serve as a preliminary guide to those who desire initiation in the new philosophy". That the original sets forth correctly the leading principles of Mr. Bergson and that Mr. Benson's translation represents the original as adequately as a translation can, we do not question. Indeed, the interpreter would seem to have caught Mr. Bergson's spirit and the translator to have reproduced the interpreter's brilliant style. And yet we cannot but doubt the utility of the book. Scholars will not need it and tyros will not understand it. Its defect is that its illustrations are often more difficult than what they would illustrate.

Princeton, N. J.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

APOLOGETICAL THEOLOGY

The Spiritual Interpretation of Nature. By JAMES Y. SIMPSON, D.Sc., F. R. S. E., Professor of Natural Science, New College, Edinburgh. New York and London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1912. 8vo; pp. xv, 383.

Dr. Simpson is the worthy successor of Henry Drummond, and the book under review might almost be described as the sequel to the latter's "Natural Law in the Spiritual World". It is this because it presents the opposite truth. Drummond would bring out the analogy of the spiritual world to the natural. Simpson would evince the conformity of the natural world to the spiritual. Both writers are pronounced evolutionists. If Drummond sought in the theory of evolution illustrations of Scripture doctrine, Simpson aims to show that evolution affords the true interpretation of Christianity. Both writers are far from being mere amateurs in science; but with Drummond science is the handmaid of religion, while it sometimes seems as if Simpson would have science give law to religion.

We congratulate the New College on her Chair of Natural Science and on her distinguished incumbents of it. The revelation of God in "the things that are made" ought to be studied much more than it is. Danger arises only when it is given the first or the chief place. Facts are facts, wherever we find them; but the Bible ought always to have the last word in our interpretation of them. This is because it is both the supernatural and the final revelation.

There is much in Dr. Simpson's book which makes it a marked publication. One of these features is its clear and often charming style. Another is its high scientific character. Its presentation of "the principles of biology", for example, is so thorough and so up-to-date as to be valuable even for the specialist in science and philosophy. The positions maintained, moreover, as well as the way in which they are maintained, are usually such as to call for the heartiest commendation. Chief among these are the following:

1. The insistence on the spirituality of life. "We know life," Dr. Simpson says, "only in association with matter, yet it is not matter" (p. 63).

2. The emphasis on individuality. "With regard to the realm of life even although all forms are of the same chemical constitution, yet it is not possible to imagine a summed mass even of invertebrate life. Still less can we think the term humanity in the same corporate way as we can think the term rock, for the former is composed of distinct individuals whose very life is a protest against fusion in any single mass" (p. 98).

3. Its searching and just estimate of Darwinism. "In fact, Darwinism is as Ptolemaism and needs the introduction of subsidiary cycles and epicycles to make the explanation cover all the facts. Which simply means that it is incomplete, if not positively faulty: the Copernicus of biology has not yet arisen" (p. 152).

4. Its recognition of the self-regarding and of the altruistic virtues as both essential to the ethical ideal. "The altruistic motto is, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor'. The individualistic motto is, 'Thou shalt love thyself'. The incomparable Christian motto is a choice blend of these two words, 'Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself'. Here we have law not merely rational but divine" (p. 165).

5. Its doctrine of the uniqueness and the originality of the soul. "Its constituents are largely, perhaps all, hereditary, but the particular collection—that cream that rises to the top out of them all, that extract or essence in itself—is not a hereditary thing. It is a unique creation; it is not a duplicate; it is a living soul" (p. 245).

6. The insistence on a "directive factor in evolution". "To what is due," he asks, "that particular heterogeneity, that definite arrangement of matter and energy, that at any stage contains implicit within it all that follows?" "This question," he adds, "Spencer never answers" (p. 259).

7. The emphatic denial that "evolution supplies its standard of morality in what actually survives as the result of natural selection". "This is to ignore much in the physical zone of the environment that

is unaffected by that factor. It is wholly to forget that the demands of the psychical zone have often led to the immediate physical extermination of those who yielded to them, but by that very circumstance the ideals in question gained a wider recognition and led to the survival of the race" (p. 329).

8. The affirmation of the possibility of miracles from the scientific standpoint and of their necessity from the moral one. "If the aversion to miracles is simply an expression of belief in a purely mechanical self-contained world, then the human spirit must hail them in defense of its own liberty. For if God be so bound by his laws that initiative is no longer his, much more are we. And if he cannot intervene in the physical realm, still less can he do so in the spiritual, for the two stand in close relationship. The miracle is the sign of the divine freedom" (p. 362).

While, however, because of all these and many other admirable features, it would not be easy to speak too highly of this uncommon book, there is also that, and some of it not unimportant, to which we must decidedly dissent.

1. We cannot agree with the position taken on mental evolution, that "in the light of the historical argument, within the records of the human race alone, the probability of such an evolution almost amounts to certainty" (p. 310). No less an authority in science than Alfred Russell Wallace, we remember, holds just the contrary. Nor is Dr. Simpson's claim to the unlimited time "mayhap 600,000 years of human development", that his theory demands undisputed. Lord Kelvin, Prof. Virchow, Prof. G. F. Wright, not to mention others eminent in physics and biology and geology are against him.

2. While endorsing his conception of evolution as continuous, we deprecate his unwillingness to admit divine intervention here and there in its continuous process. That there is "divine direction" throughout it, as he rightly insists; that there are even "increments" at critical points such as the origin of life, the dawning of consciousness, the birth of Christ (p. 131)—this is not enough to assert. The point is, Whence the increment? Does it bring to a head the elements implicit in the preceding process, or does it express an influx from outside and above the process? Was Christ only the greatest of the prophets, or was he not the "Son of man who came down from heaven"?

3. While, as has been said, we can scarcely commend too highly his insistence on God's power and right to intervene in and even to interfere with the order of nature, and while we heartily agree also that such interference on God's part will never be in any lawless way, we regret that Dr. Simpson has seen fit to qualify this by teaching that this interference will rather be "through the medium or superposition of laws other than those that are already open to our comprehension" (p. 135). This is to miss the point of the whole matter. Incomprehensibility is not the essence of the miracle. It is wonderful precisely because it is the result of the outputting in nature of God's own hand. It sometimes seems as if our author had lost sight of the distinction between providence and miracle.

4. There is the same oversight or confusion with regard to the Christian doctrine of sin. "So far as the doctrine of Original Sin," we are told, "is construed as a doctrine of Original Guilt—imputational in the Augustinian sense—it has been rejected by the developed Christian moral sense of to-day: indeed, it is a contradiction in terms. It belongs to a period in which the value of the individual was yet undeveloped" (p. 336). However, this doctrine forms a part of the Confession of faith of the great and glorious church in one of the divinity halls of which Dr. Simpson is an honored professor; it is the teaching of the Apostle Paul (Rom. v. 12, 15-19); and whether it does violence to the individual or not depends largely on its philosophical basis, on whether one adopts the Realistic or the Federal theory of imputation.

5. Even more erroneous appear to us to be the conclusions as to immortality. "The whole method of evolution," he thinks, "seems to point in the direction of the theological doctrine of Conditional Immortality." "It was Plato, not Jesus Christ, who taught that the soul is inherently immortal." "If we exclude the Platonic myth, there is no conception of immortality, in or out of Scripture, that is not in some vital sense conditional" (p. 373). From these and other statements, however, it appears that he mistakes the import of "the theological doctrine of Conditional Immortality". That doctrine represents eternal life as the gracious gift of God to those who meet the conditions of salvation. Dr. Simpson virtually agrees with Rev. Dr. S. D. McConnell in his theory that immortality is achieved and attained through our own efforts in the progress of moral evolution. So, too, he confuses salvation, or what the New Testament often calls "eternal life", with what Dr. McConnell speaks of as immortality. The former the Gospel always makes conditional on faith in Christ. The latter it never does. Our Lord Himself declared: "Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation" (John v. 28, 29). How could this be if the future existence, whether of the soul or of the body, were conditioned either on moral achievement or on the gift of grace?

6. He underestimates the significance of the destructive criticism of the Bible. He regards it as a matter of indifference, if only one be sincere, whether he holds the alleged authors of the Scriptures to have been the real authors. He fails to see that these questions touch the veracity and so the person of our Lord. If Christ was mistaken in His conception of the Old Testament, how can we trust Him in His proclamation of the Gospel? He viewed both as but different stages in the one way of life.

7. The distinction between the natural and the supernatural is altogether missed. They are not "different aspects of one reality" (p. 35). Though causally related, they are mutually exclusive. The supernatural is the Absolute or Uncaused. The natural, spiritual as well as physical, is the caused and relative. The supernatural would exist unchanged,

were there no natural; but there could not be a natural, were there not the supernatural.

8. Finally, our author's conception of the relation of truth to life, of theology to religion, is utterly wrong. He tells us that "the sense of dependent relationship that is involved in religion cannot be touched by any study of the intellectual account of religious experience usually termed theology. The personal attachment to Jesus Christ that is at the heart of any genuine Christian endeavor, whether individual or social, is unaffected by theories of his life and work" (p. 10). Could there be a sentiment more at variance with our Lord's words, "Ye shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free" (St. John viii. 32)?

The question has been asked whether Dr. Simpson's volume might not be used as a text-book. The reviewer's answer can readily be inferred. Not unless its standpoint and trend be changed radically. But beyond this, it would need simplification. Often, and specially in its ablest chapters, as those on *The Principles of Biology*, it is too technical for the tyro. In a word, those who can understand it would not need a text-book, and most of those who do need a text-book would miss the meaning of much of it.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Social Idealism and The Changing Theology. A Study of the Ethical Aspects of Christian Doctrine. The Nathaniel William Taylor Lectures for 1912. Delivered before the Yale Divinity School. By GERALD BIRNEY SMITH, Associate Professor of Christian Theology in the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. New York: The Macmillan Company. 1913. 8vo; pp. xxiii, 251. \$1.25 net.

"The purpose of these lectures is to show how and why the change from aristocratic to democratic ideals has taken place, and to indicate wherein an understanding of the significance of this ethical evolution may aid in the reconstruction of theology. It is hoped that when this is clearly apprehended by theologians and ministers, the reconstruction of religious belief may be more closely related to the great problems of social ethics now looming so large, and needing the help which a positive religious faith can supply."

In carrying out this purpose the author "first attempts to show how the exigencies of the Christian church during the first millennium of its existence made the adoption and the perfection of the authority ideal in theology a source of moral power". This ideal was "the inevitable result of facing the facts of a decadent world under the sway of an apocalyptic view of history". Such a condition and such a view could not but issue in pessimism; and "so long as men know their own relative inability to achieve for themselves the best things of life, the attitude of docile learning from authority is natural and ethical". The writer then "shows how during the past four or five centuries changes in our social and intellectual life have taken place

which have gradually brought into existence a new type of moral loyalty". Such changes are "the development of a secular theory of industry", "the secularization of politics", "the changed position of the church in a secular state", "the secularization of modern scholarship", "the rise of a secular ethics", and "the historical explanation of religion". Thus our author tries to show "that the Christian church, in so far as it retains the authority ideal, has lost its hold on large sections of modern life because of a failure to appreciate the real moral problems involved". "The moral challenge due to these facts is then stated." "Finally, the ethical aspects of the work of theological reconstruction are considered in the light of the preceding survey."

The discussion thus imperfectly outlined is careful, interesting, and instructive. It is instructive:

1. In that it reveals how far theology may depart from historic Christianity and still presume to call itself Christian and even to pose as defending "the faith which was once for all delivered unto the saints". Thus, John tells us that "many other signs truly did Jesus in the presence of his disciples, which are not written in this book: but these are written, that ye might believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God; and that believing ye might have life through his name" (John xx. 30, 31). Dr. Smith, however, refers approvingly to certain modern theologians "the actual content of whose theology and the actual structure of whose faith would not be seriously impaired if it should be found necessary to deny the historicity of the Biblical marvels—theologians who expound man's knowledge of God, his relation to God, his salvation through Christ, and his religious life, in terms which would require practically no changes in content if the possibility of miracle were denied outright" (p. 225). That is, Dr. Smith would defend and develop Christianity by setting aside its supernatural essence.

2. In calling attention to the prevalent misconception of the ethical and the supernatural as at least in contrast with one another, not to say as contradictory the one of the other. It is assumed throughout the volume, not only that true religion must be ethical, but also that it must cease to be ethical in proportion as it is supernatural. In so far as it presupposes "supernatural forces which lie out of man's reach", in so far as it depends on miracle, it must be non-ethical, if not unethical. Could there, however, be a greater or a more dangerous mistake? Does it not, in the last analysis, amount to this, that fallen man is held to be capable of making himself righteous instead of being, as Paul affirms him to be, "dead through trespasses and sins"? Scientific development is highly useful, but what if the subject to be developed be a corpse?

3. In the comparison which it draws and the contrast which it points between what it calls the assurance of content and the assurance of method, between the assurance which results from the agreement of our belief with "a guaranteed *content* of theology" and the assurance which comes from "a reliable *method* of ascertaining the

meaning of religion". The discussion at this point is glaringly faulty. It assumes, that these two methods are exclusive; that because one bases his assurance on what he takes to be an infallible since supernatural revelation, therefore, he has no use for scientific method in the interpretation or even in the validation of that revelation; and that because one grounds his confidence on the scientific method of his investigation, therefore, it is a matter of indifference whether what he investigates be conceived as the truth of God or the myth of man. The truth is that these two kinds of assurance are vitally related and mutually indispensable. The fact of a supernatural revelation demands the highest scholarship for its study, and scholarly methods are wasted when applied to the interpretation of fables.

4. In the light which it throws on the new ethics. This is "a science of relative values rather than an exposition of 'absolute truths'". Of course, there are certain abiding human traits and needs, as there are certain abiding conditions of human life; and these will continue to require certain fundamental moral principles. But the validity of such principles is referred to the needs of humanity in its present relations to the world and to society rather than to super-human sanctions" (p. 90). That is, what ought to be is determined by what man needs rather than what man needs is determined by what ought to be. In the last analysis, it is man and not God who makes law and so constitutes right. Could there be a worse case of putting the cart before the horse than this? Let us remember, then, that it is the only ethics to which pragmatism can give rise.

5. In emphasizing unintentionally and unconsciously, that on the basis of such an ethics no theology or reconstruction of theology can give the assurance and conviction to the modern view of life which the author feels that it lacks and which he recognizes as its most imperative need. It is not only in a decadent age that man needs an authority outside of himself. As Bacon said in his essay on Atheism, "man looks up to God as naturally as the dog does to his master"; and he can not look up to a God whom he has fashioned out of his own head or bow to a law which he has evolved out of his own necessities. Doubtless, we are confronted by a new moral situation; doubtless, many and novel social questions are pressing for solution; doubtless, the demand of the hour is that the new social order should be brought under the control of positive and Christian belief: but if this is to be done, it can be done only by a return to the religion and to the ethics of authority, to the Word of God, to the Scriptures which, because inspired by Him who is himself the law and who "knows the end from the beginning", are always and equally "profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness, that the man of God may be perfect, thoroughly furnished unto all good work". In a word, it is no reconstruction of theology, but a general and fearless reapplication of the theology of the ages which social idealism calls for.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

Our Own Religion in Ancient Persia. Being lectures delivered in Oxford, presenting the Zend Avesta as collated with the pre-Christian exilic Pharisaism, advancing the Persian question to the foremost position in our Biblical research. By LAWRENCE MILLS, Professor of Zend (Avesta) Philology in the University of Oxford, etc., published in the United States by the Open Court Publishing Company, 1913, pp. x, 193.

The title of this collection of lectures scarcely prepares us for the variety of their contents. A series of eleven lectures on various themes related to the Avesta, interrupted by supplements, recapitulations, interludes, and the like, issues in two lectures, as an appendix, whose titles "God contemplated as Almighty and Superpersonal—Defined from Universal Nature—He is not the World-soul" and "God as Almighty, Superpersonal and Illimitable, further defined from Universal Nature" indicate their character. The appendix, in turn, issues in a summary with an application. The first lecture, "Zarathushtra and the Bible", which is re-edited from the *Nineteenth Century Review* of 1894, and from the *Open Court* of 1909, and the second lecture, which contains "a continued recapitulation with expansions and fresh pointing", review the points of doctrinal similarity between the Zend Avesta and Judaism, both exilic and post-exilic, and conclude as follows: "The long prior religion of the Mazda-worshippers was supremely useful in giving point and body to many loose conceptions among the Jewish religious teachers, and doubtless also in introducing many good ideas which were entirely new, while as to the doctrines of immortality and resurrection within a restricted sphere the most important of all, it certainly assisted and confirmed, though it did not positively originate belief. But the greatest and by far the noblest service which it rendered was the quasi-origination and propagation of the doctrine that 'virtue is chiefly its own reward', even in the great religious reckoning, and 'vice its own punishment'."

Germantown, Pa.

HAROLD MCA. ROBINSON.

EXEGETICAL THEOLOGY

Die jüdischen Exulanten in Babylonien. Being Heft 10 of the *Beiträge zur Wissenschaft vom Alten Testamente*, edited by Rudolf Kittel. By ERICH KLAMROTH, Lic. Theol. Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs. 1912. Pp. 107. M. 2.80.

This monograph is an attempt to supply a deficiency to which the author calls attention on his first page in these words: "The Babylonian exile has never yet been made the object of a special investigation by a German scholar." The scope of the book may be best judged by the titles of its chapters: methods of exiling; Judah's deportations; journey to Babylon; treatment of the exiles; their social situation; God, nation and land; false prophets; religious parties; and worship of Jehovah. Its presuppositions throughout are those of scholars who follow the lead of Kuenen and Wellhausen. At the same time Klam-

roth shows a tendency to appeal for support to traditions so late and historically worthless, that in comparison with them the testimony of "the Chronicler", which this school rejects, is of the first importance.

For the early exile Ezekiel is naturally the chief source. For conditions at the end of the exile it is necessary to piece together a variety of hints, gathered here and there from historical, prophetic and even poetical books, and in this task free rein may be given to the imagination. The view entertained by some scholars, that at the Persian conquest there was an influential body of Jewish exiles, men of wealth and station, is totally rejected by our author, who interprets literally a number of allusions in Isaiah and the Psalter to prove a severe and general persecution of pious Jews just at this time.

It is of interest to note that such a work as this leads its author inevitably to the conclusion that the edict of Cyrus, as given in the opening verses of Ezra, though so generally rejected by historians of Judaism (e.g. even by Meyer), is actually in accordance with what the historical situation demands. Our author, after commenting on the supreme significance of rebuilding the temple as the constitutive moment of the Jews' return to Palestine, and on the analogy between this fact and the facts recorded on the Cyrus-cylinder, remarks: "We will not here enter upon the difficulties which the Cyrus-edict [Ezra i. 2-4] offers; it suffices to assert that only by such an edict, which commanded the restoration of the cultus at Jerusalem, could a Jewish nation be recognized as existing" (p. 62). And again Klamroth suggests (p. 81) that the "strange circumstance" that Cyrus' edict permitting the Jews' return is not mentioned in the cuneiform record, may be explained by the absence from their worship of any image or other sensible symbol of the deity's presence, such as the ark might have afforded if it had been preserved. "The king [Cyrus] when he visited the Babylonian temples must have decreed the restoration of the various idols there collected, together with the corresponding settlement of colonies of their worshippers; in this he overlooked the Jewish nation, because he was not reminded of the God of Israel by anything tangible save certain vessels." More and more will criticism be driven to the acceptance of the Cyrus-edict as genuine, not only in the fragment preserved in Ezra vi. 3-5, but also in the portion embodied, in a form at least substantially faithful to the original, in Ezra i. 2-4.

Lic. Klamroth has a theory concerning the successive deportations of Judah that claims serious consideration. He believes that in Jer. xxix. 2 the words "after that" are to be taken literally and point to a large deportation of Jews subsequent to that of 597 in which King Jeconiah (Jehoiachin) was carried captive. He distrusts some of the chronological notices scattered through the book of Ezekiel, which, he thinks, have been conformed to the theory that Ezekiel himself and the other "priests, prophets and people" mentioned in Jer. xxix. 2 were deported along with their king and his court. But the facts, according to our author, point to the lapse of two years between Jeconiah's and Ezekiel's removal to Babylon. Among other advantages this theory makes it possible to explain the "thirtieth year" of Ezek. i. 1

(= 595) by the era of Nabopolassar (625), instead of by the other more or less unsatisfactory explanations proposed such as the age of Ezekiel himself.

One substantial service that Klamroth has certainly rendered is to exhibit the improbability of that conception of the great deportation, which pictures the emigrants as selling their fields to their brethren who remained, and thus carrying with them into exile good round sums of money with which to make themselves comfortable there. The evidence shows that the poor who remained received the vacated properties gratuitously, and that the exiles themselves received their new fields, not for money, but freely from the government. Indeed the whole process of deportation was so designed by the Assyrians and their Chaldaean successors, that as many individuals as possible might become completely dependent upon the government for their very existence. How far, in course of time—half a century or so—the Jews, like other deported peoples, were able to lift themselves, in individual cases, out of this slough of misery and utter dependence into an enviable state of well-being, is another question. Analogy with all the later history of Judaism, down to the twentieth century, points to the probability that no pressure such as Kings Nebuchadnezzar or Nabonidus would exert, could succeed in keeping down the thrifty, ambitious, patriotic and yet adaptable Jew. Cf. also Jer. xxix. 5.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

Das Buch Qoheleth. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Saddusäismus. Kritisch untersucht, übersetzt und erklärt. By DR. LUDWIG LEVY, Rabbi in Brünn. Leipsic: J. C. Hinrichs'sche Buchhandlung. 1912. Pp. 152.

Another to be added to the growing list of commentaries of Ecclesiastes that defend its integrity. This author has only jest for Siegfried with his array of "Q's", the successive authors and glossators of this little book. Herein, we think, lies the chief significance of Dr. Levy's contribution just at this time, when all the critics are showing signs of reaction from the extreme divisive methods in vogue until lately.

There is nothing vague in this author's idea of the origin of Ecclesiastes. For the Geiger hypothesis of the "Sadducees" he has no use. The two pupils of Antigonus of Socho, Boëthus and Zadok, living and teaching at Jerusalem in the second half of the 3d century B.C., are the source to which must be traced the origin at once of Ecclesiastes and of the "Sadducees". One of the two must have written this book. He must have been born about 270 and died about 203. At the close of chapter vii and before writing chapter viii he had to flee from Jerusalem to Egypt—himself doubtless one of "them that had done right", that "went away from the holy place and were forgotten in the city" (viii. 10). His book was finished "only shortly before his death", in his old age, the weaknesses of which (ch. xii.) he had himself experienced.

This author acknowledges, nay, helps to demonstrate, with Schechter and others, the dependence of Ecclesiasticus upon Ecclesiastes. This furnishes him with his *terminus ad quem*, which he announces as B.C. 180. But it is open to serious question whether Ben Sira, writing rather B.C. 200-190 than as late as 180, and in Palestine, would quote in the way that he does, the language of a book just published in Egypt. This is a weakness in Levy's position. His other weakness is in disregarding the evidence that Qoheleth's ideas of life, often so surprisingly similar to those of the Greek schools of philosophy, may have had their starting-point, not in that philosophy, but in the reflections and maxims common to Oriental thought from the earliest days. Professor Barton, in his recent commentary, has pointed out the true sources of inspiration, through comparison with ancient Babylonian and Egyptian literature. And Professor Bois has, in our judgment, by his brilliant criticism of Tyler, Plumptre and Pfeiderer, justified his own claim to have shown "the impossibility of proving, in a satisfactory manner, the reality of a Greek influence felt by Qoheleth. If the author of Ecclesiastes felt the Greek influence, he certainly felt it too slightly for us to be able to recognize it positively, to put it beyond question, and to regard the assertion as a truth scientifically established."

Yet it is just this influence "by the atmosphere of the Greek popular philosophy", that Dr. Levy makes his *terminus a quo* in dating the book, which he therefore shuts up to a date later than 270. If due weight be given to the solid arguments, those from the language of the book, and its developed attitude towards the chief problems of the Chokhmah, and those from the use made of it by Ben Sira, then the view of Oehler and others will most commend itself, that it belongs not far from the latter half of the 5th century B.C.

Princeton.

J. OSCAR BOYD.

Die Selbstoffenbarung Jesu bei Mat. xi. 27 (Lk. x. 22). Eine kritisch-exegetische Untersuchung. VON DR. HEINRICH SCHUMACHER, (Sixth part of the Freiburger Theologische Studien, edited by Dr. G. Hoberg and Dr. G. Pfeilschifter, Freiburg im Breisgau: Herdersche Verlagshandlung. 1912. 8vo; pp. xvi, 225.

Our Lord's great declaration of His interrelation as Son with the Father in their mutual perfect knowledge of one another, recorded in Mat. xi. 27 and Lk. x. 22, has been thrown up into great prominence in recent discussion. Those who have been engaged in what has come to be known as "the quest of the historical Jesus", that is to say, in the effort to find behind the Christ of the Christian tradition a purely human Jesus, who knew and confessed Himself to be merely a man among men, are greatly scandalized by it. It is not merely found imbedded in the Synoptic rather than in the Johannean record—"a Johannean passage in the Synoptics"—but, being found in both Matthew and Luke, must be acknowledged to form part of the oldest and best attested tradition of the utterances of Jesus. Upon the principles of the current criticism of the Evangelical narrative themselves, it would

seem to be unquestionable that it was spoken by Jesus. And if it was spoken by Jesus, it certainly seems to bear very striking testimony to his possession of a more than human self-consciousness. It is not strange therefore that the "Liberal" critics employ every possible expedient to rid themselves of its pressure as part of the trustworthy historical tradition of Jesus. Some, accepting the facts, content themselves with declaring that the saying bears witness to a fanatical element in Jesus' consciousness which, though it may be deplored, need not prevent our admiration going out to Him otherwise. Others endeavor, in one way or another, to explain away the facts. Some of them attack the meaning of the declaration and endeavor to reduce it to a mere claim on Jesus' part to a certain high, perhaps unique, moral sympathy with God. Others attack rather its genuineness as a saying of Jesus, and endeavor to find some color of reason for denying it to Him, whether as a whole or at least in its fulness as recorded by the Evangelists. In the face of this general assault upon the declaration, in its genuineness, meaning and bearing, there is a place for a calm, thorough discussion of it in all its aspects, from a point of view free from antecedent unwillingness to accept it in its obvious significance; and Dr. Schumacher has undertaken and admirably carried through such a discussion in the volume now before us. Naturally it is the recent assaults on the passage by Alfred Loisy and Adolf Harnack, from closely related points of view but by means of different instruments of attack, which especially lie in the background of Dr. Schumacher's treatment; they govern in point of fact to some extent the outline of his discussion. But he has neglected no important line of argument, and, while making his treatise in essence a positive discussion of the declaration in question, has managed in its course to discuss in great detail every mode of assailing it which has been adventured.

Comprehensiveness, it will be seen, is the note of Dr. Schumacher's work; comprehensiveness and fulness of detail. Some hint of the completeness of his discussion may be given by indicating the formal disposition of his matter. He divides his material into six chapters. In the first of these he presents a history of the problem, including an indication of the position of the problem in the latest Biblical research. Then, in a comprehensive chapter of nearly a hundred pages' length, he discusses in great detail the textual question, with a view particularly to Harnack's treatment of it. The third chapter examines the historical connection of the passage and the significance of this connection for understanding it. The fourth chapter proceeds, then, to a thorough exegetical study of the passage itself, taking it up clause by clause, and discussing it in the light of the entire literature which it has called out (pp. 100-178). There remains only in the closing two chapters to compare the exegetical results obtained with other related passages in the Synoptics, and to defend them against the several attempts to interpret the Sonship here claimed by Jesus in a lower than metaphysical sense—whether as of merely theocratic, or of theocratic-ethical, or of theocratic-mystical nature, or as merely (as

Harnack contends) the expression of Jesus' priority to other men in the discovery of the Fatherhood of God.

The fulness of the discussion of the text is justified by the elaborateness and influence of its treatment in Harnack's *Sprüche und Reden Jesu* (1907). By neglecting the primary evidence and skilfully manipulating the indirect evidence derived from their (often very free and very partial) citation in the Fathers, Harnack succeeded in reducing, to his own satisfaction, the words of Jesus in Lk. x. 22 to this: "All things have been delivered to me by the Father, and no one has known the Father (*or*, who the Father is) except the Son and he to whom the Son may reveal [Him]." This being established as the Lucan report, Harnack then assumes ("this goes without saying", E. T. p. 293) that this was also the form in which the saying stood in the common source of Luke and Matthew, and therefore that this is the most original form of the saying that has come down to us. The main textual questions involved concern the substitution of the aorist "has known" (ἔγνω) for the present "knows" (γινώσκει), and the omission of the clause "the Son [*or* who the Son is] except the Father", which is mediated by the transposition of this clause and its fellow, "the Father [*or* who the Father is] except the Son". Harnack has no difficulty, of course, in adducing patristic quotations in which the aorist is found instead of the present; and equally no difficulty in adducing patristic quotations in which the order of the clauses is reversed. What is difficult is to make out a case for preferring these readings to their opposites. For not only is the entire direct evidence against them, which is in itself conclusive (even Norden, *Agnostos Theos*, 1913, p. 301, reminds us that "the philologist knows from experience that the manuscript transmission must be given a higher value than the indirect"), but the most explicit indirect evidence is equally against them. Irenaeus, while recognizing that a reading with the aorist and the inverted clauses was current and was exploited in heretical circles, expressly testifies (*Haer.* iv. 6. 1) that the Gospels themselves read as they still read in the manuscripts. Harnack's whole argument turns as on its hinge on the assumption that the heretics spoken of by Irenaeus, *Haer.* iv. 6. 1, are the Marcionites, that therefore it is the Gospel of Luke (for it was with Luke that Marcion operated) that is in question, and that it may be inferred therefore that Luke originally read the aorist and transposed the clauses. But it does not seem at all likely that Irenaeus was citing from a Marcionite account in *Haer.* iv. 6. 1,—he rather appears to have had as at *Haer.* i. 20. 3, the Marcosians in mind; the form of the text he cites is not Lucan but Matthaean; Tertullian (*Cont. Marc.* iv. 25, though the form of the citation here too is Matthaean) seems to imply that Marcion read as in the manuscript text; and in no case throughout the whole mass of patristic citations with the aorist, does the aorist appear in a citation which has the Lucan form, "who is the Father" (always the simple Matthaean "the Father"). Schumacher (p. 72) is thoroughly justified in concluding: "In the whole patristic

literature there can be pointed out no single witness which directly or indirectly gives occasion for even a conjecture in the sense of Harnack's view, that even only silently the aorist form is indicated as the original text of Luke. On the contrary a plurality of the most important authors of the earliest age make it clear (as is obvious from the evidence given above), that the original reading by Luke is *γινώσκει*". It is quite clear, indeed, that the reading *ἔγνω* which is so common in early patristic quotations is a variant of Matthew, not of Luke. And, we may add it is also clear that it finds its account merely in the freedom of quotation from memory which reigned among the Fathers and in the equivalence in sense of the gnomic aorist with the present. For that *ἔγνω* was taken by the Fathers who quoted the text with this form habitually in the gnomic sense (Schumacher, p. 78, cf. Chapman, *JThS.* x. 1909, p. 504) is indubitable. That, once having become current, it was exploited by heretics in a historic sense for their own purposes, and was occasionally understood from the same point of view of orthodox writers, is of no significance in the case. There is no reason therefore to seek an account of the currency of *ἔγνω* in citations from Matthew as Schumacher is inclined to do, by assuming that it is a variant rendering, along with *ἐπιγινώσκει* of the common "Hebrew" original in the primitive form of Matthew, which was written according to the testimony of Papias "in the Hebrew dialect". We need not follow Schumacher in his discussion of the other textual problems. Suffice it to say that under his full and careful marshalling of the facts Harnack's whole case breaks hopelessly down, and Schumacher can close the discussion justly with the declaration: "If there is any saying in the Gospels which we can esteem without hesitation a genuine, uncorrupted saying of Jesus, it is the acclamation of Mat. xi. 27, (Lk. x. 22)" (p. 100).

The exegetical discussion is as careful and minute as the textual. It is shown that Jesus employs the term "Son" in the theological sense, as designating Him in contradistinction to all creatures the Son of God by way of eminence, as, for example, we may see in Mk. xiii. 32. "As frequently as Jesus speaks of the 'Father' with reference to His hearers, He nevertheless emphasizes with striking and unmistakable care and constancy the distinction between *His* Father and *their* Father. Even Stevens finds it noteworthy that Jesus never places Himself on the same plane with other men when He speaks of God's Fatherhood or of man's sonship. It is therefore an erroneous contention when Jülicher maintains that 'over against God, He feels Himself one with all other men'. On the contrary we hear Him always speak only in the formulas, fixed once for all, of 'your Father', 'my Father'. He never recognizes Himself as of the same rank with His disciples, otherwise so lovingly received by Him, by uniting them with Him in the common address 'Our Father'. He never, as Stevens maintains with complete accuracy, brings Himself with others 'together in a single term as being in the same sense 'sons of God'" (p. 130). The nature of this uniqueness of Sonship

claimed for Himself by our Lord, Schumacher solidly argues, cannot be properly described otherwise than as metaphysical: Jesus proclaims Himself here as consubstantial with God and as therefore knowing Him as He is known by Him. The knowledge He has of God surpasses all creaturely knowledge: the depths of His being can be plumbed by none but a divine knowledge. As Cellini argues (as quoted, p. 141): "The knowledge with which the Son knows the Father must certainly be like that with which the Father knows the Son, since this twofold knowledge is expressed by the Evangelists in the same terms, with no intimation of a difference. But the knowledge which the Father has of the Son is a specifically divine knowledge. Therefore also the knowledge which the Son has of the Father is also a specifically divine knowledge." Indeed even Harnack allows that if the text be permitted to stand as it is found in our Gospels, recognition can with difficulty be escaped of the fact that we have here "a formal equality of the Father and Son, who are distinguished only by name, and a relation of the Father and Son which has never begun but remains ever the same" (p. 142). We need not go into the details of the exegesis, which would carry us further than would be proper to this brief notice. It must serve simply to say that no detail is neglected and that the conclusions reached are reached in the full light of the whole history of the exegesis of the passage.

The author himself in bringing his discussion to a close (p. 219) sums up for us the conclusions which he considers himself to have established. "The result of our investigation," he says, "is briefly as follows: The logion, Mat. xi. 27 (Lk. x. 22), is from the point of view of textual criticism incontestable in its Biblical wording; the secondary form *ἔγω* in Matthew is, as the gnomic aorist, indistinguishable from the present. With respect to its contents this saying of the Lord is the most profound, though mysterious, self-revelation of Jesus in the Synoptic Gospels: He is the 'Son', exalted above all creatures, interpenetrating the Divine Being, the physical Son of God, absolutely independent vehicle of revelation and mediation as God Himself ('and he to whomsoever the Son wishes to make revelation'), possessor of the divine nature and might from all eternity as *filius Dei proprius naturalis*, and sharer of the same in time as *filius Dei incarnatus* ('all things have been committed to me by my Father'). This conception of the content of the saying is not strange to the Synoptic gospels, but expresses their sublime background, which only comes forward in an especially striking and illuminating way in Mat. xi. 27 (Lk. x. 22)." We think it must be admitted that this summary of the results of the discussion fairly describes what has actually been attained by it.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

Auferstehungshoffnung und Pneumagedanke bei Paulus. Von LIC. KURT DEISSNER. Leipzig. 1912. A. Deichert'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung. Pp. iv, 157.

The idea has gained currency of late among expositors of Paulinism

that a development showing several distinct stages can be traced in the Apostle's eschatology and especially in his doctrine of the resurrection and the state after death. The propelling principle in this development is assumed to have been the Pneuma-conception. In the first stage of teaching, represented by 1 Thess., Paul did not yet possess his later peculiar Pneuma-conception or, if he possessed it, did not yet bring it to bear upon his idea of the resurrection. He here expects the raising of a body like unto the body that has died, not a body differently constituted or organized. During the second stage, reflected in 1 Cor., the Apostle gives the Pneuma its full influence upon the form assumed by his resurrection-belief. What is now expected is a body different from the present body, a body deriving its specific character from the Pneuma. Now, inasmuch as the Spirit is a present possession of believers, it is urged that from this point of view, according to which the resurrection is a pneumatic transaction, the result of the indwelling of the Spirit, there was no good reason for postponing the moment when the influence of the Spirit reaches the body and effects its transformation till the parousia. If nevertheless Paul in 1 Cor. makes this pneumatic resurrection coincide with the parousia, this is an inconsistency due to a failure on his part to give full effect to the changed point of view. But this inconsistency could not last. Between the writing of 1 Cor. and 2 Cor. Paul had learned to realize that from his present premises the endowment with the pneumatic body might be just as well put at death and thus an intervening period of nakedness between death and the parousia avoided. This third stage of development, we are told, appears definitely accomplished in 2 Cor. v. where the heavenly body is represented as coming immediately after the laying aside of the earthly body or even in the same moment, what is mortal being swallowed up of life, and where consequently the entrance into full fellowship with the Lord is not postponed, as in 1 Thess., till the parousia, but placed directly after the exit from this life. Some go farther than this, and find in certain passages the extreme view that the resurrection-body is under the influence of the indwelling Spirit already in process of formation underneath the physical body during the present life, so that what takes place hereafter would be strictly speaking not the receiving but only the revelation of the new body which had been up to that point hidden under its earthly envelope.

This view just sketched has with minor variations been advocated by such writers as Pfeiderer, Schmiedel, Teichmann, Sokolowski, Charles and others. Deissner's treatise is in its main intent a criticism, and we believe a successful criticism, of its central principle, viz., that the introduction of the Pneuma-conception has essentially modified the Apostle's view of the resurrection. The author shows how little basis there is for such an assumption. A careful exegesis reveals that on the one hand there is no reason to believe that the eschatological statements of 1 Thess. have any other background than the character-

istically Pauline doctrine of the Spirit, although, owing to the peculiar form which the perplexity of the Thessalonians in regard to the destiny of their dead had assumed, there was no special occasion for Paul to make this background stand out very strongly here. It also shows that on the other hand in 2 Cor. v. there is no real abandonment of the eschatological positions of 1 Thess., nay that on the contrary the phrases and statements in which the endowment with the new body at death is here found by the advocates of the development-view in reality refer to the being-clothed-upon at the moment of the parousia, the attainment of which Paul, in his strong desire to avoid "nakedness", here expresses himself as preferring to a previous death. In other words the Pneuma-conception is an integral element in the structure of Paul's doctrine of the resurrection from the outset and not introduced subsequently as a disrupting factor. All this is shown by a very painstaking and lucid exegesis of the main passages 1 Thess. iv., 1 Cor. xv., and 2 Cor. v. If this exegetical enquiry brings out virtually nothing that is new or original, it at least has the great merit of being conducted with special reference to the point at issue, and so enables the reader to weigh the evidence much more easily than would be possible through the study of the commentaries, where the question appears mixed up with a number of other problems. One distinctly gains the impression in following the author's reasoning, that the whole hypothesis of an eschatological development in the mind of Paul is chiefly due to the present vogue of finding evolution and complications and inconsistencies wherever possible. If the writers advocating this scheme were half as eager to discover and vindicate the unity and harmony of the Apostle's teaching on this fundamental subject from beginning to end, they could have made a far stronger case than they are now able to make for the opposite view. Deissner demonstrates how impregnable the old position, notwithstanding the exegetical difficulties of such passages as 1 Cor. xv and 2 Cor. v, actually is.

In regard to certain issues not directly involved in the main point under discussion, we are not sure that we are able to follow the author. Thus e.g., where he intimates a couple of times that the order of affairs which the Apostle expects to begin at the parousia is conceived by Paul as a kingdom on earth, although nothing distinctively chiliastic is predicated of it, so that we remain in doubt in regard to its precise nature, as also in 1 Cor. xv. we remain in doubt as to the precise chronological relation between the parousia and the delivery of the kingdom by Christ unto the Father. Too much, it seems to us, is staked in this matter on the one word *καταβήσεται* of 1 Thess. iv. 16. Nor can we agree with the author when, after rejecting the development assumed by the other writers in the main substance of his doctrine, he traces a development of his own in regard to a minor point between the standpoint of 1 Thess. and 1 Cor. on the one hand and 2 Cor. and Philipp. on the other hand. This development is held to consist in this that during the earlier period Paul conceived of the

intermediate state as a state of *κοιμᾶσθαι* "sleeping", whilst during the later period he connected the entrance upon full conscious fellowship with Christ immediately with death, so that in 2 Cor. v where at first the alternative: previous death or survival till the parousia evoked from Paul strong preference for the latter and strong aversion to the former, a few verses later under the realisation of this hope of immediate enjoyment of fellowship with Christ after death, the alternative just described lost for him its acute painful character, and he professes himself contented even in prospect of the less desirable of its two possibilities. We do not believe that the use of the word *κοιμᾶσθαι* in 1 Thess. and 1 Cor. is able to bear the weight of inference here put upon it. It must have been even in the time of Paul a purely metaphorical designation of the act of dying and the state of death, and the author has not in our opinion succeeded in proving that Paul necessarily associated with it the idea of unconsciousness. On the contrary, the same argument which he urges in favor of the view that the resurrection-idea stood already at the time of writing of 1 Thess. under the influence of the Pneuma-conception, seems to us to weigh equally much in favor of the view that at that time already Paul must have conceived of the state of death as a state of fellowship with Christ. If the resurrection is here virtually described as taking place *ἐν Χριστῷ*, the same is affirmed of the *κοιμᾶσθαι*. To be sure the author believes he can escape the force of this argument by observing that in 1 Cor. xv. 18 in *οἱ κοιμηθέντες ἐν Χριστῷ* the aorist tense is used, so that only the "dying" not the "being dead" is represented as taking place in Christ. But that is certainly a hairsplitting distinction and Deissner besides overlooks that in 1 Thess. iv. 16 the phrase *νεκροὶ ἐν Χριστῷ* does not allow of such a restriction to the moment of death. If then the fellowship with Christ covers the whole intermediate state, it becomes difficult to conceive of this as a state of unconsciousness and to differentiate it any longer from the state of fellowship looked forward as beginning with death in 2 Cor. v. and Phil. i.

It was perhaps not strictly germane to the author's purpose to give the Pauline conception of the Pneuma its larger eschatological setting. His theme brings it about that he could content himself with considering merely the functional operation of the Spirit in creating the prerequisite state of the resurrection. Still by losing sight of the larger aspect of the matter and not considering the Spirit as the element of the eschatological heavenly life in general and bringing into connection with this the special work of the Spirit concerning the raising of the body, the true perspective of the whole question is somewhat put out of focus and valuable light on it is shut off. The impression even is created, as if the resurrection of the body at the last day were not a specific act of the Pneuma, although this is not explicitly said in so many words. That the author does not quite steer clear of giving this impression is due to his legitimate desire to controvert the modern notion as if the resurrection-body could be in any sense the product

In the present discussion the author contents himself with ascertaining the facts of the usage without opening up the larger questions with which they are correlated. He approaches the subject from a historico-exegetical standpoint. The main interpretations thus far advocated pass in review. That of Holtzmann and Weiss, who with more or less consistency give to ἀλήθεια the specialized sense of "cognition of God" or "knowledge of God", that of Zahn and Wendt who think that, in dependence on the Old Testament idea of "Emeth", "veracity" should be regarded as the fundamental meaning, especially in Jno. i. 14, 17, the anti-speculative interpretation, which would give a practical import to the term making truth a matter of the heart rather than of the intellect, and in which such opposite spirits as Wellhausen and Schlatter coincide, the mystico-metaphysical view represented by Cremer and others, which places the center of the conception in the idea of "eternal reality and exclusive validity", and the comprehensive definition of Godet which attempts to combine the various meanings, are passed in review and successively criticized. The criticism revolves about the three questions, whether ἀλήθεια can be explained as meaning primarily "veracity", whether the conception has a speculative background, and whether its content is coëxtensive with the knowledge of God. As regards the first point Büchsel contends against Wendt and Zahn that the allusion to the Old Testament phrase *cheshed we-emeth* in χάρις καὶ ἀλήθεια in Jno. i. 14, 17, even if it be intended, is not decisive for determining the sense of ἀλήθεια. Nor can the Old Testament phrase "to do truth" or the analogy of τὴν δικαιοσύνην ποιεῖν prove for Jno. iii. 21 that ποιεῖν τὴν ἀλήθειαν must mean "to practise truthfulness". The meaning of Rev. xxi. 27; xxii. 15 points in the opposite direction, insofar as here in the phrase ποιεῖν ψεῦδος the word ψεῦδος cannot have the subjective meaning of "untruthful" but has the objective meaning of "untrue". The main, and in our opinion decisive, consideration is that in i. 14, 17 the ἀλήθεια which forms according to the context the object of the revealing activity of Christ in the largest sense, can not be confined to such a detailed concrete point as the veracity of God: the setting of the word here emphatically requires a broader and more comprehensive idea. It might have been added that the alleged peculiar, ethical conception of "the truth" which Wendt and others find in iii. 21 can only with difficulty be developed out of the Old Testament idea of emeth which means "faithfulness", "truthfulness" in particular and not the "morally right" in general. As to the third point in question, the restriction of ἀλήθεια specifically to the knowledge of God, we feel that here also the author makes a good case against Holtzmann and Weiss. At the same time he rightly recognizes the element of truth in the criticized view, for while ἀλήθεια has at times other content than the knowledge of God, Büchsel admits that in point of fact the cognition of God stands in the center of the idea and determines its practical importance for John. We are not so sure that we can follow the writer in his criticism of the so-called metaphysical view, that

strongly in places of the peculiarities of Schlatter. It should be added, however, that it also shares with the latter the merit of intense suggestiveness, even for one who is unable to understand it fully or adopt all its conclusions.

Princeton.

GERHARDUS VOS.

The New Testament Documents. Their Origin and Early History. By GEORGE MILLIGAN, D.D., Professor of Divinity and Biblical Criticism in the University of Glasgow. With twelve facsimiles. Macmillan and Co., Limited, St. Martin's Street, London. 1913. Pp. xvii, 322.

In the Croall Lectures for 1911, which are printed in the volume now under review, Professor Milligan discusses in a popular way a number of subjects concerning which he is peculiarly well qualified to speak. His instructive and entertaining discussions of the language of the New Testament and of the literary character and early circulation of the New Testament books have been prepared for by years of painstaking investigation not only of the New Testament books themselves but particularly of the new materials for study which are being afforded by the non-literary papyri. But by Professor Milligan the new materials are employed with a moderation which is signally lacking in the works of such a scholar as Deissmann. In his enthusiasm for the papyri Deissmann is far too much inclined to lose sight of the Semitic element in the language of the New Testament, and to place the New Testament writings one-sidedly in the category of non-literary documents and private letters. In both particulars Professor Milligan registers a wholesome protest. The Semitic element receives due emphasis. And the Pauline epistles, according to Professor Milligan, are not to be compared one-sidedly with the careless letters of every-day life. "The letters of St. Paul may not be epistles, if by that we are to understand literary compositions written without any thought of a particular body of readers. At the same time, in view of the tone of authority adopted by their author, and the general principles with which they deal, they are equally far removed from the unstudied expression of personal feeling, which we associate with the idea of a true letter. And if we are to describe them as letters at all, it is well to define the term still further by the addition of some such distinguishing epithet as 'missionary' or 'pastoral'. It is not merely St. Paul the man, but St. Paul the spiritual teacher and guide who speaks in them throughout" (p. 95). Such a judicious use of the new materials serves only to render all the more evident their real value for the study of the New Testament.

With regard to authorship and date of the New Testament books Professor Milligan expresses himself in a number of instances only with caution. The Second Epistle of Peter he believes to be a pseudonymous work. Argument with regard to such questions and criticism of the author's views with regard to the New Testament canon would exceed the limits of the present review. The fourteen

notes at the end of the volume bring together in convenient form materials for study of various topics, and illuminating discussions. Particularly interesting is the note on dictation and shorthand in antiquity.
Princeton. J. GRESHAM MACHEN.

The Apocalypse of Jesus. Being a step in the search for the historical Christ. By F. W. WORSLEY, M.A., B.D. (Durh.) University College, Durham, and Clare College, Cambridge. London, J. & J. Bennett Ltd. The Century Press. 7/6 net.

The Apocalypse of Jesus, as the title suggests, is a product of the Apocalyptic School of Biblical Criticism. Declaring himself in accord with the results of critical scholarship Worsley sets himself to the task of reading the life of Jesus in the light of the "established" facts of that scholarship. Worsley belongs to the extreme right wing of the Critical School and his work judged from that standpoint is, it must be allowed, largely constructive in character.

The author divides his material into two books. Book I, which he calls *The Facts*, treats of the following: Introductory, The Preconditions, The Kingdom of God, The Son of Man, The Apocalyptic Element in Q, The Eschatology of Jesus, The Parables. Book II, *Results*, contains five chapters treating respectively of The Historicity of Mark, The Messianic Beliefs of Jesus, The Self-Revelation of Jesus, The Reception of the Revelation, and Jesus or Christ. The division into *The Facts* and *Results* is, as a reading of the book shows, rather formal and arbitrary. Chap. I, Introductory, is not particularly well placed among *The Facts*, and *The Messianic Beliefs*, e. g., might almost as properly as *The Eschatology of Jesus* have been grouped under *The Facts*. The Historicity of Mk. is treated in Book II, but is not a result or deduction from facts previously established, nor is it so treated. The same is true to a larger or smaller extent of some of the other chapters of Book II.

In the Introductory Chapter Worsley voices a protest against the Ultra-Eschatological School of Schweitzer and the Liberal Protestantism of Wrede and others. He then goes on to define his own position. His argument is in brief that Jesus, employing the language and method of Apocalyptic Literature, came to correct the misrepresentation of the Law and the erroneous conceptions of Messiah and the Kingdom as expressed in that literature, and to bring to fulfilment in his life the higher hopes of all Israel. His life thus becomes "a new Apocalypse in action". While the Apocalyptic Literature was largely eschatological, Jesus' "New Apocalypse" is eschatological only to a very small extent (*cf. et. p. 130*). We are warned not to take Apocalyptic as synonymous with eschatological. In Chap. II, Worsley takes up the Preconditions necessary to the study of the question, viz., a working knowledge of N. T. Criticism and of contemporary Apocalyptic Literature. We are then made acquainted with the commonly accepted views as to the Markan Grundschrift and with some of the Apocalyptic conceptions current in the time of Jesus. In a characteristic statement (*cf.*

et. 199) Worsley claims that Jesus, during the days of his retirement in preparation for his ministry, was studying Apocalyptic Literature with the same enthusiasm as the Law and the Prophets—a contention hard to believe and equally hard to prove. This statement of Worsley's deserves to be noticed, since also elsewhere we meet with similarly characteristic utterances. E.g. p. 54 we read: "Those, who do not adopt the church's method here, will no doubt pass through similar spiritual experiences hereafter if they are to pass into the Kingdom." The main contention of the book is stated to be that "it was the Apocalyptic Literature which was responsible for much that He said or rather . . . for the way in which He said much that is recorded".

Worsley regards (Chap. III, The Kingdom of God) Matthew as "not consistent in his translation of the Aramaic phrase", *Malkuthâ dish-mayâ*. Wherever Matthew's Q has *τῶν οὐρανῶν* (*τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*), it has been "wilfully changed" from *τοῦ θεοῦ* "unless (p. 58) we are to make the further assumption, which is not warranted, that the recension used by St. Luke was one in which the change to *τοῦ θεοῦ* had been already made". Matthew labours under a misconception in that he takes the phrase in "a purely eschatological sense". Worsley claims that when Jesus "first came, teaching and preaching the Kingdom of God, his ideas on the subject were largely governed by the prevailing notions" of the people (which notions of course were erroneous), and that "Jesus at the outset did *not* know the relation in which He himself was to stand to the Kingdom". This latter statement is directed against Professor Orr, and finds its explanation in Worsley's development-idea which plays such an important role here and throughout the entire book and prejudices so much of the author's thought.

Commenting on the Lukan passage: *ἰδοὺ γὰρ, ἡ βασιλεία τοῦ θεοῦ ἐντὸς ὑμῶν ἐστίν* (p. 50) Worsley remarks, "It seems better to take *ἐντὸς ὑμῶν* with Weiss, Hahn, as 'in your midst'", and a little later we find him contradicting himself in the following: "So here the intention evidently is to make clear to the Pharisees that the Kingdom is 'within them' in the sense that the word is sown in their hearts, etc."

In his discussion of the title, "The Son of Man", the author declares himself in sympathy with the views of Baldensperger and Charles. To determine whether Jesus ever used the title Worsley takes up the various passages where the title appears, showing rather convincingly that it is authentic. He also argues (against Schmidt and others) that the title cannot be rendered by "man". Matthew, Worsley contends, colored the use of the title with strong and pronounced eschatological ideas. Prior to Peter's confession it had no such force. It implied a "claim to special authority", "preëminent importance among men", "sympathy with the race", etc. After the confession the note of authority is overshadowed and superseded by the notion of suffering. It is a characteristic of the title that it remains applicable to the newer circumstances as they develop in the life of Jesus. In the coming-judgment passages there is a return to the meaning of authority in the title. Jesus chose the title since it was "surrounded by a halo of

mystery", and did not in any way suggest a distinctive claim to Messiahship. For Jesus Himself the title was Messianic from the beginning. In this chapter, also, the development-idea is constantly in the forefront. The development in Jesus' conception of the Kingdom brought with it a development in the conception of the title.

Worsley believes (Chap. V, The Apocalyptic Element of Q) with Resch that Q dealt in some degree with the Passion and recorded some post-resurrection sayings. He makes a study of Q particularly with a view to discover in how far it bears out the tendency on the part of Jesus to express His meaning in current Apocalyptic phraseology. Worsley quotes a large number of passages from Apoc. Lit. as parallels to Q. His general position is that Jesus' treatment of Apoc. Lit. is on a par with His treatment of the Old Testament. Throughout this chapter the author seems to be largely dependent for his parallels on Allen (commentary on Matthew), with whose views also in matters of Biblical Criticism his own are strikingly similar. Matthew here as in Chap. III, receives a good deal of rebuke and criticism. He is constantly reading an eschatological sense into Q and is credited with a large number of editorial additions. Had Matthew's Gospel afforded the *Grundschrift*, Schweitzer's view would have been held all along.

In "The Eschatology of Jesus" Worsley argues for the authenticity of the Eschatological discourse Mk. xiii, parallels. Mark, Matthew, and Luke all give evidence that three different sources existed which contained essentially the same eschatological teaching. As to the application of the parable of the fig tree the Synoptists have gained a wrong impression. Luke's phrase, "the Kingdom of God" is more authentic than "these things" of Matthew and Mark. Matthew was ignorant of Luke's phrase, or else he would have changed it into "the Kingdom of Heaven". According to Worsley reserve and "nothing-very-definite" characterizes Jesus' teachings on death, the intermediate state, and the Parousia. The fault lies with the reporters, who construed what Jesus said as being in accordance with current apocalyptic teaching, or embroidered or wilfully misrepresented Jesus' words. However, a considerable residuum remains to Worsley to enable him on the basis of this to declare himself in accord with the eschatology of Jesus as given in the Creeds.

In "The Parables" ("the parables display more than any thing else the apocalyptic character of Jesus' teaching") Worsley combats the views of Jülicher-Schmiedel on the one hand and those of Schweitzer on the other. In the parable of the sower Jesus has just abandoned the thought of an earthly kingdom. The logion "To you it is given to know the mystery of the Kingdom" Worsley argues against Jülicher is genuine and is applicable to several other parables, Jesus' teaching in the kingdom-parables being esoteric. Against Schweitzer, the parable is not eschatological. The "good ground" is "the major part of the field",—a doubtful interpretation. The "word" means more than the preaching of the kingdom; "it is the kingdom itself."! Mark's parable of the seed growing secretly is not borrowed by Matthew because of the

latter's eschatological tendency. Jesus is as guarded in his eschatological teaching in the parables as he is elsewhere. Worsley recognizes four groups of parables according to their general import. They almost always illustrate the nature and work of the kingdom. In the use of the parables we see a process analogous to that evidenced by the use of the title, The Son of Man.

The heading The Historicity of Mark (Chap. I of Bk. II, Results) should have read The Historicity of St. Mark. The author chooses to draw a distinction between Mark and St. Mark, assigning the Grundschrift to the latter, and it is of the Grundschrift that he treats in this chapter. Worsley's discussion of the historicity of St. Mark is largely determined by the "thoroughgoing" attacks of Wrede and Schweitzer. The absence of "Tendenz" in St. Mark, he argues, speaks rather for its historicity. Matthew is guilty of embroidering and coloring the facts, St. Mark is content to be a reporter. Worsley takes up in succession the different parts of St. Mark with a view to showing their historical trustworthiness. The healing of St. Peter's mother-in-law is an historical fact being vouched for by Peter himself. If this miracle is historical, other miracles are likely to be historical. St. Mark's chronology is reliable because the other two evangelists follow his outline. The effects of Jesus' teaching (Mk. iii) on his relatives and on the Pharisees bear the impress of verisimilitude. For Jesus not putting forth any Messianic claims thereby incurred the hatred of his relatives who in turn came to regard him as an imposter. For the Pharisees Jesus' whole method was far too reactionary. In this manner Worsley takes up the entire Gospel of St. Mark. One chief purpose Worsley keeps continually in view, viz., to show that the events reported set before us each time the requisite preconditions for the development of the situation. Worsley repeatedly insists that, though it may not be categorically stated or definitely traced by Mark, there is a development in the consciousness of Jesus. This is apparently meant against Schweitzer, though in the passage from Schweitzer referred to the contention made is that Mark knows nothing of any development in Jesus, which is of course a very different thing. On the whole, it must be admitted, Worsley makes out a strong case for the historicity of Mark. A gratuitous assumption it is to say that "nebulous conceptions" preceded "the awakening of His consciousness". Untenable the view p. 197 that "it is possible that John is the subject of *ἐδεν* in Mk. i. 10, as Matthew suggests".

Worsley represents Jesus (Messianic Beliefs, Chap. ii) as beginning his ministry with the belief that an end of the present state of things is at hand. The expression is somewhat indefinite but as a later utterance shows (p. 244, "There can be no doubt that Jesus at one time expected the establishment of the kingdom in its fulness during his lifetime.") it evidently implies that Jesus at the outset entertained a mistaken view as to the kingdom. It has already been intimated that the development-idea is an all-controlling one in Worsley's version of the life of Jesus. In his study of the Messianic Beliefs this idea asserts

itself in all its vigor. Worsley finds it necessary to date much later large portions of Matthew, e.g., the Sermon on the Mount, because of their developed conceptions. As to the terms, "The Holy one of God" Mk. i. 24, "The Son of God" Mk. iii. 11, etc., Jesus cannot, very naturally, be sure of their meaning at the time they were uttered. On the other hand as indicative of *growth* in Jesus' God-consciousness we find adduced the following: "He spake with authority and not as the scribes", and "I say unto you". Worsley takes up the entire Markan record to point out the successive stages in the development of the Messianic consciousness of Jesus. The Baptism convinces Jesus of his messiahship. The assumption of the title, The Son of Man ("The title was begotten of his half-developed consciousness") is with the purpose of compromise, since his ideas are in a state of conflict between the militant Messiah of the Psalms of Solomon and the Son of Man of Enoch. The determining factor in the whole process of development of Jesus' messianic beliefs is the opposition of the religious rulers. In Mk. i-ii we see Jesus conscious of holding a unique position, in Mk. iii closely identifying himself with God the Father and God the Holy Ghost, in Mk. iv realizing that the aims and the essence of the kingdom are purely spiritual and in consequence his views as to his own part assuming a more definite shape. The incident of the healing of the Syrophenician woman indicates that Jesus does not yet conceive of the Gentiles as entering into the kingdom save through the portals of Judaism. The central point in the process of development of the messianic beliefs is the confession of Peter. Jesus here has arrived at a full consciousness as to his person and office. The future of the kingdom is a vast spiritual reality and for the accomplishment of this his death and resurrection are essential, etc. Worsley asserts that the principal development in the messianic beliefs is to be found in the eschatological teaching of the last few days, but can hardly be said to succeed in indicating a progress in that development after the incident at Caesarea Philippi.

Worsley opens his chapter on The Self-revelation of Jesus with the significant sentence, "If Jesus was not conscious until the events at Caesarea Philippi of the great sacrificial part that he was called upon to play, it is obvious that he could not have revealed as much to the disciples or to anybody else." The same thought occurs in a clearer form, p. 261: "Up to the moment of St. Peter's confession there is no conscious self-revelation of Jesus at all." The truth of the introductory sentence, provided its premise is granted, is of course self-evident. But it is hardly necessary to say that it cannot be regarded as scientific to approach the study of the self-revelation with the foregone conclusion as is the above one. It will then as a matter of course follow that the assumption of the title, "The Son of Man", cannot mean "a revealing of a claim as yet to Messiahship" but must be "simply the assertion of a personal mission among men". In the Parable of the Sower and the parables that immediately follow we will then not find any "definite statement of messiahship", "because He himself is not certain". Of

the Sign of Jonah the three days and nights which Jesus was to spend in the tomb may then very naturally be "due to the Editor of the Gospel, as such a thought never occurred to Jesus at this period."! From the moment of Peter's confession, as the introductory statement anticipated, Jesus' real self-revelation begins. The whole outlook as to the revelation to the world has here undergone a complete change. The newer aspect "is wonderfully shown in the eschatological passage". The above is the conclusion reached from St. Mark, and Q is substantially in accord with it. The importance of John's Gospel is that it gives us the self-revelation which was vouchsafed by Jesus to the disciples on the eve of his death.

In the Synoptists there is according to Worsley (Chap. IV, *The Reception of the Revelation*), no attempt discernible to portray the results produced in the minds of men by the teaching of Jesus. Though the disciples started out with the conviction that Jesus was Messiah, "this does not seem to have been the case with regard to the people in general". This contention of Worsley's is based on the following doubtful assumptions: first, that in all that the Baptist said there was "only so much as might lead them to suppose that a greater prophet was to come"; second, that Jesus made no definite statement concerning his messiahship to the people. Worsley is hereby obliged to question the genuineness of certain messianic utterances of Jesus as e.g. in the episode of the Samaritan woman. And the Baptist's words, John iii. 28, "I am not the Christ, but am sent before him" are declared to be "not a public announcement, for those who thus questioned were but a handful". As touching the disciples they were as hidebound by tradition as were the people and not ready to listen to any teaching that Jesus gave them and to accept his own explanation of it. When Jesus did not carry out the sort of campaign as tradition had mapped out, their enthusiasm received a check. In Peter's cry "Lord to whom shall we go" Worsley finds a note akin to desperation. In *ἀληθῶς θεοῦ υἱὸς ἐστίν* Worsley attaches too much importance to the anarthrous *υἱὸς* regarding it to be a holding back of the full declaration and as eloquent of the mixed feelings of the perplexed men.

The closing chapter, Jesus or Christ, takes up the question of the "historical" Jesus, the Virgin-birth, the resurrection, and the ascension. Theories as those of Drews are deservedly dismissed without serious discussion. On insufficient evidence, viz., silence as to the Virgin-birth on the part of Peter in his preaching to Cornelius and of Paul at Pisidian Antioch, Worsley contends that "the Apostles at this time were ignorant of the supernatural birth and supposed that Jesus was the son of Joseph". It was very likely not until after the resurrection that they came to know the truth. On the other hand Paul's christology, Worsley believes, is incompatible with ignorance as to the Virgin-birth. The various theories of the resurrection Worsley shows to be unsatisfactory. The great objection to them is the fact of the empty tomb. The train of the disciples' thought during the great forty days, the events of Pentecost, the rise of, or reason for the doctrine of exaltation, the

spread of the infant church in the face of opposition, etc.,—these are all facts that cannot be explained by any other cause than the resurrection and ascension.

Corrigenda occur p. 47 ἐφθάσεν, p. 49 παρουσία, p. 50 ἔρουσιν, ἰδου, p. 52 μείζων, kindom, τῇν. p. 53 δὲ τις, l. 25 may (defendum), p. 55 τοιάντων, τῇν, p. 56 ἐκείνου, δεῖν, λυεῖν, p. 64 Die (should be De), Eerdmanns (et p. 65), p. 70 jüdische Apocaliptik, p. 89 וְלִמְשָׁעִים, p. 94 הַנְּבוֹרָה, p. 95 גְּבוּרָה, p. 105 ζωῆς μου, πάτερα, p. 112 synoptischen (l. 6), p. 116 ἄλλας, ἵνα, ἀπ' αὐτήν, p. 117 μακαρίος, ᾠψα (bis), p. 118 χορτασθήσονται, p. 119 (last line) 43 (should be 44), p. 120 Father of God, ζωῆς μου, p. 124 (l. 13) recession, p. 125 reminder, p. 132 utter (should be uttered), p. 156 (l. 5) seem, p. 182 altjudische, 194 δαιμονίον, p. 237 (l. 1) abrogating, 248 (l. 28) reference, p. 256 (line 5 from below) And, p. 258 (l. 20) he, p. 270 (l. 10) no, p. 275 בַּר, p. 302 εἰ, p. 308 כִּי, p. 312 Geschichte, p. 320 B. W. Warfield (B. B. W.), p. 324 (l. 13) writes, p. 327 (l. 1) pace, p. 340 principle (l. 19 was, p. 362 Warfield, B. W. (B. B.)).

Knox College, Galesburg, Ill.

RALPH JANSSEN.

HISTORICAL THEOLOGY

Theologischer Jahresbericht. Dreissigster Band 1910 . . . herausgegeben von PROF. DR. G. KRUEGER und PROF. DR. M. SCHIAN in Giessen. Des ganzen Bandes IV. Abteilung. (Zweite Lieferung). *Kirchengeschichte.* Leipzig: M. Heinsius Nachfolger; New York, G. E. Stechert & Co. 1913. Pp. 321-592. Price 11 m.

The first part of this division of the *Jahresbericht* was noted in the immediately preceding number of this magazine. It was there stated also that the editors expected to publish the second and last part within a short time. This they have not been able to do on account of not receiving the manuscript for the literature of the eighteenth century, so rather than wait longer they have now published a second part, and promise the third and last before long. The volume before us, for it is quite large enough to be dignified by the name, contains the literature of the periods falling between 1648 and 1800, and between 1900 and 1910, with continuous paging, so that the chronological sequence has been sacrificed.

With regard to the contents, we need only note that the editors are Professors Zscharnack and Schian, and that they have performed their work with the excellence characteristic of the *Jahresbericht*. Not so much can be said of the responsible proof-readers, for the English names and titles are frequently misspelled. In glancing through the pages we could not but notice the comparative lack of interest in the history of Theology in the modern churches. Practical and experiential Christianity receives much attention; so does the Roman Catholic Church; and it is doubtless indicative of the growth of the free

churches on the continent, that both France and Germany are looking into the origin and history in English speaking lands of the Methodists and the Baptists.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

Bible Reading in the Early Church. By ADOLF HARNACK, Professor of Church History in the University of Berlin. Translated by the REV. J. R. WILKINSON, M.A., late scholar of Worcester College, Oxford; and Rector of Winford. New York: Geo. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. x, 159. \$1.50. (The Crown Theological Library.)

The thesis that Professor Harnack undertakes to prove is that during the first four centuries no attempt was made, or even contemplated, to restrict the reading of the Bible by all classes of the people. On the contrary, the Scriptures were everywhere regarded as a message from God, which every man should read and study for himself. In this examination the writer has in mind two classes of opponents; first, the Roman Catholics who maintain that the Bible has been committed to the Church, i.e. ultimately to the Pope, and is to be given or withheld from the laity as she sees fit; and second, modern scholars who would make of early Christianity a mystery religion of a kind with the other cults of the Graeco-Roman world. Without going into details, it is enough to say that Professor Harnack has proved his point up to the hilt. Leaning upon Walch and aided by his own wide knowledge of the Fathers he reviews the literature of the first four centuries in such a way as to leave no doubt as to the undisputed access of Christian and heathen, layman and cleric, to the Scriptures in these centuries. And this in turn he quite correctly points out, as Bible reading was at the very centre of the life of the Christian life, is fatal to all theories which would make of early Christianity a thing subservient to a church organization, or a mystery religion.

There are just two criticisms we would like to make, one of which affects Professor Harnack's general position, and the other the work of the translator. Of course if, as Professor Harnack so conclusively shows, the reading of the Bible was felt to be outside the control of the church, the obvious conclusion is that the Bible itself was felt to be superior to the church. That we think is the correct view. The church of the second century did not make the Bible, either Old or New Testament, but felt itself bound and conditioned by books over which it had no control. But although this shines all through Professor Harnack's thesis, it is not, as every one knows, his own view. The Old Testament, he holds, did indeed occupy such a unique position, being received by the church from the Jews as the very word of God; but there was no such feeling toward the writings which later came to be known as the New Testament, until the second century, when under stress of circumstances so-called apostolic writings were raised for the first time to a position of equality beside those of the Old Testament. Here is a great inconsistency. How is it conceivable that a church which felt itself bound not to interfere with the inspired writings, dared to assert that certain books which had long

been considered not to be part of the word of God in reality were so or were made so. That this inconsistency is to be referred to the early church and not to Professor Harnack is of course possible. History is not always logical. But after his strong presentation of the view that the early church regarded herself as the servant and not the mistress of the Scriptures, we have a right to ask of Professor Harnack just as strong or stronger historical evidence, and a philosophical explanation, of this very illogical behaviour on the part of the early church; and until this is forthcoming we shall continue to think that he, and not the early Christians, is guilty of inconsistency. In this connection too we may note that he is still entangled in, and embarrassed by, the opinion that the statement of the Muratori Fragment to the effect that the Shepherd of Hermas ought to be read, refers not to the Shepherd alone but to a whole class of literature. For this there is of course not a scintilla of evidence; and the problem of the Shepherd's place in the early church, and incidentally the relation of this classic passage of the Muratori Fragment to the history of the Canon, will never be rightly understood until the words are taken to mean exactly what they say, and this then be taken as a starting point from which to reconstruct a situation which called for such a statement.

As to the translation, Mr. Wilkinson has reproduced very successfully both the sense and the spirit of the original; but we would suggest for the future, that books intended for sale in America would find a readier acceptance if translations of Greek and Latin quotations were inserted in the text and the original put in the foot-notes. In this volume there are many passages and several of considerable length, without an accompanying translation, and this fact militates against the usefulness of the book more than any but an American can appreciate.

Princeton.

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

Protestantism and Progress. A Historical Study of the Relation of Protestantism to the Modern World. By ERNST TROELTSCH, Dr. Theol., Phil., Jur., Professor of Theology in the University of Heidelberg. Translated by W. MONTGOMERY, B.D. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1912. Pp. xii, 210. \$1.50.

Professor Troeltsch's work, the latest fruit of the Calvin celebration, has been known to scholars on both sides of the Atlantic for some time and is now offered to a wider public in English form. That it will be widely read and enjoyed there is no doubt. The author has read widely and thought carefully on the problems of religion and the modern world, and few men command greater respect. The problem he handles in the volume before us is the relation of the modern world, to early protestantism. By the modern world he means Europe and America and by protestantism the revolt against Church civilization under Luther, Calvin, the Anabaptists and others in the sixteenth century. In brief his thesis is that early Lutheranism and Calvinism are to be reckoned to the preceding age of ecclesiasticism,

i.e., the Middle Ages, rather than to the Modern world. Of course both of these and especially Calvinism contributed something to our present culture, but the other-worldliness, the submission to authority, the desire to establish national and exclusive Churches, which were the characteristics of early Protestantism, show greater kinship to the preceding than to the present period, whose characteristics are this-worldliness, independence of authority, relativity and anti-supernaturalism.

A detailed statement or examination of Professor Troeltsch's position would be here out of place. We desire simply to make a few remarks on some matters which to our mind have not been given their proper relative value. Professor Loofs has objected already to Troeltsch's picture of the modern world that it is to be seen only out of a university window, and to us the criticism appears applicable to what he says of the Reformation and Illumination as well. To Professor Troeltsch the modern world is a unity which can be characterized by a few broad generalizations, the Reformation on the contrary a much divided thing. Neither the one nor the other is true. Because we are removed from it by a few centuries we can look back upon the sixteenth century and calmly disentangle the forces which were then entangled. A future historian will do the same for our own period. Calvin it is true, as Troeltsch recognizes, brought comparative order out of the chaos; but even Calvinism was not a unit, and as for the others, there can be no sharp line of demarcation drawn between the names of Luther, Carlstadt, Zwingli, Hubmaier and even M nzer. Nor can we think Troeltsch correct in elevating to a place of first importance the intolerance and what he calls the asceticism of the early protestants. That men only slowly freed themselves from the idea of the necessity of the union of Church and State, and that a habit of mind which reflected the ideals of the period of Church domination long remained, especially in the Lutheran lands, is not only true but natural and necessary. But to say that these things are at the centre of Protestantism is to mis-read history. The proof of this is to be found in the consciousness of the Reformers themselves who knew the past and felt that they were fundamentally breaking with it; also in the fact that the several protestant churches existed under so many forms of civil and ecclesiastical government. The center of Protestantism lay in the affirmation of the right and the duty of the individual to approach God directly and to learn individually of him in the Scriptures. What was not in harmony with this fundamental declaration of independence was soon sloughed off.

The only way in which Protestantism can be linked to the preceding Romanism is by contrasting both with anti-supernaturalism; and this is of course just what Professor Troeltsch does, at the same time explaining the present world as anti-supernatural, and so anti-Roman and anti-Protestant. Whether this characterization is applicable to Germany or not we will let others determine. Professor Loofs denies that it is. But in speaking of the English-speaking world in this

manner Professor Troeltsch is certainly misinformed, and part of his mistake comes we think from a one-sided view of Illuminism, which he regards as largely responsible for our present civilization. The name Illuminism is generally reserved for that humanistic movement in the eighteenth century which was accompanied on its religious side by rationalism in Germany and deism in England and by similar phenomena elsewhere; but it must not be forgotten that it had as its counterpart, or more exactly, its complement, the great religious movement which we call by various names, Pietism, Methodism, Evangelicalism, The Great Awakening. In aim and spirit Illuminism and Pietism were inseparable; both strove for a subjective assurance of truth and both were intensely practical. Both over-shot the mark and had to be freed from excrescences but both together have largely determined our modern culture. Another thing that should be remembered in considering Pietism is that it was necessarily tied to the essential doctrines of the Reformation. If humanistic Illuminism was a recrudescence of the Renaissance, Pietism was the re-affirmation under different circumstances of early Protestantism. Again, it is a matter of no small importance to note how these two which were so interwoven and over-lapping succeeded each other in different countries. In Germany, Pietism and the Church quarreled before rationalistic Illuminism appeared to conquer easily a foe thus engaged in fratricidal strife; and religion in Germany has lived more or less under the rationalism of that period from that day to this. In England on the contrary deism had been answered before Wesley and Whitefield began their work; and England and English speaking countries have been living under the influence of the evangelical revival ever since. This is a fact that Professor Troeltsch does not seem to realize. We have our anti-supernaturalists of course, and they make considerable noise; but any picture of the modern English and American world that does not recognize the success of separatism and voluntarism in the Churches with all that they mean, or note the activity in foreign missions and the success of protestant supernaturalism there, or fails to weigh the fact that the demand for Bibles is as steady as that for sugar and calico, cannot do justice to the truth.

Princeton,

KERR D. MACMILLAN.

The Rise of the Mediaeval Church and Its Influence on the Civilization of Western Europe from the First to the Thirteenth Century.

By ALEXANDER CLARENCE FLICK, Ph.D., Litt.D., Professor of European History in Syracuse University. New York: G. A. Putnam's Sons. 1909. 8vo; pp. xiii, 623.

Even the somewhat cumbrous title of this manual fails to indicate with sufficient accuracy the unusually narrow limits of the account here given of the Mediaeval Church. As a professor of European history dealing with students whose interest in the subject is not professional but purely "cultural", the author, long convinced that "not a single Church history suitable for regular college work, or for popular reading is available", has undertaken to meet this need in his

to the needs of those who can use only English books of reference. The footnotes, too, give evidence of the thoroughness and the scholarly ability with which this manual has been prepared. The index is all that could be desired.

We shall be glad to welcome the companion volumes which the author promises—one on the Reformation and another on the Modern Church—and also the proposed source-book on Church history to supplement the texts.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

A History of Creeds and Confessions of Faith in Christendom and Beyond. With Historical Tables. By WILLIAM A. CURTIS, B.D., D.Litt. (Edin.), Professor of Systematic Theology in the University of Aberdeen. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark. 1911. Demy 8vo; pp. xix, 502. \$4.00 net.

These "first-fruits", gratefully offered by the author to the memory of the late Prof. Robert Flint, and to the Faculties of Divinity in the Universities of Edinburgh and Aberdeen, his teachers and colleagues, are a fine sample, and as we shall hope a sure pledge for the continuation by him, of work in historical theology.

Condensed and summary as is the treatment in every part, the style is never dry or dull, but always vigorous, giving in admirable combination the technical details of the history and the author's valuations of the finished credal formulas. The judgments expressed are those of a mind full of reverence for the best achievements of the past, hospitable to the truth whether new or old, skilled in critical analysis, and reasonably fair in its expression of results. True, the reader has occasion to regret the extreme brevity of some of the chapters, but when he regards the unusual breadth of the work he cannot but feel that the proportion is admirably maintained. The second chapter (consisting of twenty-three pages on "Creeds and Confessions outside Hebrew and Christian Religion" is the most fragmentary and least satisfactory part of the volume. It is one of a number of elements that may stimulate the interest of the general reader but will offer little of value to the student of historic religious thought. More widely useful will be the exhibition of the creeds of such ecclesiastical free lances as Tolstoi, such sects as the "First Church of Christ, Scientist", and such organizations as the Salvation Army. But the main value of the book lies in its being a comprehensive and yet concise book of reference on the creeds and confessions of Christendom.

Four Historical Tables, in the form of Appendices, illustrate the rise of the ancient creeds, the evolution of the Apostles' Creed, the Confessional Divisions of the Church, and the history of confessions of faith in modern Christendom.

The author's spirit and point of view are most fully revealed in the concluding chapters in which he indulges in a general retrospect of the history in its broader features, offers some reflections on the dogmatic movement as a whole, argues in favor of the need of

retaining creeds and of revising those of the past, and discusses the question of the ethics of creed-subscription.

Among ecclesiastical confessions the Westminster Shorter Catechism and the Brief Statement of the Reformed Faith, of our own Church, please Dr. Curtis best. Concerning the latter he says (p. 290): "More than any other Confession, perhaps, it speaks in modern language, such as the pulpit may utter frankly and without alteration or paraphrase. It is perhaps not an exaggeration to say that every Protestant Church might cheerfully and heartily accept it for use both at home and in the mission field." But the ideal creed, to the author's way of thinking, is one couched in Biblical terms and offered by our Lord Himself: "Thou art the Christ, Son of the Living God."

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Life of Sir Henry Vane the Younger, Statesman and Mystic (1613-1662). By JOHN WILLCOCK, M.A., D.D., F.R. Hist. Soc. Published by the Saint Catherine Press, London. 1913. Crown 8vo; pp. xxiii, 405.

Dr. Willcock has already given us three biographies dealing with the central years of the seventeenth century. One of these is devoted to the romantic figure of the author of *The Exquisite Jewel*,—Sir Thomas Urquhart of Cromartie (1611-61). The two others trace the careers of those sharply contrasting figures, the eighth and ninth Earls of Argyll—*The Great Marquess: Life and Times of Archibald, 8th Earl and 1st (and only) Marquess of Argyll (1607-61)*, and *A Scots Earl in Covenanting Times: Being Life and Times of Archibald, 9th Earl of Argyll (1629-85)*. In the present volume he turns to the English side of the same great struggle for civil and religious liberty which was described on its Scotch side in *The Great Marquess*, and groups an account of its progress on English ground around the figure of Sir Henry Vane the Younger. Argyll was certainly the most commanding figure in the Scotch history of the times; and Dr. Willcock would place Vane by his side as occupying something like the same position of relative eminence in the English history of the day. There can be no good biography when there is no sympathy with the character and achievements of the person whose history is depicted; and we count it only gain for the general value of this volume that Dr. Willcock looks upon Vane with an admiring eye. "The purest patriot that England has ever seen" he calls him (p. 344) with genuine enthusiasm, if possibly with some exaggeration. To him more than to any other, he thinks, we are indebted for that vindication of our liberties which was the crowning service to us of the epoch of strife through which Vane lived. He does not hesitate to assign to him preëminence among all the statesmen of his time. "Three great names," he remarks, "are associated by us with the English Commonwealth which rose on the ruins of the Monarchy in the middle of the seventeenth century: Cromwell supreme in the field of war, Blake on the sea, and Vane in the cabinet" (p. 1). "Nothing, to a

modern man is more astonishing in Vane's career," he explains more fully (p. 347), "than the advanced views which he held regarding so many political matters. His advocacy of toleration, of religious equality, of the sovereign power of Parliament, of reform in the House of Commons, and of a written constitution, shows him to have been far in advance of his time. In some respects, indeed, he is in advance of our time. And the mere fact of his being able to rise so completely above the level of his age explains how it was that he so often stood alone and was so often regarded with hostile feelings."

It is as the enlightened advocate, not so much of religious toleration as of the equality of all religions before the law, that Vane especially commands Dr. Willcock's admiration. It is in effect in this aspect of his character that Dr. Willcock essays particularly to depict him. In the effort to throw into a vivid light how much Vane towered in this above his contemporaries, perhaps now and then something less than justice is done to them. "The principle of toleration," we read (p. 17), "was firmly rooted in Vane's nature, and it would be hard to say whether Geneva or Rome, Canterbury, or Edinburgh, or Boston, in those days hated it most." That a practical unanimity of opinion obtained in the middle of the seventeenth century, that a religious function belonged to the civil magistrate; and that it was his duty, as the Westminster Confession expressed it, "to take order that unity and peace be preserved in the church, that the truth of God be kept pure and entire, that all blasphemies and heresies be suppressed, all corruptions and abuses in worship and discipline prevented or reformed, and all the ordinances of God duly settled, administered, and observed", is of course true. But we can hardly on the basis of this common consent that it belonged to the magistrate to foster the true religion and to suppress heresy, wipe out the differences with respect to toleration which existed between Rome, say, with its "anarchical methods of propagating religion"—by means of force and fraud and massacres and burnings (pp. 33-34)—and Protestantism; or even between Canterbury with its Laudian doctrine of "thorough", and Edinburgh, operating under its "Solemn League and Covenant". If Argyll may be taken as a representative of Covenanted Edinburgh,—and surely no better representative could be wished—we have Dr. Willcock's own testimony that he was no persecutor (*The Great Marquess*, pp. 193-4, 198). The "comprehensive ecclesiastical establishment", which Argyll expounded in his great speech at Westminster on the 25th of June, 1646, while it sought "a reasonable measure of uniformity in religion", could not (as Dr. Willcock points out himself) "press heavily upon devout, well-disposed persons who had conscientious scruples",—and indeed, clearly (as Dr. Willcock also tells us), "expressed the same idea" in another way, which Cromwell gave famous utterance to in his letter to the Speaker of Parliament after the battle of Naseby. And that Argyll was in his broad views of the establishment occupying the same ground with his other brethren in

the Covenant is notorious. Precisely the same views for example had been declared by George Gillespie in his sermon before the House of Lords in 1645, and other equally authoritative announcements of them might easily be adduced. No doubt all these men were advocates of an "established church", and Vane had progressed beyond that standpoint. He was convinced, as they were not, that the magistrate as such had no function in the sphere of religion; and in this he rose superior to them, and manifested an insight into the essential fitness of things to which they had not yet attained. We may contrast with the article on the "Civil Magistrate" in the Westminster Confession from which we have just quoted the exposition of "the Rule of Magistracy" given by Vane in his *Retired Man's Meditations* published in 1655 (p. 388) and observe with admiration the height above all theories of "establishment" to which Vane had soared. "We are to understand by this terme," he says, "the proper sphere, bounds, and limits of that office, which is not to intrude itself into the office and proper concernes of Christ's inward government and rule in the conscience, but is to content itself with the outward man, and to intermeddle with the concernes thereof in reference to the converse which man ought to have with man, upon the grounds of natural justice and right, in 'things appertaining to this life', wherein the Magistrate or higher power is not only the proper Judge, but hath the right of coercion thereunto, if not obeyed, and the more illuminated the Magistrate's conscience and judgment is, as to natural justice and right, by the knowledge of God and communications of light from Christ . . . the better qualified is he to execute his office, and the more accountable he is to God and man in default thereof" (p. 229). But because the true relation of the civil magistracy to the church was as yet so little understood, is no reason why we should lump all the advocates of the "establishment" of religion in an indistinguishable mass of intolerant persecutors. In point of fact Vane would have had little quarrel with the Scots with their accomplished independence of the Church in *spiritualia*: what vexed his righteous soul most was the ingrained Erastianism of the English Parliament, on which, more than any other one thing, was wrecked the scheme of a uniform religious establishment in the two kingdoms.

And this leads us to speak a word on Vane's relation to the Solemn League and Covenant. We are loath to believe that the real state of the case is fairly represented when we are told that "Vane succeeded in inserting clauses in it" (p. 122) by means of which—that it was "through Vane's diplomacy that—the terms" (p. 145) in which its obligations were expressed were weakened beyond the purpose of the contracting Scots. Baillie leaves us in no doubt that the declaration in its final form was understood by the Scots to express their full mind. And certainly the terms in which the obligations were expressed in the final form seem to be precise enough to bind most consciences (*cf.* this REVIEW vi [April 1908], pp. 198 ff.). Vane himself moreover in 1662 declared, at his trial and on the scaffold, his

loyalty to the Covenant and his reverence for it, only explaining that he did not consider that it should be rigidly imposed. "I will not deny," he says in his "Reasons for an Arrest of Judgment", "that as to the manner of prosecution of the Covenant to other ends than itself warrants, and with a rigid, oppressive spirit, to bring all dissenting minds and tender consciences under one uniformity of church discipline and government, it was utterly against my judgment. For I always esteemed it more agreeable to the Word of God that the ends and work declared in the Covenant should be promoted in a spirit of love and forbearance to differing judgments and consciences, that thereby we might be approving ourselves 'in doing that to others which we desire they would do to us'; and so, though upon different principles, be found joint and faithful advancers of the reformation contained in the Covenant, both public and personal" (p. 129). On the scaffold he speaks with evidently true feeling of the Marquess of Argyll as "that noble person whose memory I honour" and describes how he "was with myself at the beginning and making of the Solemn League and Covenant, the matter of which", he continues, "and the holy ends therein contained I fully assent unto, and have been as desirous to observe; but the rigid way of prosecuting it, and the oppressive uniformity that hath been endeavored by it, I never approved. This were sufficient to vindicate me from the false aspersions and calumnies which have been laid upon me, of Jesuitism and Popery, and almost what not, to make my name of ill savour with good men" (p. 130). These do not seem natural words on the lips of one who had sought so to frame the wording of the Covenant as to make it palter in a double sense; and we would fain believe, if it be possible to do so, that Vane was incapable of arguing as, for example, Browne argued, when rebuking the Assembly of Divines for its attitude regarding the *jus divinum*, that as there is no positive rule of church government in the Word, the Covenant leaves absolute freedom to all on this point. We prefer to think, if it be possible to do so, that Vane's meaning is not very far from that of Argyll; or of George Gillespie when Gillespie declares that he would condemn "any rigorous or violent course against such as being sound in the faith and holy in life, and not of a turbulent, factious carriage, do differ in smaller matters from the common rule",—and apostrophises thus: "Let that day be darkness, let not God regard it from above, neither let the light shine upon it, in which it shall be said that the children of God in Britain are enemies and persecutors of each other." No doubt Vane would interpret the "smaller matters" more broadly than Gillespie and seek a wider toleration but we should not forget that the toleration of the Scots was wide enough to include Vane's party. "We may be very confident," declared the Scottish Commissioners in 1646 of the Pilgrim Fathers, "that the godly people who did transplant themselves out of this island (the fame of whose piety and zeal shall never suffer detraction or the smallest diminution from our thoughts or words) might have lived in the Church of Scotland en-

joying the pure ordinances of God, with peace in their consciences and comfort to their souls." The chief enemy of Vane in his pleadings for toleration was not the Scots with their Solemn League and Covenant, within which toleration would have been readily granted for all the practical of Vane's friends, but the chief enemy of the Scots with their Solemn League and Covenant,—the Erastian Parliament, who would itself govern everything, even the inmost *spiritualia*, and would allow no freedom outside the reach of its prescriptions.

The main lack which the reader feels in the volume is an adequate account of Vane's theological opinions. "Dreamy Mysticism" is what he is credited with; "strange dreams and fantastical interpretation of Scripture and sheer unintelligibility" we are told "often overcloud his religious writings." A contemporary critic is quoted to the effect that he "hath not contented himself in the shallows, but hath waded into the deeps of divinity, possibly so far sometimes as that he cannot feel the ground of Scripture". Some description is given of his chief religious writings: and (with the help of T. H. Green) a brief *précis* of his teaching is offered. A good deal more than this would have been welcomed by theological readers who have not access to Vane's books.

Dr. Willcock is more interested in the man, however, than in his religious opinions, and brings him before us with especial zest as the Apostle of liberty, civil and religious. He is full of admiration for his insight and foresight and credits him, as we have seen, with being in advance not only of his time but even of our time in the clearness of his convictions and the boldness of his suggestions. No doubt it is generally true that most of the political advance which has been slowly worked out in Britain for the last two hundred and fifty years has merely given effect to what was already present in promise in the Puritan Revolution: and Vane as the bold spirit who was ever in the lead in the Puritan Revolution naturally embodies in his own person the *clairvoyant* element inherent in it. Some of his suggestions have not even yet worked themselves into fact: some of them—as for example government by a single-chamber—we may hope never will, though certainly a close approximation to it is already in being. But the praise which Dr. Willcock pours out upon him seems fairly justified in general. The biography he has given us of him is most illuminating. The field it covered was not unoccupied: other biographies of Vane are in existence. There was room, however, for a new one, and Dr. Willcock has written this new one with adequate knowledge, keen sympathy and just characterization. The positive new contributions to our knowledge of Vane which he makes he does not claim to be large. He thinks he has given a fuller account of Vane's relations with Cromwell, and of his political career from Cromwell's death to the restoration of Charles II, than has hitherto been accessible. And he presents the material for a judgment upon the connection of Vane which has recently been alleged with the plot in which Sir Richard Willis was the chief spirit and which had for its object the seizure—perhaps the murder—of Charles II and his brother, the Duke of

York, expressing his hope, at the same time, that Vane may be ultimately cleared of complicity in this discreditable proceeding. But the chief claim of the volume upon attention is its lucid and well-ordered narrative of the whole story of Vane's career. As is usual in Dr. Willcock's books the volume is well illustrated. It is also provided with a useful index.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

What is the Truth about Jesus Christ? Problems of Christology discussed in six Haskell Lectures at Oberlin, Ohio. By FRIEDRICH LOOFS, Ph.D., Th.D., Professor of Church History in the University of Halle-Wittenberg, Germany. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1913. 12mo; pp. vii, 241.

There are few men better equipped than Friedrich Loofs to give an illuminating survey of recent christological discussion. He is handicapped, of course, by his own dogmatic point of view. His dogmatic point of view is that of right-wing Ritschlianism. As a right-wing Ritschlian, Jesus is to him the unique Revealer of God and Mediator of Redemption. From this standpoint he looks out upon all recent discussion, and by its standard he estimates the value of its contribution to thought. Whatever is less than this, and, equally, whatever is more than this, he condemns; and he so conducts the survey of the progress of discussion as to lead up with apparent naturalness to the conclusion that it is thus and not otherwise that we must think of Christ. It is only at the end of the volume, therefore, that we learn Loofs' own Christological opinions; and they are given to us there less as the constitutive elements of his own Christology than as the residuum of the Christological discussion of recent years. "For us," says he (p. 236), "the three following thoughts, held out by these views, are the most valuable: first, that the historical person of Christ is looked upon as a human personality; secondly, that this personality, through an indwelling of God or his Spirit, which was unique both before and after, up to the end of all time, became the Son of God who reveals the Father and becomes also the beginner of a new mankind; and, thirdly, that in the future state of perfection a similar indwelling of God has to be realized, though in a copied and therefore secondary form, in all people whom Christ has redeemed." Here are just the familiar forms of right-wing Ritschlianism: Jesus Christ is only a man; but in this man God dwells uniquely and by this unique indwelling of God, He is made the Revelation of God and the Mediator of redemption; and the redeemed are to be brought in their measure into a relation to God similar to that in which He stood. When Loofs, then, speaks of Jesus being something more than man—as he sometimes does in the course of his lectures,—it is this that he means: not that Jesus is in

Himself more than a man, but that God dwells in Him more fully than He dwells in other men. "The conviction that God dwelt so perfectly in Jesus through his Spirit, as had never been the case before and never will be till the end of all time," he says, "does justice to what we know historically about Jesus, and may, at the same time, be regarded as satisfactorily expressing the unique position of Jesus which is a certainty to faith" (p. 238-9). We know "historically" that Jesus is a man. We are sure with "the certainty of faith" that Jesus has in Him something more than we can find in other men. When we speak of Jesus as the man in whom God uniquely dwelt we are doing justice to both facts. "It also," he even adds, "justifies our finding God in Christ when we pray to him" (p. 239). That is to say, although He is only a man in whom God dwells in a measure superior to that in which He dwells in other men, we are justified, because we can thus find God "in Him", in praying to Him. What it means for God to dwell in Christ; and what it means to say it is by His Spirit that He dwells in Christ; and indeed what it means to speak at all of God's "Spirit" remains meanwhile uncertain (p. 239). "My last refuge, therefore is," he says, "the term which Paul sharply emphasizes in the epistles to the Colossians and Ephesians, *the mystery of Christ*" (p. 209). "We can never penetrate so deep as to learn how God made Him what He was" (p. 241). This is Loofs' Christological standpoint.

From this standpoint Loofs is sure that Jesus, the man Jesus, existed. And therefore he opens his course of lectures with a refutation of the modern radicalism—the most important representation of which he finds (p. 6) in William Benjamin Smith—that denies the existence of the man Jesus. It is the extra-canonical testimony and the witness of Paul to which he gives his chief attention. He concedes—we think improperly—"that the historicity of Christ cannot be conclusively proved by the non-Christian sources"; though he contends that they give weighty evidence for it, such as to render it very difficult to deny His existence (pp. 30-31). The stress of the argument is therefore thrown upon the shoulders of Paul; and, of course, Paul can bear it.

From the same standpoint Loofs is equally sure that the life of Jesus was not a natural human life, and he devotes three of his six lectures (the second, third and fourth) to making this clear against the current "Liberal" contentions. The "Liberal" thinkers, he shows, starting with the presupposition that Jesus' life must needs have been a purely human life have found it impossible to sustain themselves on that ground. They come in the end inevitably to one or the other of these two conclusions—either that "we know next to nothing about Jesus", or that "Jesus was a religious enthusiast". And neither conclusion is tenable in the face of what we most surely know about Jesus, namely that "there was a growing community shortly after the death of Jesus which highly revered Jesus, and which must, therefore, have had a lively interest in his words and deeds", and that the most surely genuine words of Jesus that have come down to us are certainly not the words of a fanatic. Then taking up the "Liberal"

assumption that Jesus exhibited nothing above the measure of a man in life on its merits, Loofs shows that Jesus certainly was conscious of something that was more than human within Him; that His immediate followers recognized something that was more than human in Him; and that this faith of the earliest community has been verified by the experience of multitudes since. "History", he says impressively, "does not know of any community in those primitive times that saw in Jesus merely the teacher and the exemplar of Christian faith. To the earliest Christians too, Jesus was an object of their belief. Paul also assumed that all Christians prayed to Christ. He characterized the Christians as people *who call upon the name of Jesus Christ*" (p. 148). Still more impressively, he says: "Science has to respect realities. And it is a reality that the faith in Jesus the Saviour has been a power in history, and still is a power in the world up to the present day. Historical science cannot do justice to the sources with its assumption that the life of Jesus was a purely human life. It cannot draw a credible picture of Jesus. But the faith of all time carries a picture in its heart which has its prototype in the Jesus of the Gospels and in his own self-consciousness" (p. 160).

But from his standpoint Loofs is also bound to declare that the conviction of His church that Jesus Christ is really (*realiter*) God as well as man is also untenable. He argues against this conviction in his fifth lecture,—on three grounds: first, "rational logic" condemns it; secondly, it is not in accord with New Testament views; and thirdly, it is a product of Greek philosophy. Under the first of these heads he urges that the incarnation of only a single person of the Trinity is unthinkable, that it is meaningless to say God could become flesh, that incarnation of a person of the Trinity breaks up the Trinity—if there be such a thing as a Trinity. Under the second head he pleads that the Scriptures know nothing of a Son of God before the incarnation; that they know nothing of the Trinity; that they give to Jesus a human, not divine personality; that they attribute to Him a human development; and that they present Him as in organic connection with the human race. Under the third head he endeavors to trace the origin in the church of the doctrines of the Trinity and the Two-Natures of Christ as the product of philosophical thought impressing Greek conceptions upon the simple Christian facts.

Having thus disposed of all possible rival views, Loofs has little difficulty, in his last lecture, by means of a rapid survey of the efforts of recent theorizers in this field to present a valid conception of Christ—from the Kenotists, of whom he speaks with deserved contempt to their opposites, the Dornerites—in arriving at last at the enunciation of his own right-wing Ritschlianism as the pure product of the age-long thinking of the church concerning the nature of its Lord. He is not a God who has been made into a man and He is not a man who has been made into a God; He is a man in whom God so dwells that in Him we see the unique revelation of God and through Him we are redeemed to God. It is to Loofs' credit that he does not seem fully

satisfied with this formula, as we certainly are not; he seems to hold to it only as a kind of safe middle-way, walking in which he may avoid the crass humanizing of Christ and the crass deifying of Him which he conceives is done respectively by the "Liberals" and the "Orthodox". Perhaps we may admit that it is as near the truth as one can come who has lost the guidance of the authoritative Scriptures and is thrown back for the conception he will form of Christ upon general considerations, interpreted under the guidance of modern chariness of the supernatural.

There are many points which are incidentally discussed in the course of Loofs' argument to some of which we would like to advert.

There is, for example, the picture of the state of present-day German thought in the field of Christology which he gives, in allusions throughout the lectures indeed, but chiefly in the last lecture. He tells us that the doctrine of the Two Natures has perished out of German academical circles (p. 202); Philippi (†1882) was the last recognized theologian who taught it. He tells us again that the Kenotic speculation, if it has not yet quite died out, has nevertheless "been pushed pretty far back" (p. 223). He expresses wonder that it has been taken up by English writers just as it is dying out in Germany; "in Sweden too", he slyly remarks, "it was confidently defended as late as 1903 by Oskar Bensow",—as, we may add, it was in Germany too as late as 1902 by Alexander von Oettingen. Other mediating views, whether, like those of Johannes Kunze and Erich Schäfer, echoes of Kenoticism, or, like those of Martin Kähler and Reinhold Seeberg, echoes of Dornerism, he evidently thinks have no general significance. All "learned" Germany is given over, in a word, to humanitarianism and divides only on the question whether the man Jesus shall be thought of as a special organ of God (the "Mediatorial Christology", in the nomenclature of Otto Kirn), or merely as a God-seeking man (Kirn's "Prophetic Christology"). Loofs' own view is the former; but he does not glaze the wide extension of the latter, to which Jesus Christ is but the first Christian. It will be well for us to bear in mind that thus "learned" Germany has pretty much as a body fallen away from the Divine Christ.

It is interesting to observe the decision with which Loofs wishes to separate himself from the extreme schools of "Liberalism", as in their Christology, so also in their methods of criticism. He recognizes that their aim is to prove the life of Jesus to be a merely natural human life (p. 3), and he fully recognizes that this aim is not only wrong in itself but has been sought by most reprehensible critical methods. He thus sweeps the extreme radical criticism out of the way at one blow, as thoroughly prejudiced and untrustworthy: "judging by what I understand by historical method", he remarks, "such criticism is historically unjustifiable because it violates the sources instead of doing justice to them" (p. 112). It is particularly interesting to observe the judgment he passes on the currently employed canons of historical criticism, as they are enunciated say, by Heitmüller or somewhat more extremely by P. W. Schmiedel. "Critics", says he (pp. 114 sq.), "have

tried to introduce rules for picking out the genuine words [of Jesus]. As a basis, says Heitmüller, we have to take all the materials that are not in accordance with the belief, theology, worship, and customs of the ancient Christian community, or, at any rate, do not completely agree with it. We may absolutely trust all this and everything that is organically united therewith. On the other hand, we must pass the verdict 'not genuine' whenever a story or a word agrees too obviously with the thoughts and customs and the dogmatic and eschatological wants of the later community. This sounds very circumspect, and certainly contains correct ideas. . . . Yet we cannot make use of this canon as a general rule. For, in the first place, if we consider with how much freedom tradition treated the words of Jesus (as we can see on many occasions) we shall not at all expect a word of Jesus in the Gospels which does not agree with the belief of the reporter. If we interpret any word in this way we have to fear that we misinterpret it. And, secondly, it would be contrary to all sound knowledge if we suspected those words of Jesus which agree most obviously with the belief of the ancient Christians simply for this reason. For there was no greater authority for these Christians than Jesus. We are also in practice brought to evident absurdities if we apply this rule . . ." Of course this deliverance is not free from the "halbheit" which is inherent in Loofs' whole attitude—as it is in that of the entire school to which he belongs. But on account of this very "halbheit" of his attitude, his adverse judgment on the validity of the critical canon upon which, in point of fact, the entire case of the reconstruction of the evangelical narrative in the naturalistic interest hangs, is valuable (*cf.* THE PRINCETON THEOLOGICAL REVIEW, April, 1913; pp. 254 *sq.*).

But perhaps the most interesting element in these lectures is the intimation given, in suggestions here and there, of the basis on which Loofs founds his historical judgments on the one hand and his dogmatic conclusions on the other. There are involved here a doctrine of the nature of historical science, and a doctrine of the validity of judgments of faith, both of which attract attention and perhaps also criticism.

Loofs commits himself to a purely naturalistic conception of History. "History", says he ((pp. 81 *sq.*) "has to reckon with the analogy from other experience. . . . Everything that is impossible according to all our experience is to be put aside as being unhistorical. For historical research has to make clear in its genetic connection what happened in the past; and, as measure for what is possible, it has to employ our experience. . . . Where we cannot find any cause which, according to our experience, is possible, then every conscientious historian is prevented from speaking of a historical fact. Hence, when historians are forced by credible reports to recognize a fact as having really occurred, they must assume causes lying within the sphere of our experience." This is the precise position relatively to "history" which our naturalists occupy relatively to "science". "Nature", for example,

says Huxley (*Hume*, p. 129), "means neither more nor less than that which is; the sum of phenomena presented to our experience; the totality of events past, present and to come. Every event must be taken to be part of nature, until proof to the contrary is supplied. And such proof is, from the nature of the case, impossible." "In truth," he adds, applying his doctrine, "If a dead man did come to life, the fact would be evidence not that any law of nature had been violated, but that these laws, even when they express the results of a very long and uniform experience, are necessarily based on incomplete knowledge, and are to be held only on grounds of more or less justifiable expectation." We do not know what may happen to-morrow but we know that whatever happens—either to-day or to-morrow—is "natural", and we must simply assume for it and search out its appropriate natural cause. So, Loofs intimates, we do not know except by testimony what happened yesterday; but as historians, we must assume that all that happened yesterday happened in accordance with "nature" as known to our experience, and we must seek a cause for it "lying within the sphere of our experience". This is a purely naturalistic conception of "history", and will permit "history" to record as fact only the "natural".

This naturalistic conception of history Loofs of course applies to the history of Christ. "From this," he writes (p. 83), "it follows that historical science, when investigating the life of Jesus, must take into consideration the supposition that it was a purely human life and that nothing happened in it which falls outside the sphere of human experience. Giving up this supposition would mean admitting that the life of Jesus, or this or that event in his life, is incommensurable for historical science." "Historical science, therefore, is not only allowed, but also obliged, to explain the conviction of the resurrection of Jesus from causes lying within the sphere of natural human experience" (p. 84). "As long as a historian does not declare his science incompetent, he must look for a natural explanation of the faith of the disciples. No description of the life of Jesus that recognizes supernatural factors is purely historical" (p. 84). If this means anything, it means that from the point of view of "historical science", Jesus *must* be explained, in all the elements of his manifestation, as a purely natural phenomenon, transcending in nothing the experience of ordinary men. Loofs does not in the least, however, believe that Jesus can be so explained. But instead of inferring from this that his definition of historical science is wrong and correcting it accordingly, he simply proclaims Jesus as a "supernatural" phenomenon. The "unhistorical" can, it seems, have been actual, because we elect to define the "historical" as the "natural", and to remove out of the province of historical science all that is above nature. Thus "the science of history" is set upon a task which is *ab initio* proclaimed impossible: it *must* explain all that has occurred on natural grounds; but all that has occurred is, in point of fact, not explicable on natural grounds. The fundamental assumption on which "the science of history" proceeds is therefore false, and history is necessarily in conflict with faith.

To avoid this conflict, Loofs demands that in a case like that of Jesus historical science, instead of pressing its claims, must just abrogate its function. That Jesus as He was manifested in the actual life He lived lies outside the sphere of history, Loofs is therefore explicit in affirming. Before Him "historical science" must declare itself incompetent. If we undertake to write a life of Jesus, we are "forced to suppose that his life was a purely human one". Since His life, however, in point of fact was not a purely human one, all that "historical science" can do with respect to Him is to stand aside (p. 88). It may give from its sources evidence to this or that of the doings and sayings of Jesus, but it is beyond its power to give us an account of Jesus. When it attempts to give an account of Jesus it finds itself, with its instrument of research, viz., the analogy of our own experience, before an impossible task: the Jesus of the sources is not a purely natural Jesus. There is nothing for historical science to do, therefore, but to draw back from the problem of Jesus and to hand it over to the judgment of faith. The one thing that must not be done is to mix the two matters. "An author treating his subject in some chapters as a historian would do, but elsewhere emancipating himself from the analogy of human experience, will produce a mixture of history and assertions of faith. And in my opinion this combination of heterogeneous modes of consideration is to be welcomed neither by a believing Christian nor by a scholarly historian" (pp. 84-5). It is then not on the ground of historical science but solely on the ground of the assertions of faith that we know that there is something divine about Jesus. This is not to be taken as meaning, however, we are assured, that we can affirm on the ground of faith that which historical science declares not to have been actual; though how "historical science" as defined can refrain from declaring all that transcends the natural not actual it is hard to see. What it means, we are told, is only that we may, or must, affirm on the ground of faith what historical science is incompetent to declare on the ground of experience to be actual. "Historical science can as little conceive Jesus correctly as natural science can appreciate God correctly. Its method cannot reach up to Him" (p. 100). Historical science stands before Jesus therefore helpless and we must call in the judgments of faith or remain forever incapable of understanding Jesus. We have no other instrument.

Nevertheless we do not thus escape after all wholly from history. The judgment of faith as to Jesus, we are told, is given to us partly in the records of the New Testament: for the records of the New Testament are testimonies of the faith of primitive Christian times. Their records, however, combine historical facts about Jesus and beliefs of the community which He founded concerning Him. They already mix, therefore, historical knowledge and the assertions of faith. We cannot, of course, accept that mixture out of hand as the truth. Historical knowledge and the assertions of faith must indeed be combined in our conclusions as to what Jesus really was and is: but this combination must be of our own—not of another's—convictions of

faith with historical truths if it is to be valid (p. 205). "Historical research shows us a number of traits in the historical Jesus which it cannot combine into a homogeneous picture on the basis of its pre-suppositions." "Historical science, which is forced to recognize the analogy of human experience, is therefore, in the case of Jesus, placed before a dilemma. It must either reduce the notices about the self-consciousness of Jesus to such an extent that they fit into the frame of a purely human life; or it must declare itself incompetent to speak the last word on this question; that is, it must be satisfied with a frank acknowledgement of the existence of these heterogeneous elements which it cannot combine, and must then leave it to the other, not purely historical, observation to unite the heterogeneous elements into one uniform whole" (p. 207). It is faith and faith only which can effect this combination. The experiences of faith which are "the common property of riper Christians of all ages" become thus the key to the interpretation of Jesus. These experiences certainly include the ineradicable conviction that in Jesus Christ we have a unique revelation of God: and with it a revelation of what we may through His revelation of God to us, become. "Faith will, therefore, have to oppose the science of history, if the latter, unwilling to recognize that Jesus stands beyond the reach of its standards, thinks it has to eliminate those traits in the picture of Jesus which surpass the ordinary bounds of human life. Faith will have to claim—and it has a right to do so—that historical science shall acknowledge that it cannot say the last word about Jesus. Faith and the seemingly contradictory traits in the picture of Jesus which historical science can show—those truly human and those surpassing human bonds—these two support one another" (p. 218). Here is the triumph of faith over "historical science" manifested.

In reviewing this statement of principles we cannot fail to marvel at the sharp discrimination between the science of history and the assertions of faith which it insists upon. There is no reason whatever for defining history at the outset naturalistically and therefore committing it to the discovery of a purely natural Jesus. It is surely the function of history to discern and portray what actually was, not to describe the past in terms of natural law. There is no more reason for describing the judgments of faith in so exclusively a subjective fashion, lest we sublimate them into mere fancies. We should be the last to deny that Christian experience has its convincing testimony to bring to the deity of the Lord. But we think it important to make it clear from the outset that Christian experience is an experience of realities. I may well doubt whether I am not trusting to a fevered dream when a wild-eyed starving man tells me of the feasts that have been spread for him and which he is daily enjoying; but when, amid a starving population, one who is obviously sleek and well-fed tells of the provision made for our needs by good people to whom he would direct us, the benefits he has already received become the best evidence of the truth of his story. The effects of Christ in the world and in the individual, in the regulation

of lives and society, are valid proofs of His claims and power. No one would neglect them. But there is no need—or propriety—in setting them in opposition to the “historical evidence” of His claims and power, as the sole proof of their truth. In point of fact they are themselves just historical evidences, along with the other forms of historical evidence, and lead us not merely to a conviction of faith, but to a historical judgment. That is no true “historical science” which in forming its historical judgments fails to take account of the effects of historical events or personalities. And if these effects are of a supernatural order it belongs to historical science to assume for them a supernatural cause emerging in history, on pain of ceasing to be historical science. For science means causal thinking, and causal thinking means the discovery and validation of *adequate* causes. The Divine Christ is not merely a fact of faith, but a fact of history; and it is not history but a *priori* reconstruction of history in the interest of an erroneous world-view which would eliminate Him from history and relegate Him to the realm of faith alone. That Loofs reacts from this extreme view is to his credit; that he reacts only partially is only a part of that fatal “halbheit” which vitiates all the reasonings of the whole school to which he belongs and of which he is one of the chief ornaments. The “assertions of faith” are not to be set over against the findings of “historical science” to correct them; they are to be made part of the evidence on which “historical science” depends for its findings and are to coöperate with whatever other evidence “historical science” has at its disposal in rendering beyond all question the historical fact of the Divine Christ, who is given to us on the ground of a great variety of historical evidence, only one item of which is found in our own experiences of His reality and power.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Rule of Faith, being the Baird Lecture for 1905. By the Rev. W. P. PATERSON, D.D., Professor of Divinity in the University of Edinburgh. London and New York: Hodder and Stoughton. 1912. Crown 8vo; pp. x, 439.

The range of Dr. Paterson's discussion in his Baird lectures, now published in this attractive volume, will scarcely be suggested to the average reader by the title he has given them,—*The Rule of Faith*. He considers himself entitled to subsume the whole under this title, however, because of a certain ambiguity attaching to it, due to its divergent use in Patristic and in Protestant Theology. In the early ages of the church “the Rule of Faith” (or “the Rule of Truth”) was the designation given to the common fundamental faith of the Church, as drawn out from Scripture and expressed in a succinct formula, say for example, the Baptismal Creed. By their harmony with this standard of teaching the orthodoxy of all theological constructions was estimated. In the Post-Reformation controversies, on the other hand, “the Rule of Faith” is the designation given to the proximate authoritative source of Christian knowledge, from the

teaching of which alone what is genuinely Christian doctrine is to be ascertained. In the former usage the substance of Christian doctrine, in the latter the seat of Christian doctrine is called "the Rule of Faith"; and by this circumstance Dr. Paterson considers he is given a certain justification in employing the term as the general title of a series of lectures in which both the seat and the substance of doctrine are discussed. There is, however, a deeper justification of Dr. Paterson's procedure here than can be provided by the mere ambiguity of a term. As a result of his discussion of the seat of Christian doctrine, Dr. Paterson arrives at the conclusion that the seat of Christian doctrine lies really in the substance of Christian doctrine; so that the discussion of the seat of doctrine necessarily involves in it the discussion of the substance of doctrine, and any discussion of the Rule of Faith in the former sense must include both topics. The bald announcement of this conclusion has undoubtedly a paradoxical sound. That is, however, Dr. Paterson's concern, not ours; and it must be conceded to him that if he does actually find the seat of Christian doctrine in the substance of Christian doctrine, then he must discuss under the head of "the Rule of Faith" not merely the seat but the substance of Christian doctrine, and he is from his own point of view justified in dividing his lectures on "the Rule of Faith" into these two main topics, and, indeed, in giving the larger share of the discussion to the topic of the substance of Christian doctrine. This is in point of fact what he does. So that what we find in the volume before us is a parallel discussion of first, the seat of doctrine (pp. 31-173), and secondly, the substance of doctrine (pp. 177-396); to which there is added a series of illustrative appendices (pp. 397-428), and an Index (pp. 429-439).

Whatever we may think of the cardinal decision by which the question of the seat of Christian doctrine is transferred to the question of the substance of Christian doctrine (and we have no wish to conceal the fact that we do not think well of it), the reader of the volume profits by the inclusion in it of the rich discussions upon the substance of Christian doctrine which Dr. Paterson gives us. Decidedly it is here that Dr. Paterson is at his best. His method is historico-critical. He passes in review, in turn, the Orthodox—that is to say, the Patristic—Interpretation of Christianity, the Genius of Roman Catholicism, the Gospel of Protestantism, the Distinctive Testimony of the Reformed Churches, the Rationalistic Theology, the Theology of Schleiermacher, and the Ritschlian Revision, endeavoring on each occasion to fix the conception of Christianity presented and to estimate it as an attempt to set forth Christianity in its substance. The order pursued is in each case to begin with a careful exposition of the view under scrutiny, then in a few sentences to point out in general its excellences, and antithetically its shortcomings, and only after this to enter into detailed criticisms. It is doubtless an old-fashioned method of conducting a discussion, and a certain air of formality hangs around it; but it contributes a singular tone of judicious balance to the discussion, which combines with Dr. Paterson's scrupulous care

as an expositor and the very unusual insight which he displays in his criticisms to render the whole a very attractive piece of exposition. The effect is heightened by the plain, clear, penetrating style in which the whole is written, and the independence and sturdy common-sense of the point of view which suggests that rather of the experienced man of affairs than of the pedantic scholar poring over his texts.

No doubt part differs from part both in lucidity and in satisfactoriness, and curiously enough the power of the discussion appears to increase steadily as it progresses. On the whole the least satisfactory section is that on the Patristic Theology where the great doctrines of the Trinity and the Person of Christ come under consideration. On both doctrines Dr. Paterson seems to waver somewhat and to be not altogether free from confusion of mind: he even goes so far as to suggest in the one case whether the question of tritheism might not be hopefully reopened, while in the other he seems to be almost inclined, though without full satisfaction, to seek refuge in the Kenotic theory, pronouncing it (in its moderate form) "the only possible interpretation of the Person of Christ", *provided*,—provided, that is, that we believe both in the preëxistence of the Son of God and the true humanity of Jesus. In sharp contrast with this fumbling touch on matters of the highest concernment, the sections on the Rationalistic Theology, the Theology of Schleiermacher, and the Ritschlian Revision leave little to be desired. The exposition here is sympathetic and adequate and the criticism fundamental and full of weight. A passage like the following (p. 363), goes indeed to the root of matters; and the reader may be pardoned if he wonders before he finishes the work, whether Dr. Paterson has kept these wise words in mind for his own guidance. "But a religious theory which, by whatever path, brings us back to the imperfect self as the ground of our confidence violates what may well be felt to be an axiom of the Christian religion. Our deepest spiritual need is to look away from what has been divinely and graciously wrought in ourselves to a ground of confidence which is wholly of God, and perfectly worthy of God; and it is a mark of theological decadence to disturb religious assurance by transferring the gaze to the humiliated and imprisoned Christ that is discernible in the experiences even of the most Christ-like of those who have entered on the new life." In general one gets the impression that Dr. Paterson's touch is steadiest and his modeling firmest when he is dealing with recent thought, especially if it is of German origin, and particularly if it lies in the region of soteriology rather than in that of theology proper.

It perhaps ought not to be a matter of surprise therefore that we find the section on the "Testimony of the Reformed Churches" unwontedly good. It breaks down, indeed, only when it faces the doctrine of preterition (pp. 311 ff.), and it breaks down there apparently only because it fails to realize with sufficient poignancy what sin is and its deserts, and reasons as if the salvation of all were a question of merely the power of God: God has power enough to

save all; if, then, He does not, there must be some flaw in His love. The obstacle of justice is not realized. Dr. Paterson can see but two ways out: either, on the one hand, in an Arminian or semi-Arminian modification (which obviously he shrinks from as fundamentally wrong), or else in a doctrine of universal salvation (which, apparently, with the late Dr. Hastie, he inclines to). The difficulty is, however, purely artificial, and is wholly due to the practical elimination of the element of justice from the conception of the Divine character. It is not difficult to understand why a just God does not save all sinners; the difficulty is to understand how a just God saves any sinners. It is precisely this difficulty which Christianity meets, and if neither the difficulty is felt nor the manner in which Christianity meets it appreciated,—then Christianity is not understood, and we have substituted for it in our thought of it something which is essentially different.

Dr. Paterson, it must be borne in mind, has introduced this discussion of the substance of Christianity as part of a discussion of the seat of Christianity. He has reached the conclusion that the seat of Christianity is found in the substance of Christianity, and so passes into the discussion of the latter topic. We seem to be entitled to obtain from him in these circumstances, a clear exposition of that substance of Christianity which is to stand as its norm. We do not feel that we receive it. A very illuminating discussion of the several main views of the nature of Christianity which have ruled in the Church is given us, and from that discussion we may infer what Dr. Paterson thinks Christianity to be. The impression we gain thus of his own conception of Christianity is in general reassuring: but we should hardly be justified in drawing out from this criticism of others a positive statement of what should be held to be so of the essence of Christianity that it should stand as its substantial norm, to which in all its details Christianity must conform on pain of being no longer Christianity. The short opening chapter of this section of the book, entitled, "The Nature of the Christian Religion", deals only in certain wide notions, which Dr. Paterson no doubt gathers up into a formal definition of Christianity (p. 199 note), but which he certainly would not himself, if we are to judge by the drift of the whole discussion, consider to embody the substance of Christianity in sufficient detail to enable it to stand as the norm of what Christianity is. On his own showing Christianity necessarily contains much more than is here set down to its credit. Neither do we get any clear light from the short concluding chapter. There no doubt we are told in general what Christianity is like, and some of the things which have been attached to it without being of it, and are assured again that there is "a groundwork of the Christian religion" which is present in all its divergent forms. But there again no serious attempt is made to extract this "groundwork" and set it plainly before us, that we may see precisely what Christianity in its essence is, persistent in all its genuine forms, the presence of which is Christianity,

and the absence of which is the absence of Christianity. On the face of it, Dr. Paterson seems to have left his task incomplete. His main undertaking was to present us with the Christian rule of faith. He intimates that this rule of faith lies ultimately in the substance of the Christian faith. And then he leaves this substance of the Christian faith only vaguely indicated, with shadowy boundaries on this side and that.

It seems to be time that we should revert, therefore, to the main question. The main question which Dr. Paterson invites us to consider is the question of the Christian "Rule of Faith". This he himself explains (p. 4) to mean, "in brief", the question of "what is the proximate source from which we collect the special Christian knowledge which is held to be derived from God as its primary source, and how is this source known to be trustworthy". Primarily, therefore, the question before us is, what is the source of our knowledge of Christian truth. Now, Dr. Paterson tells us, many answers have been given to this question in the Christian Church. The Roman Catholics have their answer. It runs in brief: the Word of God, as contained in Scripture plus tradition, as interpreted by the Church, speaking through its infallible organ, the Pope. The Protestants have their answer. In direct opposition to the Roman Catholic (and on the other hand to the Mystical) view, it runs: the Word of God as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments. The Mystics have their answer. They appeal to the Word of God, spoken directly to the soul of each man. The Rationalists have their answers. They appeal to the primal endowment of man with reason as the adequate source of knowledge of divine things. Professor Patterson passes all these answers in review, and then for the sake of completeness adds two additional chapters, in the one of which he investigates the attempt to find in spontaneous religious feeling the norm of all religious truth, and in the other, the attempt to find the norm of Christian truth not in the Scriptures as a whole, but in some particular portion of the Scriptural content. With this last view in general, which Professor Paterson calls "Biblical Eclecticism", he expresses his own sympathy. The Rule of Faith is therefore to be found, according to Professor Paterson, not in the Church nor in the Reason, not in the Inner Word, nor in the Feelings, but in the Scriptures: but not in the Scriptures as a whole but in a certain portion of the Scriptural contents isolated by him as "the substance of Christianity". Thus he draws us away from the Scriptures as such and invites us to attend, as "the Seat of Christianity", rather to the "substance of Christianity" as transmitted to us in the Scriptures.

The justification which Dr. Paterson offers for deserting the Protestant doctrine of the Rule of Faith is, brusquely put, that the Scriptures, in their full extent, are not a trustworthy source of Christian truth. They contain a human element of ignorance and error; and they teach differently in different portions so that no single system of either doctrine or morals can be extracted from

them. It is then simply impossible to make them in their entirety the authoritative rule of faith: no man can possibly believe all they teach. The way for rejecting the authority of Scripture in its entirety as the source of truth is prepared by the contention that in point of fact Scripture never was in its entirety the rule of faith to anyone. The Reformers themselves practically used as the rule of faith not the whole Bible but a selected portion of the Bible, a Bible within the Bible: and we are entitled to do no less. We shall not stay to refute either of these very refutable propositions. It is enough for us to note that on their support what Dr. Paterson proposes for us to do is to find the source of our knowledge of what Christianity is, not in the Scriptures as such but rather in a certain body of contents which has been transmitted to us by Scripture. He seems to be under the impression that he does not thus desert the Protestant doctrine of the rule of faith, but only modifies it: not all Scripture but some Scripture is, he intimates, his formula. This is, however, plainly an illusion. He no longer appeals to Scripture at all as authority. What he appeals to is a certain sum of truths selected out of Scripture on the authority of something extraneous to Scripture. The most that can be said for Scripture is that it is the vehicle in which—along with much else—the items of Christian knowledge which in their sum constitute Christianity are conveyed to us. What assures us that these are genuine items of Christian knowledge is not that they are found in Scripture, but that they are gathered out of the heap of things found in Scripture by quite another magnet.

The magnet by which these items of Christian knowledge are gathered out of the dust heap of Scripture is sometimes described as spiritual tact (pp. 98, 170). This is explained to mean that the divine message that is in Scripture is "self-authenticating to those who meet it with a trustful mind and an obedient will" (pp. 76-7). When the need of a deeper ground of confidence is felt, it is found in "the testimony of the Holy Spirit" (pp. 70, 164, 165). And when something more objective is desiderated, a pragmatic test is suggested (p. 169). Perhaps no fuller statement is given than that embodied in the eloquent closing words of the volume, where we are told that Christianity has an absolute persuasion of its central doctrinal content, "which forms the soul and power of the Christian religion". The grounds of this full persuasion are suggested in the following series of sentences: "It passes down from generation to generation under the protection of experience and of God. It is accredited afresh from age to age by the fact that it is an engine for doing spiritual work of the most valuable kind, and that those who make use of it find that it makes good its promises. It is also authenticated by a conviction of its truth wrought in the hearts of those who live by it, which shows such strength, tenacity and energizing activity that they confidently interpret it as a gift of God through the testimony of the Holy Ghost" (p. 395). If we may venture to subject words which are so suffused with lofty feeling to a logical analysis, we may per-

haps be permitted to distinguish here three lines of evidence which, according to Professor Paterson, converge to give the Christian confidence in the central doctrinal content of Christianity. There is first the evidence from experience: the Christian has made trial of these truths and found in them salvation, and he perceives himself to be but one of a long series of men and women extending through the ages who have had the same blessed experience. The central truths of Christianity authenticate themselves and have always authenticated themselves by their blessed effects in human hearts. There is secondly the evidence of the observation of the effects of Christianity in the world,—the pragmatic proof: Christianity has transformed the world and continues to transform it wherever it is embraced—it obviously “works”. From a hint let drop (on p. 387), we may presume that Dr. Paterson has in mind here only the effects wrought in *the world*, in the amelioration of social conditions; and is not speaking “from an eschatological point of view”. And then, lastly, there is the “testimony of the Holy Spirit”, that is to say, as apparently expounded here (it is differently expounded elsewhere), a conviction of the truth of the central doctrinal content of Christianity arising in the soul, of such “strength, tenacity and energising activity” as suggests powerfully that it is God-given. On these three grounds, then, Christians are convinced that Christianity is true, in its central content. And in this central content they have in their hands a Rule of Faith. Whatever enters into this “central content”, that is Christianity. Whatever lies outside this “central content”, may or may not be true, may or may not be valuable; it is not of the essence of faith, and no one need be asked to believe it that he may be a Christian.

Surely no one will doubt that Christianity continuously authenticates itself by its blessed effects. And surely no one will doubt that we know that that is true Christianity which thus continuously authenticates itself by its effects. We may conceivably learn what is true Christianity therefore by analysis of that Christianity which “works”. Whatever is necessarily involved in the effects may be confidently assumed in the cause. Give me but the one assured fact, indeed, that I am saved through faith in Jesus Christ and make the content of this fact all that it really is in him who is really saved through faith in Jesus Christ, and I will draw out from this one fact by inference after inference—like the waves spreading out in ever increasing circles around a stone cast into the water—the entire body of the Calvinistic divinity. But that of course is only because unless the entire body of Calvinistic divinity were true I could not be saved through faith in Jesus Christ. Salvation by faith in Jesus Christ authenticates therefore the entire body of Calvinistic divinity. It surely will not do to tell me that my experience of salvation through faith in Jesus Christ authenticates nothing except my salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. I could not experience this salvation were not every thing true which is necessarily presupposed by it. But neither will it do to tell me that I can know the truth of these things only by inference back from this experience.

It might be truer to say that I will never have this experience until I know the truth of all these things at least implicitly. So long as I am not convinced of the truth of these things I shall never make experiment of salvation through faith in Jesus Christ. Shall I not ask, Who is He, Lord, that I may believe on Him? Shall I not argue, How shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in Him whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach except they be sent? Must I not have the knowledge before I exercise the faith, through which I gain the experience I am to analyse? And where am I to get this knowledge? This is the problem of the Rule of Faith. It is the question of the source of the knowledge acting on which I may be saved. It is all very well to tell a man that he may know his pump is a good one if it brings the water, and that he may learn therefore what kind of a pump is a good one by the simple experiment of trying all pumps and seeing which of them bring the water. That a pump brings the water is quite evidently proof enough that it is a good pump. But where will he find pumps that will bring water to him, unless the principles of suction on which alone pumps that will bring water must be constructed, are understood beforehand? The question is, on what rules shall pumps be constructed that they may bring water? And the question is on what rule shall the "Christianity" be constructed that will save? We can derive the one no more than the other from "experience". Theory precedes practice.

Professor Paterson has, in a word, lost sight of his problem in the course of his argumentation. His task is not to prove the truth of the Christian religion. His task is to point out whence we obtain knowledge of what the Christian religion consists of. That the Christian religion "works" is a very important fact: but the Christian religion must exist before it "works". It was brought into the world before it "worked", and it has "worked" on those who have never seen it "work" before, and who could not have learned its nature first from its "working". We may indeed be told, Try it and you will find that it will "work". Try what? Must we not be told what it is we are to try? And why should we try it on the mere chance of its "working"? Obviously we need an authoritative source of information as to what Christianity is, and the problem of that source is the problem of the Rule of Faith.

What Dr. Paterson has done is to shift the source of information from an objective to a subjective basis. For the "Schriftprinzip" of Protestantism he has substituted a "Geistprinzip"; and what he tells us in effect is merely that we may be sure that true Christianity is what we find effective Christianity to be: beyond that circle of truths which we find effective we need not bother ourselves. But thus we are cast upon a wide and uncertain sea and that utterly without chart, loadstar, or rudder. We must settle for ourselves what it is we would have done. We must settle for ourselves that this is effectively done. We must settle for ourselves what it is that

has done it. We must, in a word, invent our own Christianity. Professor Paterson merely takes his place in the great company of modern subjective writers in this matter. And so far as we have been able to see, despite the superior sanity of his judgment in passing on the several doctrines and the varying constructions which come before him, he has nothing to offer us in the way of a Rule of Faith superior to what other subjective writers have previously offered us. There is much in his book that is useful and admirably said; but it leaves us wholly without an objectively valid Rule of Faith. It is a great thing to know that there is a Christianity which propagates itself down the ages and "does its work", blessing the lives of men, filling them with deathless hope, assuring them of the favor of God. But when we ask what this Christianity producing all these great effects is,—what are its precise contents, what is its extent, what enters into it giving it its full power and ensuring its stability,—Professor Paterson can help us very little. He can only say: I can point you to some things which certainly stand at its center. But where can we learn it in its whole extent? This is the problem of the Rule of Faith, and it is an important problem; and Professor Paterson has no guidance to give us as to its solution.

Princeton.

BENJAMIN B. WARFIELD.

The Glory After the Passion. A study of the events in the life of our Lord from His Descent into Hell to His Enthronement in Heaven. By the REV. JAMES S. STONE, D.D., Rector of St. James's Church, Chicago. London: Longmans, Green and Co. 1913. Pp. 393.

This is the third volume of the series projected by the author. The first, *The Prayer Before The Passion*, was reviewed in these pages in October 1911. The second was entitled, *The Passion of Christ*. It is understood that the author is engaged at present on *The Preparation For The Passion*, in which he will deal with the question of the Pre-incarnate State of Our Lord, His Birth and His Earthly Ministry. The volume before us, like those preceding it, is written continuously, without the usual divisions into chapters, but, in the course of it, he covers the doctrine of Immortality, The Descent into Hell, The Resurrection, The Forty Days, The Ascension, The Session at the Right Hand of God, The Heavenly Priesthood and The Intercession. Another volume will deal with The Return of our Lord in Glory, The Resurrection of the Dead, The Judgment and the events which are to follow.

Dr. Stone is fully aware of the difficulty of his present task arising out of the tendencies of thought in our day (p. 375 ff). Modern conditions do not afford time for reflection. Churches are not without displays of energy but music and ritual are substitutes for devotion while philanthropy, building and mending civic and social conditions pass now for religion. The spirit of the age calls for action, not thought; for physical enterprise not for spiritual culture. "It is not the hardness of the doctrines that stands in the way but the trouble

it takes to think of them." Accordingly, it has become common that the events which befell our Lord after His Crucifixion are passed over as of no such consequence as His earthly life and those things which He did for the good of man while in the flesh. Yet the Gospel of the Apostles and Evangelists was based, not on the Sermon on the Mount nor upon any ethical teaching but on the fact that Jesus of Nazareth had risen from the dead. The Resurrection is the fundamental principle of Christianity. "Without this fact, there is no such religion as Christianity. The name loses its life and stands for nothing" (p. 383). In this analysis of present-day thought, Dr. Stone will be followed closely by everyone who interprets aright the Gospel and it is a hopeful sign that one so well prepared in mind and in heart has undertaken the task.

The volume opens with a clear recognition of the widely-spread disbelief in a life or consciousness after death (p. 7), involving the primary questions of the Future Life and of the nature of the Ego. The author shows that faith in a life after death has been universal among the nations and he well says that this faith, if worsted in argument, falls back on intuition and that that intuition remains firm and impregnable (p. 13). The mere fact of the other world, however, is not in itself sufficient and men inevitably will speculate upon its nature and upon the state of the dead, the primary distinction recognized being that given by the moral sense, namely as between the good and the evil. This, of course, suggests to the average man the need of preparation for that future state. Greater interest has been felt in the regions of torment than in the conception of Heaven. Dante's *Inferno*, for example, "is made as definite as an Ordnance map" (p. 23). Yet, despite this well-nigh universal belief, it was not easy in the days of our Lord, nor is it now, to secure the acceptance of the events which happened immediately after the Crucifixion, the difficulty arising not so much from the question as to their possibility as from the want of sufficient evidence. For this reason, Dr. Stone thinks there is needed some bias or tendency towards these truths and he deems Mysticism as helpful, when viewed as "an intuition, an instinctive, immediate apprehension" that "does not run contrary to reason and the senses" (p. 27). Mysticism, thus defined, seems to be put here instead of that spiritual apprehension of heavenly things, wrought in believers by the power of the Holy Spirit, triumphing over temperament, guiding our natural apprehensions and producing conviction in the minds of the most prosaic of men. Elsewhere, however, Dr. Stone distinctively recognizes the work of the Holy Spirit.

What impresses us as the unique feature of Dr. Stone's present volume is summed up in the opening sentence of his discussion of the Glory of our Lord:

In the Descent into Hell appears the beginning of that triumph of Jesus Christ which should increase, event after event and age after age, until the consummation, when the kingdoms of this world shall have become the Kingdom of our Lord and of His Christ (p. 33).

The author's purpose to exalt our Lord and to manifest His glory runs throughout the volume and none will admit this more readily than those who cannot accept all of his interpretations. The issue, of course, is joined in this opening sentence. Dr. Stone quotes the Westminster Catechism to show that our Lord continued under the power of death, but he overlooks the fact that the Westminster doctrine, which is the common evangelical doctrine, is that the Descensus was a part, the last stage, of the Humiliation of our Lord and not the first stage of His Glory. This primary difference colors the whole discussion. If the Descensus be the beginning of the Glory, it must be blessed, beautiful, glorious even as were the Resurrection and the Ascension and everything that suggests pain and shame and darkness must be put away as far as possible. This appears in nearly all of the striking passages in which Dr. Stone unfolds his interpretation. The following are examples:

In the Borderland of Hades, towards that Paradise into which Christ promised admittance to the penitent thief, may have been the hosts of saints of earlier dispensations waiting till the Christ should come to give them clearer light and greater happiness, waiting as "prisoners of hope" even as others less advanced in holiness than they, may have been retained in deeper gloom as "prisoners of fear". Some, too, may have been in that Underworld, who, like the multitudes swept away by the Flood, in this life, may not have heard or have apprehended the warnings addressed to them, in other words, may never have had a chance. These many sorts and conditions of men, uncondemned to eternal woe and yet incapable of heavenly joy, had no chance of release except through the victory of Christ.—That fringe or outskirts in Hades adjoining Paradise, in which the righteous waited for the coming of Christ before going into Heaven is called *Limbus Patrum*—The Borderland of the Fathers . . . Not into the Gehenna of condemned and lost souls did our blessed Lord descend, but into this realm of spirits waiting for redemption (p. 59-61).

Step by step, Dr. Stone unfolds this view and reverently points out the glory which he thinks it gives to our Lord. His view is what is known generally as the Patristic. Familiar as it is to students of Christian doctrine, it will be difficult to find anywhere a statement surpassing this one for the combination of reverence, self-restraint and tolerance. The effect upon the casual reader is likely to be that, after this, there is nothing more to be said and that the volume brings to the modern Church a great discovery. This makes it the more needful to consider the facts adduced by Dr. Stone and some others which he does not mention that thereby we may understand, as far as possible, the significance of that mysterious period in the history of our Lord.

Dr. Stone is careful to distinguish the doctrine of the Limbus, as he holds it from that of Purgatory or a Second Probation or a Universal Restitution. His moderation has excited severe criticism from high-Anglican reviewers in this country and in England. He frankly states that his view is "not an article of faith" (p. 61) and that no authority "binds the individual to accept any interpretation of a fact which the Church has not thought possible of a definition" (p. 95).

His conclusions, therefore, are all stated cautiously, as the expression of a hope rather than of an assured conviction, as what may be rather than as what is. He even entitles the climax of his discussion "a short journey into the wilderness of conjecture" (p. 96). There is, of course, good reason for this caution. While it is claimed that the early Church held this view of the Descensus, it is admitted by Dr. Stone that the article in the Apostle's Creed is a late addition used first in the Church of Aquileia and dating from about the fifth century. It appears further that, where the phrase occurs, there is no mention of the burial of Christ, as if the one phrase in some sense took the place of the other. Later creeds refrain from a definition of the Descensus. The question ought to be held as at best one for private judgment, although many of the writers quoted by Dr. Stone are not so cautious as he. Dean Alford, for example, is so fixed in his opinion that he lays it down as an ultimatum that, on any other interpretation, "exegesis has no longer any fixed rule, and Scripture may be made to prove anything".

Dr. Stone quotes freely from the formidable list of authorities supporting his view. To these may be added the late Dr. Briggs, whose conclusions in their final form are given in the volume published recently, *The Fundamental Christian Faith*. He endorses the view held by Dr. Stone as "the only sound interpretation" (p. 129) but he gives none of the reasons on which he bases this statement. Dr. Stone is only fair in quoting from those who repeat his theory, such as Dr. Isaac Barrow, Bishop Burnet, Rev. Wm. Perkins. He quotes also from Calvin, as if approvingly. His mention of Calvin raises the question of that Reformer's views, but, for the present, it must suffice to say that, in the very chapter quoted by Dr. Stone, Calvin calls the doctrine of the Limbus "a fable. To conclude from it that the souls of the dead are in prison is childish." (Institutes ii, p. 59.) Among modern scholars, Bishop Westcott is quoted in his statement that the Patristic interpretation rests on "too precarious a foundation to claim general acceptance" (p. 57). The limits of space doubtless prevented Dr. Stone from outlining the reasonings of such authors as Bishop Pearson of the older school, Bishop Moule, Dr. Charles Hodge, Dr. A. A. Hodge and Principal Salmond among modern scholars. That the issue may be clearly seen, we quote from Bishop Pearson, as thorough an Anglican in his day, as Dr. Stone is in ours. His massive work, *An Exposition of the Creed*, although published in 1659 has not yet been superseded and in the language of that day sets forth what we conceive to be the evangelical belief of our day:

Wherefore, being it is most infallibly certain that the death of Christ was as powerful and effectual for the redemption of the saints before Him, as for those which followed Him. . . . I cannot admit this as the end of Christ's Descent into Hell, to convey the souls of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob and those which were with them from thence, nor can I think there was any reference to such an action in the word "Thou shalt not leave my soul in Hell." (Ed. London 1824, p. 406-407.)

The soul of Christ, really separated from His body by death,

did truly pass unto the places below, where the souls of men departed were and I conceive the end for which He did so, was that He might undergo the condition of a dead man as well as of a living. . . . His body was laid in a grave, as ordinarily the bodies of dead men are; His soul was conveyed into such receptacles as the souls of other persons use to be. . . . By the Descent of Christ into Hell, all those which believe in Him are secured from descending thither; He went into these regions of darkness, that our souls might never come into those torments which are there. By His Descent, He freed us from our fears, as by His Ascension, He secured us of our hopes" (*ibid.*, pp. 412-413).

The question at issue is, of course, primarily as to the teaching of Scripture. Dr. Stone recognizes this by quoting a number of passages but his discussion of them is very brief. He quotes freely from the Patristic literature, from the apocryphal gospels, from the mystery plays and other writings, all of which are interesting but not decisive. The general question of the Descensus has been for so long before the Church and the lines of discussion are so well marked that any one who is reasonably familiar with the subject should be able to indicate sufficiently the points needing to be observed in arriving at a conclusion.

The Scriptural foundation for the Patristic view is a composite of a number of passages, which, woven together, seem to read thus: Our Lord at His death descended into the abyss (Rom. x. 7) but God did not leave his soul in Hades neither did His flesh see corruption (Ps. xvi. 10, Acts ii. 27, 31): He suffered for sins that He might bring us to God, being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit; by which also He went and preached unto the spirits in prison; which sometimes were disobedient (1 Peter iii. 18, 20): The Gospel was preached to them that are dead that they might be judged according to men in the flesh but live according to God in the spirit (1 Peter iv. 6). Read thus, the teaching seems very clear and the dogmatic tone from which Dr. Stone is so free, seems to have ample warrant. When we analyze the passages, the case is different. Among them, the Petrine passages are central and the fact that in one, the sermon at Pentecost, Peter is the speaker and Luke the reporter, while in the other two Peter himself is the writer, ought not to lessen our recognition of the common origin of the three. His teaching seems to be that Ps. xvi. 10 was fulfilled, not in David, but in Christ, whose Resurrection was spoken of there in that His soul was not left in Hell neither did His flesh see corruption. The triumphant word "This Jesus hath God raised up" was the keynote of Peter's sermon, after which three thousand souls were added to the number of the disciples. Not a word is said in this Pentecostal sermon about Christ's preaching either to the living or to the dead, the emphasis being entirely upon His Resurrection. As to where our Lord was during those days and as to what He did, we do not know, because Scripture is silent. Dr. Morris well says that the Westminster divines, by the phrase 'under the power of death for a time' (L. C. qu. 51), "happily interpreted the ancient and perplexing expression,

He descended into Hell. Where the spirit of the Lord was during that period, or how He was occupied has never been revealed. . . . All that we truly know is that both body and spirit remained in the condition into which the tragic death had introduced them, and in that sense remained under the power of death until the glad moment of the Resurrection arrived." (*Theology of the Westminster Standards*, pp. 346, 347.) Dr. Swete, whose sympathies are apparently with the Patristic view goes no further than to call it "an apostolic belief which affirms that the Incarnate Son consecrated by His presence the condition of departed souls". (*Apostles Creed* p. 62). On this, of course, there is no controversy.

Thirty years elapsed after the sermon at Pentecost and then this same Apostle wrote his First Epistle to the Diaspora in which he speaks of our Lord preaching to spirits, who were then in prison and of the Gospel having been preached to them that are now dead but he makes no mention of the Descensus. In view of the fact that the circumstances in which each utterance was made are so different and of the long space of time which elapsed between them, dare we read them as one or even as connected together? Further even the two passages in the First Epistle are not connected sufficiently together to warrant the belief that they treat of the same subject. In the one, the preaching is that of our Lord, in the other our Lord is not named as the preacher. It is significant that Bishop Bilson, quoted by Dr. Stone, held that neither passage in the Epistle was pertinent to the Descensus (p. 57), and further that Dr. Chas. Hodge in his two discussions of the subject does not even mention 1 Peter iv. 6. (*Systematic Theology* II, p. 618, III, p. 736.)

Dr. Swete (*op. cit.* p. 58) is candid enough to say "Nor is there any considerable evidence that either of these passages influence the thought of the second century . . . on the whole, it is scarcely possible to account for the early legends of the Descensus by supposing them to be based upon reminiscences of St. Peter's words". The more closely this composite is examined, the less warrant appears for reading these passages as if they were one or even as if they dealt with the same subject. The doctrine of the Limbus seems to rest upon inferences only and these inferences have their real origin in a Rabbinical or Patristic belief outside of the Scripture itself.

This will appear readily upon an examination of the passages in the First Epistle of Peter. The Epistle itself was written somewhere between A.D. 59-68, probably about 64, during the Neronian persecutions. It was addressed to Christians throughout the Empire who had now come to expect the worst. They were facing death for Christ's sake. The allusions to martyrdom are unmistakeable, the warnings against their enemies are emphatic and the call to Christian endurance is sounded again and again. In a practical epistle, addressed to living men and women to meet a present want in their lives, it is needful to show very strong reasons why the Apostle

should suddenly turn from his subject to discuss the state of disembodied souls and their relation to the Gospel of Christ. It is not enough that many scholarly men are inclined to believe that these two passages admit of the Patristic interpretation or even that they positively teach it. It is required by every rule of interpretation that this strange departure from the subject in hand be accounted for. This has not been done. The verses are taken as standing alone and apart from their context, a mistake which modern scholarship has often pointed out in other connections.

Further, the interpretation of 1 Peter iii. 19 that our Lord after His death exercised a ministry of grace in Hades by preaching to disembodied spirits which were imprisoned there because of their disobedience can be made to cover the doctrine of the Limbus only on conditions which seem to be impossible. One is that the patriarchs who were in the Limbus were "the spirits in prison which sometime were disobedient". Another is that the preceding verse, closing with the word "quickened by the Spirit", can be made to apply to the state of our Lord after His Death rather than to His state after His Resurrection. Still another condition is that, granting that "the spirits in prison" referred to the "disobedient" men of Noah's time who refused to listen to His preaching, they can be classified, in the language of Dr. Stone, as "uncondemned to eternal woe and yet incapable of heavenly joy" (p. 60). It would also be necessary to show wherein these men of Noah's time were worthy of a special visitation and wherein they had less "chance" (p. 60) than multitudes of others. For these reasons, the interpretation held in one form or another by Augustine, Aquinas, Bede, Beza, Turretin and among recent writers by Hofmann, Schweitzer and Salmond seems almost forced upon us. In the language of Principal Salmond: "It refers the scene of the preaching to earth instead of Hades, and the time of the preaching to Noah's day instead of the period between Christ's Death and the Resurrection. It takes the preacher to have been Christ Himself in His pre-incarnate activity, and the preaching to have been in the form of the divine warnings of the time, the spectacle of the building of the Ark, and the various tokens of God's long-suffering." Thus understood, the words mean: "Reflect, how then, too, our Lord acted in this gracious way, how He went and preached to the guilty generation of the Flood, making known to those grossest of wrong doers, by the spectacle of the ark a-building, the word of His servant Noah, and the varied warnings of the time, His will to save them." (*Christian Doctrine of Immortality*, p. 472.)

Further still, the "dead" to whom the Gospel was "preached" in iv. 6 are, under the Patristic view, assumed to be the "dead" of the verse preceding, the inference being that men condemned for their sins were afforded by the Hades ministry of our Lord an opportunity to repent and be saved. Yet nothing is said in this chapter of the Descensus or of the preaching of our Lord and the dead of verse 5 are those who shall be found dead at the last day and shall then appear before God, while the dead of verse 6 are those who suffered

death for their witness to Christ. The verb rendered "judged" has a definite judicial significance. It is, as Dr. West points out, the sentence of death pronounced by a human court, consequent on a criminal accusation. It indicates, therefore, those who had suffered death for their profession of the Gospel, especially those who went to martyrdom for Jesus' sake in the Neronian persecutions. (*Princeton Review*, 1878, p. 470.) Their's was a death as to the body, while they lived according to God in their spirits, a life which no human court could take away. Their fate was notice to the Christians of Peter's time as to what they might expect. The disciple is not above his Master and he ought not to expect to be above his fellow-disciples. Steadfastness in the faith brings the "judgment" of men and often death as its earthly reward. The Apostle would prepare his readers for what awaited them.

This outline is perhaps sufficient to indicate that, despite the formidable authorities behind it, grave difficulties attend the Patristic interpretation. Clearly, it is not as some have claimed the only possible view. Granting that, because of the eminence of the scholars who have espoused it, it is a possible view, it is needful to inquire whether it be the most probable view and the probabilities in the case are to be based not only on the interpretation of the individual passages but also on the Analogy of Faith. That is, even if one incline to the Patristic view of these passages, he has to meet the questions arising out of the general teaching of Scripture with which the Patristic view is in conflict. The question then is, Shall we overturn the general teaching of Scripture for the sake of a dubious interpretation of certain passages or shall we seek an interpretation of these passages which harmonizes with this general teaching? There is little doubt as to the answer which the great body of Christian believers will give to this alternative. The Analogy of Faith is against the Patristic view of the Descensus in at least three particulars:

(a) Those believers who died before Christ came, such as the patriarchs, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, are represented in Scripture as, not in a Limbus but in Paradise, in Heaven, in Glory, that is, in the presence of God. Nowhere else is it even suggested that they are "in prison". The Westminster Shorter Catechism, with other Reformed symbols, makes no distinction between believers before and believers after the coming of Christ as to their blessedness, but says: The souls of believers are at their death made perfect in holiness and do immediately pass into glory, and their bodies, being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the Resurrection (qu. 37). More fully, the Larger Catechism, from which Dr. Stone quotes, says "The communion and glory with Christ, which the members of the Invisible Church enjoy immediately after death, is in that their souls are then made perfect in holiness, and received into the highest heavens, where they behold the face of God in light and glory; waiting for the full redemption of their bodies, etc." (q. 86). As to the distinctions between Paradise, Abraham's Bosom, Heaven and the Highest Heavens, the Westminster Confession states the faith of

evangelical Christians that, besides the two places for souls separated from their bodies, Heaven for the righteous and Hell for the wicked, "the Scripture acknowledgeth none" (xxx. 1).

(b) The Gospel is represented in Scripture as exercising its salutary influences upon man from the beginning of time. The first Gospel promise was to the first man; Abel, the first martyr, "by faith" offered a more excellent sacrifice than Cain; Enoch walked with God and was not, having been translated that he should not see death; Abraham believed God and "rejoiced to see my day" said our Lord; Moses "wrote of Me" said our Lord and he esteemed "the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures in Egypt"; the Israelites drank of that rock that followed them and "that rock was Christ"; David "spake before of the Resurrection of Christ"; Isaiah's prophecies read like history; the Apostle Peter tells us in this very Epistle that the prophets searched diligently as to what or what manner of time the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify, when it testified before-hand the sufferings of Christ and the glory that should follow (i. 10-11). Old Testament saints by faith looked forward to Him to whom by faith we look back. The Glory of Christ was revealed, not in a Descensus to release spirits held in prison because He had not come before, but in that far reach of His salvation, back to the very beginning of time, so that they who foresaw and believed on Him entered into the same blessedness with those of our day who are "asleep in Jesus". The communion of saints in the Glory above is unmarred by distinctions as to the dispensations under which they lived.

(c) The responsibility of those who die out of Christ for their eternal destiny is clearly recognized throughout Scripture. Of those who lived under the Old Testament dispensation, our Lord spoke when, in the parable of Dives and Lazarus, He represents Abraham as saying: If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead (Lk. xvi. 31). The Apostle Paul, presenting the case of Jew and Gentile says that the law was given that every mouth may be stopped, and all the world may become guilty before God (Rom. iii. 19). There is no warrant for the theory that it was needful for our Lord to preach to the dead in order to make good the lack of mercy in the lives of men at any period of the world's history, or to afford them the "chance" which was denied them on earth. This theory reaches far beyond the use made of it by Dr. Stone. Dr. Briggs (*op. cit.* p. 130) says: "If the Gospel was preached to them (the wicked antediluvians) certainly to others less wicked than they and also certainly not in vain." Dr. Briggs, however, does not, in this last volume, enlarge upon his distinctive doctrine of the Middle State. Dr. Stone expressly repudiates the doctrines of a Second Probation and Universal Restitution, but he will not deny that his interpretation does duty for both of these. These theories are very attractive to men who would excuse themselves before God or complain that He has not dealt justly with them. Men, whether under the light of revelation or not, are not

unfortunates, badly treated by a cruel or neglectful God, but sinners who shall give account for the deeds done in the body. This solemn truth, so often overlooked to-day, lies at the base of the Gospel call to repentance and salvation by faith in Christ.

For these reasons, the interpretation of the Descensus given by Dr. Stone, cannot, we think, be approved.

It is greatly to be regretted that the limits of space forbid us to enlarge upon the later portions of Dr. Stone's volume. They will commend themselves to devout believers. We must be content with one quotation which illustrates his penetration and his reverent understanding in the things of Christ:

We may think therefore of our great High Priest, in the glory of the Eternal Presence, the ever-living Witness as well as the Author of Salvation. By His presence there, He pleads for those who have come unto God through Him. It is not necessary that He should utter words or perform rites as do earthly ministrants: He Himself is both Intercessor and Intercession. And this not in one act, but by a continuous and unceasing service. He ever liveth. That sinners cannot be saved without His death, is generally admitted; but it is equally true, that believers cannot be kept safe without His life following that death. It was not enough that He should fight the battle of the Cross, and leave us to avail ourselves of its victory; or, by His wonderful example and faithfulness unto the end, lay a foundation for us to build upon: and then ascend into the heavens to enjoy His glory. Man needs His continual help: not only pardon for sin, but protection against the temptations and adversities of this world. Less than this will not save unto the uttermost, i.e., wholly and completely, to the extinction of every element or trait that alienates us from God" (pp. 360, 361).

It is earnestly to be hoped that the purpose of Dr. Stone to arrest the attention of the present-day Church to the great facts following upon the death of our Lord will be crowned with success and that a new devotion to Him will be vouchsafed us all. We will await the promised volumes of Dr. Stone with much interest.

Chicago.

W. S. PLUMER BRYAN.

Socialism: Its Strength, Weakness, Problems and Future. By ALFRED RAYMOND JOHNS. New York: Eaton & Mains; Cincinnati: Jennings & Graham. 8vo; pp. 75. 50 cents net.

The title of this booklet indicates its scope, but gives no indication of its excellence. Brief though it is, it would be difficult to conceive of a clearer, fairer, more striking and more comprehensive presentation. Mr. Johns writes sympathetically. He predicts for Socialism a great and growing influence. He outlines that influence correctly, as we think, and most instructively. It is, therefore, significant when he concludes from a study of its propaganda that "Socialism can never be realized in all its fullness; and that it is visionary, impractical, impossible." We would go further. Socialism impresses us, as essentially irreligious, as essentially unjust, as essentially absurd. It is irreligious, because it would put the state in the place of God and would have the

government override providence. It is unjust, because its aim is to treat all as nearly alike as possible; and because there is no injustice so great as that of treating unequals as if they were equal. It is absurd, because "it is an attempt to make the world better without making men better". We cannot, therefore, agree with Mr. Stelzle when he says "that a man has a perfect right to be a Socialist, if he is convinced that Socialism is morally and economically sound". No one has a right to be convinced that a system is morally and economically sound which is essentially irreligious, unjust and absurd.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PRACTICAL THEOLOGY

Life's Unexpected Issues and Other Papers on Character and Conduct.

By WILLIAM L. WATKINSON, D.D., LL.D., author of "The Fatal Barter", "The Bane and the Antidote", "The Blind Spot", etc.
New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 212.
\$1.00 net.

A volume of sermons by this celebrated preacher always makes delightful and profitable reading. These seventeen discourses are thoroughly characteristic of his homiletic art. They reveal an unusual intellectual versatility and breadth, combined with tender spiritual fervor and exquisite graces of style. The venerable editor and preacher gleans from many fields of literature and makes the scientific study of nature yield a wealth of strikingly apt illustrations. He has an uncommon power of drawing novel and instructive lessons from familiar texts.

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FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The James Sprunt Lectures delivered at Union Theological Seminary in Virginia. *The Sermon: Its Construction and Delivery.* By DAVID JAMES BURRELL, D.D., LL.D., Pastor Marble Collegiate Church, New York. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1913. 8vo; cloth, pp. 329. \$1.50 net.

"This book is made up, for the most part", says the Preface, "of material used in Princeton Theological Seminary, where the author recently supplied a four years' vacancy in the chair of Homiletics. The lectures . . . were afterwards revised and committed to writing for use in other seminaries and ministerial associations. They have been still further revised and reduced to their present form to meet the requirements of the James Sprunt Lectureship in the Union Theological Seminary of Richmond, Va."

The introductory chapter is an incisive discussion of the definition of the sermon, "an address to a congregation on the subject of religion from the standpoint of the Scriptures, with the purpose of persuading men". The seven main divisions of the work are devoted to the con-

sideration of the following subjects: Texts and Topics; The Outline of the Sermon (with an excellent treatment of textual and expository outlines, and a well illustrated discussion of topical outlines with special reference to ethical, doctrinal, historical, biographical, and evangelistic sermons); The Body of the Sermon (presented under the three heads, the exordium, the argument, and the peroration); The Forensic or Finished Discourse (style, illustration, humor in the pulpit); The Delivery of the Sermon; Getting Attention; Pulpit Power (its secret; Christ our model).

In this manual on preaching, as in his own sermons, Dr. Burrell treats everything in a fresh, vital, practical way. The fundamental principles of effective sermonizing are clearly stated, admirably illustrated, and convincingly applied to the many details of the preacher's art. The suggestions and counsels given at the conclusion of most of the chapters are invariably judicious and helpful, while the many quotations from other homiletic works will serve to stimulate the reader to consult the best literature on special phases of the subject.

The chapters on illustration and delivery are especially suggestive, and valuable, but the whole book will well repay the preacher and the theological student for the careful perusal of its pages. An acknowledged master of the pulpit here gives us the wisdom of a lifetime of devoted and most successful service in the ministry of the Word.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Efficient Religion. By GEORGE ARTHUR ANDREWS, author of "What is Essential". New York: George H. Doran Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 178. \$1.00 net

Accepting the utilitarian temper of our age as one of its most important characteristics, the author undertakes to answer the question, "What is the use of the religion of Jesus? What is it good for? What can it do?" The writer makes no attempt at an exhaustive exhibition of the evidence, but rather, assuming its adequacy, suggests a basis in reason for our practical acceptance of the claims of the Gospel. The argument, stated summarily, is that a Christian is a man who has a "profitable faith", "practicable love", "prevailing prayer", "loving forgiveness", "abundant health", "sufficient consolation", "sustaining strength", "satisfying joy", "attainable peace", and "achieving power". The spirit of the discussions may be fairly inferred from the statement that the religion of Jesus must be rescued "from the realm of intellectual thought" and brought "into the realm of efficient action". In the sequel we find the author tarrying about as long in the former as in the latter sphere, for he must needs offer us his own "concepts" and "speculations" as to the truths he wishes us to adopt as principles of conduct. But in spite of this treacherous antithesis between thought and life, he presents a great deal of truth that every Christian can verify in his own experience.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Ministry of the Word. By the REV. W. C. E. NEWBOLT, M.A., Canon and Chancellor of St. Paul's Cathedral. London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1913. 12mo; pp. vi, 135. 90 cents net.

The title of this volume is rather too general to suit the specific aim of the author, which is to show "that words spoken from the pulpit are first and foremost a message from God; and that therefore the spiritual storing of the heart and mind is the main and most pressing requisite for the preacher". The whole subject is viewed from the spiritual side, and the stress is laid upon the personal qualifications of the minister for his high calling and upon the means to be used in securing these. The author speaks out of a strong conviction, in which many, if not most, of his readers will agree with him, that "preaching at the present moment seems to be suffering from a contemptuous disparagement in those who hear, and from a misunderstanding on the part of those who speak", and that the remedy for both evils can be found only in a return to a more biblical conception of the work of the ministry.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Modern Christianity Or The Plain Gospel Modernly Expounded. By JOHN P. PETERS, Ph.D., Sc.D., D.D. Rector of St. Michael's Church, New York, and Canon Residentiary of the Cathedral of St. John the Divine New York; G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1909. 12mo; pp. viii, 323.

Modern Christianity, if one were to judge from this volume of sermons, is a rather vague affair, and, so far as it is here clearly interpreted, a much poorer and far less attractive boon than that which the New Testament offers us. Dr. Peters divides his discourses into two parts—nineteen on "Doctrines of the Church" and eight on "The Social Teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ", a division of material that hardly permits the doing of justice to either part. As a matter of fact Christianity in these pages offers us little more than an ideal, good and true enough for many practical purposes, but needing for its realization somewhat more of divine grace than is here proclaimed. We admire the fearlessness and the directness with which these parish sermons enforce the ethical teachings of the Gospel, but we sadly miss the sweetest and most comforting notes that even the modern sinner must hear if the salvation of Christ is to be good news.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

Expository Preaching: Plans and Methods. By REV. F. B. MEYER, B.A. New York: George H. Doran Company. 1910. 12mo; pp. vi, 141. \$1.00 net.

Mr. Meyer makes a noble and forceful plea for a larger use of the expository method of preaching and gives many helpful directions for the attainment of success in this department of the minister's work. Each of the six chapters is followed by an expository sermon of the author's in which he illustrates the leading points emphasized in the

discussions. The book merits the attention of all who are interested, and yet more the attention of those who are not but ought to be interested, in this method of preaching.

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Cole Lectures for 1912 delivered before Vanderbilt University. *What Does Christianity Mean?* By WILLIAM HERBERT PERRY FAUNCE, President of Brown University. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. 1912. 12mo; pp. 245.

The first of these six lectures, on "The Essence of Christianity", lays the foundation for the rest. President Faunce defines Christianity, first negatively and then positively. It is not ritual; it is not a series of propositions; it is not history; it is not a series of good deeds to be done or bad deeds to be avoided; it is purpose; more specifically, it is "the revelation through Jesus of Nazareth of the eternal unchanging purpose of God, and the developing of that same purpose in the lives and institutions of men." In this statement all the other ideas of the lectures—as we may summarize them by the use of the title-words—are implicated: "the meaning of God", "the basis and test of character", "the principle of fellowship", "the aim of education", "the goal of our efforts".

Dr. Faunce writes with great clearness and power, and his book is an able attempt, by one manifestly reared upon the basis of evangelical truth, to mediate between the traditional and the now widely prevalent anti-supernaturalistic conception of Christianity.

The author has some misgivings, indeed, as to the issue of his endeavor to fashion a unifying view of the conflicting ideas. He fears that he can succeed only by sacrificing what some consider vital. "We must leave many cars standing on side-tracks if we are to keep the main line open for through trains. Some men will doubtless mourn that their private car was left on a siding." Our grief, rather, is that this main line is not satisfactory either in the glimpses it gives us of the King's realm as we sit by the window or in the guarantees it furnishes that we shall, even at the terminal, see the sort of King we had hoped for. "Justification by faith is simply"—the italics are the author's—"classification by fundamental intention and tendency." . . . "It is the clear apprehension and affirmation, that he who steadily intends righteousness is righteous, and should he classed with righteous men." But what, after all, is the standard of righteousness and what has "Jesus of Nazareth" to do with our "steadily intending" righteousness? Far more satisfactory to us is Luther's doctrine of justification by faith, which Dr. Faunce himself, by a happy inconsistency, commends to us as the "bulwark of moral reform, the hope of every soul on life's moral battlefield".

Quite unworthy of the book as a whole is the erroneous assertion (p. 214), "No Hebrew prophet, and only one New Testament apostle, makes any reference to the Garden of Eden".

Princeton.

FREDERICK W. LOETSCHER.

The Renaissance of Faith. By the Reverend RICHARD ROBERTS. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 318. \$1.50 net.

This volume may be defined as a plea for the recovery of a sound spiritual idealism. The present forgetfulness of God, selfishness, shallowness of thought, and "dismemberment of life", are traced to "the evil seed of materialism"; and the "tyranny of things", the impotence of science to give relief, the insolvency of organized religion, the evil results of imperfect methods of religious instruction, are shown to be demanding a remedy which can be found only in a renaissance of faith.

Such a renaissance the author ventures to predict. The prophecy is based upon the general theory that, in spite of occasional declensions and depressions, the movement of the race is upward, and upon the special considerations of the present spirit of unrest, the feeling of brotherhood, the efforts for international peace, and the vogue of Rudolf Eucken. While some may desire more sure grounds for prediction, and may differ from certain theological implications, no one can fail to appreciate the cleverness, charm and seriousness of the writer, nor to share with him the hope that an increasingly spiritual view of Christianity may result in a wider evangelism, an awakened social conscience, in a broad missionary vision, and a larger liberty of belief. Many readers will be awakened to a truer conception of the critical character of modern moral, social and religious conditions.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Second Book of the Kings. The Smaller Cambridge Bible for Schools. New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 184. Map. 30 cents net.

The Second Book of Samuel. The Revised Version, edited for the use of schools. Cambridge University Press. Imported by G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 101. Map. 50 cents net.

These two small commentaries contain explanatory notes which are brief but helpful. It may be questioned whether, in volumes intended for the youngest students, it is wise to introduce such alleged results of biblical criticism as are suggested in the introductory chapters. However the larger portion of the work will be of unquestioned value to all readers of these Old Testament narratives.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Gospels. By the REV. LEIGHTON PULLAN, Fellow and Tutor of S. John Baptists' College Oxford. London and New York: Longmans, Green and Co. Cloth. Crown 8vo; pp. 323. 5 shillings.

This volume forms a part of "The Oxford Library of Practical Theology", edited by the Rev. W. C. E. Newbolt, M.A., and the Rev. Darwell Stone, D.D., and designed to supply to devout laymen sound and readable instruction on the subjects included under the common title "The Christian Religion". This purpose has been kept in view by

the author of these studies in the field of New Testament criticism. While suggesting the main problems presented by modern scholarship, the discussion is free from unnecessary technicalities, and deals with questions which bear most vitally on the Person and teaching of Christ.

In discussing the "Canon of the Gospels" the writer concludes that the church was convinced, by A.D. 150 at latest, that all four were authentic, and that their record was true. As to the "Criticism of the Gospels" he shows how much less serious are the difficulties presented by "enlightened orthodoxy" than those of "liberal Protestantism" or "Judeo-German rationalism".

Dealing with the "Synoptic Problem" the popular modern critical theory of the composite origin of these gospels is accepted, but stated in no dogmatic spirit; as to the documents used exact knowledge is declared to be impossible. Matthew and Luke are said to be based upon Mark and on the document commonly denoted by the symbol Q. This document was known to Mark but little used by him. Luke, in addition to Mark and Q employed another important source denoted by the symbol S. The discussion is not convincing, but will reveal to the layman the more usual and conservative of modern critical processes, and serves to emphasize, aside from the theories and conjectures involved, certain unquestioned features and characteristics of the Gospels. Yet it again and again seems that apparent but not real differences are so construed as to be contradictions, and that the real problems could be solved by methods less intricate and conjectural.

As to the fourth Gospel the author ably defends the view that it was written by John, at Ephesus, and that the Christ of John was no creation of fancy nor a "Christ of experience", but the veritable Christ of history.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Most Beautiful Book Ever Written. By D. A. HAYES, Professor of New Testament Interpretation in the Graduate School of Theology, Garrett Biblical Institute. New York: Eaton & Mains. Cloth. 12mo; pp. viii, 183. 75 cents net.

As a title for this book, the author has adopted the phrase by which Renan described the third Gospel. In fact, the author and character of "*The Gospel according to Luke*" are the themes under discussion. Controversial points are avoided, but by means of historic statements, traditions and conjecture, all that is possible has been done to make real and vivid the life and character of "the beloved physician". While the Person and work of Christ are not made to stand out as impressively as may be possible in such a study, the peculiar features of the Gospel narrative are set forth clearly and suggestively, and are shown to have been determined by the characteristics of the beautiful soul by which the "Book Beautiful" was composed.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Miscellanies. By AUGUSTUS HOPKINS STRONG, D.D., LL.D., Ex-President of Rochester Theological Seminary. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 493, 504. \$1.00 per volume.

These two beautiful volumes form a collection of essays, sermons and addresses which embody much of the ripest thought and scholarship of the distinguished author. The first volume contains addresses and essays which are chiefly historical; the second volume is mainly theological. The former deals in part with the history and character of the Baptist denomination; but all the contents of the two volumes are of interest to anyone who is concerned with the faith and progress of the Christian Church. These essays, published in this attractive form, are a crown to the long years of fruitful service in the sphere of literary and theological production in which the author has been so conspicuous.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Report of Proceedings. The Second Quadrennial Council of the Federal Council of The Churches of Christ in America. New York: 215 Fifth Ave. Paper. 8vo; pp. 140.

Christian Unity at Work. Cloth. 8vo; pp. 291. \$1.00 net.

These two volumes contain a full account of the second meeting of the Federal Council held in Chicago, December 4-9, 1912. The first, in pamphlet form, gives the minutes of the Council, the reports of committees, the lists of delegates. The second, a well-printed and edited volume, presents the substance of all the addresses delivered at the various sessions of the Council. These are grouped under the three heads: "Christian Unity in Conference", "Christian Unity in the Work of the Church", "Christian Unity and the Social Order".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Vicar's Excursion. By DU BOIS H. LOUX. New York: The Worker's Press. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 159.

This is a pathetic fragment of autobiography. The writer is a graduate of Wooster University and of McCormick Theological Seminary. He served as pastor of the Campbell Park Church, and of Crerar Chapel, Chicago. He assisted Dr. Jefferson in New York, and was minister of the Old Centre Church of Meriden, Conn. Excepting his experience in New York, he feels he has been cruelly abused because of his peculiar loyalty to Christ, that he has "been hounded out of one position and thwarted in his efforts to obtain another". He is convinced that the church misrepresents the social principles of Christ, but he is resolved to prove himself true to his Christian stewardship in spite of the martyrdom he is suffering at the hands of a "commercialized" "ecclesiasticism". Those unacquainted with all the facts will read this arraignment of the church with no doubt as to the sincerity and devotion of the author, but not without some question as to the wisdom and charity of his judgments.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Religious Unrest and Its Remedy. By JAMES A. ANDERSON, D.D., LL.D.
New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 128.
75 cents net.

The causes of present theological unrest are found in modern freedom of thought and eagerness for investigation, in the discoveries of science, in the acceptance of the theory of evolution and the results of Biblical criticism. The remedy suggested is in the acceptance of the fact of Jesus Christ. More than is necessary may be conceded as to the possible defects of Scripture, but the historicity of the Gospels is defended, and the claims of Christ are vindicated on the grounds of his power in human history, and in the lives of individual men, by the testimony of Christian experience and the admissions of unbelievers. The discussion ends with an appeal to a complete abandonment of self to the transforming power of Christ.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Endeavors After the Spirit of Religion. By ARTHUR G. BEACH. Boston: Sherman, French & Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 124.
\$1.00 net.

According to the author all religions are merely human in their origin, and it is therefore the privilege, if not the duty of every man, to create for himself a religion which accords with his own tastes. One is warned to expect little help from what was believed in the days of Augustine or of Bunyan, but encouraged to consider what is believed to-day. To aid in this construction of a personal religion the author makes certain kindly suggestions relative to the elements he has discovered as common to all religions. He intimates the kind of a God we should make for ourselves, and expresses himself as confident that we shall yet be able to shape our modern conception of God into one which shall satisfy the heart as well as the head. Even though Jesus lived long ago he is conceded to have been of some aid to religion, specifically in giving an example of confident and buoyant faith. However, in spite of such elements, these essays are less interesting than might be supposed.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Methods of The Master. By GEORGE CLARKE PECK, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 207.
\$1.00 net.

These essays are admirable in their style and valuable in their substance. In terse, striking sentences, bright with illustrations, the author shows how conclusively our Lord dealt with problems which are modern because they are timeless. Among these great problems are those of "Finding God", "Doubt", "Sin", "Salvation", "Poverty", "Divorce", "The Sabbath", "Sickness", "Conflicting Duties", "Sorrow", "The Future", "Jesus Christ". The very titles of these chapters are as attractive as they are familiar; but the treatment of each theme is original, suggestive, stimulating.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Concerning Them That Are Asleep. By DANIEL HOFFMAN MARTIN.
Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Boards. 12mo; pp. 74.
50 cents.

This beautiful little volume sets forth the teaching of Scripture relative to "the blessed dead". The chapters answer the following questions, or suggest light on these problems: Does death end all? Is death to be dreaded? With what manner of body do they come? Shall we recognize our friends in the future? What is the meaning of sorrow? The truths set forth will bring comfort to many hearts.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Church Triumphant. By the REV. LUCIEN ADELBERT DAVISON.
Milwaukee: The Young Churchman Co. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 115.
\$1.00 net.

It is refreshing to read the confident statements of the author relative to the infallible authority of the Scriptures, and interesting to note his assured conviction of the premillennial return of Christ. It is to be feared, however, that this volume will strengthen the popular misconception that such views of the Bible and of prophecy are to be identified with allegorical interpretations and careless exegesis. The writer has two main propositions, neither of which are necessarily related to the doctrine of the coming of Christ, although they have been advocated by many of the less scholarly writers upon that theme: (a) That the seven days of creation are prophetic of seven subsequent historic eras, and (b) that the seven "Churches of Asia" symbolize seven successive periods of church history. Most of the interpretations of Scripture found in this book are fanciful; the pages have curious tinges of a blended high-church Episcopalianism, and a traditional Plymouth-Bretherenism; nevertheless many will enjoy the confident assurance of the personal, glorious, return of the Lord, and all should agree in the practical conclusion that the pressing, immediate duty of the church is the evangelization of the world.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

One Hundred Brief Bible Studies. By J. B. SHEARER, D.D., LL.D.,
Professor of Biblical Instruction, Davidson College, N. C. Richmond, Virginia: Presbyterian Committee of Publication. Cloth.
12mo; pp. 229.

These discussions are so brief as to be almost fragmentary. They are, however, not without value, especially to college students for whom they were intended, and they are certainly not without interest as they were completed on the eightieth birthday of one whose long life has been devoted to the teaching and defense of the Bible as the infallible and inspired Word of God.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Religious Education in the Home. By JOHN D. FOLSON. New York:
Eaton and Mains. Cloth. 16mo; pp. 190. 75 cents net.

The writer presents in a brief form some of the general principles

relating to the religious training of children in the home. He aims to help parents, pastors and teachers. He discusses "Possibilities", "Environment", "Suggestion", "Imitation", "Instruction", "Training", "Home Government", "The Holy Spirit", "Personality", "Stages of Growth". No one can read these pages without being impressed anew with the difficulty, the sacredness and the importance of the task to which attention is herein so thoughtfully and sympathetically directed.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Gates of Dawn. By W. L. WATKINSON, D.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. Crown 8vo; pp. 387. \$1.25 net.

This is a volume of devotional readings. These are intended to cover an entire year. A morning lesson from the Bible is suggested for each day of the year, followed by one special Scriptural thought, and then a "meditation" by Dr. Watkinson, whose quaint style and peculiar illustrative ability are here seen in their most attractive qualities. The daily readings are concluded with a short series of prayers by Rev. Laughlan MacLean Watt, M.A., B.D.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Book of Common Prayer. By SAMUEL HART, D.D., LL.D. Seawancee, Tennessee: The University Press. 12mo; cloth, pp. 299.

The purpose of this volume is to guide candidates for Holy Orders in the Episcopal Church in their study of the History and Contents of the Book of Common Prayer as it has been set forth for use in the American Protestant Episcopal Church.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Making of Tomorrow. By SHAILER MATTHEWS, Dean of the Divinity School of the University of Chicago. New York: Eaton and Mains. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 193. \$1.00 net.

These forty fragmentary essays, dealing with various political and social problems, appeared originally as editorials, and are now grouped under four general captions: "The Common Lot", "The Church and Society", "The Stirrings of a Nation's Conscience" and "The Extension of Democracy".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

Inside Views of Mission Life. By ANNIE L. A. BAIRD. Philadelphia: The Westminster Press. Boards. 12mo; pp. 138. 35 cents.

The writer is a missionary of the Presbyterian Church at Pyeng Yang, Korea, and does not need to draw upon her imagination, but can depend upon observation and memory as she sketches in fascinating vividness, "Missionary Temptations", "Trials", "Tasks", "Community Life", "Joys". The little book is not designed to be merely interesting, but instructive; and it should be specially commended to young missionary candidates.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Bible. By I. M. HALDEMAN, D.D. New York: Charles C. Cook. Paper. 12mo; pp. 66. 15 cents.

This article is taken from the book by Dr. Haldeman entitled "*Christ, Christianity and the Bible*". It is intended to prove that the Bible is "not such a book as a man would write if he could, nor such a book as a man could write if he would". Its teachings as to man and sin, its fulfilled prophecies, its unity of organism and theme, its literary style and moral influence show it to be the veritable "Word of God".

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

A Muslim Sir Galahad. By HENRY OTIS DWIGHT, LL.D. New York: Fleming H. Revell Company. Cloth. 12mo; pp. 188. \$1.00 net.

This is "a present-day story of Islam in Turkey". It narrates the true but romantic experiences of a young Kurd, whose pure heart longed for a truer knowledge of God than his Mohammedan guides could give, and who found peace and strength through Christ. It suggests the great difficulties but also the vast possibilities of Christian Missions in the Moslem world.

Princeton.

CHARLES R. ERDMAN.

The Signs of the Times. By WILLIAM JENNINGS BRYAN. An address delivered before several colleges.

The Call of Jesus to Joy. By WILLIAM ELLIOT GRIFFIS, D.D. A sermon on the "Gospel of Gladness".

The Misfortune of a World Without Pain. By NEWELL DWIGHT HILLIS, D.D., LL.D. Studies in the problem of suffering.

The Conservation of Womanhood and Childhood. By THEODORE ROOSEVELT. An address delivered before the Civic Forum and the Child's Welfare League.

The Latent Energies in Life. By CHARLES REYNOLDS BROWN, D.D. An essay on unrealized possibilities.

These five minute volumes form part of the Leather-Bound Pocket Series published by Funk & Wagnalls Company, New York and London. Each volume is bound in flexible leather and sold for 80 cents, postpaid.

Princeton.

WILLIAM BRENTON GREENE, JR.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE

American Journal of Theology, Chicago, July: EUGENE W. LYMAN, What is Theology? The Essential Nature of the Theologian's Task; PAUL WENDLAND, Hellenistic Ideas of Salvation in the Light of Ancient Anthropology; JOHANNES WEISS, Significance of Paul for Modern Christians; JAMES MOFFATT, Ninety Years After: A Survey of Bretschneider's "Probabilia" in the Light of Subsequent Johannine Criticism; GEORGE R. DODSON, Aristotle as a Corrective in Present Theological Thought; J. W. BASHFORD, Adaptation of Modern Christianity

to the People of the Orient; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, *The Freer Gospels*; EDGAR J. GOODSPEED, *Professor Harnack and the Paris Manuscript of Justin*.

Bibliotheca Sacra, Oberlin, July: W. J. MCGLOTHLIN, *The Minister and the Truth*; HERBERT W. MAGOUN, *A Layman's View of the Critical Theory*; CHARLES W. SUPER, *Two Distinguished Frenchmen in England*; J. B. LAWRENCE, "The Theology of Prometheus Bound"; HENRY H. BEACH, *Physiological Psychology*; HENRY C. MABIE, *The Atonement and Conscience*; JACOB THE SON OF AARON, *The Book of Enlightenment*; WILLIAM M. LANGDON, *Some Merits of the American Standard Bible*; HAROLD M. WIENER, *Studies in the Septuagintal Texts of Leviticus*.

Church Quarterly Review, London, July: Montenegro and the Eastern Question; T. HANNAN, *Popular Education in Britain, France and Germany*; W. H. FRERE, *Some Vicissitudes of English Parochial History*; H. D. OAKLEY, *Time and Eternal Life*; A. C. HEADLAM, *Degrees in Divinity*; H. T. K. ROBINSON, *Pensions for the Clergy: An Estimate of Cost*; B. J. KIDD, *Papalism or Federalism*; H. KINGSMILL MOORE, *The Sunday School in the Twentieth Century*.

Constructive Quarterly, New York, September: ARCHBISHOP PLATON, *Admitting All Impossibilities, Nevertheless Unity is Possible*; MGR. BONOMELLI, *An Appeal for Unity from Italy*; F. D. KERSHNER, *Restoration Plea of Disciples of Christ*; GEORGE P. MAINS, *Comprehension not Compromise*; THOMAS J. GARLAND, *An American Contribution to Unity*; PETER T. FORSYTH, *Congregationalism and Liberty*; FRANCIS J. HALL, *The Anglican Position Constructively Stated*; ROBERT E. SPEER, *Foreign Missions a Constructive Interpretation of Christian Principles*; A. G. FRASER, *Missionary Education in India*; EXCELLENZ VON BEZZEL, *The Church and The State*; MAX TURMANN, *Moral and Religious Restoration of a Tenement House Quarter in Paris*; GEORGE B. EAGER, *Christ's Teaching about Marriage*; JACQUES ZEILLER, *Fred-eric Ozanam, Founder of the Conferences of St. Vincent de Paul*.

East & West, London, July: Mohammedanism in Malaya; ALEX YAKOLEV, *Missionary Work in Siberia*; W. E. S. HOLLAND, *Missionary Conferences*; MRS. CREIGHTON, *The Continuation Committee of the Edinburgh Conference*; S. K. RUDRA, *Religious Changes in India during the British Period*; J. P. HAYTHORNWAITE, *India's Demand for Mass-education and her Quest for the "Ideal University"*; H. WYATT, *Missionaries and the European Community in India*.

Expositor, London, August: JOHN SKINNER, *The Samaritan Pentateuch*; G. BUCHANAN GRAY, *Forms of Hebrew Poetry. Parallelism and Rhythm in Lamentations*; F. R. TENNANT, *Services of Philosophy to Theology*; D. S. MARGOLIOUTH, *The Zadokites*; W. MONTGOMERY, *Albert Schweitzer*; A. E. GARVIE, *Psychology and Exegesis*; ERSKINE HILL, *History and Mysticism. The Same*, September; MAURICE JONES, *Date of Epistle to the Galatians*; W. B. STEVENSON, *Interpretation of Isaiah 41. 8-20 and 51. 1-8*; G. BUCHANAN GRAY, *Forms of Hebrew Poetry. Elements of Hebrew Rhythm*; C. MCEVOY, *New Testament Language of Endearment to the Lord Jesus Christ*; F. R. TENNANT, *Philosophy of Religion as an Autonomous Subject*; JOHN SKINNER, *Divine Names in Genesis*.

Harvard Theological Review, Cambridge, July: GEORGE H. PARKER, Brief Survey of Field of Organic Evolution; HOWARD N. BROWN, Finalism and Freedom; L. P. JACKS, Quest for Absolute Certainty; BENJAMIN W. BACON, Two Forgotten Creeds; C. DELISLE BURNS, Mysticism of a Modernist; STEWART MEANS, Future of Religion; AMBROSE W. VERNON, Christianity and Ministerial Ordination.

Hibbert Journal, Boston, July: RABINDRANATH TAGORE, Problem of Evil; A. C. MCGIFFERT, Christianity in the Light of Its History; PRESERVED SMITH, New Light on Relations of Peter and Paul; T. C. SNOW, Imagination in Utopia; A. SMYTHE PALMER, Fall of Lucifer; JAMES DRUMMOND, Occasion and Object of Epistle to Romans; F. P. BADHAM AND F. C. CONYBEARE, Fragments of an Ancient (? Egyptian) Gospel used by the Cathars of Albi; R. B. TOWNSHEND, Antiochus Epiphanes, The Brilliant Madman; THOMAS C. HALL, Significance of Coercion; H. D. RAWNSLEY, The Child and the Cinematograph Show; J. N. LARNED, Evil. A Discussion for the Times; ARTHUR DALE, A Plea for the Unemployables.

Hindustan Review, Allahabad, July: B. N. DAR, Indian Progress and Anglo-Indian Bureaucracy; M. P. DEWEBB, Better Money for India; S. N. SINGH, Passing of Indo-Chinese Opium Trade; P. C. GHOSH, India as Known to Ancient Europe; The Balkan War and Indian Mussalmans; N. S. AIYAR, Status or Contract in Regard to the Practice of Religion.

International Journal of Ethics, Philadelphia, July: WILLIAM J. COLLINS, Place of Volition in Education; C. D. BROAD, Lord Hugh Cecil's "Conservatism"; ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, Practical Tendencies of Bergsonism; HELEN BOSANQUET, English Divorce Law and the Report of the Royal Commission; J. DASHIELL STOOPS, Ethics of Industry.

Interpreter, London, July: WALTER LOCK, God is Love; OWEN C. WHITEHOUSE, Historic Background of Book of Baruch; A. H. MCNEILE, Law, Sin, and Sacrifice in the Old Testament; A. C. BOUQUET, Parables of Our Lord: Sources and Parallels; W. L. MACKENNAL, History of an Irish Jesuit; J. E. SYMES, Epistle of St. James; N. E. EGERTON SWANN, Supernatural Religion and Social Conditions; H. NORTHOTE, Love the Interpreter of Belief.

Irish Theological Quarterly, Dublin, July: HUGH POPE, A Neglected Factor in the Study of the Synoptic Problem; JAMES MCCAFFREY, Catholic School System of the United States; BRUNO WALKLEY, Testimony of St. Irenaeus in Favour of the Roman Primacy; THOMAS GOGARTY, Dawn of the Reformation; M. J. O'DONNELL, Seal of Confession.

Jewish Quarterly Review, Philadelphia, July: NORMAN BENTWICH, From Philo to Plotinus; V. APTOWITZER, Formularies of Decrees and Documents from a Gaonic Court; ISRAEL DAVIDSON, Poetic Fragments of the Genizah. IV; W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, Aryan Words in the Old Testament.

Jewish Review, London, July: BEN YISRAEL, An Open Letter to Mr. Zangwill; A. CALEFF, Jews of Bulgaria; LEONARD G. MONTEFIORE, Jewish Question in Prussia and in Berlin; H. GOLLANCZ, Thoughts

upon the International Congress of Historians; BERTRAM B. BENAS, A Jewish University in Jerusalem; J. SNOWMAN, Jewish Eugenics.

Journal of Religious Psychology, Worcester, July: CLARK WISSLER, Doctrine of Evolution and Anthropology; WILSON D. WALLIS, Religion and Magic; ALBERT N. GILBERTSON, The Pitfall; ALEXANDER F. CHAMBERLAIN, Antagonism of City and Country.

London Quarterly Review, London, July: GEORGE JACKSON, Reformation Doctrine of the Bible; SAINT N. SINGH, Japan's Status Among the Nations; W. F. LOFTHOUSE, Parzifal and Parsifal; ANNE E. KEELING, New History of the Vaudois; HENRY W. CLARK, Christian Idea of Revelation; CHARLES BONE, Chinese Fiction, Ancient and Modern; J. PARTON MILUM, Fallacy of Eugenics.

Lutheran Church Review, Philadelphia, July: W. JENTSCH, The Church of England at the Time of Shakespeare; W. JENTSCH, Shakespeare's Baptism and Boyhood; PAUL FEINE, Positive Theological Research in Systematic Theology in Germany; J. E. WHITTEKER, The Minister's Sphere; PAUL H. C. SCHMIEDER, Church Orders of the Sixteenth Century; THEODORE E. SCHMAUK, Can Christianity Unite on the Disciples' Basis?; THEODORE E. SCHMAUK, Philosophy of the Disciples' Proposal for Christian Unity; J. C. MATTES, Use of the Lord's Prayer in the Consecration of the Sacrament at the Altar; T. KNAPPE, Permanent Menace of Rome; JOHN W. RICHARDS, Valerius Herberger: a Sermon; EDWARD T. HORN, Outcastes in India; J. M. HANTZ, The Apostolic Age and Writings Considered with Reference to Gospel of Mark.

Lutheran Quarterly, Gettysburg, July: WILLIAM B. PATTERSON, Significance of the the Social Movement in the Church; J. M. REIMENSnyder, The Character of Preaching; J. S. SIMON, The Righteousness of God; LUCY F. BITTENDER, German-American Literature; GEORGE H. SCHODDE, The Parables and Their Interpretation; CHARLES W. SUPER, Martin Luther in the Twentieth Century; WALTER KRUMWEIDE, The Book of Job; A Critical Study; AUGUST SPIECKMANN, Attitude of the Lutheran Church in America toward Modern Thought; WAYNE O. KANTNER, Confessional History of the General Synod.

Methodist Review, New York September-October: W. A. QUAYLE, Nec Timeo; S. PARKES CADMAN, George Eliot; HERBERT WELCH, Great Words of the Age; H. W. CONN, Eugenics vs. Social Heredity; HARRY F. WARD, Songs of Discontent; A. B. LEONARD, Value of Prophecy and Miracle; SAMUEL PLANTZ, Our need of the Productive Scholar; PAUL WEYAND, Beecher and Cleveland: A Sermon that Made a President.

Methodist Review Quarterly, Nashville, July: G. W. DYER, The Christian Home in Peril; D. M. KEY, Religious Experiences of R. L. Stevenson; R. E. ZEIGLER, P. T. Forsyth and his Theology; ALFRED BURBANK, Personal Observations in the Philippines; S. W. GILL, The Y. M. C. A. and the World's Problems; T. H. TIMMONS, My Capture and My Experience as a Prisoner of War; W. D. WEATHERFORD, The Amazing Progress of the Negro Race; J. W. BOSWELL, The Religious Status of Little Children; H. N. SNYDER, The College under Fire; C. W. MATHISON, Parasitism; ERNEST RICHARDS, St

Clair and Major Pendennis; O. E. BROWN, The Challenge of the New China.

Missionary Review of the World, New York, September: MASUMI HINO, Ought Japan to Become a Christian Nation?; WILLIAM E. GRIFFIS, Bishop Channing M. Williams of Japan—Christian Pioneer, Spartan; KOZAKI KIRMICHI, The Kumamoto Band in Retrospect; MASIH PARSHAD, How I Became a Christian; MRS. T. C. ROUNDS, Louis Meyer—A Christian Prince in Israel; ROBERT H. GLOVER, The Real Heart of the Missionary Problem.

Monist, Chicago, July: RICHARD GARBE, Christian Elements in the Māhābharata, Excepting the Bhagavadgītā; PHILIP E. B. JOURDAIN, Robert Hooke as a Precursor of Newton; HENRI POINCARÉ, The New Mechanics; WILHELM O. FOCKE, History of Plant Hybrids; PAUL CARUS, Principle of Relativity as a Phase of Development of Science; J. W. POWELL, Books of Primeval History.

Moslem World, London, July: W. ST. CLAIR TISDALL, Shi'Ah Additions to the Koran; PROFESSOR MONTET, Saint Worship in North Africa; F. E. SCHÄFER, The Rosary in Islam; N. L. ROCKEY, Progress of Islam in Oudh; G. MONDAIN, Islam in Madagascar; S. M. ZWEMER, The Clock, the Calendar and the Koran; MISSES THOMPSON AND FRANCKE, The Zar in Egypt; S. VAN R. TROWBRIDGE, Mohammed's Views of Religious War.

Philosophical Review, Lancaster, September: J. W. SCOTT, Idealism as Tautology or Paradox; OSCAR EWALD, German Philosophy in 1912; THEODORE DE LAGUNA, Nature of Primary Qualities; CHARLES E. CORY, Bergson's Intellect and Matter; J. F. DASHIELL, 'Values' and the Nature of Science.

Reformed Church Review, Lancaster, July: A. S. WEBER, Contemporary Religious Thought; C. ERNEST WAGNER, An Essay of Provincialism; EDWIN M. HARTMAN, Some Practical Applications of Modern Psychology; EDWARD EVERETT HALE, JR., Politics out of Office; HIRAM KING, Identity of Christ; LEE M. ERDMAN, Sources of Gospel of Luke with Especial Reference to the Gospel of Mark; A. V. HIESTER, Contemporary Socialism.

Review and Expositor, Louisville, July: E. B. POLLARD, Luther Rice and His Place in American Baptist History; GIOVANNI LUZZI, Modernism; W. E. HENRY, Christ's Resurrection and the Father; ARTHUR YAGER, Should a Preacher Participate in the Political Life of his Country? If so, Why and How?; E. R. PENDLETON, The Kind of Ministry Needed To-Day; S. ANGUS, Hebrew, Greek and Roman. II; A. J. DICKINSON, Genesis of Epistle to Romans.

Yale Review, New Haven, July: A. PIATT ANDREW, The Crux of the Currency Question; HENRY H. CURRAN, What the Ten Year Sergeant of Police Tells; RALPH A. CRAM, Style in American Architecture; ANSON P. STOKES, JR., Historic Universities in a Democracy; DUNCAN PHILLIPS, Giorgione: The First Modern Master; CHARLTON M. LEWIS, William Vaughn Moody; AVARD L. BISHOP, High Cost of Living; CHARLES SCHUCERT, Climates of the Past; A. J. DuBois, The Religion of a Civil Engineer; LEE W. DODD, The Well Made Play.

La Ciencia Temista, Madrid, Julio-agosto: A. COLUNGA, El don de



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